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Foreword
On occasion in Newport and at other venues where scholars of naval and maritime affairs congregate, old-timers lament the relative shortage of scholars, especially younger
ones, interested in the U.S. Navy. Aside from a handful of naval officers who manage to
earn their doctorates while on active duty or who return to the university upon retirement to finish their terminal degrees, there are relatively few scholars of the younger
generations deeply interested in the U.S. Navy. Many of us read the bloggers and op-ed
writers who write passionately about the latest development regarding the littoral
combat ship or the impact of so-called strategic-pivot naval deployments. A few of us
know faculty at the Naval War College or one of the other professional military education institutions who, after cutting their intellectual teeth on other topics, ranging from
nuclear deterrence to Asian regional security, turn their attention to the U.S. Navy or
the Marines for professional reasons. And, of course, they have written some very fine
analyses. But scholars who begin their careers researching Navy issues are few and far
between. (No, I have not named names in this paragraph, but I could. The risk would
be to leave out worthy scholars or to mischaracterize someone and thus draw attention
away from the larger point.)
Further, those who are interested in the Navy—whether serving or retired officers or
scholars dabbling in naval affairs later in their careers—are often historians studying
past battles, the evolution of technology, or long-lost doctrinal debates. Few use quantitative methods, concern themselves with testing hypotheses, or address long-standing
arguments within the disciplines of political science, international relations, or even
strategic studies.
Many maritime hands might argue, so what? Why is it important for scholars from
other disciplines to study the Navy? Why not leave the business of studying what the
Navy does and has done to specialists and members of the community? The answers to
these questions would require more argumentation than is appropriate here, but two
points are suggestive. First, skeptics aside, methodologically sound studies can offer
insights that would be difficult to replicate from traditional historical or case-based
research. Second, I would also argue that the Navy’s intellectual capital occasionally
needs replenishment from outside the proverbial lifelines. After all, some of the most
influential postwar studies of the U.S. Navy, its role in the world, and its contribution to
U.S. national security have come from scholars not closely associated with the service;
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Bernard Brodie and the Sprouts, Harold and Margaret, are some of the earliest and most
famous examples.
It is thus a welcome development to find a young civilian scholar with few ties to the
Navy who seeks to study that service using the techniques of modern social science. It is
even more welcome for the young scholar to be a woman, a non-American, and a native
of a small, landlocked country. But that is exactly what we have here, with the author of
this Newport Paper—Dr. Larissa Forster.
Dr. Forster came to our attention through a roundabout but classic fashion: hers was
a story of scholars talking to scholars about who is studying what, why, and where.
Eventually, she found her way, as a predissertation doctoral student at the University of
Zurich, to the Strategic Research Department of the Naval War College’s Center for Naval Warfare Studies, where she was a visiting research fellow. With the encouragement
of many, ranging from Provost Mary Ann Peters to Dean Robert C. “Barney” Rubel, she
conceived of a dissertation that became, with many revisions and rewrites, the monograph that follows.
I would encourage readers to consider Dr. Forster’s arguments carefully both because
of her substantive conclusions and, perhaps even more importantly, because of her efforts to build on the work of analysts like Adam Siegel, who in his days at the Center for
Naval Analyses worked long and hard to build a usable database of naval activities. Like
Adam and a handful of others, Dr. Forster has labored to increase our analytic capacity
by collecting data that will be available to analysts and scholars in the future.
In terms of substance, this study explores the political use of naval forces during foreign
policy crises short of full-scale warfare. Dr. Forster uses a statistical model to analyze
naval crisis data in ways useful to policy makers and strategists. She outlines the unique
characteristics, advantages, and disadvantages of naval forces; summarizes theoretical
literature on naval diplomacy and coercion; reviews earlier quantitative research; and
explains the variables used in her analysis. In the end, the monograph presents an empirical analysis in terms of crisis characteristics, actors, U.S. involvement, and outcomes.

peter dombrowski
Chairman, Strategic Research Department
Naval War College
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Introduction: Military Interventions and the Deployment of Naval Forces
As long as the United States chooses to continue as the leader of the free
world, sea power is the absolutely vital basis for United States policy, in
peace or war, anywhere in the world.
J. C. Wylie

Mit der Navy sichern die USA im Frieden und im Krieg ihren Einfluss
und ihre Macht. (The U.S. Navy secures U.S. influence and power in both
wartime and peacetime.)
Albert a. Stahel

The use of military force is not restricted to fighting; it can also be employed to shape
1
and influence events. During the October Arab-Israeli War of 1973, neither superpower
was directly engaged in the fighting, but both heavily supported their “client” states.
The deployment of naval forces sent a strong signal, not only to the direct crisis participants but also to the other superpower. The Soviet navy initiated movements of assets
into proximity of the crisis a couple of days before hostilities erupted. In direct reaction
to the outbreak of the conflict on 5 October, the United States reinforced its Sixth Fleet
and also moved vessels closer to the crisis location.
At the onset of the war, the U.S. Navy (USN) had two aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean and was thus ready to react on the same day. The aircraft carrier USS Independence (CV 62) and three destroyers were ordered almost immediately to proceed to
Crete and to stand by there. The other carrier, USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CV 42), began
to move east a couple of days later, and a third aircraft carrier was sent to the Mediterranean as a backup. Over the next few weeks, the United States stretched a chain of ships,
elements of the Sixth Fleet, across the Mediterranean to support U.S. transport aircraft
and replacement fighter-bombers on their way to Israel. The ships were placed to provide navigational, refueling, and rescue services and if necessary to prevent interdiction
attempts from North Africa.
Increased readiness was relaxed on 17 November. The third, backup, aircraft carrier departed the Mediterranean, and the Sixth Fleet resumed its normal operations. While the
U.S. naval vessels had played no direct role in the fighting, they had contributed greatly
to the U.S. diplomatic efforts. During the conflict the naval forces never entered the
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combat zone and faced no direct challenge, but by containing the conflict they helped
achieve diplomatic success. The presence of a strong force, strategically distributed,
sent clear signals to both the Soviet Union and the crisis participants and underscored
2
U.S. resolve. This example shows how naval forces can be used as a political tool to add
weight to the diplomatic efforts without resorting to full-scale force.
Military intervention always has been and always will be an important part of foreign
3
policy, a tool to further national interests and influence world events. Many scholars
have tried to explain the intervention behavior of states in crises, conflicts, and wars.
When and why do states intervene, and what are reasons for nonintervention? What
conflicts and crises are more likely to call for intervention, and why? When is intervention successful? The explanations are manifold and include political, military, econom4
ic, social, environmental, domestic, and humanitarian factors. The theoretical literature
covers a gamut of realist intentions, ranging from security, power, and national inter5
6
ests, as guides to state action; to emphasis on international trade and economics; and
7
to domestic politics. Some argue for explanations based on idealistic aspirations, such
8
9
as democracy and human rights. Many studies focus on a mix of different reasons. As
10
Ken Booth observes, a combination of motivations is the most common. An approach
mostly neglected in the political science research is to ask why states choose different
11
intervention strategies. Assuming capacity and will to intervene, policy makers must
12
also determine how to pursue their goals.
From this vast field I have selected international crises involving any form of U.S. activity in the years 1946–2006. Within these U.S. activities, I distinguish between crisis
response with and without naval forces, as this study intends to advance the knowledge
of the use of U.S. naval forces as a response to international crises and to contribute to
a better understanding of when and how the U.S. Navy is deployed. There are various
studies analyzing why the United States becomes involved in international conflicts,
13
crises, or wars. One factor nearly absent in the research of this broad topic is in-depth
analysis of what form and type of force is employed and why. Military interventions
are responses to a variety of situations, exercised by many states, and carried out by
different types of military services. As James Meernik and Chelsea Brown observe,
“While there has been a tremendous amount of research regarding the domestic and
international factors that influence the decision to use force, far less work has been done
to analyze the types of operations authorized and their relationship to duration, policy
success, security, and stability in the affected areas, as well as a host of other concerns.
14
Further research is needed in several areas.”
Full-scale wars have become rare, and the majority of confrontations occur at lower
intensity levels. Crisis response is an activity short of full-scale war. Some identify it as a
peacetime activity, and others locate it between peace and war. Most international crises
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have occurred without an escalation to war, and many have been resolved without even
resorting to the use of force. Crisis response covers a range of activities, from strictly political uses of force, such as the backing up of diplomacy with the threat of force, to open
military engagement. While war preparedness is their ultimate raison d’être, armed
forces are involved in many other international situations short of actual war, a fact that
allows a broad analysis of naval activities. As a superpower, the United States is in an
exceptional position to influence global events. The questions of when, where, and why
the country should employ military force are among the national issues most frequently
15
and passionately debated.
Naval forces possess certain advantages over other military services. “Navies are not
16
something you think about,” says Robert Kaplan. “They are out there over the horizon.
But if you look throughout history, navies are often a good indicator of where power is
going. Navies are able to do things that armies can’t.” The U.S. Navy supports foreign
policy objectives through a variety of missions, ranging from “showing the flag” to retaliatory attacks against hostile nations. An important asset in crises is the Navy’s abil17
ity to act as a persuasive deterrent to war by demonstrating an ability to destroy. The
vast presence of the U.S. Navy around the world at all times allows for fast reaction. Sea
power can influence nearly every country; very few places have no access to the sea or
are beyond the reach of the power-projection capabilities of aircraft carriers. The ability
to be present almost anywhere around the world and exert influence without “boots on
the ground” is the quality that sets navies apart from armies and air forces in deployments short of war and highlights their unique capabilities for political missions during
18
peacetime and crises. Before World War II, the engagement of the United States in
world affairs was sporadic. But by the end of the war, it had established its preeminence
in world politics, finance, and security. Today, the nation’s armed forces, especially the
U.S. Navy, face no equal competitor.
To date, naval forces as crisis-response tools have not been analyzed sufficiently. Although there are studies researching the involvement of naval power in a particular crisis or war, there is a dearth of empirical analysis and theory on their systemic role. The
nation’s continuing reliance on the use of military force to influence events throughout
19
the world justifies an in-depth inquiry into these events.
The impetus of this project is to gain a fuller grasp of the U.S. Navy not simply as a
military fighting force but as a political instrument. In the twentieth century, the Navy
climbed up into the top ranks of the world’s fleets and became a powerful actor on the
global stage. Harold and Margaret Sprout identify the end of World War I as the beginning of the U.S. Navy’s worldwide power status and of its evolution from an important
instrument of national policy into an important element of the foreign policy of the
20
United States. U.S. naval forces played a prominent role during World War II, from
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battles like those of Midway and Leyte Gulf to Japan’s official surrender on the deck of
USS Missouri (BB 63). The end of World War II and the changed international structure
and politics that emerged favored the use of naval forces as political instruments over
other types of forces. Not only did the political situation and the general U.S. use of
force change significantly after World War II, but the U.S. Navy itself was transformed
dramatically. It was by then the world’s largest and able to exert significant influence,
with the help of its powerful aircraft carriers.
Since World War II the Navy has functioned simultaneously as what Charles Pirtle calls
21
the “Sword of the State” and the “Shield of the Republic.” The Navy’s crisis-response
capabilities (assisted by those of the Marine Corps) guaranteed its important position
as a tool in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. In the following Cold War, the Navy
served as a nuclear deterrent and crisis-response force, while preparing for a possible
global war with the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, the USN was always ready for
this eventuality. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy’s power has been unchal22
lenged. Peacetime presence and focus on regional conflicts have been emphasized. The
USN has regularly responded to international incidents, but it has done so even more
23
frequently since the demise of the Soviet Union.
The specific goals of this study are twofold. First, a new data set will be generated.
Most popular crisis data sets do not distinguish between the involvements of different
military service types within an intervention. The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA)
published studies with basic data about the reactions of naval forces to international
24
situations but not in a larger context. This exploratory study combines both extensive
crisis data with naval involvement information by introducing new variables to an established data set. Thus, the first step is the generation of data that will allow examining
naval crisis response more broadly than is possible with case studies. On the basis of the
available data and information, different empirical methods will be employed to analyze hypotheses derived from assumed advantages and disadvantages of naval forces.
Second, the basic empirical results will help to begin answering the many questions
pertaining to the overarching question that follows.
What Is the Role of U.S. Naval Forces in Crisis Response?
In order to structure the analysis, the study focuses on four different areas critical for
understanding crisis response. The first set of questions focuses on the dimensions,
context, and attributes of the crisis, followed by actor characteristics. The next category
poses questions in regard to the U.S. involvement, both as third party and direct actor;
the last part is concerned with the crisis termination. These four categories encompass
most significant events.
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1. Crisis Characteristics
•

1.1. In what type of crises are U.S. naval forces mostly deployed?

•

1.2. To which crisis locations do U.S. naval forces mostly deploy?

2. Crisis Actors
•

2.1. How do other actors influence U.S. naval involvement?

•

2.2. What crisis-actor characteristics trigger the deployment of U.S. naval forces?

•

2.3. How is the U.S. naval involvement perceived by the other crisis actors?

3. U.S. Involvement
•

3.1. In what type of activity are U.S. naval forces most likely deployed?

•

3.2. How do U.S. naval forces deploy with other military services?

•

3.3. How effective is the U.S. naval involvement?

4. Crisis Outcomes
•

4.1. How do U.S. naval forces influence outcomes?

Defining the Concepts
Military forces can be deployed as reactions to a variety of incidents, such as full-scale
wars, small wars, civil wars, domestic crises, international crises or conflicts, ethnic
conflicts, intrastate conflicts, or disasters, to name a few.
Crises, Conflicts, and Wars
Richard Lebow presents the following justification for focusing on international crises
in studying the use of force short of war: “Short of war, crises are the most salient and
25
visible points of conflict between states.” Crisis and conflict, although often conflated,
are different phenomena. In most cases, a crisis concerns a single event—for example,
a threat to a political regime—whereas “conflict” emphasizes the time factor. Conflicts
can stretch over a long period of time and may erupt on multiple occasions with different degrees of intensity. International crises often occur within conflicts or even within
wars—“intrawar crises.” Crises can also lead to long-lasting conflicts or to the outbreak
26
of wars. Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld classify war as a subset of crisis.
27
Furthermore, all wars are preceded by crises, but not all crises conclude in a war.
There are many definitions of international crisis. According to Lebow, most classifications have in common certain elements, such as “perception of threat, heightened
anxieties on the part of the decision-makers, the expectation of possible violence, the
belief that important far-reaching decisions are required and must be made on the basis
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of incomplete information in a stressful environment.”28 International crises often represent turning points in international politics and change the perceptions of the crisis
participants, not only between those involved but also their perceptions of other states.
“We regard crisis as an occasion for decision. That is, crisis is a situation or an event that
29
confronts decision makers with an opportunity for response, either action or inaction.”
This analysis considers, in accordance with the International Crisis Behavior Project,
30
that an international crisis is present when the following conditions are met:
1. A change in type/or increase of disruptive—that is hostile verbal or physical—interactions
between two or more states, with a heightened possibility of military hostilities, that, in turn:
2. destabilizes their relationship and challenges the structure of an international system—global,
dominant, or subsystem.

An international crisis erupts with a “break-point,” posing a threat to the values of
states, coupled with time restraint and “a heightened probability of involvement in
military hostilities.”
International crises are heavily influenced by external parties. Much depends on when,
how, and why these parties become involved. The involvement of a major power can
profoundly impact and shape the outcome.
Political Use of Force and (Military) Intervention
Many authors, such as Barry Blechman, point to the great value of military power as
31
a political use of force short of actual deployment in war. Generally, the political use
of force means the use of armed forces short of war. In their extensive study on the use
of armed forces Blechman and Kaplan define the political use of force as follows: “A
political use of the armed forces occurs when physical actions are taken by one or more
components of the uniformed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the
national authorities to influence, or to be prepared to influence, specific behavior of
32
individuals in another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence.”
The ultimate goal should be a show of military strength that allows a nation to accomplish goals without having to resort to violence. As Clausewitz remarked, “So, too, the
armed forces—by their very existence as well as by their general character, deployment,
and day-to-day activities—can be used as an instrument of policy in time of peace. In
peace, as in war, a prudent statesman will turn to the military not as a replacement or
33
substitute for other tools of policy but as an integral part of an admixture . . . of means.”
Any decision to intervene in an international crisis is risky and challenging. It is often
difficult to categorize the involvement clearly. Generally war imposes the will of one
state on another, whereas the political use of force involves a lesser degree of violence (if
any) and is employed to influence the behavior of foreign actors. Despite this distinction,
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it is not always clear where to draw the line. Meernik describes the intervention in
34
Panama in 1989 as an example. That invasion can be viewed as an effort either to
impose U.S. will on Panama or merely to influence events. The existence of permanent military bases abroad and routine operations, he believes, do not fall under the
category of political uses of force. While I agree with Meernik on this point, I disagree
with his statement that covert or paramilitary operations cannot be part of the political
use of force. This deployment of armed forces too aims at altering and influencing the
behavior and actions of adversaries and therefore can be said to be political rather than
specifically military and violent in nature, not synonymous with imposing will and
employing full-scale force.
By becoming involved in an international crisis, the actors essentially intervene in the
affairs of a third party, or several parties. For the statistical analyses in this study, no
classification of intervention is needed. However, the following explanations help in
understanding the broader picture of involvement in international crises. Intervention
can be a very extensive concept. James Rosenau points to the difficulty of agreeing on a
35
clear definition. For Adrian Guelke, intervention can include any event between states,
while for Bryan Hehir, “intervention means the use of force to address problems within
36
boundaries of a sovereign state.” Karen Feste describes intervention, in its broadest
form, as a
process of overt or covert involvement by an outsider in the internal economic, social, or political
processes of another society with the aim of determining the direction of trends in the target country’s policies, institutions, or policies. Strategies used to exercise leverage in these situations include
a range of assistance through military instruments (supplying combat troops or peacekeeping
observers, weaponry, advisors), economic support or sanctions (financial aid, embargo), and political and diplomatic initiatives (mediation offices, nonrecognition, refugee policies). The intervention
approach may be passive, providing little beyond words of support or condemnation to the parties
in the conflict; or active, with physical movement of troops and supplies.37

Some scholars, like Hehir, already include the use of force in their definitions of in38
tervention. Elizabeth Saunders provides a detailed account of military interventions,
adding the “military component” to interventions:
I thus define military intervention as an overt, short-term deployment of at least 1,000 combatready ground troops across international boundaries to influence an outcome in another state or an
interstate dispute; it may or may not interfere in another state’s domestic institutions. “Short-term”
may encompass a wide range of time frames, but it excludes conquest or colonialism. Interventions
into both interstate and intrastate conflicts or crises are included in the universe of cases; both can
vary in the degree of internal interference.39

These definitions demonstrate how variously the concept of intervention can be
interpreted. Thus a deployment of naval forces to reach a foreign-policy objective can
be classified, depending on goals and forms of deployment, as either an intervention
or a military intervention. For a detailed analysis of the deployment of the U.S. armed
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services, it is important to maintain the distinctions between forms of intervention, including between covert/semi-military and direct military, and types of mission. Feste’s
detailed explanation and very inclusive description of the different characteristics help
40
to demonstrate the various aspects the term can encompass. The identification of both
overt and covert activities and of both military and nonmilitary aspects captures important elements of interventions.
Naval Crisis Response: Peacetime or Wartime Activity
The focus on crisis response invites the question where to locate this activity along the
spectrum of naval operations. The broadest classification of naval functions divides it
into two categories: the use of force and action short of the use of force. Another possibility is categorization into wartime and peacetime functions. Crisis response, often
referred to as a peacetime function, can include not only threatened but also actual use
of force. Therefore, arguably, crisis response should be a separate category, between
peacetime and wartime. To employ the first distinction—that between the use of force
and action short of force—crisis response would be situated between these two. While
the mere demonstration of power without actual employment of force is desirable, it
might be necessary to resort at least to a limited amount of force to resolve a crisis.
The second categorization—wartime and peacetime—allows a more nuanced explanation of crisis response. Scholars differ in their interpretations of “peacetime.” For
Alberto Coll, “peacetime engagement refers to those activities carried out before a crisis
41
exists, or at least before it has crossed the threshold into armed violence.” Dr. Coll
refers to operations between war and peace, such as humanitarian interventions or
peace enforcement, as “chaos management,” accompanied by a heightened possibility
of force. Other scholars define peacetime more broadly. During the Cold War, Bradford
Dismukes suggested the following comprehensive definition: “[peacetime] is meant to
encompass all situations short of major war with the USSR. Operations in peacetime
can range from routine forward deployments, to crisis augmentations of forces, to actions against a nation other than the USSR, and can even include a local conventional
42
exchange between U.S. and Soviet forces in connection with a Third World crisis.”
At around the same time, Charles Allen distinguished two peacetime deployments for
43
naval forces: routine posture, and operations/reactions to increased tensions or crisis.
Robert Mahoney and Adam Siegel (writing separately) also define crisis response as a
44
peacetime activity but offer more general classifications independent of the Cold War.
The absence of war, defined by the threshold of U.S. casualties lower than one thousand,
defines the term “peacetime activity.” The U.S. General Accounting Office (as today’s
Government Accountability Office was then known) and Linton Brooks provided in the
45
mid-1990s more detailed characterizations. According to the former, “the peacetime
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role of forward-deployed carrier battle groups and amphibious task forces covers the
spectrum of military involvement—from single-ship port visits, maritime interdiction
and blockades, humanitarian relief missions, and emergency evacuation of U.S. nationals, to major amphibious operations.” Similarly, Brooks defines crisis as part of “military
operations other than war” (MOOTW). In his view, all military peacetime operations
support one of the three following tasks:
• Preparing for war. Training, operating in areas of potential conflict to get accustomed to
them, working with allies.

• Responding to crises with action. Protecting American citizens, respond to natural disasters,
solutions for local conflicts, prevent conflicts from spreading, punishing aggression.

• Advancing U.S. interests without the use of force. Deterring adversaries, reassuring allies and
friends, sending signals of U.S. interests, fostering goodwill.46

More recently, in 2007, in “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” the
heads of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard highlighted the presence of
naval forces in the event of crisis. The Navy possesses, it declared, the capability to
47
respond even “should peacetime operations transition to war.” It is debatable when
exactly this “transition” occurs, when an operation is considered a wartime, and no
longer a peacetime, undertaking. International crises per se are confrontations short
of actual full-scale wars, and therefore I will follow the earlier definition of Mahoney
and Siegel, considering all responses involving fewer than a thousand U.S. casualties
48
“peacetime operations.”
Plan of the Study
This study is very exploratory in nature. First, a new data set had to be created combining crisis and naval-response information. Second, four subsets of crisis are chosen in
an attempt to provide a comprehensive account of the influence of seaborne forces. The
idea of the political use of force, short of full-scale warfare, guides the entire analysis.
Chapter 1 sets the stage by explaining the advantages and disadvantages of naval forces
and providing a detailed account of naval functions. The chapter concludes with the
most recent developments, as of this writing; an understanding of the unique capabilities of naval forces is important as a basis for theories and hypotheses. The theoretical
explanations in chapter 2 connect naval capabilities with literature on naval diplomacy
and coercion, so as to inform the hypotheses. Chapter 3 explains the groundwork of
my empirical analyses, discussing earlier quantitative research and identifying naval
variables for international crises, thereby generating a new data set. The various empirical methods will be explained, followed by the presentation of “simple frequencies.”
The purpose in doing so will be not to develop a complex statistical model but rather
to find and present naval crisis data. Chapters 4 (crisis characteristics and actors) and 5
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(U.S. involvement and outcomes) present the results of the empirical analyses. Where
possible, specific international crises will be briefly summarized to support or question the findings. After each of these two chapters, the results of the models will be
explained. The last chapter reviews the most important findings, discusses limitations,
points to future research, and argues that these results are of importance for policy and
decision makers.
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chapter one

Navies Are Able to Do Things That Armies Can’t
The Difference between the U.S. Navy and Other U.S.
Armed Forces

We can do all that because our equipment is flexible and fungible,
because our forces have a zero land based footprint, and we can
maneuver because our forces and their equipment are together. When
we are ordered by the President to meet some challenge on behalf of our
Nation, we don’t have to negotiate or wait for permission to use someone
else’s soil. We move on the seas that we control.
Ray Mabus, Secretary of the Navy, 2009

The U.S. Navy enjoys a unique position among the military services. Armies, navies,
1
and air forces are not of the same kind. The most obvious difference is in the environments within which they operate—land, sea, and air. The Navy is the only armed force
2
that operates on, above, and under the surface of the sea.
Advantages of Naval Forces
As regulated by international law and convention, naval forces are free to maneuver on
3
the world’s oceans as close to any coastline as twelve miles. The vast presence of the
U.S. Navy around the world at all times enables fast reactions. This ability to be present almost anywhere is the quality that sets navies apart from armies and air forces.
The U.S. Navy can be employed “overtly or covertly, directly or indirectly, actively or
passively, but almost always effectively, in whatever may at any moment be the national
interest.” J. C. Wylie further describes “maritime presence” as subtle, benign, and ubiq4
uitous in quality and as the great asset of sea power in times of peace and war. Fleets are
not only highly effective combat tools; they can also be employed as mediums of diplo5
macy, advancing U.S. interests without the use of force. Ubiquity, flexibility, mobility,
limited intrusiveness (“leaving no footprints”), readiness, and independence represent
6
the great advantages of navies.
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Ubiquity, Flexibility, Mobility, and Limited Intrusiveness
The fact that naval forces operate in the neutral medium of the world’s oceans permits
nations to engage relatively subtly and nonintrusively. Naval forces can be sent to points
on the sea near crises and there wait for developments. They can be visible without
invading foreign sovereign territory, but they can also wait close by and yet stay out of
sight. Such actions will most likely be perceived as less invasive than the movement of
land forces, and the risks, as well as the political costs, will likely be more acceptable.
James Cable points out that the U.S. Air Force and Army cannot be deployed without
7
evoking the threat of high levels of violence and anxiety. Navies, even if they enter
foreign territorial waters, are portrayed as “a lesser involvement than a platoon that has
crossed the frontier or an aircraft that has dropped a bomb.”
The traditional combination of the military and diplomatic roles of naval forces means
that while potential adversaries view the use of naval forces as representing significant
national interest and willingness to act on the part of the United States, it also implies
8
a lesser threat than do airpower or armies of destruction and war. As Adm. Sergei
Gorshkov, for many years commander in chief of the Soviet navy, once wrote, navies
can “demonstrate graphically the real fighting power of one’s state. Demonstrations by
the navy in many cases have made it possible to achieve political ends without resorting
to armed struggle, merely by putting on pressure with one’s own potential might and
threatening to start military operations. Thus, the navy has always been an instrument
9
of the policy of states, an important aid to diplomacy in peacetime.” The great mobil10
ity and flexibility of naval power allow for the calibration of action to circumstances.
Should political initiatives and shows of force fail, naval forces can resort to coercion
11
and war fighting. At any time of the day and under almost any weather conditions, and
12
at times and locations of their choosing, naval forces can project offensive power.
The Navy can hardly be studied without taking account of the U.S. Marine Corps
13
(USMC), the “sea portable” ground force. This sea mobility is the Marines’ advantage.
With the help of the Marine Corps, power can be projected ashore through amphibious
operations, in addition to naval gunfire, carrier airpower, or cruise missiles. Marines
embark on USN vessels and are able to change quickly from sea to land combat, often
with support of naval forces. With amphibious landings, Marines can be deployed to
14
the crisis location with little political constraint. In most naval crisis responses, USMC
forces deploy with the USN. Ever since the American Revolution, the two services have
15
regularly deployed jointly. Sean Cate describes the “Navy–Marine Corps team,” with
its mobility, sustainability, and power-projection capability, as a “go anywhere, do any16
thing [force].”
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Independence and Readiness
The Navy and Marine Corps are inherently crisis- and contingency-oriented forces and
have conducted peacetime operations in littoral areas since their respective creations.
Both forces are designed so that the naval services collectively can maintain forward
17
presence and rapidly respond to crises, in addition to their war-fighting requirements.
Other military forces are more constrained by their needs and by the environment they
operate in and so cannot deploy as freely. They depend on approval of third parties
and are restricted by legal, logistical, and political factors. Navies, unlike armies and
air forces, are not dependent on access to foreign bases or military facilities, permission to use foreign airspace, or rights to refuel in other countries. Their strength lies in
their freedom of action, their ability to function on their own without depending on
the goodwill and support of others. According to Dakota Wood, the Navy can stay on
18
crisis location and sustain itself for months. P. K. Ghosh writes, “A single naval unit is
self-sufficient on its own. A naval task force is a stand-alone unit that incorporates the
19
elements of land, air and sea power into it.” Its ability to “wait and see” allows the government to gain time—for reflection, for other preparations, for diplomacy, or for nego20
tiation. Naval forces promise a more rapid deployment compared to land-based units
21
and are less costly to move. Arthur Barber acknowledges the high costs of maintaining
strong naval forces but argues that “cheapness is relative: the most expensive force for a
given mission is the one that does not have the flexibility or availability to be used when
22
force is needed.” Once naval forces arrive at the crisis location, their ships are im23
mediately ready for action—what Pirtle calls “readiness on arrival.” Furthermore, the
24
withdrawal of navies is less difficult than the withdrawal of land forces.
Finally, the deployment of naval forces also provokes less criticism or debate within the
United States. Kaplan observes,
If we want to deploy an extra 30,000 troops somewhere, there is a big national debate about it. But
you can double the number of warships in the Persian Gulf and nobody in Congress breathes a word
about it or cares. You can go from one to two to three carrier strike groups in the Persian Gulf—a
carrier strike group is an aircraft carrier with 5,000 seamen onboard, with two cruisers, two destroyers, a frigate, two submarines; you are dealing with 10,000 or so sailors—you can just send one
a few miles off the coast of Iran, and there is nary a word of protest.25

Disadvantages of Naval Forces
Notwithstanding the many valuable characteristics of naval forces, there are also
disadvantages and limitations. According to Joseph Bouchard, the “irony of naval crisis
response is that the characteristics of naval forces that make them the preferred type of
force for use as a political instrument in crisis also tend to make them relatively more
26
susceptible to crisis stability problems than other types of forces.” Weaknesses include
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misinterpretation of signals, limitations on endurance, vulnerability, and indecisive
outcomes.
Misperception, Endurance, and Vulnerability
Signaling by naval forces is prone to misperception. Observing events and showing presence from a distance may have a positive influence on a crisis, but they may also worsen
the situation. The signal perceived in naval presence can lead to very different interpretations about reasons and intentions. In a crisis situation, potential enemies might fear
an intervention because of ships’ presence; this perception can lead either to reluctance
to continue the fighting or resolution to escalate an already tense situation. Another
problem is the duration of the deployments. Even a carrier group, despite its ability to
replenish, refuel, and rearm at sea, can sustain itself for only a certain period before it
needs access to a base, at least for the replenishment ships supporting it; also, replacements on station are required periodically to allow opportunities for major repairs and
crew rest. While not a problem for short-term crises and conflicts, this becomes an issue
if the crisis and tensions persist. Naval vessels, particularly aircraft carriers, are also
very vulnerable to attack. This vulnerability, especially to missiles, is one of the aircraft
27
carrier’s main weaknesses.
Decisiveness
“Maritime power is such a flexible instrument that it is inevitably the tool of choice,
whenever circumstances permit, for the government intending the threat or use of lim28
ited force. On the other hand, its value in total war has declined.” This quotation from
Cable dates back many years, but the use of exclusively naval forces in full-scale wars
has decreased even more since the demise of the Soviet Union. Because the USN faces
no equal competitor, its role has changed mostly to supporting wars on land. Richard
Betts even says, “The one unique thing naval combat forces can do is fight other bluewater navies. . . . With the exception of war at sea, naval combat power overlaps with
29
the capabilities of the other services and fills few gaps that are completely uncovered.”
He further claims that naval airpower is too expensive and limited in its effects and is
therefore justifiable only in situations when there is no access to land airfields.
Many scholars agree that in military confrontations, U.S. naval forces rarely achieve
30
decisive results on their own. However, Don Inbody argues that neither does airpower,
31
when it comes to winning a war. While sea power and airpower (as well as space power) will play enabling roles, ground forces are necessary to achieve a decisive victory on
land. But according to Colin Gray, this naval help is very important and may well “pro32
vide a decisive edge in war overall.” Most importantly, Norman Friedman argues that
“in the post–Cold War age . . . we are not fighting for our lives; we rarely seek decisive

meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP39:_InDesign:03 NP_39 Chapter1.indd January 29, 2013 1:05 PM

influence without boots on the ground   17

ends. Almost always we seek some limited outcome, which reduces dangers to ourselves.
We cannot afford unlimited investment in each conflict to achieve the most favorable
decisive resolution. Agile, mobile, seapower is well suited to such a world. We can gain
33
a satisfactory outcome, and then leave when we want or when we must.” Thus while
naval forces might need support to achieve decisive victories, this is hardly a reason to
dismiss their importance or ignore their other advantages. Ground troops, for their
part, rely on naval and air forces to bring them to the operation theater. Thus today, no
full-scale war is fought by one armed service alone—rather, they deploy jointly.
Era of Jointness
The end of the Cold War marked a growing importance for joint operations. The
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 represented a major change in the organization of defense and promoted joint forces. Brooks states that “a major goal of peacetime operation
should be to work with other services to foster inter-operability between U.S. forces,
especially the Navy, and the air forces, and to a lesser extent, the ground forces, of
34
potential coalition partners.” The Navy is equipped to transport other military forces
to desired destinations and to support land operations. Because naval forces are often
the first to arrive at a crisis location, they possess the military capabilities to secure the
35
environment and prepare for the arrival of other forces. Once other military services
36
have reached the theater, naval forces can switch to a supporting function. While this
latter role is important, the U.S. Marine Corps and Army are to a certain extent capable
of sustaining their own land operations and can receive support from the Air Force
37
instead of the USN. Today important Navy missions such as worldwide presence and
deployments to support foreign policy are no longer solely naval in character. The Army
and Air Force have also served as political U.S. foreign-policy tools; despite all their
38
advantages, navies are not the only military forces employed in MOOTW. Exercising with foreign armed forces, deploying mobile-training or humanitarian-assistance
teams, and sending logistical aircraft and attachés are only a few of the examples. Especially the Air Force has been more frequently deployed for humanitarian responses, at
39
about ten times the rate of the other services. While the Navy and the Army are clearly
distinct services, the Air Force has certain characteristics and capabilities in common
with naval forces.
Sea and Air
The Navy and the Air Force, ever since the establishment of the latter as a separate service, have been in constant competition. Roy Walker and Larry Ridolfi find that “we no
longer always need to wait for the power of the U.S. Navy to steam to the area to defend
our interests in littoral areas which coincidentally place the fleet within range of enemy
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mines or shore-to-ship weapons. Land based airpower can be anywhere in the world
in a matter of hours. The historic notion that only ships are needed to extend maritime
40
influence has ended.” These authors claim the Air Force can perform equally well in
maritime operations. They list functions ranging from projecting power ashore and
controlling sea lines of communication to bottling up enemy shipping, attacking and
sinking enemy ships, and conducting maritime interdiction operations. They come to
the radical conclusion that the advantages of airpower render the Navy obsolete:
The Revolution in Military Affairs has placed the ship as a weapon of war in the same position
as a Knight from the Middle Ages. Knights were well trained and armed; expensive to maintain.
Along came cheap Longbow technology[,] which pierced a Knight’s defenses. European battlefields
were quickly covered with expensive casualties. The era of Knights came to an end. Navies are well
armed and expensively manned. Today, we have the potential for a new innovative use of high tech
airpower and missiles. Should the next battleground be covered with sacrificial ships?41

Not many critics go as far. Inbody locates the main advantages of the Air Force in accu42
racy, speed, and range. Surged from the United States, air forces travel much faster than
43
sea forces. But they require highly technical support and need prepared airfields, which
are highly vulnerable to attack. The safety of the sea in comparison to bases ashore;
independence from the need for access rights by host countries; mobility and endurance;
and the ability to deliver accurate air strikes, conduct blockades and port-denial attacks,
interdict commerce, move large numbers of personnel and volumes of matériel, and insert and aid ground forces are the main advantages of naval forces, according to Inbody.
He identifies the biggest disadvantages of sea power as the challenge of protecting supply
lines and vulnerability to long-range aircraft, precision-guided munitions, and cruise
missiles. However, control of the sea and air can minimize these threats. Inbody considers it very important to understand the advantages and disadvantages of both the Navy
and the Air Force and to employ the two services accordingly. Both can be successful
in limited wars and interventions, but as mentioned previously, in a full-scale war they
need the support of ground troops. Overall, Inbody argues that naval forces offer more
advantages than air forces and in particular are better suited for coercion but that the
Air Force is more useful for achieving strategic effects. He concludes “that, applied correctly with its full range of capabilities (which includes air, sea, and land components),
sea power can bring an enemy to its knees while air power cannot.”
It is important to note that despite the competition between these two services, they
operate jointly and support each other. Good examples are joint pilot training and aerial
44
refueling of Navy aircraft by the Air Force. This integration of the Navy and Air Force
in aerial strike warfare is a fairly recent phenomenon in American military experience.
For more than two centuries the Navy operated independently on the high seas and so
became accustomed to functioning independently and self-reliantly. The nation’s sea
service was forward deployed from the beginning of its existence, and throughout most
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of the Cold War it was, Benjamin Lambeth writes, the only service that was “‘out there,’
45
in and above the maritime commons and ready for action.”
But the Gulf War in 1991 demonstrated to the Navy that its environment had changed—
the capacity to fight open-ocean battles was no longer relevant. In that conflict the USN
46
faced no surface forces or aerial threat. Lacking a significant precision-strike capability, naval strike aviation was denied certain targets during Operation Desert Storm,
targets that were assigned to the Air Force instead. Over the next years, however, the
several Iraq operations brought the two services closer together. Land-based and seabased fighters jointly enforced the no-fly zones, in what Lambeth calls an “aerial strike
47
policing function.” After 9/11, the lack of access to land bases in Southwest Asia led to
the creation of sea bases, with deep-strike capability to project power. The fact is that
for the first time in the history of joint warfare, Operation Enduring Freedom showed real synergies in Air Force and Navy conduct of integrated strike operations. Navy fighters escorted Air
Force bombers into Afghan airspace until allied air supremacy was established. For its part, the
Air Force (along with the [United Kingdom’s] RAF [Royal Air Force]) provided roughly 80 percent
of the tanker support . . . that allowed Navy carrier-based fighters to reach central and northern
Afghanistan. That support, in turn, enabled sea-based strikes far beyond littoral limits, as well as a
sustained carrier-based strike-fighter presence over remote target areas for hours if needed for oncall strikes on [time-sensitive targets].48

As can be seen, naval forces show both similarities to and differences from other
military forces. In order to analyze the role naval forces play in crisis response, it is
also fundamental to understand general naval functions as defined by national policy.
Shedding light on the unique capabilities they can offer in the context of crisis management will be important for the theoretical background of seaborne crisis response. We
have defined naval crisis response as a peacetime activity. The remainder of this chapter
presents a more general introduction into the functions of naval forces, highlighting
their important role in activities short of wars and placing them in a historical context.
Functions of the U.S. Navy
There are many ways to categorize and describe naval responsibilities. Booth offers
a good introductory example, characterizing the functions of navies as the sides of a
triangle: a diplomatic role (negotiation, manipulation, and prestige), a military role (balance of power and projection of force), and a policing role (coast-guard responsibilities
49
and nation building).
General Naval Functions
The Navy’s diplomatic responsibilities are concerned with most aspects of foreign policy
short of the use of force. Bargaining, such as occurs in negotiations, aims to persuade a
target state to act in the desired manner. The military capabilities of countries affect and
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shape the thinking and choices of their political leaders and policy makers. Manipulation attempts to change the political calculations of the target state by granting or
withholding rewards. Booth describes military aid as one of the most important tools
used to influence foreign governments. Prestige is mostly a useful by-product of naval
activities—for example, port visits, aid, and events hosted on board ship in foreign
harbors. Balance-of-power functions comprise the peacetime activities of the military
role. Deterrence (conventional and nuclear), defense, and maintenance of good order at
50
sea fall into this category.
The other aspect of the military role is the use of force. Booth divides the use of force
at sea into four categories: “General Wars,” “Conventional Wars,” “Limited Wars,” and
“Guerilla Wars.” The first two categories have not involved naval forces since the end
of World War II. The U.S. Navy has mostly been concerned with small-scale interventions and limited wars. The deployment of forces to protect interests in conflicts and
crises has been widely employed. But most Western navies have left the policing role to
their nations’ coast guards. Policing functions are mainly concerned with extending
51
sovereignty as far out as the nation’s maritime frontiers. In Ty Waterman’s words, “In
modeling naval functions as a combination of diplomatic, military, and policing roles,
52
generic coast guard functions fall under the policing role.”
On the basis of these considerations about limited policing and direct war fighting, the
following sections describe the functions carried out by U.S. naval forces in some detail.
Specific Functions of the U.S. Navy
The U.S. Navy has always had wartime and peacetime functions, but the relative emphasis has varied over time. Although wartime combat missions are the main rationale
for equipping naval forces, the Navy’s strength and uniqueness lie in employment short
53
of full-scale wars. As Cable has said, “Anyone who denies the peacetime relevance of
navies will find himself rather short of recent examples of the traditional wartime battle
54
between rival fleets.” U.S. naval forces have always engaged in MOOTW and small con55
tingencies, in various environments and with changing technologies. Over the years a
succession of documents have been released discussing the missions of the U.S. Navy. In
them, not only is the term “strategy” widely debated, but there is also no common agreement as to whether to call “missions” by that name or, instead, “functions,” or “capabili56
ties.” The terms have been used interchangeably. But if naval and maritime visions,
concepts, and strategies have shifted over time, core missions have remained constant.
There are many different characterizations of the purposes and contents of the documents. In 2009, Peter Swartz developed a comprehensive report discussing all major
naval documents released since 1970. Figure 1 shows the capstone documents since

meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP39:_InDesign:03 NP_39 Chapter1.indd January 29, 2013 1:05 PM

influence without boots on the ground   21

Figure 1

Major Capstone Documents since 1970 (adapted from Swartz, U.S. Navy Capstone
Strategy Policy, Vision and Concept Documents, p. 745)
Name

Missions

Project Sixty (1970)

4 categories of USN capabilities (“classic 4”)

Missions of the USN (1974)

4 missions (“classic 4”)

NWP 1 (Rev. A) (1978)

2 functions (sea control, power projection); 3 roles (including strategic
nuclear deterrence); presence a side benefit

Sea Plan 2000 (1978)
Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)
The Maritime Strategy (1986)

3 primary missions (sea control, power projection, sealift)

The Way Ahead (1991)
The Navy Policy Book (1992)

20 characteristics of naval operations, including “classic 4,” sealift

. . . From the Sea (1992)

6 capabilities (“classic 4,” crises, sealift)

NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)

10 characteristics of “what we do,” including “classic 4”

Forward . . . From the Sea (1994)

5 fundamental and enduring roles (“classic 4” + sealift)

Navy Operational Concept (1997)
Anytime, Anywhere (1997)

4 broad missions (sea control the prerequisite)

NSPG II (1999–2000)

10-part multilevel model, including “classic 4” missions

SP 21 & Global CONOPS (2002)

5 enduring missions (“classic 4” + strategic sealift)

Naval Power 21 (2002)
NOCJO (2003)
Fleet Response Plan (2003)
NSP ISO POM 08 (2006)
NOP 2006 (2006)

13 naval missions, including “classic 4”; no sealift

NSP ISO POM 10 (2007)
Cooperative Strategy (2007)

6 expanded core capabilities (“classic 4” + MSO, HA/DR); no sealift

NSG ISO PR 11 (2007)
NSP ISO POM 10 (Change 1) (2008)
NDP 1: Naval Warfare (2010)
NSP ISO POM 12
NOP 2010

1970. Figure 2 lists the most important of these documents and the core capabilities
57
defined in them.
The more than twenty-five “capstone” documents that have been published since 1970
have made it clear that the global environment and the challenges facing the United
States have changed and that different functions have gained priority and others are
no longer regarded as vital. What has remained consistent are what Stansfield Turner
58
listed in 1974 as the four missions of the U.S. Navy. The “classic four” have proved to
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be enduring and are still relevant today, although new functions have been added. The
59
following discussion of U.S. naval missions is based on Turner’s categorization.
•

Sea control

•

Projection of power ashore

•

Naval presence

•

Strategic deterrence.

Figure 2

Major Documents and Core Missions (adapted from Swartz, U.S. Navy Capstone
Strategy Policy, Vision and Concept Documents, pp. 745–47)
PROJECT SIXTY (1970)

MISSIONS OF THE US NAVY (1974)

4 Capabilities

4 missions/mission areas

l

Assured second strike

l

Strategic deterrence

o

Control of sea lines & areas/sea control

o

Sea control

n

Projection of power ashore

n

Projection of power (ashore)

u

Overseas presence in peacetime

u

Naval presence

NWP 1 (REV A) (1978)

THE MARITIME STRATEGY (1986)

2 functions
o

Sea control

n

Power projection

3 primary missions
o

Sea control

n

Power projection

v

Sealift

. . . FROM THE SEA (1992)

FORWARD . . . FROM THE SEA (1994)

6 capabilities

5 fundamental & enduring roles

u

Forward deployment/presence

n

Projection of power from sea to land

l

Strategic deterrence

o

Sea control and maritime supremacy

o

Control of the seas

l

Strategic deterrence

w

Crisis response

v

Strategic sealift

n

Project precise power

u

Forward naval presence

v

Sealift

ANYTIME, ANYWHERE (1997)

SEA POWER 21 (2002)

4 broad missions

5 enduring missions

o

Sea and area control

o

Sea control

n

Power projection

n

Power projection

u

Presence

l

Strategic deterrence

l

Deterrence

v

Strategic sealift

u

Forward presence
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The newest (at this writing) documents—such as A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower (CS21), and the Naval Operations Concept—enlarge on the original four core
missions, notably with the additions of security operations, humanitarian assistance,
60
and disaster relief, as well as cyber and space capabilities. I will discuss these recent
developments after analyzing the four core missions. The following models show
Figure 2

Major Documents and Core Missions (adapted from Swartz, U.S. Navy Capstone
Strategy Policy, Vision and Concept Documents, pp. 745–47), continued
COOPERATIVE STRATEGY FOR 21ST CENTURY
SEAPOWER (2007)

NAVAL OPERATIONS CONCEPT (2006)
13 naval missions

6 expanded core capabilities

u

Forward naval presence

u

Forward presence

w

Crisis response

l

Deterrence

n

Expeditionary power projection

o

Sea Control

t

Maritime security operations

n

Power projection

o

Sea control

t

Maritime security

l

Deterrence

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

Security cooperation
Civil-military operations
Counterinsurgency
Counterterrorism
Counterproliferation
Air and missile defense
Information operation

NAVAL STRATEGIC GUIDANCE ISO PR 11
(2007)
6 core capabilities: 6 additional capabilities
Warfare capabilities

Enabling capabilities
l

u

Deterrence

l

Deterrence

Humanitarian assistance &
disaster relief

o

Sea control

Forward presence

n

Power projection

Sea basing

t

Maritime security

Cyber superiority

Maritime BMD

Global awareness

Cyber superiority

Space superiority

Space superiority

Naval expeditionary
logistics
n Power projection
t Maritime security

o Sea control
w Crisis response

l Deterrence

u Forward presence

v Sealift
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alternative permutations of crisis response within the different possibilities, in order to
situate crisis response and the Navy’s core capabilities. Generally, sea control and power
projection are categorized as war-fighting capabilities and forward presence and deterrence as peacetime functions. The relationships between the missions themselves are
not part of the models.
Figure 3

Crisis Model 1 and 2: Crisis Part of War and Peace and Crisis Part of Peace

Power
Projection

War

Sea Control

Crisis

Presence

Power
Projection

Peace

War

Deterrence

Sea Control

Presence

Crisis

Peace

Deterrence

Crisis is located between war and peace, though realistically the three are not completely separate. In a crisis, all four naval functions are important tools. Although most
important in the categories of war and crisis, sea control facilitates the Navy’s routine
activities in peace as well. Presence is not necessary in war, but reaction times are
shorter if ships are already close by at the outbreak. Also, familiarity with the environment greatly helps in any operation. Deterrence pertains only to crisis and peace. If war
breaks out, deterrence has failed, although it could be argued that further escalation
might be deterred. Power projection might become necessary in a crisis, but only in a
limited form. Model 1 (see figure 3) situates crisis in between war and peace but overlapping with both, while Model 2 (again, see figure 3) depicts crisis response as part of
peacetime and distinct from war. As Bouchard states, “national objectives are achieved
through political impact, and, if necessary, the direct military impact, of war-fighting
61
capabilities brought to bear at the scene of a crisis.” Although crisis response includes
tasks such as power projection, not otherwise employed in peacetime, the two categories
differ in degree—it is possible to describe the power projection in crisis as a “mild” form
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of power projection and therefore clearly distinct from wartime. Although it is often
difficult to draw a clear line between nonwar and war, I argue that the level of intensity
is lower in crisis response and thus it should be seen as separate from war.
Sea Control. Sea control has been the central mission for naval forces for a long time. In
1977 the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. James L. Holloway III, defined sea control as
“the fundamental function of the U.S. Navy, . . . [connoting] control of designated air,
62
surface, and subsurface areas.” It secures free usage of the sea while denying—or, more
63
realistically, limiting—the adversary’s use of the sea. “Sea control” replaced the expressions “command of the sea” and “control of the sea.” The difference between “control of
the sea” and “sea control” would seem minor but the change, according to Turner, was a
deliberate one, meant to reflect the impact of technological innovations on previous no64
tions of control, notably in air and submarine warfare. Sea control no longer connotes
absolute control everywhere and at all times but rather in limited areas and for particular periods of time. “Nowadays force can be used on, over or under the sea to protect
65
or to deny a particular use of the sea.” But even Alfred Thayer Mahan was not writing
about absolute but rather working command—absolute command in a certain area at a
66
certain time.
Sea denial, another term closely related to sea control, focuses mostly on denying the
enemy the use of the sea; it is often the strategy chosen by weaker navies. For Mahan
and other influential naval strategists, gaining control of the sea was a necessary first
67
step in exploiting an advantage. The views of these theorists varied as to what forms
gaining control of the sea might take—for example, commerce protection, interdiction of the sea lines of communication, for guerre de course, or for power projection
at sea or ashore. In Mahan’s view, control of the sea in war meant the destruction of
the enemy’s fleet. This, he argued, should be the exclusive focus of the Navy. Gained
control of the sea would bring economic rewards, maintaining free access to the
resources of the world while at the same time denying access to the enemy, thereby
68
strangling his economy.
Although navies operate on water, their actions are mostly reactions to events on land.
The earliest navies only had one mission—command of the sea. It was because of Rome’s
control over the western Mediterranean during the Second Punic War (218–202 bc) that
Carthage was unable to reinforce the army under Hannibal that was ravaging the Italian
Peninsula. Subsequently, control of the sea became vital as well for commerce protection
and for military expeditions. It was crucial not only to secure free usage of the seas but
also to deny it to the enemy, for both commercial and military reasons.
According to Turner, there has been a redefinition of traditional U.S. naval roles and
69
70
missions since the 1970s. Since World War II, there have been no major battles at sea.
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This has affected the role of the USN. Its primary missions today focus much more
on influence from the sea than at sea, a perspective emphasizing power projection
71
ashore. Nevertheless, as James Ellis says, “Maritime supremacy will provide the ability
to use the oceans as a bridge to its friends, a barrier to its enemies, a source of bounti72
ful resources, and a bastion from which to wield power.” Geoffrey Till calls the sea a
73
“strategic highroad.” Around three-quarters of the earth is covered by seawater, and
about the same percentage of the world’s population lives in littoral areas, within two
hundred miles of the shore. Eighty percent of the world’s capital cities, as well as the
most important trading centers and states that are military powers, are located within
74
this area. Around 90 percent of world trade travels by sea. It is therefore not surprising
that control over the seas always has been afforded a very high value.
Whosoever commands the sea, commands the trade. Whosoever commands the trade of the world
commands the riches of the World, and consequently the world itself.75
Control of the sea by maritime commerce and naval supremacy means predominant influence in
the world . . . [and] is the chief among the merely material elements on the power and prosperity of
nations.76

Although these quotes date back to the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, respectively, they are still valid today.
The following incident highlights the benefits of sea control in a crisis. In May 1958,
Lebanon experienced a crisis in which riots among political and religious factions
threatened the government. The Lebanese president requested U.S. help to control the
situation. Washington was at first hesitant, but a revolt in Iraq in July 1958, triggered
by an army coup against the Hashemite government in Baghdad, led President Dwight
D. Eisenhower to approve Operation Blue Bat in Lebanon. All branches of the U.S.
armed forces were involved. Marines landed on Lebanese shores to restore order in
Beirut, stabilize the country, and protect American citizens. Deployed U.S. naval forces
comprised seventy vessels, including the three aircraft carriers USS Saratoga (CV 60),
Wasp (CV 18), and Essex (CV 9), as well as heavy cruiser USS Des Moines (CA 134), the
guided-missile heavy cruiser Boston (CAG 9), and twenty-eight destroyers. The entire
Sixth Fleet supported the operation, especially through the landing of the Marines. Its
tasks included patrol, reconnaissance, and transportation by carrier aviation of Marines
who needed to be evacuated.
This incident clearly demonstrated the Sixth Fleet’s dominance in the Mediterranean.
Soviet naval forces in the proximity were capable of challenging neither U.S. influence
in this crisis nor the Sixth Fleet’s control over the Mediterranean. The Navy’s readiness
played an important role; in contrast, U.S. Air Force and Army units were unable to
react promptly. The Navy was ready off the coast of Lebanon thirteen hours after the
order was received, whereas it took the Air Force five days to advance from its base in
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Turkey.77 This example also shows how closely power projection and sea control are
78
connected. Naturally, most crisis examples “fit” more than just one mission, as they
are all interlinked.
Projection of Power Ashore. Projection of power ashore is the use of naval forces against
land forces and targets. In the words of Till “maritime power projection involves the
use of seaborne military forces directly to influence events on land. Whereas the area
of sea control is on, under and over the sea, power projection ashore manifests itself
in the naval influence on events ashore. For Corbett this is the ultimate justification for
79
having navies.”
Turner divides power projection ashore into three categories, Friedman into four,
80
as shown in the figure. Through his three categories, Turner sees navies attempting to
Turner (1974)

Friedman (2001)

1. Amphibious assault

1. Traditional (control of offshore shipping,
e.g., embargo)

2. Naval bombardment

2. Discrete strikes (e.g., air raid on Tripoli,
1986)

3. Tactical air (strikes by carrier-based tactical
aircraft or sea-launched cruise missiles).

3. Sustained air attacks (usually in support of
other operations, e.g., Kosovo)
4. Landing Marines.

achieve the following four objectives: “to secure territory from which a land campaign
can be launched and supported[;] . . . [t]o secure land area from which an air operation
can be launched and supported[;] . . . [t]o secure selected territory or facilities to prevent
enemy use of them[;] . . . [t]o destroy enemy facilities, interrupt his communications,
81
divert his effort, et cetera, by means of amphibious raids with planned withdrawal.”
Tactical air and naval bombardment are employed to influence happenings ashore
directly. These bombardments can be delivered in support of troops operating near
the coast or for interdiction and pursuit close to the shore. Tactical air projection aims
at destroying the enemy’s war-making potential and hinders his movement, while
facilitating the movement of one’s own troops. Power projection is most efficient when
82
the targets are close to the shore or within the radius of carrier-launched aircraft. Till
83
identifies eight specific goals of maritime power projection:
(1) Determining the outcome of a
conflict

(5)	Economic warfare

(2)	Opening new operational fronts

(6)	Seizing or attacking naval bases and
ports

(3) Direct support of the land forces

(7) Forcing an inferior adversary to fight

(4) Force displacement

(8) Political coercion.
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In the post–Cold War era, power projection has become more difficult. The increasing
need to move into the littorals to influence events on land or to support the operations
84
of other services ashore poses a great risk of enemy attack on naval forces. But Admiral
Gary Roughead, when Chief of Naval Operations (2007–2011), praised the USN’s forceprojection capabilities in times of war and peace. As his statement shows, even power
projection is not confined to the use of force:
We project power in a variety of ways. We can do it from our aircraft carriers of which they are
always deployed. We can do it in the form of missiles that come off of our cruisers and destroyers
or submarines, but we in the Navy have also another unique relationship in that we project power
with the United States Marine Corps with our amphibious ships and the Marines that launch either
on the sea or in the air for whatever operations they need to take part. And that power projection
doesn’t always mean that it’s a forceful power. Consider for example, in the last couple of weeks a
Navy and Marine Corps task group, amphibious ready group happened to be operating in the Western Pacific. The range hit the Philippines, the earthquake hit Indonesia, and a tsunami hit Samoa.
That amphibious ready group was there; they were global, they were forward, they were ready; they
projected their power in a humanitarian way; and split themselves apart. Some went to the Philippines, some went to Indonesia and then some operated in and around Samoa to render humanitarian assistance.85

American retaliatory strikes in 1998 in response to attacks on U.S. embassies in East
Africa constitute an exemplary use of forceful power projection ashore. On 7 August
1998, the embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, were the targets
of terrorist attacks. The almost simultaneous bombings killed 224 people and wounded
more than five thousand. Shortly thereafter, the United States identified al-Qa'ida as
the primary suspect and accused the Taliban in Afghanistan of allowing Osama Bin
Laden and al-Qa'ida to operate freely. Although the United States received international
support in condemning the embassy attacks, the Taliban refused to comply with its
request to hand over Bin Laden. On 20 August, U.S. forces executed retaliatory air and
cruise-missile strikes in Operation Infinite R each against terrorist training grounds
in Afghanistan and a factory in Sudan. Allegedly this pharmaceutical factory, in Sudan’s
capital, Khartoum, was capable of producing chemical weapons and was collaborating
with al-Qa'ida. The U.S. retaliation took place without warning and involved a number
86
of naval vessels in the Red and Arabian Seas. The surface combatants and nuclearpowered attack submarine (SSN) that fired the cruise missiles, Tomahawks, had been in
the Indian Ocean prior to the attacks. Infinite R each highlights the limited use of
force to achieve an objective and supports Booth’s observation that killing and fighting
are not the Navy’s foremost functions: “Military strategy is not the science of military
87
victory but the diplomacy of violence.”
The next two naval functions to be discussed—naval presence and deterrence—are
primarily political uses of naval forces in which actual force plays only a secondary role.
As Les Aspin, when Secretary of Defense (1993–94), said, “Our naval forces should be
sized and shaped not only for armed conflict, but also for the many other important
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tasks we call upon them to do. Forward presence is certainly a key ingredient of this
mix, along with such missions as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, deterrence
88
and crisis control.”
Naval Presence. The term “naval presence,” as a mission, was first defined by Turner
in 1974—the use of naval forces, short of war, to achieve political objectives. Naval
presence had been exercised before, but its characterization as a separate mission was
new. In the Maritime Strategy of 1986, the mission of “forward presence” encompassed
earlier concepts of naval forces as instruments of foreign policy and of “naval presence.”
Today the Navy states on its website, “The U.S. Navy is engaged. And engaged means
89
being there.” Forward presence comprises forward-stationed and rotationally deployed
forces. The former are dependent on the goodwill and permission of friends and allies.
The latter are homeported on U.S. territory and are deployed as necessary to guarantee
a continuous presence. Both forms of presence can symbolize U.S. interest or concern
and demonstrate to friends and enemies alike where U.S. global interests lie. Forward
presence by U.S. Navy aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBGs), expeditionary strike
groups (ESGs), and amphibious ready groups (ARGs) helps secure national interests
overseas. As William Cohen, former secretary of defense (1997–2001), once declared,
“If you don’t have that forward deployed presence, you have less of a voice, less of an
90
influence.”
Till stresses the difference between presence and “existence”—that is, the simple possession of a fleet. Presence, he argues, can take various forms, from routine operations
to demonstrate interest or periodic deployments, but in any case deploys forces actively
91
around the globe, whereas “existence” does not necessarily imply “forward.” Similarly,
Bud Jones defines the objective of military presence as exerting influence and thus as
92
requiring more than “just being present.” According to Frank Uhlig, Jr., through naval
presence a force can pose a threat of the following:
•

Amphibious assault

•

Air attack, bombardment

•

Blockade and exposure through reconnaissance.93

Commander James McNulty identifies seven specific roles for naval forces during a
presence mission:
1.	Supporting U.S. international military commitments, such as the NATO alliance,
with forward-deployed forces;
2. Confirming on a routine basis U.S. political commitments to other nations, by showing the flag in port visits and holding joint exercises with other navies;
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3. Demonstrating the capability of U.S. naval forces to act in support of national
interests;
4.	Asserting continuing U.S. interest in important areas of the world, such as the Persian Gulf;
5. Demonstrating war-fighting capabilities in a tension area to deter potential opponents and serving as an instrument of crisis management, such as by signaling U.S.
intentions;
6. Providing humanitarian aid; and
94

7. Coercing an opponent to comply with a preferred course of action.

As this list shows, the presence mission has been defined as covering the full range of
95
naval missions short of wartime actions. Such capabilities as showing the flag, signaling, and coercion lie on a continuum from peace to war. As James Miskel states, “naval
96
presence is as much a diplomatic as it is a military function.” Naval forces have to be
forward deployed to influence events and to be able to react immediately. Robert Work
underlines the importance of forward-deployed and -stationed forces to support U.S.
foreign policy and calls for the establishment of seven “global fleet stations,” in the
Caribbean/east coast of South America, the west coast of Africa, the east coast of Africa,
97
Southwest/South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, and the western Pacific/Oceania. The
deployment of naval forces overseas is an important part of the U.S. national strategy,
demonstrating presence year-round, not only during times of hostilities. The presence
of naval forces of any size can signal concern. Turner emphasized the importance of
sending the right force at the right time: “Naval Presence can be enormously useful in
complementing diplomatic actions to achieve political objectives. Applied deftly but
firmly, in precisely the proper force, Naval Presence can be a persuasive deterrent to
98
war.” This function of presence provides the link to deterrence. The 2010 Naval Operations Concept (known as NOP 2010) describes the changes of forward presence: “Originally conducted to protect U.S. merchant shipping, promote overseas trade, and support
diplomacy, over time the basis of our forward presence operations has evolved and
99
expanded to include crisis response as well as conventional and nuclear deterrence.”
An illustration of the benefits of presence (and deterrence) is the crisis in Lebanon of
1982. Israel attacked the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in southern Lebanon and invaded Lebanese territory on 5 June 1982. The rapid progress of the invasion
deepened the crisis for Syria. Israel and Syria agreed on a cease-fire with the help of
U.S. mediation, but fighting erupted again on 11 June. The Mediterranean Amphibious
Ready Group (MARG) was ordered to deploy to the eastern Mediterranean in June, and
the aircraft carrier USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67) was sent to the region to stand by for
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possible evacuation of American and other foreign nationals from Beirut. Kennedy was
relieved on 17 June by USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CV 69). The U.S. embassy, advising
all American citizens to leave Lebanon, closed on 24 June. U.S. nationals were evacuated and transported to ships of the Sixth Fleet, which took them to Cyprus. In July
the United States halted military aid to Israel to demonstrate its disapproval of Israel’s
activities. In August the situation worsened, and the MARG stood ready for deployment as part of a peacekeeping force and to support the evacuation of PLO forces from
Beirut. By September, with the help of U.S. mediation, the crisis between Syria and Israel
was resolved. On 22 September the MARG was ordered to Lebanon, together with two
aircraft carriers, to support U.S. Marines ashore. On 2 January 1983 USS America (CV
66) arrived off the coast of Lebanon, where it was relieved by USS Nimitz (CV 68) on
the 20th. In February the U.S. alert level was lowered, but the United States remained
actively involved and ready to deploy military forces to Lebanon if necessary. Direct
talks between the governments of Israel and Lebanon under American auspices led to a
peace agreement in May 1983.
The presence of U.S. (and other nations’) naval forces had helped limit the conflict by
preventing a threatened Israeli attack on Beirut itself. The presence of naval forces also
supported the diplomatic efforts of the United States, not least by providing helicopter
100
transportation for the mediators during their shuttle diplomacy.
Yet not everybody supports forward presence. Brooks points to the possible negative
effects of constant U.S. naval presence. The permanent stationing of the U.S. Navy in
a particular region signals the importance of that region to the United States, but the
demonstrated resolve may become taken for granted and thus exert only limited influence. Moreover, it may even have a reverse effect—if forces are withdrawn temporarily,
their absence may be more visible than their extended presence and create the impres101
sion that the United States is losing interest. Daniel Gouré criticizes the shaping func102
tion of forward presence as not well defined and empirically unprovable. He even calls
naval forward presence a “tyranny” overstretching naval capabilities, since the USN
does not dispose of a sufficient number of ships to meet all the demands.
Deterrence. Sea control, projection of power ashore by amphibious means, and naval
103
presence were the missions of navies through the end of World War II. After the war
two new missions—tactical airpower in support of land campaigns (as an addition to
projection of power ashore) and strategic deterrence—were added. Deterrence threatens
the use of force by conditioning forceful actions on the part of the opponent. As Robert
104
Art has said, “its purpose is to prevent something undesirable from happening.” Naval
forces are used to persuade the adversary not to do something by demonstrating that
the likely costs may well outweigh the expected benefits. According to Turner, strategic
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deterrence missions are employed “to deter all-out attack on the United States or its
allies; to face any potential aggressor contemplating less than all-out attack with unacceptable risks; and to maintain a stable political environment within which the threat
105
of aggression or coercion against the United States or its allies is minimized.” Till
names two forms of deterrence: “The mere existence in an area of a capable naval force
loitering with intent in international waters near an area of concern may be all that is required. Or naval forces may be ostentatiously surged into the area to bring the prospective adversary to realize the error of his way. Here the naval advantage most of value for
106
purposes of deterrence is their speed and strategic mobility.”
It is important to note that deterrence is based on the potential rather than the actual
use of force and is highly dependent on the enemy’s reaction. Because deterrence is essentially psychological, the naval forces involved need to have the necessary capabilities
to convince the adversary. The more powerful the ships (in general), the more successfully deterrence works. Thus the deterrence function is linked with the scale of military
power, and the deployment of strong naval forces underlines the willingness to use these
107
forces if necessary. The ability to deter by the implicit or explicit threat of nuclear
weapons at sea is the most extreme case (nuclear deterrence). Since the collapse of the
Soviet Union, conventional deterrence has supplanted the Cold War focus on nuclear
deterrence. Michael Gerson distinguishes between deterrence by punishment (mostly
108
precision strikes) and the more common form, deterrence by denial. The latter frustrates the adversary’s hostile objectives by signaling: “Deterrence is best served when the
attacker believes that his only alternative is a protracted war: The threat of a war of attri109
tion is the bedrock of conventional deterrence.” Gerson emphasizes the importance of
both strategies:
Some adversaries are more likely to be deterred by the threat of punishment and others by the threat
of denial. For example, some leaders may believe that they can simply withstand or “ride out” whatever punishment the opponent’s conventional forces can inflict. For these regimes, threats to deny
success may be a more potent deterrent than threats of punishment. On the other hand, some aggressors may convince themselves that US conventional forces will not be able to successfully deny
their objectives. These leaders may believe that they can achieve their aims in spite of the opposing
conventional power because they have greater resolve and are willing to fight longer and harder, and
accept greater casualties. Often, they base this resolve on the belief that they can achieve their goals
before substantial US conventional power arrives, a fait accompli.110

“Compellence” is closely related to deterrence. Compellence is the use of threats to
make a target stop an action it has already undertaken or take an action that the coercer
wants. Coercion, then, depends on two factors: credibility (whether the target believes that the coercer will execute its threats) and persuasiveness (whether the threats
111
will have a great impact on the target). In general, deterrence aims at preventing an
unwanted action from taking place by showing the costs of those actions, whereas compellence is specific and active, intended to oblige an adversary to act according to the
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wishes of the “compelling” party, usually to reverse an action already begun.112 Despite
this distinction, some argue that there are no major differences between the two strategies. According to Edward Luttwak, both belong to the realm of “coercive suasion,” a
term that underscores the use of the direct threat and suggests an affinity with coercive
113
diplomacy. “It boils down to the assertion that it is more difficult to compel than it is
to deter since (1) moves are more difficult to reverse than prevent in that the moves to
be stopped or reversed may have acquired their own ‘tactical’ and political momentum
and (2) public compliance with others’ demands would entail additional losses in the
way of prestige. The underlying working principles and requirement of both strategies
114
are the same.” However, deterrence is passive and preventive, whereas compellence is
active and offensive, usually involving the threatened or actual use of force. Compellence offers an alternative crisis response to unforeseen crises that, by definition, cannot
115
be deterred.
It is very difficult to measure the direct impact of deterrence. In the Iraq/Kuwait crisis
of 1994 the presence of naval forces is said to have exerted a deterrent effect. The crisis
had its origin in an Iraqi troop deployment toward the Kuwaiti border on 7 October.
The United States responded within a day, deploying the aircraft carrier Eisenhower,
accompanied by an Aegis cruiser carrying Tomahawk missiles, to demonstrate resolve and deter Iraq from crossing the border. Air Force and Navy units already in the
area as part of Operation Southern Watch were now assigned to a new operation,
Vigilant Warrior. Additional vessels supporting Vigilant Warrior included
the USS George Washington (CVN 73) battle group, USS Tripoli (LPH 10), an amphibious ready group, the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (or
116
MEU[SOC]), and Military Sealift Command ships. The U.S. commitment to Saudi
Arabia was reaffirmed, and Iraqi troops began to retreat on 11 October. The crisis ended
on 10 November, when Saddam Hussein signed a declaration of “Iraq’s recognition of
the sovereignty of the state of Kuwait, its territorial integrity and political independence.” The United States increased its military strength in the region so as to respond
quickly to future threats.
As this introduction into the core naval functions demonstrates, all four functions play
important roles in naval crisis response. The recent past, however, has brought about
significant changes in the strategic environment. In order to understand the future of
naval crisis response, it is important to take new realities into account.
Recent Transformations and Challenges
We have gone from a blue-water Navy, which is clearly where we were
before the [Berlin] Wall came down, to a Navy that has vastly expanded
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its mission sets in a world that’s much more uncertain, much more
unpredictable, and in a world that I believe the Navy and the Marine
Corps have the ability and the maneuverability to be out and about.
Admiral Michael Mullen, 2006, then Chief of Naval Operations

As at the end of the Cold War, the events on 9/11 caused a shift in the strategic environment, leading to a new emphasis on counterterrorism (CT) and asymmetric opera117
tions. The global war on terror (GWOT) and the emergence of new security threats
have influenced naval responsibilities.
The Twenty-First-Century Navy
In 2007 the National Research Council released a document identifying three roles for
naval forces to support the GWOT efforts: “forward presence, maritime operations,
and homeland defense.” These roles require three critical naval capabilities: maritime
domain awareness (or MDA, which includes increased maritime intelligence), command and control, and naval force protection. In a 2009 report for Congress, Ronald
118
O’Rourke presented a more detailed list of actual USN operations in CT missions. He
highlighted the importance of joint operations of the three U.S. sea forces, emphasizing
homeland defense. Other important points he raised include Tomahawk cruise-missile
attacks, SEAL operations, and surveillance by naval forces, as well as MDA and protection of forward-deployed naval vessels. The Navy, he argued, is less concerned with
preventing terrorists from carrying out attacks at sea than with denying them the use of
the seas. Terrorists resort to the oceans and waterways to move people, resources, and
money in relative anonymity. As Joshua Lasky says, “attacks at sea have little chance of
attracting maximum public attention, achieving significant loss of life, and are significantly complicated by reasonably good security measures, thus hold little value. The
challenge for the U.S. Navy and all U.S. Navy naval forces is to detect, monitor, and
interdict or facilitate the interdiction of terrorists, or prevent terrorism related use of the
119
vast maritime domain.” Low-intensity, irregular warfare (IW), and counterterrorism
are important challenges for the Navy, generally trained as it is in conventional warfare.
Further, the Navy has responded with sea basing, global partnerships, intensified interservice collaboration, and expansion of expeditionary missions. The service has also
taken into account new technologies and weapons, and the need to replace ships, as well
as new challenges—for example, maritime security and the emergence of new maritime
powers—especially China.
In early 2006, in reaction to the increased demand for expeditionary missions and to
support the six core missions later put forward in CS21, the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) was established. NECC “provides a full spectrum of operations,
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including effective waterborne and ashore antiterrorism force protection; theater securi120
ty cooperation and engagement; and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.” The
grouping of forces known as the expeditionary strike group, comprising amphibious
ships, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, was developed. The nature of expeditionary
missions allows fast reactions aimed at shaping the world order. The forces employed are
sea based; they “come from the sea and return to the sea [and are] sustained from the
121
sea.” Most expeditionary operations are executed in a littoral environment, not on the
high seas. Expeditionary forces need high-grade equipment and skills that are specific
to their particular tasks and operational area. The development of littoral combat ships
(LCSs) and advances in riverine warfare demonstrate that the U.S. Navy is preparing for
the new challenges, where in the past the Navy was predominantly focused on blue122
water operations. The ESG broadens the response capabilities of seaborne forces. They
are capable of operating independently in low-to-medium-threat environments, thereby
increasing the fleet’s responsiveness and strategic impact, especially when aircraft carriers are scarce. NOP 2010 highlighted the value of naval expeditionary capabilities in enabling and supporting joint force efforts to combat conventional and irregular threats.
In 2008 the Navy Irregular Warfare Office was established, to “institutionalize current
ad hoc efforts in IW missions of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency and the supporting missions of information operations, intelligence operations, foreign internal
123
defense and unconventional warfare as they apply to [CT] and [counterinsurgency].”
Since the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the USN has been heavily engaged in the Persian Gulf
and Arabian Sea in support of the Army and Marine Corps in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Navy personnel are also involved ashore in the two theaters. Robert C. Rubel highlights Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan as a good example of the use
of sea basing, as the initial phase of this operation was almost entirely supported by a
124
naval task force. But the lack of suitable bases had already become apparent in earlier
125
conflicts, such as the first Persian Gulf War (1990), Bosnia, and Kosovo. Securing access to foreign land bases or permission to maintain naval bases in foreign countries is
becoming steadily more difficult—most countries do not allow the United States to base
military personnel on their soil. Additionally, land bases are increasingly vulnerable to
126
attack.
The Navy has responded by shifting to the role “of an offshore weapons platform.”127 Sea
basing lessens dependence on the support of other countries. The Navy’s “Sea Power 21”
initiative brought forward three new concepts: “Sea Strike,” the projection of offensive
power; “Sea Shield,” the projection of defensive power; and “Sea Basing,” the projec128
tion of sovereignty. The concept of sea basing centers on the use of the ocean to assemble, move, project, support, and sustain forces. In some respects the sea offers many
advantages over the land. Forces there are less vulnerable to enemy attack, sovereignty
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concerns and need for access rights can be avoided, and personnel and equipment can
129
be transported and withdrawn quickly. The need to build logistic stockpiles ashore
is reduced, sealift is minimized, and joint forces can be positioned forward without
depending on the goodwill of host nations. Henry Cook highlights too such benefits as
130
accelerated deployment times and seaborne positioning. Douglas King and John Berry
point out that sea basing not only functions as a platform but also supports the projec131
tion of sea power ashore to influence events. Till praises sea-based strategic missiles
attacks: “Today a fleet operating against the shore is able not only to solve the tasks connected with territorial changes, but directly to influence the course and even outcome
132
of a war.” Swartz, however, does not view this as a new concept; he points out that the
Continental Navy landed Marines in the Bahamas, and shore bombardment was used
133
against the Barbary States. Similarly Peter Dombrowski and Andrew Ross see Sea
134
Power 21 as largely repackaging already existing capabilities.
While the new terms will advance the technology, then, the underlying ideas are not
revolutionary. The 9/11 attacks suggested the need to be equipped for long-term operations. The difficulty of executing operations in failed or failing states and the reluctance
of neutrals or allied countries to allow U.S. military access or overflight rights point
to the future value of sea basing. The idea of sea basing posits a nonhostile sea environment, and today the USN enjoys broad sea control. Where land-based air support
is either unavailable (the Falklands, Sierra Leone) or insufficient (Desert Storm,
Yugoslavia, Afghanistan), fleets can provide fire support (sea-launched cruise missiles,
135
carrier-based aviation, and naval gunfire). The response to the 2010 earthquake in
Haiti illustrated this strength. Although the aircraft carrier deployed to Haiti surged
from the continental United States, it served on arrival as the sea base for an aerial
rescue mission, most of the infrastructure ashore having been destroyed or badly damaged. Within three days, the carrier was on the scene and ready to act. However, as
Work says, while sea basing does offer more independence, it is not replacing land bases.
136
There are also voices that find the value of sea basing overrated. One of the oftenpraised benefits is the reduced dependence on host nations, but Gouré claims that if
the United States needs land bases, it will find them, and if it meets resistance will
137
seize and occupy them.
The concept of sea basing led to the development of the Global Fleet Station (GFS). In
October 2007 the Africa Partnership Station (APS) was established in the Gulf of Guinea, where it served as a platform for humanitarian and disaster-relief (HA and DR) operations in the area. The pilot APS mission, which ended in May 2008, laid a foundation
for conflict prevention. Future deployments were facilitated through the relationships
the USN built with and between the peoples of the Gulf of Guinea region and by the
138
goodwill it created through its HA and DR activities. In November 2008 the Southern
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Partnership Station (SPS) mission was established; until April 2009 the USN deployed
various forces throughout the Caribbean and Central and South America. SPS strengthened regional partnerships and maritime security; USN forces conducted training and
139
cooperative activities with navies, coast guards, and civilian services. Kathi Sohn sees
this development of sea basing as a broad concept “and its promise and flexibility arise
from . . . its minimal military footprint ashore and the wide cross-section of professional
140
resources that it hosts.”
Generally, Till notes an increase in coalition operations and a rising concern about the
141
maintenance of international security. Collaboration between navies is important
and is much more frequent than land military cooperation. Kaplan attributes that
142
to the “brotherhood of the sea.” In 2006 Adm. Michael Mullen had announced the
“Thousand-Ship Navy,” now known as the Global Maritime Partnership (GMP), to
enhance cooperation between the USN and foreign navies, coast guards, and maritime
police forces in identifying common threats and jointly providing security against them,
143
as well as in maintaining global maritime security. The SPS and APS can be viewed as
specific measures for promoting global maritime partnership, for supporting U.S. Navy
engagement with countries in those regions, particularly for purposes of security partnership building, and for increasing the capabilities of those countries for maritimesecurity operations.
144

These developments can be traced back to CS21. This strategy provided the first
unified maritime strategy for the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, stressing their partnership. To the USN responsibilities for global presence, deterrence, sea
control, and power projection ashore, this maritime strategy added maritime security,
humanitarian assistance, and disaster response. Another important change is the equal
priority afforded preventing wars and winning them. According to Wang Baofu, the
pursuit of absolute military superiority, assuring the defeat of any opponent, has always
145
been the core of U.S. military strategy. The objective of using military force to prevent
war has been embodied to some extent in U.S. military strategic deterrence theory but
has very rarely been placed at the same level as winning wars in important strategic documents. Nonetheless, Till does not see a major change, since most of the Cold War era
146
was spent preventing wars. He rather emphasizes the enlarged function of deterrence:
“The coercive approach of demonstrating denial capabilities against, or promising
punishment for, prospective wrongdoers has been absorbed into a much wider concept of working against the social, environmental, and economic conditions that make
wrongdoing more likely.” He also highlights the new profile of HA and DR as a new
development: “Instead of being something of bonus when the need arises and assets are
available because there is no decent war to fight elsewhere, the task is accepted as part of
one of the six strategic imperatives, and the ability to do it has apparently been elevated
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to equal standing with more traditional core capabilities like forward presence and sea
control.” Thus the new maritime strategy explicitly emphasizes maritime cooperation
and naval soft power—a new development, and one viewed very favorably by other nations and navies.
Increased international cooperation is also encouraged by recent operations to protect
shipping. These maritime security operations aim at securing global commerce and sealanes. Maritime security is now defined as “the creation and maintenance of security
at sea, which is essential to mitigating threats short of war, including piracy, terrorism,
147
weapons proliferation, drug trafficking, and other illicit activities.” In the realm of
maritime security, counterpiracy efforts have become a central focus. In the recent past,
piracy has seen a stark increase, leading to the launching of multinational antipiracy
148
operations in 2008 off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. In an impressive
display of international cooperation, navies from many nations are collaborating to
protect commercial and other ships from pirate attacks. The European Union, NATO,
Australia, China, India, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia are among the participants. This collaboration is even more impressive in that some of the involved countries are otherwise
politically alienated from the United States. Furthering the cooperation with China and
Russia in the counterpiracy efforts, especially information sharing, is emphasized in the
149
“CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] Guidance” for 2010.
New strategic documents, such as the National Security Strategy or the Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) for 2010 have defined the larger Indian Ocean region as an area
of interest to the United States. Tim Sullivan states that “as home to a number of the
world’s most dynamic economies, two rising powers, and six nuclear states, Asia is a
region of enormous strategic importance to the United States. For over six decades,
America has functioned as the preeminent power in Asia, playing a vital role in providing security and ensuring a stable balance of power that has allowed the region’s states
150
to flourish politically and economically.” Within the Indo-Pacific commons, the two
rising powers, China and India, are of particular U.S. interest. James Holmes and Toshi
Yoshihara speak of a strategic triangle in the region, consisting of the United States,
151
China, and India.
The rise of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy, or PLAN) is a topic
of highest priority in Washington. Some believe China’s preoccupation with Taiwan
is the main reason behind the PLAN buildup, while others emphasize the Chinese
desire to control sea-lanes, to make manifest its status as a major world power, to secure
regional interests (such as in disputes over the South China Sea and, in particular, the
resource-rich Spratly and Paracel Islands), or generally to oppose U.S. regional mili152
tary influence. China is building defenses (antiaccess forces) against hostile naval
intervention with the aim of delaying its arrival or reducing its effectiveness. O’Rourke
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compares the strategy to Soviet sea denial during the Cold War.153 Also, according to
Kaplan, China is producing or acquiring submarines at five times the rate of the United
154
States. What makes China’s strategy more dangerous is its possession of antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), capable of hitting moving targets at sea. Furthermore the PLA
Navy has been buying naval mines and technology to block Global Positioning System
(GPS) signals. The PLAN is also striving for a fifth generation of stealth fighters, new
155
submarine models, aircraft carriers, and advances in space. In August 2011 China
began sea trials with its first aircraft carrier—an old, retrofitted Soviet vessel formerly
156
known as Varyag. At some point in the next decade the PLAN will surpass the USN
in number of warships overall. According to Work, “China is now the largest builder
of merchant ships in the world, and it has embarked on an impressive buildup of naval
157
warfighting capabilities—many of them directly targeting the U.S. Navy fleet.” These
modernization efforts have implications for the USN and affect deliberations about
forward homeporting, forward basing and shipbuilding, and the advancement of other
naval capabilities such as improved antisubmarine-warfare systems and antimissile
defenses to protect ships. More generally, they impact strategic planning for the Pacific
and Indian Oceans and the South China Sea, as well as future relations with allies and
non-allies in the region.
In order to become more familiar with the PLAN, cooperation mechanisms should be
explored. The USN and PLAN have engaged in joint search-and-rescue exercise, but
to foster mutual understanding, more cooperation is needed. Nontraditional security
158
issues like international terrorism offer a good starting point. For the United States,
the establishment of military-to-military relations with China is difficult, in particular
because of the Taiwan question. The accidental NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy
in Belgrade in 1999, the collision of a U.S. intelligence aircraft with a Chinese fighter jet
near Hainan Island in 2001, and the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis had serious implications for U.S.–Chinese military relations. Nonetheless, nontraditional security issues
such as counterpiracy, joint search and rescue, and humanitarian missions offer ways to
increase interactions and create an environment to foster a relationship. Promoting mutual trust and building consensus are essential preconditions for future Sino-U.S. naval
security cooperation. A report by the Heritage Foundation argues that misperception
and misunderstanding are only part of the problem and different goals and incentives
159
further explain the difficulties of U.S. Navy–Chinese military relations. In May 2011,
the Chinese counterpart of the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (then Admiral
Mullen) visited Washington, D.C., for talks that both sides described as a positive step
160
toward a stronger relationship.
But above all, the developments themselves must be closely observed and analyzed. The
United States is striving for a force distribution of sixty–forty between the Pacific and
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Atlantic.161 Already six out of the eleven aircraft carriers (CVs) are located in the Pacific
Ocean. In the recent past, incidents between the PLAN and the USN in the western
Pacific have increased. PLAN vessels have shadowed or even blocked U.S. ships in the
162
region. The Chinese maritime ambitions are matters of concern not only for U.S. strategy but for that of many regional countries. India, the other major growing power in the
region, with close ties to the United States, has shown great concern about the rise of the
Chinese navy, especially in the Indian Ocean, in close proximity to India. That country
is determined to defend its influence in the surrounding waters, and a stronger PLAN
presence is likely to trigger Indian maritime countermeasures. Holmes and Yoshihara
see possibilities in a more rapid buildup of naval forces or an expansion of Indian naval
163
presence toward both the South China Sea and Horn of Africa.
Moreover, innovative technologies and the changing global security environment
pose serious challenges and greatly affect U.S. defensive and offensive considerations.
O’Rourke, for example, sees a need to replace the fourteen Ohio-class ballistic-missile
nuclear-powered submarines (SSBNs) with twelve next-generation SSBNs and to develop
164
LCSs and longer-range carrier aircraft. In December 2010, after much negotiation,
Congress approved the building of twenty LCSs through 2015. To meet the growing
demand for ballistic-missile defense, the Navy also calls for a large number of Aegisequipped cruisers and destroyers. The former CNO, Admiral Roughead, had promised
to make ballistic-missile defense a core mission and in April 2009 established the Navy
Air and Missile Defense Command. A breakthrough in 2011 was the beginning of the
technology-development phase of the Ohio replacement program—an important step
165
toward a shipbuilding contract.
According to Navy officials, the USN will require a larger fleet to meet its growing
responsibilities, including sustained forward presence and maritime security, partnership capacity building, and humanitarian relief. As Admiral Roughead commented in
2008, “even the [planned] 313-ship Navy will not be enough for the missions that we’re
166
going to be tasked with in the coming years.” The Navy is striving to add fifty new
battle-force ships by fiscal year (FY) 2015. While the 313-ship Navy could be realized
in theory, this prospect seems less plausible in light of the current budget crisis. In early
May 2010, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned that “our current plan
is to have eleven carrier strike groups through 2040 and it’s in the budget. And to be
sure, the need to project power across the oceans will never go away. But, consider the
massive overmatch the United States already enjoys. Consider, too, the growing antiship
capabilities of adversaries. Do we really need eleven carrier strike groups for another 30
167
years when no other country has more than one?”
While he did not doubt the need for new ships, Gates pointed to the considerable
increase in costs. Today, submarines and amphibious ships have tripled their building
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costs compared to the 1980s, while the overall budget has shrunk by 20 percent. But
Gates also spoke of possibilities offered and challenges presented by new technologies:
“At the higher end of the access-denial spectrum, the virtual monopoly the U.S. has
enjoyed with precision guided weapons is eroding—especially with long-range, accurate antiship cruise and ballistic missiles that can potentially strike from over the
168
horizon.” Work, for his part, argues that it is crucial to focus on the capabilities when
169
talking about ship numbers. With (at this writing) the aircraft carriers USS Roosevelt
and Lincoln undergoing repair and maintenance and Enterprise scheduled to retire after
its next deployment in spring 2012 (inactivation ceremony December 2012), the number
170
of active CVBGs could temporarily drop to nine. Roosevelt should be ready to deploy
171
again in December 2012; Lincoln is likely to return to active service only in 2015. The
newest CV, USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), is scheduled to be ready for deployment in
172
2015, but Raymond Pritchett suggests 2017 as more likely.
The revolution in technology does not affect shipbuilding and weapon requirements
alone. As Thomas Mahnken said in 2001, the U.S. Navy must “define its roles in space
173
and cyberspace.” The importance of intelligence and communication was recognized
by reestablishing the Tenth Fleet (it had been a specialized antisubmarine force in World
War II), reactivated in January 2010 as the cyber fleet, without ships or aircraft but
174
fitted for joint information and intelligence tasks. The fleet’s mission is to combine
intelligence and communication to support information warfare. Richard Burgess calls
this an important step compared to the Cold War, when there was a “wall of separation
between intelligence collection and fleet operations that once was a given—for security
175
reasons.” In May 2009, Admiral Roughead, as CNO, argued that while within the
military, cyberspace is often depicted as “a little lightning bolt going up to the satellites
and running around down to earth[,] [t]hat’s not cyber space. Cyber space is on the bottom of the ocean because 95 percent of what moves in cyber space moves on cables that
rest on the bottom of the ocean. That’s the maritime domain. That’s the domain of the
United States Navy.” Therefore the USN has to play a lead role in securing, protecting,
176
and defending cyberspace.
In addition to the cyberspace domain, naval use of space is the subject of an important
debate today. In the 1990s Gulf War U.S. space-based assets delivered valuable operational
177
information. Since then other states have been striving to advance in space. Spacebased systems can perform essential functions facilitating military activities on land,
in the air, and on and under the sea. Because of the diverse nature of space, U.S. space
operations have implications influencing all elements of national power—diplomatic,
178
military, economic, technological, and information. According to Frank Lacroix and
Irving Blickstein, this development could influence the naval presence mission and
179
maybe one day even replace it.
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Two aspects of the space discussion are important: command of space and space communication. Space command is the control of space communications for civil, commercial, intelligence, and military purposes. Command of space allows the close study of
180
the adversary and the tailoring of capabilities to fight that enemy. Command of space
does not mean that one’s adversary cannot act in space, only that he cannot seriously
interfere in one’s actions thereby. Space has great value for communications; therefore,
space warfare must aim at either securing command of space or preventing the enemy
from securing it. Space communications are used for the movement of trade, matériel,
181
supplies, and information. Network-centric warfare (NCW) heavily relies on space
182
assets. NCW focuses on the combination of actions by a fleet, even if not physically
concentrated. With the help of sensors, valuable information about the adversary’s
183
forces is collected and distributed in real time. Rear Admiral Kenneth W. Deutsch,
speaking before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, described space systems as providing “essential communication capabilities,
position, navigation and timing support, missile warning, meteorological data, and
184
over-the-horizon surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities on a worldwide basis.”
Most space-related issues have been moved to the Air Force, but the Navy has important
interests in space and must be involved in that realm. According to Steven Whiting,
space assets offer unique diplomatic advantages: “From peacetime through war, the
United States can use the varied components of space assets’ diplomatic power directly
185
to improve its diplomatic, economic, and military position.”
The Navy, then, has gone through a number of transformations and now faces many
challenges. Before turning to the next chapter, the study will discuss developments of
the peacetime missions—forward presence and deterrence—and also the “enabler” of
the two, sea control.
Development of Naval Functions
CS21 marked a milestone for cooperation activities and emphasized naval missions that
are essentially peacetime functions—exercising soft power, nation building, cooperation building, and the “Thousand-Ship Navy,” to name a few. However, traditional naval
186
roles have remained relevant. The newest strategic document, NOP 2010, lists sea
control, power projection, deterrence, forward presence, maritime security, and HA/DR
as core capabilities. It builds on CS21 and essentially provides the basis for assessing the
forces required to implement that document.
A study in 2009 by the Institute for Defense Analysis proposes five core capabilities for
the USN (adding one new mission to Turner’s list), ranking them as follows: strategic
deterrence, maritime security/irregular warfare (new), power projection, sea con187
trol, and forward deterrence (presence, renamed). Its authors see a change since the
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outbreak of the GWOT, in that adversaries have become less visible and more difficult
to influence. Because forward presence aims at deterring conventional and irregular
threats to (regional) stability, and forward forces are immediately ready to deploy in case
conventional deterrence fails, the study’s authors argue for renaming forward presence
“forward deterrence/assurance.” They write, “strategic” deterrence “is defined as the
prevention of nuclear war and aggression or coercion, threatening the vital interests of
188
the United States, and/or our national survival.”
The study also discusses HA and DR, added to core capabilities in 2007. Its authors
conclude that those two missions, while very important, are by-products of traditional
naval capabilities and therefore do not need to be categorized as separate core capabilities. However, I believe that this elevation of them is appropriate, as it recognizes the
important contributions military forces can offer in this arena. Since the relief efforts
after the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, the military role in HA and DR missions has
gained prominence and the U.S. armed forces have conducted several such operations.
Examples include the responses to the earthquake in Haiti in 2010 and the tsunami in
Japan 2011. Also, annual deployments offer humanitarian, medical, dental, and engineering assistance to South and Latin America (under Continuing Promise—the
hospital ship USNS Comfort or an amphibious vessel, in alternate years) and to Asia (as
part of the Pacific Partnership program—the hospital ship USNS Mercy or an amphibious ship in alternate years). Overall, the USN has a long tradition of providing medical
aid and disaster relief.
Since World War II, the USN has enjoyed sea control, though during the Cold War its
ability to retain it should conflict break out was sometimes challenged. With the demise
of the Soviet Union, the mission lost its highest priority, but it is still nevertheless im189
portant for security and prosperity. Sustaining sea control is vital to allow the USN to
move freely in peacetime and react to crises. The rise of the Chinese navy has the potential to pose a threat to U.S. sea control in the future. James Kraska hypothesizes that by
190
2015 American command of the global commons will no longer be taken for granted.
While the oceans and the airspace above them have been the exclusive domain of the
U.S. Navy since World War II, this situation could be challenged by then. Although
China is not an enemy of the United States it is becoming a legitimate peer competitor.
But not only China is augmenting its naval forces; Russia and India are also attempting
to strengthen their navies. Kaplan surmises that India will soon possess the third-largest
191
navy. Forces engaged in expeditionary operations depend especially on safe passage
in both open ocean and coastal waters. As Till observes, “This kind of assured theater
access, in turn, depends on naval forces securing the degree of sea control necessary
for them to operate effectively and for the shipping they protect to arrive safely at its
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destination and operate there according to requirements.”192 Therefore sea control has to
remain a core function and priority for the USN.
In the first decades after World War II, the Navy emphasized two missions, projection
193
of force and nuclear deterrence. Both were direct reactions to the environment of the
Cold War and the possibility of confrontation with the Soviet Union. Deterrence works
194
best when there are constants and certainty in the international system. But it has not
lost its value with the end of the Cold War; deterrence without the Soviet Union has,
195
according to Brooks, become even more convincing. The focus has largely shifted to
conventional deterrence. Although it is impossible to measure how much direct relevance the Navy has in deterring any specific adversary, naval operations can help display national power and signal national will, both essential components of deterrence.
The Navy has to adapt deterrence strategies to the party it wishes to deter; different
enemies require different types of deterring forces. Today, Gerson argues, “with two ongoing wars already straining the military, concerns about a recalcitrant and militarized
Russia, Iran’s continued uranium enrichment activities, North Korea’s nascent nuclear
arsenal, and top-to-bottom military modernization in China, adversary-specific deterrence strategies will likely become a prominent component of national and international
196
security in an increasingly multipolar world.”
But not only naval forces contribute to deterrence. The Army and Air Force argue that
they are better suited for this task and that forward presence is not a necessary capability. The Army reasons that because deterrence is mostly related to perception, land
power is more influential and effective. The Air Force, for its part, views deterrence as a
task that can be fulfilled from a distance. In this view, new technology trumps forward
197
presence and will help to stabilize the post–Cold War world order. A study by Gerson
and Daniel Whiteneck lays out in graphic form the functions of the different U.S. armed
198
forces in deterrence missions.
Gerson and Whiteneck cite North Korea as an instance where “U.S. presence on the
Korean peninsula has apparently deterred North Korean aggression against South
Korea for over five decades (although . . . we cannot definitively prove that North Korea
199
has wanted to attack the South at any time since the Korean War).” While land-based
presence is assumed to be a more effective deterrent, stationing troops on foreign soil
becomes, as we have noted, increasingly more difficult. Forward naval forces and sea
basing offer alternatives. Conventional deterrence is closely linked with forward deployment, intended to act as a deterrent or for immediate reaction if deterrence fails, in what
200
Jerome Burke and his coauthors rename “forward deterrence.”
Beginning with a traditional status as a by-product of other naval missions, the presence
mission has grown to the Navy’s most important contribution to peacetime operations.
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Figure 4

Deterrence Capabilities by U.S. Armed Forces (adapted from Gerson and
Whiteneck, Deterrence and Influence, p. 61)
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During the Cold War the Navy identified its principal duties as containing Soviet
expansion, destroying the Soviet navy in case of war, securing command of the sea, and
contributing to nuclear deterrence with the help of forward forces. As part of this strategy, the Navy recognized the diplomatic leverage its forces could produce when forward
deployed. With the end of the Cold War in 1989, it began searching for a new strategy,
and a resulting white paper, From the Sea, stated that the Navy–Marine Corps team was
201
reorienting toward a littoral strategy intended to focus on influencing events ashore.
As part of this strategy, the Navy stated, the highest peacetime priority was achieving
diplomatic benefits by the forward presence of naval vessels. Forward presence had
evolved to a core function of the USN. Today the GWOT relies on and calls for forward
presence in critical regions. NOP 2010 even states that “forward presence facilitates all
other naval missions, most importantly sea control, which is a necessary condition for
the deployment and sustained employment of any joint or multinational force.”
But the concept and the amount of forward presence are intensely debated. Some argue
it puts an unnecessary strain on forces and diverts combat power from other areas.
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Others argue that forward presence makes the Navy capable of reacting immediately,
influencing events, or nipping crises in the bud before they can seriously break out or
escalate. In any case, the justification goes both ways: the Navy needs to be there to
respond rapidly, and because the Navy is there, it is the first force to arrive on a scene.
Presence is not risk-free, as, for example, the bombing in 2000 of the guided-missile destroyer USS Cole (DDG 67) in Yemen painfully demonstrated. Conversely, events such
as the tsunami in Indonesia in 2004 clearly underscored the value of forward presence.
The USN was the first military force to arrive and provide crucial help. As Admiral
Mullen said,
We must be able to continue to react quickly in times of humanitarian crises and with resolve in
times of conflict. We must deter and dissuade potential adversaries in peacetime through persistent
forward presence, and respond instantaneously in war by amassing overwhelming and lethal
combat power. As we learned in Indonesia, and as we are seeing in the international relief efforts in
earthquake-stricken Pakistan today [a Pakistani zone of Kashmir was, when the admiral wrote in
2006, recovering with substantial U.S. military assistance from an earthquake that had occurred in
October 2005], virtual presence is not the answer. You need to be there to make a difference.202

Although acknowledging the great influence of the Navy–Marine Corps teams, exerted
without leaving footprints, Kaplan argues that the “United States was able to lead the
relief effort off the coast of Indonesia only because the carrier strike group USS Abraham Lincoln happened to be in the vicinity and not in the Korean Peninsula, where it
203
was headed.” However, even a deployment from the Korean Peninsula would have
shortened the reaction time dramatically compared to a surge from the continental
United States. Kaplan further points out that while this was a humanitarian mission, the
necessary skills resembled a war situation, with the need for rapid assembly of ships and
aircraft. During the crisis sea basing proved highly valuable. All land routes had been
damaged, and supplies could be delivered only by air, but the United States could perform its services independently of land access. Furthermore the geographic conditions
(an impassable mountain range in the northwest of the affected province, Aceh) favored
204
access from the sea.
Forward presence clearly helps the United States respond rapidly, and it supports not
only deterrence and power projection but also HA and DR, maritime security, and diplomatic initiatives. Additionally, concepts like sea basing demonstrate the importance
of forward naval forces for other military services. The capabilities of “being there” and
influencing without leaving footprints are unique and make naval forces important.
No other service can replace these advantages. “For example, a U.S. military base in
Okinawa, Japan, simultaneously provides a forward base to deter North Korea, prevents
Japan from increasing defense spending and becoming a potential military rival to the
205
United States, and provides U.S. Marines an important training area.” Notwithstanding the current debate over which types of forces best provide presence, the real question
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is: Which forces will work successfully across the widest possible spectrum of events to
206
influence future international situations? Giving up global presence would surrender
the initiative to adversaries, unless naval forces were deployed preemptively from the
continental United States. But any preemptive deployment or attack would involve great
costs, both domestically and internationally. Any policy/decision maker would take
preemptive action only after much deliberation and with great care.
207
Dismukes describes forward forces as “immune to this problem.” Augmenting already
deployed forward forces has smaller political costs and “express[es] unambiguous U.S.
commitment in the most compelling form of political communication: the language
of action.” Forward forces have the capability to demonstrate American intentions and
are likely to be more credible than words alone. Further, Dismukes points to the lack of
experience of forces that have remained in the continental United States with potential crisis locations. Through forward presence they become familiar with conditions,
environments, and possible partners. Forward-deployed forces frequently engage in
exercises with foreign navies, enhancing their interoperability with potential allies.
Cultural awareness is crucial to fostering trust and building relationships. Only frequent
interaction can create such an environment. Furthermore, cooperation with foreign
forces is necessary to learn their procedures and prepare for combined military operations. Hans Binnendijk emphasizes as well the benefits of close cooperation for diplomatic initiatives:

Bosnia has illustrated the correlation between force presence and influence in the contact group.
Cooperation can benefit civil-military relations in transitional societies as the Partnership for Peace
has demonstrated. . . . Forward deployment is crucial to forging patterns of cooperation without
which American influence would rapidly decline. Forward deployed forces are fundamental to
America’s ability to react to crises around the world which affect vital interests or humanitarian
concerns.208

Additionally, the backing-up of diplomacy with force is more effective when forces are
in proximity and immediately ready to react; an example would be a suddenly necessary
evacuation of an embassy. Forces based at home require time and would deploy only
after a warning of a possible or actual crisis. In 2002 a Center for Strategic Studies study
researched warning times in crises, distinguishing between “out of the blue” cases (no
warning time), “peaks in messes” (situations of concern that have slowly arisen until
a certain event led the United States to deploy forces), “slowly gathering cases” (“no
particular incidents of such a magnitude as to trigger a U.S. response. The responses
became a matter of when the United States found the situation so intolerable that it
decided to act”), and “those where it was the U.S.’s choice of the time to initiate some
action” (“that is, warning time was not the problem since a situation existed beforehand
and there was no precipitating attack or incident that the U.S. was responding to”). The
study’s author found that even when there is sufficient warning time, sometimes years,
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the forces actually used are most often already overseas, and thus forward presence
greatly helps the United States to respond to crises. The most important value of forward forces lies in small-scale crises and when action is required immediately, but even
for larger interventions familiarity with the environment and closer proximity favor
209
them over forces that have remained at home.
All this argues that as long as the United States continues to have globally distributed
national interests, those interests will need to be defended, and forward presence helps
secure them and demonstrate the will and capacity to do so. But as mentioned above,
budget restrictions threaten the status quo. In a recent CNA study, Whiteneck and
coauthors concluded that the existing forward strategies based on combat-credible for210
ward presence are unsustainable. It is a fact that while the demand remains constant,
resources are stagnating or even shrinking. In addition, great costs are associated with
modernization, people, and infrastructure. The Navy’s battle forces have decreased by
20 percent, while the number of deployments has remained more or less the same. The
CNA coauthors suggest a “two hub” approach (credible combat power in East Asia and
Arabian Sea/Indian Ocean, with reduction of global forward presence) or one “hub”
(credible combat power only in East Asia, with global forward presence less than currently but still robust) to preserve sufficient forward presence to reassure allies and deter
adversaries but not overstrain naval forces. The two-hub option would result in fewer
resources for lower-end missions, such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, engagement, shaping, and maritime policing. The one-hub scenario means an unbalanced
fleet, with consequent loss of flexibility, but more resources for small-scale activities.
Alternatives such as reducing combat credibility overall while maintaining the global
presence or significantly reducing forward presence while focusing more on surging
naval forces are less attractive. But if the current forward posture is not reconsidered,
the USN is at risk of losing influence and credibility. In this realm the importance of
ESGs arises—less costly than carrier strike groups, this type of force presents a viable
alternative for lower-intensity crises. The emphasis on combat-credible forward forces
requires those forces to be strong, so that, while rarely engaged in combat alone, they
might influence by virtue of their combat credibility. The CNA study’s suggestion to
concentrate on East Asia while keeping smaller forces globally dispersed would leave
much of the globe with limited combat-credible forward presence.
It is not yet clear whether, for example, deterrence would have the same effect with
smaller forces. The focus on East Asia, however, is in line with the steadily rising importance of the Indo-Pacific commons. NOP 2010 recognizes the difficulties posed by
forward presence but nonetheless continues to emphasize its importance: “The challenge is to employ globally distributed, mission-tailored forces across a wide range of
missions that promote stability, prevent crises and combat terrorism; while maintaining
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the capability to regionally concentrate credible combat power to protect vital American
interests, assure friends, and deter and dissuade potential adversaries. Forward forces
and forces surged from the United States, along with those of allies and partners, must
be sufficiently ready and interoperable to respond effectively across a broad spectrum
211
of crises.” It remains to be seen how this will affect the Navy and its functions in the
coming years.
Summary
The goal of chapter 1 was twofold. First, it intended to show the importance of seaborne
crisis response and the need of an approach focusing on the military services separately,
rather than treating armed forces as a unity. Second, it provided an introduction into
the different naval core missions, with emphasis on peacetime activities, linking them
to recent developments. Which military service is best for what purpose is widely debated, and as this study develops it will link naval advantages, disadvantages, and crisis
response in more detail. Because of the differences between the military services, it is
important to appreciate the impact of the uniqueness of each part of the armed forces. A
better understanding of why, how, and when naval forces are sent to respond to a crisis
can enhance crisis-response effectiveness. The influence of latent use of force and the
frequent employment of the USN as an instrument of foreign policy in times of peace
point to the importance of a more in-depth inquiry of the influence of uniquely naval
attributes. The next chapter provides the theoretical background and relevant literature
for hypotheses explaining naval crisis response.
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chapter two

Just Enough Force?

A Theoretical Framework for Seaborne Crisis Response
In having a peacetime political function in addition to their combat
capabilities, naval forces are like all other forms of military power, only
more so.
Edward Luttwak

There is no single theory directly linking the involvement of the United States in inter1
national crises with the use of naval forces. However, there are many theories explaining the motivations of the use of force and assumptions about the advantages as well as
disadvantages of naval power. The first part of this chapter will briefly summarize the
history of the American use of force, followed by the three dominant schools of thought
for justifying intervention decisions: realist, idealist, and diversionary theories. These
theories will serve as an introduction into the U.S. use of force, but not all directly influence the hypotheses drawn later.
There are a variety of different approaches states can employ in reacting to international
conflicts and crises. Political leaders can publicly voice disapproval, announce political
or economic sanctions, engage in negotiations, support mediation attempts, undertake
diplomatic efforts, or employ violence. This diversity of possible responses suggests the
many tools at the disposal of the decision makers. As Meernik says, “the United States
has utilized a vast arsenal of foreign policy carrots and sticks to induce, compel, and
2
deter changes in other nations’ foreign policies.” Often, especially since the end of the
3
Cold War, the United States has relied on military forces to respond to crises. Ideally,
military force is used as only a last resort, but frequently it not only serves as a backup
for other forms of engagement but substitutes for them. However, military power can be
employed in many different ways and forms; it is not confined to war fighting.
The second part of this chapter focuses on the use of naval power and crisis-response
capabilities. Because naval forces share a number of attributes with ground and landbased air forces, I will attempt to identify any significant circumstances where naval
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capabilities are of unique value, especially for operations short of full-scale war.4 Together with the advantages/disadvantages of seaborne forces, these considerations will
inform the building of measurable hypotheses. Rather than establishing a single theory
of naval deployments, I pursue here a general inquiry that encompasses as many factors
as possible in order to answer four main questions—pertaining to the relations between
the use of naval forces and crisis characteristics, actors, U.S. activity, and outcomes—to
determine where future research will be useful.
Explaining the U.S. Use of Force
Up until the twentieth century, as Gerald Astor describes, Americans used force as a
5
means of protecting national security or self-defense. The war against the Barbary
States, the War of 1812, and the Civil War are cited as examples. The war with Mexico
(1846–48) was fought for territorial gains, and the Spanish-American War (1898) can
be seen as a demonstration of American power in the tradition of the Monroe Doctrine.
Within the United States, the Sioux wars (between 1854 and 1890) exemplify a fight for
6
territory between U.S. and Indian forces.
Motives behind Intervention Decisions
Since the founding of the Republic, the United States has deployed forces overseas for
many purposes short of war. Prior to World War II, these included protecting commerce
and trade routes, deterring and punishing piracy, enhancing prestige, cultivating relations with foreign governments, restoring order, guaranteeing the collection of debts,
7
and defending American citizens and interests during regional upheavals. Strictly
speaking, the United States was never truly isolationist. For example, U.S. military
forces have been committed in East Asia since 1898 and have frequently intervened in
8
the Western Hemisphere.
By the twentieth century, however, the United States had troops almost constantly
9
deployed around the world. Feste identifies four moments in American history that
have shaped intervention policy: World War II, the middle of the Vietnam War, the
10
end of the Cold War, and one decade post–Cold War. Before World War II, American
military capabilities were limited; real global intervention activism and commitment
11
began only after the war. The United States was resolved to remain actively involved in
world affairs and to prevent a unilateral buildup of hostile might. Munich was engraved
in the minds of American presidents. No longer were the main reasons for using force
threats to U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere, its citizens, or—however rarely—
the homeland.
During the Cold War, the use of force centered on the standoff between the two
superpowers. Protection of the free world, maintenance of the balance of power, and
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prevention of Soviet gain of territory or the spread of communism dominated U.S. foreign policy. The United States tried to keep the Western Hemisphere, and as many other
12
Third World nations as possible, under American control. In Vietnam, the United
States suffered a major defeat and for a while became more reluctant to use force (openly) abroad. But Jeffrey Record interprets the lesson from Vietnam not as an example to
discredit U.S. use of force but rather as evidence of the mismatch between conventional
13
military power and revolutionary forces. The two paradigms, Munich and Vietnam,
influence most presidents in their attitudes toward intervention.
In the wake of the Cold War, the United States no longer faced an equal adversary,
14
and its military supremacy became unchallenged. Escalations with the Soviet Union,
triggered by involvement in countries located in the Soviet sphere of interest, did not
15
influence U.S. intervention decisions any more. The danger of a war between the
superpowers had been eliminated, but conflicts and crises persisted, and military power
16
remains essential, rendering the “responsibility of global leadership greater than ever.”
As many crises and conflicts have occurred since the collapse of the Berlin Wall and
the demise of the Soviet Union as prior to those momentous events. As Richard Neal
says, “While the Cold War superpower contest is over, the world may be a more peaceful
17
place, but it is not a world at peace.” According to Art, military power continues to be
18
important because the relations between states remain anarchic. Thus military force
19
and foreign policy stay closely linked.
20

Some even see a rising importance of intervention since the end of the Cold War.
Humanitarian interventions, for example, have emerged as a new post–Cold War phe21
nomenon. Human suffering, brought to the American homes on television, has led to
22
interventions mainly undertaken to halt human-rights abuses. In general, military op23
erations other than war gained momentum in the post–Cold War era. The increase of
overt intervention after the end of the Cold War, according to Feste, can be attributed to
a combination of diminished concern about Soviet involvement, the rising importance
of economic criteria, and reemphasis on idealistic considerations, such as human rights
24
and democracy. While American intervention policy continues to be strongly oriented
to national interests, humanitarian concerns—and, since 9/11, antiterrorism—seem to
have replaced communist containment. The year 2001 brought the global war on terror
and opened a new chapter in the justification of U.S. use of force—preemptive strikes,
democratization, and a new (or renewed) moralization of warfare. The communist
threat from the Cold War had shifted to the terrorist threat, no longer confined to states
but instead found among individuals and transnational and international organizations.
But in Paul Atwood’s words the war on terror “is in keeping with the long history of
25
American foreign policy.” Some even argue that military supremacy has become part
26
of the national identity.
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Thomas Barnett highlights the changes in the U.S. intervention pattern.27 Key targets
are countries located in what Barnett calls the “gap,” that part of the world excluded
from the benefits of globalization and therefore outside the “core”: “Simply put, . . . [if a]
country was losing out to globalization or rejecting much of its cultural content flows,
there was a far greater chance that the United States would end up sending troops there
at some point across the 1990s.” The 9/11 attacks triggered another change. Barnett
speaks of a time of chaos and uncertainty and of the necessity to “defend all against
28
all.” Since the demise of the Soviet Union, no coherent strategy for when force should
be used had been established. “Today, America and the world stand at a crossroad similar to the one we faced following World War II. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 have pro29
vided us all a glimpse of the new form of international crisis that will define our age.”
The attacks of 2001 represented a milestone in the international security system. States
30
were no longer the exclusive actors but gave way to substate and transstate systems.
During the 1990s, Washington mainly concentrated on individual enemies, whereas the
Cold War had focused on a hostile order. Rogue states and their leaders, failing states,
31
extremists, and terrorists became new targets. The war on terrorism focuses mostly on
individuals or groups and on countries providing them with support and safe havens.
During the Cold War the West faced a known threat from the Soviet Union and, to a
lesser extent, China, which had well-known intentions and goals. Today the motives and
moves are less predictable. In the words of the former American secretary of defense,
Donald H. Rumsfeld, new military thinking is now required to arm Western societies
32
“against the unknown, the uncertain, the unseen, and the unexpected.”
Soft Power?
Feste observes that “the United States is widely perceived as emphasizing military power
as a tool of foreign policy, at the expense of the complexities of diplomacy and other
33
forms of soft power.” Joseph Nye has frequently warned that the United States has
lost “soft power”—its ability to attract others by the legitimacy of U.S. policies and the
34
values that underlie them. The United States both undervalues this form of power and
underestimates its importance. The Cold War was won with a strategy of containment
that employed soft power along with hard power. After 9/11 the United States pursued a
unilateralist foreign policy and relied excessively on military means to resolve all security problems, not only damaging its hard power but also seriously setting back its soft
power. Damage to hard power can be made good in a relatively short period, whereas
losses in soft power are long lasting and require fundamental policy changes to address.
The preemption doctrine has removed “the distinction between imminent (immediate)
and potential future threats. It assumes that grave threats are now always imminent.”
This thought process leads to the devaluation of diplomacy and negotiation and shifts
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the emphasis to the use of force as an immediate resource, thereby failing to distinguish
between short- and long-term threats and different adversaries. The result is a more
35
complex security scenario and greater instability. The soft-power dilemma has triggered persistent discussions in the U.S. academic community. The Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS), an American think tank in Washington, D.C., held in
2007 special seminars involving such former government officials and expert as Zbig36
niew Brzezinski, Richard Armitage, and Joseph Nye. The consensus view was the need
for a new balance on the part of the United States if it was to prolong its hegemony. The
participants “proposed to use hard and soft power in coordination as ‘rational strength’
37
in order to realize strategic national security goals.” Nye had previously defined this
“combination of the hard power of coercion and payment with the soft power of persuasion and attraction” as smart power.
Two years later, in 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates proposed the following
approach:
What is dubbed the war on terror is, in grim reality, a prolonged, worldwide irregular campaign—a
struggle between the forces of violent extremism and those of moderation. Direct military force
will continue to play a role in the long-term effort against terrorists and other extremists. But over
the long term, the United States cannot kill or capture its way to victory. Where possible, what the
military calls kinetic operations should be subordinated to measures aimed at promoting better governance, economic programs that spur development, and efforts to address the grievances
among the discontented, from whom the terrorists recruit. It will take the patient accumulation of
quiet successes over a long time to discredit and defeat extremist movements and their ideologies.38

This statement supports the smart-power commission’s call for a soft-power approach
39
linked with military force.
A policy shift became visible with the release of a National Security Strategy (NSS) in
2010 and the 2010 QDR. Both strategic documents recognized the importance of soft
power and emphasized the American interest in focusing on it. If necessary, however,
soft power can be backed up by hard power, which suggests a combination of the two.
Naval forces are a uniquely appropriate smart-power tool, because of their global presence, frequent interactions, diplomatic potential, and low intrusiveness. This point is
reflected in the newest maritime strategy, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
40
Seapower,” and NOP 10. The latter explains how naval forces “will blend soft and hard
power in support of the approach, objectives and enduring national interests articulated
in the National Defense Strategy (NDS).” According to Bruce Elleman, “during the
nineteenth and most of the twentieth centuries, the very thought that sea powers might
regularly use naval platforms to deliver humanitarian aid, as opposed to cutting off and
starving an enemy’s supply lines, would have seemed alien. In the twenty-first century,
however, national power and prestige are more and more characterized by ‘soft power.’
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Unified Assistance [after the tsunami in Southeast Asia] showed that ‘hard power’
41
assets like aircraft carriers can also be the best providers of ‘soft power.’ ”
Realism, Idealism, and Diversionary Theory
Policy and decision makers face the challenge of deciding whether, when, and how to
42
use force. A large body of literature, with the help of various theoretical approaches,
has studied how the use of military force has helped to promote U.S. foreign-policy
43
goals. Three schools of thought—realism, idealism, and diversionary theory—capture
the main paradigms. Realism remains the most important for studying the use of force
44
and international relations. In classical realism, sovereign states are the dominant
actors in the international system, which is characterized by anarchy. Nation-states
are in a constant state of competition as they seek power, maximization of security,
45
and material wealth. This struggle shapes the conduct of foreign policy and international relations. Political, military, and economic assets can be used to support power
and security. In its exercise of foreign policy, the state depends on public support and
economic resources. However, domestic politics are (for the most part) secondary in the
46
formulation of foreign policy in the realist paradigm. Hans Morgenthau and E. H. Carr
are among the main proponents of classical realism, the roots of which go as far back as
47
Thucydides, Hobbes, and Machiavelli.
Unlike classical realism, the reformulated neorealism, or structural realism, downplays
the importance of the individual and human nature in explaining why states seek power
48
and sees the pursuit of power as a derivate of international structure. Even without an
imminent threat, states, treated in the aggregate, as “black boxes,” are considered well
advised to pursue power sufficient for self-defense. Different forms and interpretations,
49
such as defensive and offensive, have emerged. Defensive realists argue against the
maximization of power, because they believe the system will punish states that attempt
to gain too much power, whereas offensive realists would maximize power to the point
of hegemony: “The argument is not that conquest or domination is good in itself, but
instead that having overwhelming power is the best way to ensure one’s own survival.
For classical realists, power is an end in itself; for structural realists, power is a means
50
to an end and the ultimate end is survival.” National interests are closely linked to
realist thinking, as they are essential for power and security: “The dominant paradigm
in world politics—realism—would suggest that interventions take place only when clear
51
national interests are at stake.”
John Ikenberry describes the mainstream of American foreign policy since World War
52
II as influenced by either realist or liberalist considerations. These two strategies have
guided American presidents in their foreign-policy orientations. Liberal institutionalism, like idealism, acknowledges the importance of multilateralism, international law,
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international institutions, and democracy. U.S. power can help to create a more peaceful
and cooperative world, the vision of Woodrow Wilson. Following this ideal, foreign
policy should prefer a “carrot” rather than a “stick” approach and downplay the role
of military force. David Skidmore, analyzing American presidents from Nixon to G.
W. Bush, identifies Nixon’s foreign policy as most “realist,” whereas he believes Jimmy
Carter and William Clinton favored a liberal institutionalist approach; Carter was a
53
strong advocate of human rights, and Clinton promoted “assertive multilateralism.”
But both presidents began shifting their policies toward realism as a result of international events and domestic pressure. He describes Ronald Reagan and (after the 9/11 attacks) Bush as followers of neoconservatism. While the Reagan administration engaged
in covert operations to topple socialist and communist regimes, the “Bush doctrine” and
the GWOT endorsed overt regime change in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ikenberry argues
that the Bush doctrine sets a new precedent of unilateralism, involving less reliance
54
on allies and global institutions in the battle against terrorism and rogue states. He
criticizes the U.S. use of military force to refashion the global order and favors more attention to the international community and world stability. Francis Fukuyama cautions
that “neoconservatism, whatever its complex roots, has become indelibly associated with
concepts like coercive regime change, unilateralism and American hegemony. What is
needed now are new ideas, neither neoconservative nor realist, for how America is to
relate to the rest of the world—ideas that retain the neoconservative belief in the universality of human rights, but without illusions about the efficacy of American power and
55
hegemony to bring these ends about.”
Generally, realists tend to appreciate the use of power but are skeptical of the importance of institutions, while liberals value the importance of institutions but are skeptical of the use of power to restructure them. But Steven Brooks and William Wohlforth
argue that the benefits of international institutions are grounded in realism—that it will
be more challenging for the United States to advance its national interests if it does not
56
invest in those institutions. A discussion sparked in April 2010 after remarks by the
former White House chief of staff Rahm Emanuel highlighted the difficulties of labeling a president’s orientation in regard to idealism and realism. Rahm told the New York
Times, “If you had to put him [Barack Obama] in a category, he’s probably more realpolitik, like Bush 41 [that is, G. H. W. Bush]. . . . He knows that personal relationships are
57
important, but you’ve got to be cold-blooded about the self-interests of your nation.”
Several scholars reacted in Foreign Policy to the categorization. Whereas Robert Kagan
sees Obama’s foreign policy as oriented to idealism, Stephen Walt and Charles Kupchan
see a tilt into a realist direction. Thus a clear categorization is nearly impossible and
58
often depends more on the nature of the decision that needs to be made. Similarly Nye
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points out that Obama should not be categorized as either idealist or realist but rather as
59
oriented toward liberal realism.
To capture this variety, Miskel distinguishes two different types of realists, one with
a very narrow definition of what constitutes national interests and the other one with
60
a more inclusive definition that captures such events as Bosnia and Kosovo. He sees
most American presidents as bracketed between those two. America’s announced condi61
tions for intervention are very broad. Vital national interest is a reoccurring theme and
offers the main rationale for intervention decisions. Glenn Hastedt draws a complex picture of individuals and institutions “competing for positions of prominence in setting
62
‘values and priorities’ ” leading to a variety of different national interests.
There exists no agreement on the exact definition of national interests. Security and
power are clearly dominant, whereas humanitarian issues are secondary and normally
not categorized as vital. For Record, only a direct attack on or threat to the American
63
territory and its citizens is widely accepted as a prime vital national interest. Art lists
six categories of national interests for the United States, ranked from highest to lowest: prevent an attack on the United States; prevent a war between the major powers in
Eurasia; preserve access to oil reserves; maintain an open international economic order;
spread democracy, promote upholding human rights, and prevent genocide and mass
64
murder in civil wars; and preserve the global environment. The first three are the most
important ones and largely dominate policy making. Art argues that military power
can guarantee the first three vital interests but not the next three: “In general, military
power cannot be efficiently and effectively employed to force states to lower their barriers to trade, to create democracy in states that have never experienced it, or to force others to limit their emissions of greenhouse gases. . . . Military power can be directly used
to prevent aggression against the Persian Gulf oil sheikdoms, or to preserve Eurasian
great-power peace, by deterring would-be adversaries and reassuring America’s greatpower allies.” The fifth in this list is an idealistic goal and by itself largely irrelevant for
realist intervention decisions. Art proposes a strategy of selective engagement, between
isolationist, unilateralist, and highly global interventionist. This strategy—what he calls
“realpolitik plus”—follows both realist and liberalist ideals. Beside power and security,
the promotion of democracy, human rights, free markets, and international openness
are important goals of U.S. foreign policy. Military power is fundamental to selective
65
engagement, as it furthers both military and nonmilitary goals. Many different reasons
for interventions have been given, but the most powerful and enduring motive has been
66
security. Feste comes to the conclusion that although intervention to protect human
rights, spread democracy, or support peacekeeping missions has increased after the
67
Cold War, these purposes cannot outweigh national interests. Andrew Bacevich makes
a similar statement: “I am pretty idealistic, but when it comes to American statecraft,
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despite all our talk about American idealism, ideals matter only when they coincide
68
with U.S. interest.” Once military operations are under way, the rhetoric shifts to
69
idealistic goals rather than realist ones. Nevertheless, these commentaries point to the
overall dominance of national interest for the decision-making process.
Traditionally, “just war” theory is used for moral justification of certain interventions
and wars by reference to universal values. Unlike pacifism, just war theory does not
oppose all uses of force but gives clear limitations and offers guidelines as to when it
70
is morally legitimate. After the Vietnam War the theory gained increased recognition in the United States. Just-war theory comprises two parts: jus ad bellum and jus in
bello; the former describes the legitimate conditions for intervention, and the latter sets
rules for the behavior of soldiers and states engaged in a war. Only the first category is
relevant to the intervention decision. The principles trace back to Augustine in the early
71
fifth century and to the work of Thomas Aquinas from 1265 to 1273. Aquinas defined
72
three main criteria for when a war can be just.
•

Just cause (e.g., violent attack)

•

Right authority (e.g., United Nations)

•

Right intention (e.g., to end violence).

Other definitions, such as that put forward by the Responsibility to Protect report of
73
2001, add last resort, proportionality of means, and reasonable prospect to the list.
Frequently American presidents have rhetorically employed one or more of the justwar principles to justify decisions and portray the U.S. role as a moral force, especially
in promoting democracy and human rights. In the prelude to the 2003 war in Iraq,
just-war principles were evoked to justify actions within “a broader moral, cultural and
74
humanistic framework.” Thus, as mentioned above, realist decisions can be linked to
idealist rhetoric to “sell” intervention to the public.
Another school of thought focuses on the importance of domestic politics for foreign
policy making. The “diversionary” theory assumes a connection between domes75
tic politics and the decision to intervene. Factors such as high inflation rates, high
unemployment, recession or economic stagnation, and low presidential approval rates
can encourage a diversionary focus on foreign policy. Benjamin Fordham empirically
supports the assumption that interventions are more likely in times of high unemploy76
ment rates and low presidential-popularity ratings. Although realists commonly reject
the impact of domestic politics and considerations on foreign-policy decision making,
77
some scholars emphasize it. For example, Robert Gilpin acknowledges the importance
78
of domestic factors for explaining uses of force. In Paul Huth’s words, “state leaders are
rational foreign policy decision makers who seek to remain in power, but they are also
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concerned with promoting the international security of their country and are therefore careful to pursue security policies that do not undermine their domestic political
position. . . . [B]oth domestic political concerns and international power considerations
79
determine foreign policy choices.”
These interpretations illustrate the importance of a combination of theoretical approaches in explaining intervention decisions. Meernik’s 2004 The Political Use of Military Force in US Foreign Policy, already cited, is one of the most comprehensive research
accounts of why the United States employs military force. His empirical analyses include
realist, idealist, diversionist, and economic-interest considerations, and his various
hypotheses integrate different theories in a historical context. His empirical findings
strongly suggest an orientation to realist goals, such as power and security. The results
for the realist model are the most convincing and provide the best explanation for decisions to use force.
However, no single model is all-powerful. While the realist model is superior to other
models, the liberalist, idealist, diversionist, and economic-interest models also help to
understand when the United States will use force. This finding supports the observation
that no president is oriented to any single school of thought. As circumstances dictate,
different reasons justify their decisions. What remains convincing, however, is the
dominance of national interest; thus for this study I assume that the greater the threat
to national interests, the stronger and more forceful the U.S. response will be. In this
connection it is interesting to see how seaborne responses are influenced by national
interests and how this affects naval deployments with other forces.
How Can Naval Forces Influence International Crises (Behavior)?
American military power serves as an instrument of foreign policy by its very existence. Without ever having to be used or even referred to, it heightens U.S. prestige
and lends importance to proposals and expressions of concern. The knowledge that it
exists influences both how American policy makers approach problems and what posi80
tions other states adopt. As laid out in the previous chapter, naval forces are characterized by unique capabilities especially valuable for crisis response and the political
use of force. The power of the use of force short of war is summarized in the following
words by G. F. Hudson:
In traditional international politics the use of force has not been confined to actual war, but has
won its greatest success when governments have been intimidated into compliance with the will
of a stronger (or more determined) power without any clash of arms taking place. War can even be
regarded as a failure in the application of force, just as the killing of a cashier by a bank robber usually implies that the robber has failed to intimidate by pointing a gun and has had to carry out his
threat in action.81
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Luttwak’s Suasion
Luttwak describes the political use of sea power as “armed suasion.” He defines the phenomenon as follows: “Armed suasion defines all reactions, political or tactical, elicited
by all parties—allies, adversaries, or neutrals—to the existence, display, manipulation,
or symbolic use of any instrument of military power, whether or not such reactions
reflect any deliberate intent of the deploying party. Naval suasion refers to effects
82
evoked by sea-based or sea-related forces.” Suasion can be active or latent, coercive or
supportive, deterrent or positive. What all forms have in common is dependence on the
reactions of others. Essentially, armed suasion is about threat perception, not the actual
use of force. Suasion materializes in reactions by other actors taken because of their
perceptions, not in actions by or intentions of the “suasor.” Yet armed suasion is feasible
only if resort to force is possible and convincingly plausible.
Active suasion includes any deliberate attempt to induce a specific reaction from the
target, whether an ally, enemy, or neutral. Latent suasion, exercised through routine
or undirected naval operations, works best as a deterrent but can also be supportive,
reminding allies and clients of the capabilities that can be brought to their aid. Further,
suasion can manifest itself in signs of support (supportive mode) or can be aimed at
83
deterring (deterrence mode) the adversary. The coercive aspect of active suasion can
84
deter or compel, while the supportive form reassures allies or clients. Michael Codner
85
illustrates Luttwak’s different modes of suasion with the graph given in figure 5.
One example given by Luttwak of unintended effects brought about by latent suasion
86
involves U.S. naval activity in the Mediterranean in the years following World War II.
Figure 5

Armed Suasion (adapted from Codner, “Defining Deterrence,” p. 2)
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While the U.S. Sixth Fleet was consciously deterring Russian and Arab moves against
American interests, it may also have been giving unintended encouragement to Israeli
activism in a manner inimical to the interests of the United States. The active version
of supportive suasion is exemplified by the visit of the battleship USS Missouri (BB 63)
to Istanbul in March 1946, a visit that marked the beginning of the postwar deployment of American naval power in the Mediterranean. The Missouri episode demonstrated the political application of naval power—the use of ships as symbols, rather than
instruments, of power. The offensive power represented by Missouri was secondary in
importance to gaining the declared commitment to Turkey. According to Luttwak this
87
“symbolic” role is preventive of, rather than reactive to, a confrontation. In my view,
the symbolic power of warships can be influential at any time in a crisis, be it to convince adversaries to desist from hostilities, to encourage the termination of the crisis, or
to prevent escalation.
Another example is the crisis triggered by tension between Taiwan and China in 1950.
Elements of the U.S. Seventh Fleet were deployed between Taiwan and China to dissuade, and if necessary to thwart, any attempt to mount an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. At the same time, any potential unintended supportive effects for the Nationalists
were neutralized by a public declaration that the fleet would also intervene to prevent a
Nationalist landing on the mainland. In this case, the deterrent effect on the communist
government was actually reinforced by emphasizing the supportive role of the Seventh
Fleet: Bejing’s incentive to invade Taiwan was much reduced when the Nationalist threat
to the mainland was neutralized. This incident again highlights the advantages of naval
forces, which are flexible in a sense that has no equivalent on land. Overall, since 1945
the U.S. Navy has exercised different forms of suasion, on many occasions, at all levels
of intensity, and all around the world. What Luttwak labels “suasion” can more generally be termed “naval diplomacy,” working to influence and persuade minds rather than
88
manifesting itself in physical action.
Naval Diplomacy
During the nineteenth century, “naval diplomacy” was added to the naval vocabulary.89
Over the course of history, naval forces have been used frequently and successfully to
support political-diplomatic initiatives by influencing behavior and have established
90
their role as the predominant military instrument of diplomacy.
History of Naval Diplomacy. With their capabilities to deploy forward, remain in international waters, stay on station indefinitely, interact with friendly countries, monitor
crisis spots, withdraw when no longer needed, and respond with military power, naval
91
forces have exercised diplomatic power to great effect. Sir Julian Corbett regarded
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the support or obstruction of diplomatic efforts as the central task of naval fleets.92 As
Deborah Sanders observes, “Naval diplomacy allows states to signal national interests
in a particular region, and through naval presence, navies can also act as subtle remind93
ers of their states’ military might and commitment.” John Stuart Mill observed, “our
94
diplomacy stands for nothing when we have not a fleet to back it.” At the lower end of
the diplomatic spectrum are such measures as demonstrating presence, visiting ports,
showing the flag, exercises, and other confidence-building activities. “Ship visits can be
a useful form of diplomatic exchange, help maintain or secure good relations, and win
95
popular favour.”
Sailors frequently help communities on land. Examples that foster goodwill and reassure American support include volunteer work, such as helping to build hospitals and
96
schools, or invitations to foreign nationals to visit U.S. Navy ships. Naval vessels also
operate periodically as hospital ships (in addition to actual Navy-operated hospital
ships) for poor countries and deploy in humanitarian-assistance and disaster-relief mis97
sions. Further traditional diplomatic peacetime activities center on cooperation with
foreign military forces—military-to-military contacts, exercises with foreign navies,
officer training, and access agreements—as means of demonstrating and building posi98
tive political relationships. As Blechman says, these operations “provide the backbone
99
of the strategy of global engagement.” At the higher end, armed suasion is the most
100
forceful aspect of diplomacy. The term “naval diplomacy” has been used so broadly
that it can be defined as encompassing all events, even including violence, that do not
101
lead to war.
The ability of navies to provide diplomatic leverage has long been recognized by nations.
Bob Davidson locates the origins of naval diplomacy in the heritage of colonial pow102
ers. These powers would dispatch vessels to foreign locations to boost their prestige
and reputations and also to influence events. For the majority of the nineteenth century,
the United States benefited from the gunboat diplomacy of the Royal Navy, and also to
103
some extent of the French navy, in Chinese ports. At the same time the USN conducted direct American diplomacy, and sailors served as ambassadors. Naval diplomacy today is a continuation of this tradition, aimed at influencing incidents on land
by controlling the sea or by threatening to project power ashore if necessary. Max Boot
compares the original tasks of gunboat diplomacy with the ones of the World Trade
104
Organization today. For Rob McLaughlin, the U.S. Navy is the principal military arm
105
of American diplomacy in the post–World War II world. Bouchard notes that “observers of naval diplomacy have concluded that changes in the structure and conduct of international politics since the end of World War II have been the primary factors causing
maritime powers, particularly the United States, to place greater emphasis on the use
106
of naval forces as a political instrument relative to land-based air and ground forces.”
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Likewise, Cable states that “some of the constraints on the use of American military
power to exert international influence are also such as almost to encourage reliance on
107
limited naval force for this purpose.” Others suggest domestic political constraints as
the driving force.
Whereas such authors as Booth and Peter Nailor consider gunboat diplomacy a thing
of the past and the use of naval forces for diplomacy as obsolescent, Ghosh expresses
an opposite viewpoint, that reluctance to become involved in full-scale wars increases
the need for naval diplomacy, which can be employed to achieve national objectives
without engaging in open warfare. In the latter’s words, “the focus of armed conflict is
shifting from traditional regular war to the use of military power on the lines of modern
108
gunboat coercive diplomacy.” Thomas Goodall emphasizes the technological advan109
tages of the United States for conducting gunboat diplomacy. He names carrier-based
aviation, cruise missiles, and amphibious assault as unique capabilities that further its
effectiveness. Since the USN enjoys unmatched capabilities and worldwide presence,
coercive diplomacy will remain an important tool for U.S. policy makers.
According to Matthew Scarlett, coercive diplomacy can achieve tangible foreign policy
objectives; however, it requires a fusion of political, diplomatic, and naval skills for
110
success. “The great utility of coercive naval diplomacy is made apparent through the
variety of objectives for which it can be applied. Potential objectives range from general
expression of foreign policy at one extreme, to the outright expulsion of a foreign government at the other extreme. Often coercive naval diplomacy is used to persuade an
adversary to change their behavior. Naval forces are also used to enforce peace between
111
two adversaries by a third party.” The North Korean shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in
November 2010 triggered the deployment of a well-armed naval task force, involving the
carrier George Washington, to the Yellow Sea. Pritchett calls this “a little bit of gunboat
112
diplomacy,” with China and North Korea as target states. China had warned the United States in the past not to send carriers to the Yellow Sea. With this move the United
States cautioned North Korea not to escalate the situation and sent a signal to China to
join the international denunciation of the North Korean aggression. As Pritchett says,
“Gunboat diplomacy is always distinct to time and place, and even in the twenty-first
century remains a policy of force intended to deter other nations from exercising the
113
violent use of military power.”
The following passage from Cable summarizes thinking on the usefulness of navies for
diplomacy:
Curiously enough, the expressive use of coercive diplomacy is sometimes better attempted by actions than by words, by warships rather than by politicians or diplomats. . . . The movement of warships, however, can still convey a sense of menace that is plausible to the victim because it is potent
yet undefined, but convenient to the aggrieved government, because it is simultaneously impressive
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to domestic opinion and noncommittal. Warships can always be withdrawn, provided the purpose
of their movement has been left a little vague: verbal threats become embarrassing if they are neither productive nor implemented.114

The Concept of Naval Diplomacy. The U.S. Navy underscores the areas of interest to
the United States by maintaining presence and conducting regular or periodic visits.
But the mere presence of its ships in home ports sends a signal of military readiness.
The primary objective of signaling is to influence events by shaping the perceptions and
attitudes of other nations. “The influence military forces can exert in the international
arena is related to their presence (or capability to be present), their core capabilities, the
political will to use those forces, and, most importantly, the perception of those who you
115
seek to influence.” To be successful in changing the other parties’ behavior, the presence and movements of the ships have to seize their attention. Maintaining, augmenting, and withdrawing forces all attract attention. A periodic deployment or sustained
presence serves as a symbolic use of force and can attract the attention of foreign leaders. In order to signal heightened concern or interest, the naval force must be augmented
or increase its readiness. Conversely, forces can also be left uncommitted or even sent
in the opposite direction to indicate a determination not to get involved. While routine
and presence functions are very similar to crisis management, they are more preventive, whereas the latter is more reactive. The choice of type of force and operation sends
116
additional signals.
While signaling can take place at any stage in a diplomatic crisis, it is most successful
117
before a crisis is even reached. A show of interest (mere signaling) expresses the lowest
level of activity. A show of resolve demonstrates intentions more clearly, and a show of
force is the highest level. According to Allen, the appearance of ships and a public statement of intent are the key variables in the signaling process; the reaction of the target
118
country establishes whether the operation is a success or failure. He distinguished
four levels of signaling: routine peacetime presence (e.g., normal port visits); show of
interest (expressing concern but without committing to any action); show of resolve
(signal a commitment to a friend or to halt enemy action); and show of force (when the
use of force in a specific way is threatened to resolve the crisis or influence its resolution
to our satisfaction). Except for the first level, all can be reactions to international crises,
because they divert naval forces from their regular employment. Allen states that if it
is to be signaled that the United States is ready to intervene, an aircraft carrier or an
119
amphibious force is required.
When lower-level diplomatic activity is unsuccessful, actors frequently prefer a policy
“combining diplomatic efforts with the threat of force”—coercive diplomacy—to achieve
120
their goals in world politics. If this attempt fails, the crisis escalates to a limited or gen121
eral war. Cable emphasizes that threats are only credible when there is a real readiness
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to use force.122 This implicit coercion is the “bread and butter of diplomacy.”123 He
defines this coercive “gunboat” diplomacy as “a resort to specific threats or to injurious
actions, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage, or to avert loss, in
the furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the
124
territory or the jurisdiction of their own state.” With the help of coercive diplomacy,
the employing actor aims at achieving an advantage from another state. If force is used
for other than a specific advantage, it is no longer a diplomatic action. The same is true
125
of inflicting damage after the desired objective has been achieved. Cable distinguishes
126
four types of coercive diplomacy:
•

Definitive: creates a fait accompli, leaves the adversary no choice.

•

Purposeful: induces the adversary to make a decision to do or stop something, such
as policy change—success depends on victim.

•

Catalytic: to influence events but is more manifest in a readiness to respond, such as
through the presence of a naval force.

•

Expressive: to emphasize attitudes and underline statements.

In his study on the effectiveness of gunboat diplomacy, Robert Mandel locates the roots
of gunboat diplomacy in the theories of bargaining, signaling, deterrence, coercion, and
127
force. Like Luttwak’s suasion, gunboat diplomacy incorporates many aspects of the
spectrum of possible reactions. According to Mandel, gunboat diplomacy is the most
128
frequently used “show of force” tool. Following Blechman and Kaplan, he defines a
show of force as “when physical actions are undertaken by one or more components of
the uniformed armed services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence, or to be prepared to influence, specific behavior of individuals in
129
another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence.” Mandel’s
graph (figure 6) shows the different stages from the most general classification of
gunboat diplomacy, presented by the widest circle, through the very specific, separate
categorization.
Often “gunboat diplomacy” and “coercive diplomacy” are used interchangeably. Mandel
130
observes that coercion “does seem to be at the core of gunboat diplomacy incidents.”
Christian Le Mière calls gunboat diplomacy a muscular negotiation that “attempts to
achieve its goals, which will be either coercive or deterrent, through intimidation. It is,
therefore, reliant upon a mismatch, or at least a perceived mismatch, between two states’
naval capabilities. A weaker navy will struggle to engage in gunboat diplomacy directed
131
at a stronger adversary for the simple reason that its bluff may be called.” Generally it
132
can be argued that gunboat diplomacy is more aggressive, overt, and offensive.
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Figure 6

Conceptualization of the Theoretical Context of Gunboat Diplomacy (adapted
from Mandel, “The Effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy,” p. 61)

Bargaining, signaling, and force
Coercive diplomacy, deterrence

Shows of force

Gunboat
diplomacy

Coercion
Diplomacy is closely linked to coercion. Thomas Schelling was the first scholar to
explore the power of coercion in depth. In his 1966 Arms and Influence he described war
as “brute force” aimed at destroying the adversary’s capabilities. More promising are the
coercion and intimidation of the enemy, as the power to hurt is more successful when it
is latent. Schelling concludes that “the power to hurt is bargaining power. To exploit it
is diplomacy—vicious diplomacy, but diplomacy. It is the threat of damage, or of more
damage to come, that can make someone yield or comply. It is latent violence that can
influence someone’s choice—violence that can still be withheld or inflicted or that a
victim believes can be withheld or inflicted. Unhappily, the power to hurt is often com133
municated by some performance of it.” His work clearly links diplomacy and violence.
Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman more generally define coercion as “getting the
134
adversary to act a certain way via anything short of brute force.”
Once distinguished from brute force, coercion is typically broken down into two subcategories, compellence and deterrence. Stephen Cimbala calls armed coercion “military
persuasion,” a “psychological strategy intended to influence the decision of other state or
135
nonstate actors, without necessarily having to destroy their armed forces or society.”
As these different definitions show, the term can be broadly interpreted, especially in
regard to the use of force. Bratton criticizes the lack of agreement on definitions and
136
success of coercion. Often the terms “coercion,” “compellence,” “coercive diplomacy,”
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“military coercion,” “coercive military strategy,” and “strategic coercion” are used
interchangeably. Bratton urges analysis of the effectiveness of coercion in “terms of
137
positive and negative outcomes rather than successes or failures.” His study provides a
structured analysis of the most important research on coercion and groups scholars according to their different definitions of coercion characteristics. The figure presents the
138
different types of threat involved in coercion.
Only compellent threats (i.e., coercion is
different from deterrence)

Alexander George, Janice Gross Stein, Robert
Pape

Both compellent and deterrent threats
(deterrence and compellence are both types of
coercion)

Thomas Schelling, Daniel Ellisberg, Wallace
Thies, Lawrence Freedman, Daniel Byman, and
Matthew Waxman

Note: For a detailed account of Robert Pape’s interesting discussion on airpower and coercive diplomacy see Bombing to Win. He
advocates the denial strategy of coercion and rejects the punishing power of coercive airpower. His denial theory proposes that
the specific means for coercion is the opponent’s military vulnerability: defeating an opponent’s military strategy denies him the
probability of achieving benefits and results in coercion.

A major disagreement revolves around the question whether force can be merely
threatened or must actually be used. Whereas the deterrence literature does not focus
on force—because deterrence has failed once force has to be employed—the coercion
literature has three divisions: “coercion through diplomacy separate from the use of
force; coercion exercised almost entirely through the use of force (normally air power);
139
and coercion exercised by both diplomacy and force.” The first views the use of force
as similar to deterrence: except for minor displays, force demonstrates the failure of
coercion. This school underscores the political-diplomatic nature of coercion: “The
goal of coercive diplomacy is to persuade the opponent to halt what he is doing, not to
strike him until his capabilities are so reduced that further resistance is futile. ‘Coercive
diplomacy, then, calls for using just enough force of an appropriate kind—if force is
used at all—to demonstrate one’s resolve to protect well-defined interests as well as the
140
credibility of one’s determination to use more force if necessary.’ ” The second division includes “sticks,” such as sanctions or force and threats of coercion, as an addition.
Coercion occurs simultaneously with the use of force. However, the objective is not the
destruction of the enemy’s military forces or territorial occupation but the compliance
of the opposing state. Critics complain that this school of thought often makes fine
distinctions between coercion and brute force. The third group does not distinguish
between coercion with force and coercion without force. Coercion involves diplomatic
and military means, including the use of force. “What distinguishes coercion from brute
force in this school is that force is used in a measured and controlled way to ‘signal’ to
the target the threat of further punishment unless it complies. . . . ‘Coercion depends
141
more on the threat of what is yet to come than on damage already done.’” Table 2-1
presents advocates for the three different schools.
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Table 2-1
Coercion before the use of force

George, Gross Stein

Coercion only through force

Pape

Coercion through diplomacy and force

Schelling, Thies

Thus, crisis coercion and brute force lie on a common continuum, as many different
142
levels of force can be employed to coerce. While Schelling promotes coercion through
both diplomacy and force, Alexander George urges the use of nonviolent coercion be143
fore force is used. He articulates as an alternative to war a detailed coercive-diplomacy
theory in which he describes the concept of coercive diplomacy as restricted to “efforts
to persuade an opponent to stop and/or undo an action he is already embarked upon.”
The offensive version of coercive threats, to persuade the victim aggressively to give up
something, is referred to as “blackmail strategy.” Deterrence is also different because coercive diplomacy is employed as a response to something already undertaken. Compellence often includes both blackmail and coercive diplomacy. George, however, offers the
criticism that compellence does not distinguish between defensive and offensive uses of
144
coercion and provides less flexibility.
While coercive diplomacy employs coercive threats, it also includes noncoercive persuasion and accommodation. Coercive diplomacy tries to persuade an actor to cease an
action and introduces the threat of punishment if he does not. This strategy relies on
the restricted exemplary use of force. The adversary is given the opportunity to halt his
action before more force is employed. Signaling, bargaining, and negotiating are important parts of this strategy. The goal is to avoid use of full-scale force and to minimize the
145
risk of escalation. Excessive use of force might have an effect contrary to that intended,
by hardening the position of the opposing party, and result in a further escalation of
146
tension. Such characteristics of naval forces as limited intrusiveness and flexibility
favor the role of the USN for this strategy. However, U.S. Marines, moving by sea, bring
capabilities for seizing objectives that have proved especially valuable in threatened or
actual interventions ashore.
147

George lists the impact of the following eight contexts on coercive diplomacy:
•

Type of provocation. Certain provocations are more difficult to halt or even undo. For
instance, a fait accompli, such as overrunning a neighboring country, is more challenging to reverse than coercing a state to halt an arms buildup.

•

Magnitude and depth of the conflict of interests. Very important national interests are
more complicated to manage and to reach a satisfactory solution for.
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•

Image of war. The more the parties want to avert an open war, because of the horrible
consequences, the more restraint they will show in escalating tensions and the more
amenable they will be to cooperation attempts (as was the case in, e.g., the Cuban
missile crisis).

•

Time pressure to achieve objective. Urgency felt by the parties to resolve the crisis
(for example, because of fear of losing domestic support, the influence of weather on
military operations, growing strength of the adversary, etc.).

•

Unilateral or coalitional coercive diplomacy. The more parties, the more difficult it is
for them to speak with one voice. This loss of unity might outweigh the benefits of
higher international pressure and greater resources.

•

Strong leadership. The success of coercive diplomacy may depend on the pressure of
strong and effective top-level leadership. Such leadership was provided by John F.
Kennedy in the Cuban missile crisis.

•

The isolation of the adversary. Resolution is more difficult if the adversary is not (like
Laos in 1961–62) an isolated state but is supported diplomatically and militarily by
allies.

•

The preferred postcrisis relationship with the adversary. Parties who hope to improve
the relationship after the termination of the crisis are more amenable to attempts to
reach mutually acceptable outcomes.

Further, coercive diplomacy depends greatly on context. George lists a number of
148
conditions that favor coercive diplomacy. First is the clarity of the objective of coercive
diplomacy and what is demanded of the adversary. The second is strength of motivation
(a necessary but not sufficient condition). The third is asymmetry of motivation—
coercive diplomacy is more likely to be successful if the side employing it is more highly
motivated by what is at stake in the crisis than its opponent. It is critical in this respect,
however, that the adversary believe that the coercing power is more determined. The
fourth is sense of urgency; the fifth, domestic and international support; and sixth, an
opponent’s fear of unacceptable escalation. Finally, the seventh is clarity concerning the
precise terms of the settlement of the crisis.
The effectiveness of coercive diplomacy can be appraised differently in a variety of contexts. It succeeded during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 but failed for the Gulf War
149
in 1990–91. Positive incentives or negative, punishing threats can be employed. The
assurance given to Cuba during the missile crisis was a positive inducement (carrots and
150
sticks), while during the early stages of the Gulf War punishment was threatened.
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The Problem of Effectiveness
As previously stated, naval forces can signal intentions, shape attitudes, and employ
(coercive) diplomacy. This suggests the question of the effectiveness of naval forces in
exercising these functions. How successful are naval forces at carrying out the different missions? Measuring effectiveness is complicated. Crises outcomes are often
151
characterized by a mixture of success and failure. Because naval forces normally do
not encroach on other nations’ sovereign territory and their presence poses less of a
threat than that of ground or air forces, their involvement is likely to be more readily
accepted by crisis actors. At the same time, because naval forces are relatively subtle,
they may lack the desired efficacy and directness in crises of high importance to the
United States. Authors disagree as to whether the flexibility of naval forces increases
152
or decreases their effectiveness. It is often argued that naval power is unlikely to
be as influential as ground or air forces and that it is rarely decisive on its own. In
Brooks’s words, “Attempting to use the Navy as the sole—or even the primary—vehicle
of influence is at best inefficient, and at worst useless. In an era of jointness, the Navy
153
should leave the task of influencing other states to the other services.” This suggests
that the biggest disadvantage of naval forces is their lack of decisiveness. Likewise, Till
154
claims that naval diplomacy is hardly ever decisive when employed alone. Deborah
Sanders argues that naval diplomacy lacks cultural and historical awareness and suffers
155
from inadequate information exchange. She draws on the example of Operation Sea
Breeze in 2006 in Ukraine: designed to improve the collaboration between countries,
the planned exercise “became a hostage to the political crisis in Kiev over the formation
of a new coalition government.”
Edward Rhodes and coauthors conclude that our understanding of how shaping opera156
tions during peacetime support desired political outcomes is limited. Neither the
types of military power nor the kinds of successful shaping operations are well known.
In Rhodes’s study on the effectiveness of naval presence and signaling he comes to
the following conclusion: “Further, and more germane to the issue of naval forward
presence as a crisis deterrent tool, there is some evidence that because of the general
insensitivity of potential aggressors to information, efforts to ‘signal’ resolve through
measures such as reinforcing or redeploying forces have limited effectiveness. If force
movements are large enough to foreclose particular military options, they may forestall
aggression. But as a means of indicating resolve and convincing an aggressor of the
157
credibility of deterrent commitments, they do not generally appear to have an impact.”
But as Brooks says, “Navies, by their very nature, tend to operate on the margins of
national consciousness. Their influence is likely to be subtle and indirect and not easy to
158
discern or to measure.” The fact that it is hard to measure influence is an argument for
better understanding and better methods of measurement. It is not, however, a reason
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for ignoring the influence of naval forces in seeking to advance U.S. interests.159 I will
argue that while limited effectiveness poses a problem, the many other advantages of
naval forces are valuable.
Hypotheses
Signaling, shaping, and coercive diplomacy are all possible reactions to international
crises. Of course, many other factors contribute to coercive diplomacy, and the hypotheses based on coercion literature merely borrow the idea of a limited use of force in crises
to achieve U.S. goals. These theoretical ideas, together with the functions and characteristics of navies discussed previously, provide the starting point for formulating exploratory hypotheses, attempting to answer the present research questions pertaining to the
types of crises the USN responds to, and investigating the way in which other involved
actors shape the USN involvement, the role naval forces play within U.S. crisis activity,
and the influence they exert on outcomes. The graph in figure 7 shows the strengths of
different naval-forces combinations and how they will be analyzed in the hypotheses.
Figure 7
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Table 2-2 summarizes the potential impact of advantages/disadvantages of naval forces
on the four categories of crises response. As laid out in the previous chapter, ubiquity,
readiness, mobility, flexibility, independence, and subtleness are the main advantages;
misperception, limited decisiveness, limited self-sustainment, and vulnerability are the
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TABLE 2-2
Advantages

Disadvantages

Crisis Characteristics

Observing events, adapting to changes,
immediate response, subtle influence

Limited influence

Crisis Actors

Subtle influence, less publicity

Limited influence,
misperception

U.S. Involvement

Support of all types of activities, calibration
of action to circumstances, subtle influence,
less publicity

Limited or even
negative influence

Crisis Outcomes

Different levels of coercion, subtle influence

Limited or even
negative influence

main disadvantages. The last two affect other military services even more than they do
navies and so will thus not be considered for the generation of hypotheses.
Some of the hypotheses treat the U.S. naval activity as a dependent and others as an
independent variable, since certain criteria influence the decision to send naval forces
but once launched, naval forces produce their own cause-and-effect outcomes.
Crisis Characteristics Hypotheses (H1a–H1d)
In the introductory chapter I presented two research questions concerning the crisis
characteristics:
•

In what type of crises are U.S. naval forces mostly deployed?

•

To which crisis locations do U.S. naval forces mostly deploy?

The following theoretical ideas and hypotheses will help to answer these questions.
Crisis characteristics are manifold and include the type of threats and issues, conflictmanagement techniques, levels of intensity, geographic locations, and the importance of
a crisis, to name a few. The list of advantages and disadvantages of naval forces offers a
starting point for analyzing the relation between crisis characteristics and seaborne crisis response. Advantages such as ubiquity, readiness, mobility, flexibility, and independence all enable seaborne forces to react immediately to crises. Subtleness and limited
decisiveness, on the other hand, suggest involvement in “low threat” and “low issue”
crises and, together with the problem of misperception, render U.S. seaborne activity
more likely when the threat to American national interests is low. This view is also encouraged by a realist point of view. The problem of decisiveness would further suggest a
more hesitant involvement in violent crises, while conversely ubiquity/flexibility allows
immediate response in order to halt violence.
Threat, Stakes, and Violence. Crisis characteristics are important in deciding how to
respond to and manage a crisis, as they influence severity, duration, management tech160
nique, and termination. According to Paul Diehl, the issue of a crisis and its salience
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are especially crucial to understanding national behavior and the use of military force.161
Depending on the issue and its salience, actors may be more willing to suffer high
costs, and if so, that makes diplomacy more difficult and less likely to succeed. Highsalience issues are prone to be long lasting and often call for coercion as a management
technique. Not all of George’s contextual variables affecting coercive diplomacy can be
applied to this study of international crises, but two assumptions—type of provocation
and magnitude and depth of the conflict of interests—can be transformed into hypoth162
eses. As stated above, George argues that certain types of provocations pose a greater
challenge and are thus more difficult to resolve. He identifies the invasion of foreign
territory as an example of these greater challenges, whereas a hostile arms buildup is
more amenable to coercive diplomacy. Thus, I assume, the lower the threat of the crisis,
the less difficult its resolution. As a result, very limited uses or displays of force should
be sufficient. Political crises suggest political/diplomatic means as response tools. In
general, force is graduated to the severity of the incidents, in such terms as importance,
difficulty, and risk. The more threatening and grave the crisis, the less likely naval
forces will be employed alone. The same can be assumed about the issues at stake in a
crisis. This assumption is based on George’s concept of magnitude and depth, viz., that
military issues present a greater threat to national interests than economic crises, for
example, and require a more forceful intervention.
Further analyzing the type of provocation, Paul Senese finds that territorial disputes
163
have a high likelihood of escalation and often show higher levels of severity. Huth also
points to the need to intervene as soon as possible: “Given that once territorial disputes
emerge, domestic political incentives encourage leaders to remain deadlocked in con164
flict, timely diplomatic intervention is necessary to try and avoid protracted disputes.”
This suggests that within the category “threat” of a crisis, territorial disputes trigger
naval responses, because of their capacity to respond immediately.
H1a (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is more likely in “low threat”
international crises. (Based on George’s type of provocation.)
H1b (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is more likely in “low issues”
international crises. (Based on George’s magnitude and depth of the conflict of interests.)
Deterrence theories argue that if violence levels reach full-scale warfare, diplomacy has
failed, in which case appropriate military force must be called on. Violent crises are
also said to be more difficult to resolve; thus the limited effectiveness of naval forces
may suggest more forceful responses. Graduated force can protect against violence or
control, contain, or even dominate it and thereby persuade the enemy to halt his actions.
165
As Loup Francart and Jean-Jacques Patry note, the issue is how much force to apply. I
assume that high levels of violence will typically bring stronger U.S. military responses.
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Alternatively, however, high levels of violence may increase the need for immediate
response or the capability to calibrate action to circumstances, or even encourage nonintervention. The so-called Vietnam syndrome, reinforced by the events in Lebanon in
1983 and Somalia in 1993, suggests an unwillingness to accept high casualties. Although
even a single event can be sufficient, as the overall violence level of the crises increases,
so does the danger of high casualties. As Susan Hannah Allen states, “In fact, the lower
risk of casualties associated with air power is part of its appeal as a coercive instrument
for the United States, since lower casualties are associated with lower domestic costs in
166
democratic societies.” It is thus not clear in which direction the hypotheses will go, but
following a deterrence point of view I assume the following:
H1c (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is more likely in international
crises with low levels of violence.
Geostrategic Importance and Geographical Location. Because of their limited decisiveness, naval forces are less likely to be employed in regions and crises of great interest to
the United States. If the crisis is deemed important and national interests are threatened, the United States will send a more powerful force. According to Meernik and
Chelsea Brown, “a major military operation will likely signal strong US interest in a
crisis and, thus, a willingness to use such forces for longer periods of time to attain US
167
objectives.” The commitment of ground troops and the number of troops committed
168
signal the level of resolve. Similarly, Art concludes that limited uses of force usually
provide equally limited incentives for targets to change their behavior and are therefore
169
not powerful enough when important U.S. interests are at stake.
H1d (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is more likely when the threat
to geostrategic interests posed by the international crisis is low.
Crisis Actors and USN Crisis Response: Crisis Actors Hypotheses (H2a–H2d)
The introductory chapter presented three research questions pertaining to the relation
between crisis actor characteristics and seaborne crisis response:
•

How do other actors influence U.S. naval involvement?

•

What crisis actor characteristics trigger the deployment of U.S. naval forces?

•

How is the U.S. naval involvement perceived by the other crisis actors?

Four hypotheses will help to answer these questions. The characteristics of the crisis
actors and other involved third parties play an important role and influence the crisis
management technique. The more subtle influence and the likelihood of misperception
of naval forces suggest more power when there are fewer crisis actors. Because naval
forces normally do not encroach on other countries’ sovereignty, their involvement is
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likely to be perceived more favorably. Additionally, all advantages of naval forces favor
their deployment in crisis with only limited publicity and global scrutiny.
Number of Actors. Some of Mandel’s hypotheses on the effectiveness of gunboat diplomacy can be modified and applied to naval involvement in crises. According to Glenn
Snyder and Paul Diesing, where there are several participants, accountability is more
170
broadly diffused and hostility less pronounced. Yet others claim that negotiations are
likely to be less efficient and settlements more elusive as the number of participants
171
grows. I share the latter position, viz., that naval forces are less effective when multiple actors are involved, because it is then more difficult to reach agreements and to
influence all actors. Similarly, Art finds that a multiplicity of parties on each side of the
172
confrontation renders coercive diplomacy more difficult. In this analysis there is only
one coercer (the United States), not multiple coercers, but I hypothesize that the form
of military deployment chosen by the United States is influenced by the number of coercion targets. Meernik argues that the importance of a crisis to U.S. national interests
173
increases with a growing number of actors. Because the potential impact of the crisis
intensifies with the number of actors, so does the need to respond more visibly and
decisively because of the received attention.
H2a (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is less likely in international
crises with multiple actors. (This is a counter-hypothesis to Mandel: that gunboat diplomacy is more successful if the action involves multiple assailants or victims rather than a
single assailant or victim.)
UN Involvement. The involvement of the United Nations lends a certain legitimacy
to involvement in a crisis. UN involvement can range from a preliminary discussion
of the crisis without resolution to authorization to use force. While multilateralism is
desirable, it slows down intervention decisions; the right moment to intervene might be
174
lost. Because naval forces are relatively nonintrusive and politically acceptable, they
might be the instrument of choice in crises without UN engagement, so as to attract
minimal global attention. The unique attribute of naval as compared to other forms of
military power in the diplomatic context is its oceanic ubiquity and its independence
175
from non-U.S. authorities. A study by Terrence Chapman and Dan Reiter found that
when “uses of force attract the support of the United Nations (UN) Security Council,
176
the rally in support of the American president increases significantly.” This lends additional support for the likelihood of deployment of naval forces when the UN is
not involved, as such missions also trigger less debate or criticism within the United
States. Naval forces can be deployed without attracting much attention in the U.S.
media, giving the U.S. policy makers the option of influencing events without attracting close scrutiny by the American society. Generally, strong military power is most
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commonly endorsed by the public when seen as a last resort, which is unlikely in the
177
case of low-level UN activity.
H2b (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only in international crises is more
likely when there is no or low UN involvement.
Lack of Cohesion. Conflict management works best between well-identified entities. When the government of one of the involved nations faces challenges, such as a
rebellion or insurgency, it will be more difficult for third parties to support conflict
178
resolution. Internal unity is an important source of bargaining strength. Disunity
and lack of cohesion hinder successful conflict management because of the limitations
179
they impose on the power and authority of the government. Thus, severe political and
socioeconomic disorder renders coercive diplomacy more difficult and less likely to be
successful. I hypothesize that stability is related to how receptive the state is to low-level
influence. In order to exercise more subtle influence it is necessary to have an entity
to address; thus internal stability is more likely to yield favorable results. Additionally,
unstable states have less incentive to terminate crises, because they have less to lose;
naval forces are not influential enough to change their behavior. The hypothesis follows
180
Mandel, with the United States in the role of the assailant.
H2c (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is more likely when the actors
are politically stable. (Gunboat diplomacy is more successful if the assailant possesses
equal or higher political stability than does the victim.)
Perception of U.S. Involvement. The flexibility, ubiquity, and limited intrusiveness
of naval forces establish the ground for the next hypothesis. Participants in a crisis are
more likely to perceive involvement of naval forces as less threatening than that of other
military forces and therefore to retain a more positive view of U.S. actions. Once in the
crisis area, naval forces are more flexible, less disruptive psychologically, and less offen181
sive diplomatically than equivalent land-based forces. Additionally, their deployment is
likely to be viewed with less anxiety and violence. Dov Zakheim and colleagues conducted a survey among senior opinion leaders in the Mediterranean littoral, the Middle East,
182
and East Asia. The findings were that flexible American presence is perceived as most
favorable and that maritime presence is the most flexible U.S. military presence. Treating
naval involvement as an independent variable, I hypothesize the following:
H2d (independent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only in international crises is
perceived as more favorable by the crisis actors than a combination with other military
services.
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U.S. Involvement and USN Crisis Response
The introductory chapter presented three research questions to analyze the role of seaborne forces within U.S. crisis response:
•

In what type of activity are U.S. naval forces most likely deployed?

•

How do U.S. naval forces deploy with other military services?

•

How effective is U.S. naval involvement?

Their ubiquity, readiness, and independence make naval forces an attractive way to
show concern almost immediately without waiting for a buildup, while their flexibility allows adaptation of the response as necessary. Their quality of subtleness further
encourages low-level activity. The concerns regarding limited decisiveness and misperception, on the other hand, suggest that naval deployments have less leverage, a factor
impacting the effectiveness of the contribution of U.S. activity to crisis termination.
Similarly, when the United States has a larger stake in the crises, naval forces alone
might not be the response tool of choice.
U.S. Involvement Hypotheses (H3a–H3f)
The level of military force employed signals clearly the U.S. level of commitment to a
crisis. In turn, the level and choice of force mirror the political, financial, and logistical
183
costs the United States is willing to accept. Huth explains, “Rational deterrence theorists have argued that costly signals are required to communicate credibly a defender’s
resolve. Costly signals are those actions and statements that clearly increase the risk of
a military conflict and also increase the costs of backing down from a deterrent threat,
thereby revealing information about the actual commitment of a state to defend against
an attack. States that are bluffing will be unwilling to cross a certain threshold of threat
184
and military actions in a crisis for fear of committing themselves to armed conflict.”
The questions and hypotheses involving U.S. activity include naval-force involvement as
both a dependent and independent variable.
Level of U.S. Involvement. The use of the seaborne forces, in the absence of ground or
air forces, should be prevalent in international crises with limited U.S. involvement.
Most forms of coercive diplomacy assume both limited involvement and limited force in
a first attempt to influence the adversary. The United States will try to halt and reverse
the progress of an adversary’s action before resorting to the direct use of armed forces.
Alternatively, low-level involvement demonstrates a moderate interest in the crisis and
reluctance to invest in a strong military deployment. In both cases a lower U.S. involvement is assumed to favor naval involvement.
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H3a (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is more likely in international
crises with lower forms of U.S. involvement.
U.S. Effectiveness. According to Cable, a limited use of naval force is effective if the
185
threat alone achieves the objective. However, a survey of the Mediterranean region
reveals that host nations pay the most attention to the actual use of force in crisis,
especially combat action. Furthermore, the study finds, U.S. military force is perceived
as most effective when it takes the form of combat action—for example, the air attack on
Libya in 1986. Before April of that year, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi pursued an active
program of training, supplying, and sponsoring international terrorists. After the U.S.
186
bombing, Libyan-sponsored terrorism dropped sharply and may have ceased entirely.
Meernik proposes the following hypotheses to measure the effectiveness of the different
force levels: “The greater the force level deployed, the more likely the United States will
187
achieve its objectives in the short and long term.” The dispatch of larger and stronger
forces is more likely perceived as a firmer commitment and thus can more likely lead to
or enforce an abatement of the crisis.
The following three hypotheses treat naval involvement as an independent variable,
influencing the effectiveness of the U.S. involvement.
H3b (independent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only in international crises is less
effective than the involvement of all forces.
H3c (independent): The U.S. involvement will be most effective if direct military force is
used.
H3d (independent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is less effective in contributing to the termination of the crisis.
United States as a Crisis Actor. If the United States is directly involved as a crisis actor
and not as a third party, the stakes are higher for, and the outcome is more important
to, the United States. Thus when the United States is directly involved in the crisis, one
should expect a correspondingly heavy military commitment.
H3e (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only in international crises is less
likely if the United States is a direct crisis actor.
Immediate Readiness. Naval forces are forward deployed in and close to regions where
crises are most likely to develop and U.S. national interests lie. Because U.S. naval forces
are spread around the world, they are able to react immediately. It is often argued that
they react to crises because they are “there.” But Carlisle Trost and Arthur Barber, writing separately, underscore the importance of capability as well as availability, qualities
188
that are critical in explaining their frequent use. Barber stresses that “the political
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agility and rapid in-theater availability of naval forces, as much as their military capability, have influenced decisions to use them so frequently.” Further, Cable argues that
some disputes require an immediate response to be effective. I assume that naval-forces
responses occur very shortly after the crisis breaks out. The state of readiness also de189
pends on the overall overseas number of naval personnel.
H3f (dependent): Only U.S. naval forces are able to react immediately after the international crisis breaks out.
Crises Outcomes and USN Crisis Response
The last research category presented in the introductory chapter concerns the relation
between seaborne crisis response and outcomes.
•

How do U.S. naval forces influence outcomes?

Crises Outcomes Hypotheses (H4a–H4d)
The deployment of naval forces is assumed to affect the outcome of a crisis, treating naval involvement as the independent variable. Although it is impossible to measure how
much direct relevance the Navy has in deterring a specific adversary, naval operations
can help to display national power and signal national will—both essential components
190
of deterrence. According to this view, naval forces can positively influence outcomes
in an unthreatening fashion, yet flex muscles and subtly support diplomatic efforts.
A part of Blechman and Kaplan’s study analyzed outcomes of the interventions of
191
different U.S. armed forces. A positive outcome is achieved when the United States
is satisfied with the behavior of the other participants. Their findings on the effectiveness of the different armed services in producing positive outcomes are that land-based
combat aircraft is most positively correlated with successful outcomes, followed by
land-based ground forces. Positive outcomes were more frequent when land-based
troops are employed, compared to amphibious ground forces, and they are even more
192
frequent when both of them deployed together. Blechman and Kaplan show that
positive outcomes of crises and conflicts are associated primarily with the direct use of
force, although indirect or latent uses of force can be successful in the short run. When
the objective is to end the use of force by another actor or to precipitate regime change,
direct use of armed forces is less successful. When the objective is to deter another actor
193
from repeated use of force, outcomes are positive. The authors also study the influence
of the levels of force on outcomes and conclude that “outcomes were less often positive
when greater levels of force were used, unless nuclear-capable forces were used together
194
with one or more major conventional components.”
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Higher levels of force correlate with more complicated situations, which in turn
negatively influence the chances of a successful outcome. The same study, however,
concludes that landing U.S. forces on foreign territory is more likely to result in positive
outcomes than the mere dispatch of naval forces, thus suggesting that a U.S. land com195
mitment positively influences outcomes. While the former finding is concerned with
the level of force, the latter focuses on the type of force. Overall, the findings suggest
that small land forces (satisfying criteria both for land forces and lower levels of force)
correlate most strongly with positive outcomes. Further, land-based aircraft rank higher
than ground troops, and ground troops higher than sea-based Marines; the combination of the Army and Marine troops is optimal. Although the two findings seem contradictory, they are focused on different issues—the type of force and the strength of the
force. Hastedt finds that generally the firmer the commitment, the more often favorable
196
outcomes are achieved.
The mere threat of intervention can prevent or end conflicts by altering the parties’
perceptions of a continuation or cessation of hostilities. It can reduce the rewards of war
and enhance those of peace. While this can increase the bargaining space and facilitate
agreements, there remains debate over whether or when threats of intervention have this
effect. Military forces can threaten to intervene if a party continues to fight or does not
comply. This threat can also encourage weaker parties to fight in hopes that the stronger
197
military force will come to their defense.
Despite the difficulty in assessing the crisis outcome from the vantage of the United
States as Blechman and Kaplan did, I assume that definite outcomes are overall more
198
positive, because they signify a clear-cut end to the crisis. Because naval forces are said
to be less decisive, I assume a negative relation between the involvement of naval forces
and definite crisis resolution. Stronger forces, however, are more likely to enforce a
solution instead of subtly trying to broker a formal agreement. Air and land forces pose
greater threats than naval forces and raise the odds of compliance. The promotion of an
agreement can be interpreted as a right intention in the context of just-war theory, while
an imposed outcome is likely to further the national interests of the imposing party and
thus implies an ulterior motive.
H4a (independent): International crises with only U.S. naval forces involvement are less
likely to lead to definite outcomes.
H4b (independent): International crises with only U.S. naval forces involvement are more
likely to lead to a formal agreement.
According to Linton Brooks, the very fact that naval presence can be temporary and
199
low-key, rather than dramatic, makes presence potentially useful in easing tension.
For example, James Tubbs assumes that excessive use of force actually escalates a
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confrontation.200 It is debatable, however, whether the presence of naval forces plays a decisive role in ending tension. Some aver that it could even heighten it. McNulty identifies
a possible deterrence effect if naval forces demonstrate their war-fighting capabilities
201
in a tense situation. This in turn has the potential to exacerbate tension if deterrence
fails. According to these deliberations the direction of the next hypothesis can go either
way. For now I assume a positive influence of naval forces on tension.
H4c (independent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is likely to reduce tensions in
international crises.
Another important aspect of outcomes is the satisfaction of the crisis actors with results.
Poor or weak crisis management is likely to influence negatively the overall resolution
and therefore actor satisfaction. As with arguments made above, the limited power of
naval forces may not be enough to resolve crises to the satisfaction of the involved parties. This is different from hypothesis 2d, which suggests that these characteristics leave
the actors with a favorable impression of U.S. intentions, aside from the outcome itself.
H4d (independent): International crises with only U.S. naval forces involvement are less
likely to lead to a satisfactory outcome.
Summary
Chapter 2 began with a very broad introduction into the U.S. uses of force before
focusing on the theoretical ideas of naval diplomacy and coercion. By combining these
concepts with the advantages and disadvantages of naval forces discussed in chapter 1
and other research on crisis management, I attempted to explain the generation of the
various hypotheses. Before turning to the statistical analyses, chapter 3 describes the
efforts to find and combine reliable naval-response data.
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chapter three

Uncharted Waters

Data on U.S. Naval Activity Short of War
While there is much research on naval activities, there is a dearth of empirical evidence
of the influence of naval forces. Only very few studies statistically research the deployment of the U.S. Navy in employments short of war. As laid out so far, naval forces offer
promising vehicles for crisis response, and by looking at different international crises,
the hypotheses can be used to underline both advantages and disadvantages. This chapter lays the groundwork for the empirical analyses in this study by explaining the data
collection and the creation of naval variables. The last part presents some frequencies of
the newly introduced naval variables and introduces the methodology. Prior to a discussion of the data for this project, the most important empirical studies are summarized.
Empirical Literature Review on U.S. Naval Activity
James Cable’s Gunboat Diplomacy, first published in 1971 and updated in 1981,
provides a detailed account of different instances when naval gunboat diplomacy was
employed, independent of the country and the target, between 1919 and 1979. “Gunboat
diplomacy” captures events where naval forces either threatened or used limited force,
short of war, against state actors on their territories. Cable’s data for each of the more
than two hundred cases provide the dates, the assailant, the victim, and a very brief
description. It does not account for every single use of gunboat diplomacy but rather
illustrates the range.
In 1977, Robert Mahoney, Jr., conducted a CNA study on U.S. Navy responses to crises
1
over the previous twenty years. Based on the assumption that crisis management is
among the Navy’s principal missions, the report provides a summary of U.S. naval
(including Marine Corps) responses to international incidents and crises short of war.
Only reactions of USN and of USMC forces “immediately prior and during” are included, thereby neglecting a number of activities outside this time frame, such as deterrence operations before a crisis erupts. The focus on USN and USMC activity does not
account for the possibly important role other service and different policy instruments
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play. Mahoney urges caution when applying the findings to future research: “The way
in which the Navy has been employed as an instrument of crisis diplomacy in the past
has been the result of choices made by the National Command Authorities in conjunction with certain types of foreign events. Different choices may be made in the future in
response to changing circumstances.” The following criteria were applied to define the
cases:
•

Any actions taken by the national command authorities involving the U.S. armed
forces (only the Navy and Marine Corps for immediate purposes)

•

Carried out in conjunction with events (of any type) occurring outside the United
States

•

Occurring other than in the course of general or limited war

•

With the exception of a few categories of responses (to be shown below), such as
humanitarian relief efforts

•

Reported at a given level in the political-military policy process.

The mere presence of naval forces is not sufficient for an event to be considered a “response.” Mahoney defines “peacetime” as the absence of war and therefore locates crisis
management within the peacetime activities. The peacetime category applies to any instance with fewer than a thousand casualties; once this threshold is crossed the incident
would amount to at least a limited war. Therefore, within his study’s time frame only
the Vietnam War, beginning with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964 and ending in
April 1975, is considered a war. Additionally, the following categories of responses are
excluded:
•

Humanitarian operations (e.g., the provision of medical assistance following natural
disasters abroad)

•

Intelligence and other special operations (these are not systematically covered in the
project’s sources, which do not include compartmentalized intelligence information)

•

Operations that are routinely undertaken to support American diplomacy (e.g., Navy
units are customarily alerted during presidential visits to Third World nations)

•

Incidents at sea that are not specifically related to events taking place ashore (e.g.,
hijackings, rammings, overflights of Navy ships by Soviet aircraft)

•

Extraregional alerts of Navy forces (during some responses the Navy was placed on
global alert; while this is noted, where relevant, the principal emphasis in the analysis
is on forces within the region where the crisis or incident transpired [e.g., the Mediterranean basin]).
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The Mahoney analyses reveal the following:
•

The Navy responded to ninety-nine international incidents and crises.

•

More than three-quarters of the responses took place in three regions: the Mediterranean, the Americas (Central and South America plus the Caribbean), and East Asia
(Korea through Southeast Asia).

•

In fifty-nine out of the ninety-nine cases, aircraft carriers were present. From 1955
to 1960 there were twenty operations with, and seven without, carriers; 1961–65,
twenty-two with carriers and twenty-eight without; and 1966–75, seventeen with
and five without. The 1961–65 time frame shows the highest frequency of operations
both with and without carrier deployment. The 1966–75 period was marked by fewer
carrier operations, but more than 75 percent of the total responses involved carriers.

•

Amphibious units were deployed in sixty-one out of the ninety-nine naval responses.
In 1961–65, amphibious forces were used most frequently (twenty-eight operations
with amphibious forces and twenty-two without them). The earlier and later periods
were marked by higher percentages of operations involving amphibious forces, but
overall fewer responses occurred. In 1955–60 occurred eighteen responses with and
nine without amphibious forces, and in 1966–75, fifteen with and seven without.

Power was projected ashore mostly to influence the following kinds of events:
•

Evacuation of special weapons and associated personnel

•

Rescue of endangered Western nationals

•

Short-term, moderate-scale landing and air-strike operations directed at Third
World nations

•

Signals of American intentions and concerns sent during the course of a crisis (e.g.,
the movement of two carrier groups toward the Syrian coast during the final phase of
the 1967 June War).

Carrier aviation is most likely in the last two categories of responses, especially when
overflight or basing rights are restricted or not granted. Mahoney concludes that the
Navy “has been used as a flexible instrument of crisis diplomacy” and that “it appears
that the force packages correspond (in at least a general sense) to certain types of crisis
2
situations or sets of similar policy problems.”
Blechman and Kaplan analyzed in 1978 the political use of different U.S. military ser3
vices and their deployment in responses short of war. They concluded that
•

The Navy was the armed service most often employed for political uses of force in
the post–World War II period.
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•

Air forces, excluding sea air, were involved in about half of the incidents. Combat
ground troops were the least involved and rarely without naval forces.

•

Naval forces participated in events worldwide. The results demonstrate that whoever
else was involved, wherever the incident took place, or whatever the type of incident,
the Navy was deployed in roughly nine out of ten cases.

•

Within the instances of use of naval forces, aircraft carriers were involved in more
than half the cases. The authors found that aircraft carriers were most often deployed
when the level of violence was high and the Chinese or Soviets either threatened or
actually used force. The use of amphibious forces does not seem to be influenced by
the location of the incident, with the exceptions of Southeast Asia (more frequent)
and East Asia (less frequent). Often the deployment of aircraft carrier and amphibious forces overlapped.

In regard to the outcome, the following results were presented:

4

•

Most positive outcomes were reached when land-based combat aircraft were
deployed, followed by ground troops; the deployment of naval forces reduced the
5
frequency of positive outcomes.

•

Positive outcomes occurred less often when the objective was to reinforce (assure or
deter) clients rather than to modify (compel or induce) behavior and when greater
levels of force were used.

•

Previous U.S. military engagement in the region, withdrawal of forces, and statements issued before the involvement by the president or senior administration
officials positively influenced outcomes. Both very high and very low levels of presidential popularity were frequently related to positive outcomes.

•

Involvement of the Soviet Union (as actor and as threatening or actually using force)
negatively influenced outcomes, while the strategic weapons balance between the
actors exerted no influence.

•

Finally, direct American involvement increased the frequency of positive outcomes.

In 1986, Robert Mandel published a study entitled “The Effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy.” Building on Cable’s data, he developed ten hypotheses to examine the effectiveness of gunboat diplomacy between 1947 and 1978. The hypotheses were divided into
three groups, relating to the nature of the event, the relationship between the assailant
and the victim, and the natures of both assailant and victim. He found that militarily prepared and politically stable parties were more successful in gunboat diplomacy.
Prior uses of force in the same region and a definitive, deterrent display of force further
supported success. After 1965 actual uses of force became more successful, comparable
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to the success of displays of force. The success of gunboat diplomacy was independent of
the regional identity of the participants or the relative strengths of the assailant and victim. Overall, he praises the strategy of gunboat diplomacy as a viable alternative to war if
meaningful dialogue between the disputing parties is no longer feasible.
In 1991, Adam Siegel conducted for CNA an empirical study of U.S. Navy and Ma6
rine Corps crisis-management responses to international incidents and crises. Like
Mahoney, Siegel focused on reactions immediately prior to and during U.S. involvement. Two hundred seven cases involving the U.S. Navy were identified, excluding
worldwide everyday, routine activities. Siegel defined “crisis management” as peacetime
activity, including all actions short of war. A “war” was defined by the threshold of one
thousand American casualties; for this reason both the Korean and Vietnam Wars were
excluded—considering the dates of the Korean War as 25 June 1950–27 July 1953 and
Vietnam as 10 August 1964–31 December 1974, in order that “(a) the long wind down
of heavy U.S. involvement [in Vietnam] would not be unduly reflected in the study and
(b) the evacuations of American personnel from Phnom Penh and Saigon would be
included.” The final stages of the report were written in January 1991, before the beginning of the Gulf War of that year. Siegel surmised at the time that this conflict would
be categorized as a war; however, retrospectively applying the one-thousand-and-overcasualties criterion, it would not.
All instances meeting the following criteria were included in Siegel’s study:
•

Actions taken by the national command authorities involving the U.S. armed forces
(for an action to be included in his study, a Navy surface ship or a Marine Corps unit
must have been involved)

•

Actions taken in conjunction with events occurring outside the United States

•

Actions taken other than in the course of general war (Korea in 1950–53 or Vietnam
1964–74)

•

Actions that were reported at a given (senior) level in the political-military policy
process.

A few categories of responses were not included:
•

Activities inside the United States (because the focus lies on international events).

•

Humanitarian missions, such as disaster relief and hospital-ship port calls.

•

Intelligence operations, for security reasons (because the document is unclassified,
all responses had to involve surface ships; “Other forces such as submarines, patrol
aircraft, and SEALs [were] used without surface ship involvement; however, the
activities of these forces are not well documented in the unclassified literature”).
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•

Operations that are routinely undertaken to support American diplomacy. (For
example, as noted above, U.S. Navy units are often alerted during presidential
visits overseas, such as during President George H. W. Bush’s February 1990 trip to
Colombia.)

•

Law enforcement operations (for example, the Department of Defense involvement
in drug-interdiction operations).

•

Incidents at sea, activities not specifically related to events taking place ashore, such
as incidents (collisions or harassment) between U.S. Navy and Soviet vessels. Some
types of incidents at sea, specifically terrorist hijackings or seizures of U.S.-flag vessels that prompt a U.S. military response, are included.

Every entry lists the name of the crisis, the area of responsibility (AOR), the start date
and duration, and the involvement of USMC, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Army, in addition to naval forces. Not counting the involvements in Korea and Vietnam, the periods 1951–55 and 1966–75 showed the lowest U.S. military response frequency. Siegel
suggests either that military forces were too engaged in the war activities to make more
resources available for other purposes, or that other military activities are less documented during times of war. Aircraft carriers were employed in 68 percent of the 207
cases, amphibious force in 54 percent, and the Marine Corps in 55 percent. Additionally, in twenty-one cases USMC aviation units on board carriers were involved, raising
the total USMC involvement to 57 percent of all cases. In 26 percent and 18 percent of
the crises, respectively, the Air Force and Army were involved.
In 2005 the Center for Naval Analyses released a report by Eugene Cobble, Hank
Gaffney, and Dmitry Gorenburg, of which the initial goal had been to compare U.S.
naval forces’ responses with those of other services for the period between 1970 and
7
2000. However, it became apparent that there were no major differences between the
services’ responses. This finding did not surprise the study’s coauthors, as they had
found an increase in the number of joint and coalition operations. This latest CNA
study is the only one to include responses by other military services without any naval
involvement. The report divides the type of response into six different categories (a few
cases are coded differently) and produces the frequencies shown below.
Combat

22

Show of force

65

Support of peacekeeping and military supply

64

Contingent positioning and reconnaissance

50
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Protection of noncombatants (including evacuations)

83

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR)

366

The total cases, including some other categories, numbered 660 responses. For the period
from November 2000 through June 2003, thirteen more cases (exclusive of HA/DR) were
added. Out of the additions only one—an evacuation of noncombatants from the Ivory
Coast in September 2002—did not involve naval forces. Without accounting for the
last category (HA/DR), naval forces were involved in 54 percent of all responses. While
Blechman and Kaplan had found a ratio of nine out of ten for political uses of armed
forces, these numbers suggest a proportion of a little over five out of ten for the five types
8
of responses to international incidents. More than half of USN responses included the
USMC. Very few Marine Corps or Army reactions occurred without naval forces. The
large majority of cases without the USN were Air Force responses. Figure 8 shows the
different service-combination percentages for cases with and without naval involvement.
Figure 8

CNA III USN Service Combinations
Cases with Naval Involvement
usarmY & usN

usaF & usN

usmC & usN
2.40%
51.50
%
46.10
%

54.49
%

45.51
%

27.54
%

usmC

No usaF

No USMC

usaF

usarmY
No usarmY

Not sure if yes

72.46
%

Cases without Naval Involvement (usN)
usmC without usN

8.45
%

usaF

usmC

90.85
%

usarmY without usN

usaF without usN
10.56
%

9.15%

No usmC

89.44
%

No usaF

usarmY

91.55
%

No usarmY

The CNA study’s data include the involved military services, incident name and location, response type, start/end dates, and duration. Humanitarian responses are listed
on a separate data sheet. The best way to measure the size and intensity of an operation
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is to take into account the number of units or their strengths; however, neither the
force strength nor the length of the individual responses is accounted for. The authors
observe that the cases do not represent world or conflict history. They suggest the need
for further research on naval activities and their relation to world conflicts and U.S.
national security priorities.

The three CNA reports offer collectively the most detailed and systematic account of
naval responses to incidents besides routine deployments. The reminder of this chapter
discusses the data collection and my new data set.
Data for the Empirical Analyses
I had two choices as to how to research the U.S. naval involvement in international crises: generate a data set on my own or work with an existing one. Creating my own data
set with multiple variables was not feasible, because of access restrictions and logistical
limitations. Next, I had to decide if I wanted to add “naval” variables to a data set or
“crisis” variables to USN data. Because my goal was to include as many crises characteristics as possible, I chose the latter. By focusing on an existing data set I exclude nonroutine naval reactions not meeting the data-set definition of international crises.
Data-Set Selection: International Crisis Behavior Data Set (ICB)
There are many data sets concerning the use of armed force. “Correlates of War”
(COW), “International Crisis Behavior Project” (ICB), “International Military Interventions” (IMI), “Militarized Interstate Disputes” (MID), “Military Interventions by
9
Powerful States” (MIPS), and “Use of Armed Forces” are among the most prominent.
These various projects differ in many respects, including their time frames and definitional disagreements relating to the use of force, disputes, conflicts, crises, and wars.
The COW offers data on wars and is therefore not suitable for research on political uses
10
of force short of war. Jeffrey Pickering and Emizet Kisangani updated Pearson and
11
Baumann’s IMI data for the years 1946–88 for the years from 1988 to 2005. The result
captures all cases where national military personnel were purposefully dispatched into
other sovereign states and also includes the use of armed forces against nonstate actors.
Their data set features a variable controlling for the motive of the intervenors, a very
rare measurement in military-intervention data. The MID is part of the COW collection and provides information about interstate disputes; disputes involving nonstate
actors are excluded. Benjamin Fordham and Christopher Sarver come to the conclusion
that the MID is not well suited for the analysis of the American use of force, because of
definition disagreements of the use of force; they point out important incidents missing
12
in the data set. Sullivan’s MIPS provides data for the five parties of intervention—the
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United States, Britain, France, Russia/USSR, and China. The data also include a variable
measuring the level of force used, ranging from a mere display of force to ground combat operations. Like most other databases, the cases cover only instances when military
interventions were carried out. Blechman and Kaplan’s data originally covered the Cold
War era but were extended to 1995 by Fordham and Sarver. They thus do not include
post-1995 incidents. The ICB is exceptional in that it includes cases with and without
military involvement and thus allows research into different forms of intervention.
Therefore the present analysis is based on the well-established ICB data set for international crises, compiled by the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) at the University of Maryland. In addition to the advantages already
mentioned, the ICB data set is, as Karl DeRouen and Christopher Sprecher note, “rich
13
in contextual information.” Because I want to conduct a broad analysis of when and
how naval forces are employed, the ideal data set should encompass many different cases
and crisis characteristics. The ICB allows me to research a wide variety of international
crises and offers many variables, such as controlling for the form of American involvement, the effect of that involvement, and attitudes toward it.
Moreover, the ICB provides both system and individual data, including different characteristics, reactions, and perceptions of the individual crisis actors. Although the ICB
does not include every instance of the American use of force, it presents the best choice
for the purpose of this project. The ICB was first published in 1975; the newest (ninth)
version, of January 2009, covers the period 1918 to 2006, with 452 international crises,
14
35 protracted conflicts, and 994 crisis actors. The ICB defines its goals as
the accumulation and dissemination of knowledge about interstate crises and protracted conflicts;
the generation and testing of hypotheses about the effects of crisis-induced stress on coping and
choice by decision makers; the discovery of patterns in key crisis dimensions—onset, actor behavior
and crisis management, superpower activity, involvement by international organizations, and outcome; and application of the lessons of history to the advancement of international peace and world
order. . . . Underlying the project are three assumptions: first, that the destabilizing effects of crises,
as of conflicts and wars, are dangerous to global security; second, that understanding the causes,
evolution, actor behavior, outcomes, and consequences of crises is possible by systematic investigation; and third, that knowledge can facilitate the effective management of crises so as to minimize
their adverse effects on world order.15

Expansion of the Data Set: CNA Studies
While the ICB data may be sufficient to analyze general involvement of U.S. armed
forces, it does not provide information about the type of force used. In order to control
for the naval involvement, new variables had to be added to the data set. My initial attempt, to examine the naval involvement in every crisis with some form of U.S. involvement, proved to be infeasible. Complete information on where all ships of the U.S. Navy
have been deployed at any given time is very difficult to find, if not unattainable. There
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is no uniformity in how information and data are collected; deck logs, command histories, historical reports, and fleet histories differ enormously in detail, focus, and information. While it might be possible to find material in depth about a certain response,
one cannot gain knowledge as to the day of response and the location or name of ships
involved for every incident. Furthermore, even historical data often remain classified.
In the case of the Second Fleet, for example, only five random years between 1946 and
2006 were available when my research was conducted. Without access to new information I had to take a step back and rely on already existing studies, consolidating sources
16
and adding new details where possible.
Almost all of the data on naval involvement are adapted from the comprehensive account of naval activities as documented in the three CNA reports summarized earlier in
the chapter. They researched USN responses to international situations in 1946–2003.
For the years 2004–2006 I collected information about naval interventions from a
17
variety of sources. Except for Adam Siegel’s study, the CNA reports do not describe
the incidents themselves in depth but rather provide only their names and the dates of
the naval responses. Mahoney and Siegel’s data include the types of ship involved in the
response—the number of aircraft carriers and the employment of amphibious forces.
Cobble, Gaffney, and Gorenburg give no information about the ships involved but
control for the involvement of other military forces and categorize the type of response.
While Siegel’s data include the deployment of other armed forces, they do not categorize the type of mission. These responses had to be correlated with the crises in the ICB
data set; for example, a crisis in Ethiopia might trigger a naval response off the coast
of Somalia. Since some international crises have led to multiple naval involvements, I
worked to match the dates and locations of the responses and crises. In order to validate
my matching and to control for inter-rater reliability, two graduate students verified my
data. Both Cohen’s kappa values were higher than 0.8. Kimberley Neuendorf speaks of
0.80 as the benchmark for satisfactory intercoder reliability; according to Joseph Fleiss,
18
a value above κ = .80 is excellent. Thus the inter-rater reliability meets the statistical
requirements.
There are several shortcomings in the CNA reports, including their emphasis on
“responses.” The fact is that “response” encompasses only a fraction of the total range
of actions that the Navy undertakes in support of national crisis-management efforts.
Siegel remarks that his research excludes fleet actions during precrisis periods, which
are crucial because the presence and deterrent capabilities of naval forces can then have
a far-reaching impact. Similarly Mahoney states that regular peacetime presence can
be far from “routine” in its effect on the ways in which events ashore develop. Clearly,
the optimal solution for many crisis-management problems is to prevent the crisis from
developing, by taking timely action during the precrisis period to achieve national
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goals.19 Also, Siegel observes, the number of cases underestimates naval actions since
it includes only surface movements. For example, SEALs, submarines, and transport
aircraft can operate independently of ships. Mere alerts are also not part of the selected
cases but are, according to Siegel, especially important for the U.S. Army: “For the U.S.
Army, especially, alerts are often used as a crisis response action and, depending on the
circumstances, alerts can be used as a signal similar to that created by the movement of
20
a surface ship.”
Further, Siegel surmises (in the source cited) that it would be interesting to compare not
only the deployment of the different services but also the types of forces employed. Unfortunately, none of the three data sets includes these measures. Siegel believes that his
“research does not provide an adequate basis for comparisons of service-specific activity,” but I have supplemented it with the latest CNA study, and the result is information
sufficient to research USN force combinations. Finally, the latest CNA study (by Cobble,
Gaffney, and Gorenburg) aims to compare USN responses with those from the other
services, but I have preferred to study the comparison between all-forces involvement
and the USN plus other individual services.
In most of the overlapping cases for the years 1970–90 the two studies (those of Siegel
and Cobble et al.) agree on the services involved. There were only very few cases where
the reports differed, either because a response was not listed in all reports for the overlapping years or the service combination was coded differently. Where the two coding values diverge, I followed the results of the most recent study, because its research
is most up-to-date and the data focus on the activities of all military services. Where
possible, more information is provided in the case-summary appendix (in the online
version of this monograph). Siegel excluded humanitarian operations, although he acknowledged that they often are connected with responses to crises, because he discounts
their conflict potential. Whereas Cobble, Gaffney, and Gorenburg include peace operations in their main data set, they present a separate listing of humanitarian responses
since the 1970s (defined as “responses that are not into harm’s way—the U.S. units and
21
personnel involved did not face hostile fire”). Typically this type of response consists of
disaster relief (e.g., after an earthquake) or humanitarian assistance (for example, in the
form of medical aid or refugee relief—not to be confused with “humanitarian interventions”). The Air Force is primarily in charge of humanitarian responses—by a factor of
ten, compared with the USN. Siegel points to ambiguity in dating the onset and end of
a crisis response. Lack of information or uncertainty in the distinction between routine
activity and contingency response may influence the number of cases.
I tried to address these terminological ambiguities by combining the three research
papers. None of the documents attempts to answer questions with regard to how these
deployments influenced the crises (or vice versa), their effectiveness, and why particular
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services were deployed, to name a few. In contrast, my research aims to advance the
information provided in the CNA studies. By the strengthening of their data with
information about the nature of the crisis, the involved actors, the outcomes, and the
U.S. activity, the USN involvement can be placed in a larger context, thereby allowing
analysis in greater depth of the deployment of seaborne forces. Before describing the
new variables in more detail, I shall explain my focus on aircraft carriers and amphibious forces.
Why Aircraft Carriers?
One of the most significant changes in the composition of the major
navies of the twentieth century was the battleship’s replacement by the
aircraft carrier as the capital ship.
Geoffrey Till

The aircraft carrier era began with the successful Pacific campaigns of 1944, in World
22
War II. Since World War II, carriers have been deployed in over 80 percent of the times
23
when the world was faced with the risk of international violence. Aircraft carriers form
the core of a battle group. According to Friedman, carrier battle groups (CVBGs) are the
most powerful naval formations. They are the dominant element of sea power. Normally
a CVBG includes a carrier, escorts (generally including a pair of missile cruisers), and a
station (replenishment) ship fast enough to steam with the group. Often CVBGs deploy
with one or more nuclear submarines in support. Aircraft carriers offer both offensive
and defensive firepower. They have room to embark eighty to one hundred aircraft—
24
they can be described as “floating airfields.” The use of aircraft carriers has changed
over time. In the words of Rebecca Grant, they are “no longer main guardian[s] of the
25
sea but rather mobile air base[s].”
During the 1990s, war fighting was replaced by forward presence as the main task of
26
carrier forces. For Booth the aircraft carrier is the “pinnacle of operational flexibility.”
Freedom of action for policy makers is made possible by the flexibility of the carrier (or
CV, in generic terms—a specifically nuclear-powered carrier is referred to as a CVN).
There is hardly any place in the world where the aircraft carriers cannot respond. Till
describes their functions as independent strike, amphibious support, and protection
27
against attack by land-based aircraft. Booth emphasizes air defense, surface ship interdiction, submarine pursuit, and on-shore power projection. A RAND study highlights
unparalleled mobility, power advertisement, and sustained military presence, whereas
28
Till additionally singles out independence on the open seas. CVs do not have to worry
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about foreign base access or overflight rights, and they can deploy rapidly, thanks to
forward basing. According to the USN website, “the Carrier Mission is (1) To provide
a credible, sustainable, independent forward presence and conventional deterrence in
peacetime, (2) To operate as the cornerstone of joint/allied maritime expeditionary
forces in times of crisis, and (3) To operate and support aircraft attacks on enemies,
29
protect friendly forces and engage in sustained independent operations in war.”
Thus aircraft carriers are useful not only in times of war but also in action short of war.
They are the most powerful and visible tool the USN possesses and can influence events
ashore. Aircraft carriers are symbols of strength and resolve, and they can be sent into
30
action quickly. Today, aircraft carriers are primarily political instruments. They offer
31
numerous options, ranging from discreet withdrawal to full-scale warfare. As President William Clinton once said, “When word of crisis breaks out in Washington, it’s no
accident that the first question that comes to everyone’s lips is, where is the nearest car32
rier?” Yet the utility of aircraft carriers has frequently been questioned. Grant’s critique
33
focuses on their inferior offensive potential compared with that of the U.S. Air Force.
Certainly carriers in combat often need the support of land-based air. But where the focus is on peacetime missions, combat effectiveness is not the key criterion; what counts
then is the ability to observe, influence, and react to situations in international waters.
Cost and vulnerability are also focuses of criticism. Aircraft carriers are virtually floating cities housing about five thousand Navy personnel. With their high construction
34
and maintenance costs, they are the military’s costliest asset. What sets the Navy apart,
then, is its forward presence mission, its extensive observation potential, and its varied
means of intervention, ranging from suasion to attack. Importantly, aircraft carriers can
operate where land-based air forces lack access.
The nation’s current reliance on aircraft carriers for many naval missions is well
understood by potential enemies, who are striving to find ways to counter them. For
instance, antiship ballistic missiles pose a formidable threat to carriers. Because of the
vulnerability of a big floating platform, Rubel suggests more widely distributed missile35
firing platforms that are more difficult to find and hit. Optimally they would include
submarines, surface combatants, and guided-missile destroyers. Such a mixture of ships
instead of one “key ship” offers dispersed targets and could prove valuable in crisis as a
reliable deterrent. He concludes, “This sea change in the Navy indicates the early stages
of a paradigm shift away from a force centered on big-deck aviation platforms. Although
assault ships (LHDs) and nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs) will continue to
constitute a critical power-projection capability for the United States into the foreseeable
future, the Navy will increasingly shift to dispersed but integrated surface and subsurface operations to constitute the credible combat power required by its new maritime
36
strategy.”
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Despite the voices calling for a different approach involving a focus on different ship
types, aircraft carriers remain the center of the naval power. “For the future there might
be lower cost and less vulnerable alternatives, but for now aircraft carriers will likely to
37
38
continue to be an asset of choice.” Increasingly, CVs serve as joint aviation platforms.
The important concept of sea basing emphasizes the avoidance of overflight rights and
basing restrictions and, once again, favors aircraft carriers. Recent examples include
Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, as well as the Haiti earth39
quake of 2010. However, as Charles Allen remarks, a single-carrier group can conduct
combat operations for only a certain amount of time, for personnel reasons; extended
40
combat requires more than one carrier group. In practice, the average number of
41
deployed CVs/CVNs steadily decreased between 1975 and 2005. The number dropped
again in 2007 when USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67) was decommissioned. O’Rourke
estimated in 2009 that the number of CVs would drop from eleven to ten in 2012 with
the decommissioning of Enterprise (CVN 65) and before its replacement by Gerald R.
Ford (CVN 78), scheduled to be ready in 2015 (though Pritchett suggests 2017 as a more
42
likely date). With the aircraft carriers USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) and Abraham
Lincoln (CVN 72) undergoing repair and maintenance at this writing, the number of
active CVBGs could temporarily even drop to nine. Roosevelt should be ready to deploy
43
again in February 2013, while Lincoln is likely to return to active service only in 2015.
Before taking into account the now-impending budget cuts, the Navy projected that the
44
force will increase to twelve carriers in FY 2019, when CVN 79 is commissioned.
Amphibious Operations
Amphibious warfare units, which project combat power ashore from the sea, make
45
up one of the naval service’s two principal projection forces. Like aircraft carriers,
amphibious forces play a central role in crisis management because of their ability to
46
affect events ashore, either by taking direct action or by establishing a naval presence.
Since World War II, amphibious landings have usually evoked the picture of assaults on
heavily defended beaches. The most famous U.S. Army amphibious landing was the invasion of Normandy, and for the USMC the successive seizures of the Pacific islands. In
the decades after the World War II, the Corps further developed its techniques, greatly
47
aided by technological advances.
An amphibious force consists of a Navy element—a group of ships known as an amphibious task force (ATF)—and a landing force of U.S. Marines (occasionally Army
48
troops), in total about five thousand people. Amphibious operations include amphibious assaults, withdrawals, demonstrations, raids, and special operations in support of
assaults. The aim of amphibious assaults is to land on hostile territory. During an as49
sault, supremacy on the sea, on land, and in the air is essential. Amphibious raids aim
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to achieve a tactical or operational goal, followed by a planned withdrawal. Amphibious
feints and demonstrations are aimed at tying down the enemy’s forces. Surprise and
speed are essential to minimize the risk to the attacking forces; defending forces have
50
a natural advantage over amphibious forces. In most cases, the ATF will be deployed
under the protection of a CVBG, which provides cover for the ATF and combat support
to operations ashore. The ships of the ATF are capable of embarking and supporting
other forces when the mission requires, including Army, special operations forces (SOF),
or other joint and combined forces. Because they are sea-based and because decisions to
position and engage amphibious forces are easily reversible, amphibious forces greatly
expand the range of available response options. They are particularly well suited as
demonstrations of American commitment to friends and allies, as well as adversaries.
This type of deployment closely links the Navy and USMC team.
In the ideal scenario, amphibious forces confuse the enemy and force him to guess
where along the coastline the landing force might be inserted. This limits the defender’s
ability to concentrate his forces at a single point and thereby favors a wily attacker. This
idea is encompassed by the concept of sea basing. As Wood remarks, “the entire concept
of ‘seabasing’ rests on the principle that the ocean can be used to assemble, move, pro
51
ject, support and sustain forces as is done on land.”
Selecting the Cases and Coding Naval Variables
The cases were selected according to the following criteria:
•

“Date of Perception of Crisis Breakpoint”: 1946–2006

•

“Content of U.S. Activity”: “low level, covert/semi-military, or direct military”
•

Low-level U.S. activity: political activity, including statements of approval or disapproval by authorized government officials; economic involvement (e.g., financial aid to, or the withholding of aid from, an actor); and propaganda involvement

•

U.S. covert or semi-military activity: covert activity (e.g., support for antigovernment forces); military aid or advisers, without participation in actual fighting

•

U.S. direct military activity: dispatch of troops, aerial bombing of targets, or naval
assistance to a party in a war.

The first limitation excludes any crises before World War II, because U.S. naval power
was less able to influence events ashore than it is today. When the CV replaced the
battleship as the capital ship, this dramatically changed. Earlier cases can therefore not
be compared to post–World War II cases.52
The second limitation was chosen because cases without any U.S. involvement are ir53
relevant to my analyses. Of the 452 international crises, 241 met the criteria for the
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required time frame and American involvement. Because of my definition of peacetime
operations and uncertainty in some cases about naval involvement, a small number of
cases (N = 12) were coded as “missing data.” The international crises taking place in
connection with the Korean and Vietnam (until 1972) Wars were excluded, because both
involved full-scale war activity on the part of the United States. After 1972, U.S. naval
forces were no longer engaged in major combat operations. The Gulf War of 1991 is included, because the crisis resulted in fewer than a thousand American casualties. Moreover, it led to continuing U.S. engagement in Iraq—for example, Operation Southern
Watch, aimed to prevent Iraqi aerial activity, which produced close to no coalition
casualties. The different crises triggered by Iraqi noncompliance with the United Nations
Special Commission and by the no-fly zones are listed as separate crises and are included. While Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom in their initial
phases did not exceed the casualty threshold, those two crises are of a different kind. At
the time of the analyses, Operation Enduring Freedom had not ended yet, and both
conflicts have far surpassed the critical value of one thousand casualties. Thus these two
cases are included as naval involvements but not in the statistical analyses.
Besides the engagements during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, I identified three
54
international crises for which I was not able to verify naval involvement. Because
these international crises do not meet the selection criteria, they are not included in the
database. However, because the associated naval activity appears to have had at least
peripheral relevance to the larger U.S. crisis responses, I have included them in the
crisis description appendix (available in the online version of this monograph). I also
excluded several intrawar crises during the Iran-Iraq War. For example, the USN role in
protecting international commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf (the “tanker war”) was
a response to secondary events deriving from the war, as distinct from the facet of the
war itself. Conversely, evacuation operations were direct reactions to the crisis, although
they had no bearing on its resolution, and are thus included.
“Naval” Variables
In a first step I added a dichotomous variable, “U.S. naval involvement,” simply measuring whether the USN had been involved in an international crisis or not. Naval forces
rarely reacted on their own; thus the next ten variables control for the involvement of
55
other armed forces. In a next step I grouped the different service combinations. Because the number of “USN only” cases is very small, I mostly treat the USN and USMC
as one “team,” the “USN-USMC Team.” (Siegel subtitled his work U.S. Navy and U.S.
Marine Corps Crisis Response Activity.) I acknowledge the limitation posed by this combination of the U.S. seaborne forces. The addition of the Marine Corps includes the possible or actual landing of U.S. forces on foreign territory and thus represents a greater
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intrusion. Conversely, it can be argued that the presence of a USMC force increases the
threat perceived by the enemy and increases the likelihood of a favorable outcome. Also,
given the limited number of naval responses, I could not distinguish between shows of
force and actual force projection, or between the mere presence of Marines and actual
landings. To research each response in detail, case studies, not just statistical analyses,
are necessary. For a future project, these distinctions could prove very interesting and
reveal additional information. In the online appendix listing the crises I present more
comprehensive accounts and when possible describe the activities of the Navy and
Marine Corps. Where the analyses allowed a distinction, however, I control for “USN
only” cases.
The following table explains how the different services are grouped. There was only one
case where the USN, USMC, and Army were involved. In order to qualify for an “all
forces response” both the Army and the Air Force had to have been involved, representing all three types of forces: sea based, air based, and land based. In two cases the
Marine Corps did not participate, but because the USN represents the seaborne force
I counted the two crisis responses as all-forces responses. Because only one case of the
variable “USN & Other Forces” includes “USARMY,” this variable is nearly congruent
to seaborne forces and Air Force responses and can be treated as combinations with
the Air Force. The only case including the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Army was a
noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) in Congo in 1998. Because of the already
very low number of cases, I decided not to exclude this incident; that it was a NEO
highlights the noncombat character of the mission. Using the service combination
numbers, I generated different “naval variables” that will be used as both dependent and
independent variables.
Figure 9

Three Naval Combination Variables
TYPE OF SERVICE 1
(SERVICETYPE1) (Y1)
0. NO NAVY
1. USN ONLY
2. USN-USMC
3. USN AND OTHER
FORCE
4. ALL FORCES (at least one
seaborne force and USAF
and USARMY)

TYPE OF SERVICE 2
(SERVICETYPE2) (Y2)
0. NO NAVY
1. USN-USMC TEAM
2. USN AND OTHER FORCES
3. ALL FORCES (at least one
seaborne force and USAF
and USARMY)

USN-USMC-TEAM
(USNUSMCTEAM) (Y3)
0. NO NAVY
1. USN-USMC TEAM
2. USN AND OTHER FORCES
(incl. All Forces)

For each crisis where naval forces were involved, I introduced the following variables:
•

CV involvement (yes/no)

•

Number of CVs (metric)
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•

CV strength (no CV / one CV / two or more CVs)

•

Amphibious involvement (yes/no)

•

Type of mission.

The variable “CV involvement” accounts for the deployment of an aircraft carrier.
The number as well as the capabilities of U.S. aircraft carriers has changed over time,
and it is therefore difficult to compare the quantity of CVs deployed to crises over the
56
years. However, Blechman and Kaplan distinguish between minor, standard, and high
57
components of force. For the Navy, a standard force component is a carrier task group;
two or more carriers are a major component of force; and the absence of aircraft carrier
incidents defines minor components of force. To have a complete account of CV involvement I introduced another variable measuring the actual number of involved CVs,
“Number of CVs.” For the years 1990 onward the CNA data did not provide information
about the number of CVs. When the CV involvement can be confirmed with sufficient
certainty the variable is included; otherwise it is counted as missing data. The next
variable measures the involvement of amphibious forces. In all CNA documents this is
simply measured by a binary variable (yes/no).
The variable “Type of mission” is divided into six categories, following Cobble, Gaffney,
58
and Gorenburg:
•

Contingent positioning (naval forces are ordered to an area, diverted away from their
59
routine schedule but without clear operational intentions)

•

Reconnaissance (moving U.S. forces around the world to influence actions of some
potential adversaries, mostly a naval activity)

•

Noncombatant evacuation operation

•

Show of force (similar to contingent positioning and reconnaissance but more direct
and open, e.g., actually putting boots on the ground, moving weapons systems, moving supplies)

•

Combat

•

Peace operations.

Since only the latest CNA study provides this information, in earlier cases I coded the
variable as missing data. Contingent positioning and reconnaissance responses are
characterized by diverting naval ships from their schedules to position them closer to
incipient crises. NEOs are conducted for the protection of American embassies or the
evacuation of American and other approved personnel. Shows of force are reactions in
which U.S. naval forces sail into harm’s way, though no shots are fired. In combat actions, actual combat takes place or weapons are fired. Peace operations comprise three
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different activities: support to diplomacy (peacemaking, peace building, and preventive
diplomacy), peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. “Peace operations include traditional
peacekeeping as well as peace enforcement activities such as protection of humanitarian
assistance, establishment of order and stability, enforcement of sanctions, guarantee and
denial of movement, establishment of protected zones, and forcible separation of bel60
ligerents.” Disaster-relief missions are responses to natural disasters or other emergencies that are conducted in otherwise benign environments; they are not included in this
analysis. Similarly, humanitarian-assistance missions—while likely to be carried out in
nonpermissive environments and mostly reactions to man-made events—are likely to
take place only after the initial U.S. reaction to a crisis.
Naval Involvement Frequencies
As an introduction to the main variables, I present some simple frequencies. According
to the data set, U.S. naval forces were deployed in ninety-three (including Afghanistan
and Iraq) out of the 229 international crises in which the nation was involved. Twelve
cases are excluded because they either do not meet the criterion of fewer than a thousand
American casualties or specifically naval involvement cannot be adequately confirmed.
Afghanistan and Iraq are excluded from the statistical analysis (because they exceed the
casualty threshold) but are otherwise treated as cases with naval involvement.
As shown in figure 10, naval forces were deployed in more than 40 percent of all U.S. engagements in international crises. Of the ninety-three cases under study, in thirty-nine
the USN deployed alone or with the USMC and in fifty-four cases with other forces.
Figure 10

Naval Involvement Binary and USN-USMC Team & USN with Other Forces
usN Involvement

usN-usmC Team

12

39

93

136

54

Missing Data

USN-USMC

Naval Involvement

USN & Other

No Naval Involvement

The charts in figure 11 further break down the combinations with other forces in which
the Navy was deployed. These new variables were introduced to measure the level of
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joint deployment. A deployment of all forces is a much more substantial involvement
than the other two categories and must include sea, air, and ground forces.
Figure 11

USN and Other Forces Combinations
23
31

33
39

2

16
1

USN only

USN-USMC Team

USN-USMC

USN & Other
All Forces

USN, USAF
14

USN, USMC, USAF

6

21

USN, USMC, USARMY

USN, USAF, USARMY
All Forces

Figure 12 presents the strength of the naval force, measured in number of aircraft carriers and amphibious ships. All cases that included the Marine Corps involved amphibious forces. The stronger the U.S. force, the more likely it was to reach or exceed force
levels of two CVs. Because the latest CNA study does not provide information on vessels
involved, the following charts include only cases up to 1990.
Figure 12

Naval Strength

TYPe oF serVICe 1

TYPe oF serVICe 1
usN oNlY
usN-usmC
usN oTHer
all ForCes

Count

Count

usN oNlY
usN-usmC
usN oTHer
all ForCes

NumBer oF CVs

amPHIBIous ForCes

The time lines of figures 13a and 13b graphically demonstrate the variation of the
frequency of U.S. reactions to international crises, controlling for involvements with
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and without naval forces. Whereas the first figure distinguishes only between “no naval
involvement” and “naval involvement,” the second analyzes the different service combinations with which the USN deployed.
Figure 13A

Time Line of Naval Involvement

TYPE OF SERVICE
NO NAVY
NAVY

6

4

2

0
1946 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
1947 1949 1951 1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005

YEAR OF TRIGGER

Figure 13b

Time Line of Naval Involvement, Servicetype2

meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP39:_InDesign:05 NP_39 Chapter3.indd January 29, 2013 10:37 AM

116   the

newport papers

Figure 13a shows that the peaks and lows of naval responses differed from those of nonnaval ones. Naval responses peaked in 1958 and 1962–63, while declines occurred in the
early 1950s, late 1980s, early 1990s, and after 2002. A relatively steady response pattern
is visible between 1966 and 1978 and between 1992 and 1997. In the time frame between
1977 and 1991, nonnaval American activity peaks occurred on several occasions. The
second time line, figure 13b, distinguishes among the different service combinations,
treating maritime forces jointly. The years 1962 to 1964, 1981, and 1984 saw peaks of
maritime-forces-only responses. After 1986 very few of the military responses occurred
with only seaborne forces but rather were characterized by joint deployments. This increase in joint operations coincides with the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which encouraged
interservice cooperation.
General Observations of U.S. (Naval) Activity in International Crises
Before statistically analyzing the circumstances in which the United States deploys naval forces, a historical account of the frequency and location of U.S. activity can provide
answers to crisis-characteristics questions concerning the locations of USN responses.
As shown in figure 14, the late 1940s were dominated by responses in Europe. This finding is not surprising, since many Eastern European countries were struggling against
the influence of communism at the end of World War II. In roughly half of the cases,
naval forces were involved. Somewhat more surprising are the responses in the Middle
East. In the first years after the end of World War II the United States focused mainly
on other regions, and an increasing interest in the Middle East occurs only in the early
61
1950s. However, the following decades were marked by a much higher frequency of
reactions to international crises in that region. Three responses between 1946 and 1949
occurred in Asia. The 1950s were clearly dominated by two regions, Asia and the Middle
East, with slightly more cases without naval involvement. Fewer responses took place in
Europe, mostly without the support of naval forces. The activity in Central America was
evenly distributed between no naval involvement and naval involvement, whereas crisis
response in North Africa occurred without USN deployments. In the 1960s naval forces
dominated American crisis-response activity in Central America and Europe, while in
the other major response areas, the Middle East and in Asia, only about half of the cases
featured USN forces.
The largest concentration of international crises in the 1970s occurred in Africa. During
this decade many African countries gained independence from former colonial powers.
Frequently this led to wars between factions or with bordering countries, resulting in
international crises. Most of the American responses on this continent took place in
central or southern Africa and did not include naval forces. Again, the majority of naval
deployments occurred in the Middle East and Asia, with fewer cases in Europe and
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Central America. Africa remained tumultuous in the 1980s, but American responses
also occurred in North and East Africa. The various crises with Libya are mostly responsible for the involvement in North Africa. In the Middle East, more involvements
took place without the USN, and no crisis response in Asia included naval forces. Of the
three reactions to incidents in Europe, two included naval deployments. In the 1990s the
United States was less active in Africa; however, half of the six responses included naval
forces.
The Middle East largely dominated the 1990s, but the United States also focused on
Asia, both with and without naval support. The responses in Europe are largely attributable to the wars resulting from the breakup of Yugoslavia. Few responses show up in
Central and South America. The first decade of the twenty-first century was marked by
a very small number of involvements. This may be a side effect of the GWOT, which tied
up U.S. military forces and left little room for other deployments. Only five cases for
the time span 2000–2006 led to the dispatch of naval forces, including Afghanistan and
Iraq. No activity occurred in Europe or in Central or South America, but the United
States reacted to three crises in Eurasia and five in Asia (two Navy, three without). Over
the years the Middle East; Asia, predominantly Southeast and East Asia; and Central
America were the main foci of U.S. naval forces.
In the next step, the different types of forces are analyzed in more detail. The “Navy
only” cases are located in Central and South America, the Middle East, Asia (especially
Southeast and East Asia), and some in Africa, especially in the north. This is not much
different from the findings of naval deployments independent of the force combination.
USN-USMC cases add Europe and South Asia to the regions but also occur in Central
America, North and East Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast and East Asia. Looking at all crises including the Army and Air Force explains the crisis responses in other
regions. The distributions now cover most geographic locations, although the focus
remains on the Middle East, Central America, and Southeast and East Asia.
Table 14 also distinguishes between different levels of U.S. activity. The majority of
American responses occurred at only a low level of activity. For this type of response
“no naval involvement” was more frequent than the deployment of naval forces. For
responses of the next category, semi-military involvement, naval forces are frequently
deployed. The smallest set of responses involved direct military activity, which often included naval forces. Only in two cases where the U.S. activity was coded as “direct military” were no naval forces involved. The two crises in question are the Congo II crisis
of 1964 and the Libyan jets crisis of 1988. During the Congo crisis the United States and
Belgium dispatched paratroops to support a hostage-rescue mission. The shooting down
of two Libyan MiG-23s by U.S. fighters was coded as direct military involvement in a
crisis initially triggered by the Pan American airliner crash at Lockerbie in late 1988.
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Figure 14

Geographic Location & Content of U.S. Activity
(the three crises where USN involvement is uncertain are circled by broken line)
CONTENT OF U.S. ACTIVITY
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As previously shown, the majority of responses occurred in the Middle East, Central
America, and South, Southeast, and East Asia. While in the first region half of the
responses occurred with naval forces, the other half without, in the latter two regions
more than 50 percent of the responses involved naval forces. The majority of the various
responses in East Asia included the dispatch of the USN, while in Africa the larger part
of U.S. activity took place without naval forces (with the exception of North Africa) and
also occurred at a low level. After the end of the Cold War, direct military “all forces”
responses dominated Middle East crisis response, whereas previously only USN-USMC
forces had been deployed frequently. Central America shows a high level of semimilitary USN-USMC response activity. Overall, since the end of the Cold War U.S.
direct military crisis-response activity has increased.
Methodology
There are important limitations here. The relatively small number of naval involvements
and the even more limited data on the response time, specific mission, and strength of
the deployment pose great challenges to statistical analysis. While I would like to create
complex models accounting for a variety of different effects, especially also interaction
effects, this goal is not attainable with the current data. Instead of elaboration on the
hypotheses and taking into account more variations of naval deployments, the following empirical analyses will be rather basic in nature. Based on the available information
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and restrictions posed by statistical requirements, the analyses are necessarily confined
to simple regression models, in an attempt to provide more information than simple
frequencies. However, given the exploratory character of this study, even frequencies
will be an important first step and ideally will encourage future efforts to report naval
involvements in more detail as to allow deeper analysis of their impact.
Binary and Multinomial Logistic Regression
Regression analyses help to understand the relation between one dependent and one or
more independent variables. The most common regression, linear regression, requires
the dependent variable to be metrically scaled. Logistic regressions allow us to predict
dependent variables based on dichotomous, categorical, or continuous independent
variables. Binary (or binomial) logistic regression is employed when the dependent is a
dichotomous variable and the independents are of any variable type. Multinomial logistic regression models are applied when the dependent variable has more than two values
and is categorically scaled. When the dependent variable can be ranked, an ordinal
logistic regression model is preferred. In all of these three regression types, there can be
only one dependent variable.
Logistic regression applies maximum-likelihood estimation after converting the
dependent into a logit variable (the natural log of the odds of the dependent occurring
or not). In this way, logistic regression estimates the odds of a certain event occurring.
Logistic regression has many analogies to the ordinary-least-square (OLS) methods in
linear regressions: logit coefficients correspond to b coefficients in the logistic regression equation, the standardized logit coefficients correspond to beta weights (b values),
2
and a pseudo-R statistic is available to summarize the strength of the relationship. But
2
62
these “pseudo-R statistics” have to be interpreted with care. For OLS regressions the
2
R value provides information on how much of the variance in the dependent variable is
explained by the independent variable(s). For regressions with dichotomous or categori2
cal dependent variables, however, R does not serve as a measurement of the variance of
the dependent variable but rather has to be interpreted as a measurement of the strength
of association.
Unlike OLS regression, logistic regression does not assume that the relationship between dependent and independent variables is linear, and the choice is not restricted
to normally distributed variables. Further, no homoscedasticity (equality of statistical
variance) is assumed, and generally the requirements are less stringent. Goodness-of-fit
tests are available, such as the likelihood ratio test as an indicator of model suitability and the Wald statistic to test the significance of individual independent variables.
In order to interpret the output, the b values need to be discussed. The b values—
Exp(B)—generate the factor by which the likelihood of the occurrence of “1” values of
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the dependent variable (0 or 1) increases. All values smaller than 1 signify a negative
relationship, and no assumption can be made regarding the strength of the negative
influence. A b value of 1 signifies a neutral indicator, with no influence on the depen63
dent variable. Binary logistic regression predicts the “1” value of the dependent, using
the “0” level as the reference value. Multinomial logistic regression compares each level
of the dependent with the baseline category for each independent variable. Because
the hypotheses not only measure the naval involvement as a binary variable but also
distinguish between the different combinations of the services, both binary logistic and
multinomial logistic models are appropriate.
For multinomial logistic regression we must select a baseline category for the dependent
variable. For instance, given the multinomial dependent “naval involvement” with levels
0 = “No Navy,” 1 = “USN-USMC,” 2 = “USN & Other Forces,” and 3 = “All Forces,” four
choices can be made for the baseline category. If “All Forces” is chosen as baseline, the
multinomial logistic output will show, first, the comparison of “No Naval Involvement”
with “All Forces”; second, the comparison of “USN-USMC” with “All Forces”; and third,
the comparison of “USN & Other Forces” with “All Forces.” Similarly, for the independent variables a reference category has to be defined. The statistical program SPSS automatically defaults the highest value. If the researcher desires another reference category,
the variables have to be recoded accordingly. This brings up three considerations. First,
because the b coefficients for dummy variables will reflect changes in the dependent
with respect to the reference group (which is the left-out group), it is best if the reference
group is clearly defined. Thus leaving out the “Other” or “Miscellaneous” category, for
example, is suboptimal, for the reference comparisons will be unclear. Second, the leftout reference group should have multiple cases if it is to lead to stable reference comparisons. Third, some researchers prefer to leave out a “middle” category when transforming
ordinal categories into dummy variables, arguing that reference comparisons with
median groups are preferable to comparisons with extremes. In this study the small
number of cases often posed a problem in this regard, and I tried to choose the reference
category as carefully as possible.
Structure of the Regression Analyses
In order to measure how much the independent variable influences the dependent
variable, simple or stepwise regression models are employed. When the data and the
theoretical considerations allow, I chose stepwise multiple regression models, thereby
automatically eliminating independent variables with no significant influence. Stepwise
regression assumes that the term would have a coefficient of 0 and adds the term only
when there is sufficient evidence that the null hypothesis can be rejected. Otherwise,
simple regression analyses were employed to test hypotheses separately and determine
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which factors change the dependent variable independent of any intercorrelation effects
between independent variables. In multiple regression models, the influence may be
altered by intercorrelation effects. Moreover, because the dependent variable varies from
hypothesis to hypothesis, no general overarching regression model can be calculated. In
2
simple regression models the pseudo-R values are lower, because usually one variable
64
alone is less strongly associated with the dependent variable. Again, it is important to
2
note that R values have to be interpreted with care in logistic regression models. While
most regression analyses were run with “servicetype2” (treating USN-USMC as a single
force team) serving as dependent variable, the basic frequencies are presented with
“servicetype1” (USN and USN-USMC separate categories). To calculate the frequencies
for the joint seaborne forces, the categories USN only and USN-USMC need only be
added. The already low number of cases for the different variables and the additional
decrease in cases when dividing into the different categories often do not allow a further
distinction between the seaborne forces, especially on the system level. However, when
statistically possible and when results reveal interesting differences, the more detailed
regression outputs are discussed.
In a first step, tables with the frequencies for the different forms of American involvement and the variables categories are depicted. In a second step, the results of the regression analysis are presented. In order to simplify the statistical outputs, generally only
two categories are chosen as baseline and reference categories. The values in the tables
represent the Exp(B) values with the according significance level. After the statistical
analyses, if possible, historical examples are described to strengthen the validity of the
argument and support the empirical results.
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chapter four

We Move on the Seas That We Control, Part I

Assessing the Empirical Evidence—Crisis Characteristics
and Actors
To better understand the influence of different crisis characteristics on seaborne crisis
1
response, four hypotheses were generated in chapter 2. The first three are concerned
with the type of crisis, while the last one analyzes the influence of the crisis on the
global system. All variables are measured on the system level.
The following three hypotheses are analyzed in a combined stepwise regression model,
Crisis Characteristics Model 1 (see sidebar 1). Graver threats and higher stakes were assumed to favor “all forces” responses and render the deployment of seaborne responses
less likely. In regard to higher levels of violence the hypothesis can go either way, either
increasing or decreasing the likelihood of seaborne responses alone.
Figure 15

Crisis Characteristics Model 1
H1a: Threats

x1 = gravity of threat

H1b: Stakes

x2 = issues

H1b: Violence

x3 = violence

Y = U.S. seaborne
crisis response

Sidebar 1
The variables in the hypotheses can be expressed mathematically as follows.
(1) x1a and x1b = gravity of threat (gravcr, gravcr2, gravcr3).
A low-threat crisis is measured with the variable “gravity of value threatened.” Categories have to be transformed from their original values. The
variable measures the seriousness of the threat of the crisis for the actors,
ranging from “low level” fear, such as economic threats, through midrange
fears, such as threats to “territory” and “influence,” and ultimately to a
danger to existence (“grave threat”).
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(2) x2 = issues (issue, issue2).
A low-politics crisis is measured by the nature and number of issues at
stake. If a case includes military-security issues the crisis threatens high
politics. The variable contains three categories: “1–2 issues non-militarysecurity,” “military-security issue alone,” and “2 issues including militarysecurity/3 issues.”
(3) x3 = violence (viol).
The level of violence is identified with the help of the variable “violence,”
controlling for the highest level of violence in a crisis. “No violence” is the
lowest level, followed by “minor clashes,” “major clashes,” and the last
category, “war.”
(4) x4 = geographic location (geogloc, geogloc2), and
(5) x5 = geostrategic salience (geostr, geostr2).
A crisis of geostrategic interest is measured by its “geostrategic salience”
and the “geographic location” of the crisis. The variable “geographic location” was converted into a new binary variable. Thomas Barnett and H. H.
Gaffney define Central America and the Caribbean, Europe, Southwest
Asia (particularly the Persian Gulf region), Japan, Taiwan, and Korea as regions or countries of most importance to the United States.a Blechman and
Kaplan find frequent U.S. involvement in Europe, Southeast and East Asia,
Middle East, and Central America.b The Persian Gulf region is a subset of
the Middle East, but clearly the United States has a great interest in the
latter.c Japan, Taiwan, and Korea are the key nations in East Asia. Therefore
the ICB variable “geographic location” was converted into a binary variable
depending on whether an area was or is of interest to the United States following Blechman and Kaplan’s definition. Geostrategic salience identifies
the level and number of the international systems affected by the crisis. The
variable was reexamined as a binary variable measuring whether the crisis
affected “only subsystem(s)” or the “dominant/global system.”
a.

Thomas Barnett and H. H. Gaffney, “100 Top Rules of the New American Way
of War,” British Army Review—London Ministry of Defence, no. 131 (2003), pp.
40–44.

b.

Blechman and Kaplan, Force without War.

c..

See, for example, Hahn, Crisis and Crossfire.

The second model, Crisis Characteristics Model 2 (see sidebar 1), analyzes the hypothesis assuming a negative relation between the deployment of seaborne forces only and
crises of high geostrategic importance.
Figure 16

Crisis Characteristics Model 2
x4 = geographic location
H1d: Geostrategic
Importance

Y = U.S. seaborne
crisis response
x5 = geostrategic salience
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Before turning to the regression analyses, the frequencies of the variables are summarized in figure 17.
Figure 17

Crisis Characteristics Frequencies
Crisis Characteristics
Gravity of threat 2

Gravity of threat 3

Issues 2

Violence

Geostrategic salience

USN onlY

USN-USMC

USN &
Other
FORCES

ALL ForceS

Low-level threat

54/40.3

9/39.1

9/56.3

5/23.8

10/32.3

Territorial or influence

63/47

9/39.1

3/18.8

7/33.3

12/38.7

Grave threat

17/12.7

5/21.7

4/25

9/42.9

9/29

Low-level threat

54/40.3

9/39.1

9/56.3

5/23.8

10/32.3

Territorial threat

46/34.3

7/30.4

2/12.5

3/14.3

Threat to influence

17/12.7

2/8.7

1/6.3

4/19

Grave threat

17/12.7

5/21.7

4/25

9/42.9

0/0
12/38.7
9/29

1–2 non-Mil-Sec

23/16.9

3/13.6

3/18.8

2/9.5

9/29

1 Mil-Sec

66/48.5

6/27.3

7/43.8

2/9.5

4/12.9

2 issues incl. Mil-Sec or 3+

47/34.6

13/59.1

6/37.5

17/81

18/58.1

No violence

33/24.3

6/26.1

5/31.3

4/19

6/19.4
11/35.5

Minor clashes

43/31.6

5/21.7

4/25

4/19

Major clashes

48/35.3

2/8.7

2/12.5

6/28.6

7/22.6

War

12/8.8

10/43.5

5/31.3

7/33.3

7/22.6

118/86.8

17/73.9

11/68.8

14/66.7

6/26.1

5/31.3

7/33.3

Subsystem only
Global system

Geographic location

No Navy

18/13.26

9/23.1
22/71

Not important

69/50.7

6/26.1

2/12.5

6/28.6

3/9.7

Important

67/49.3

17/73.9

14/87.5

15/71.4

28/90.3

Note: The first number presents the frequencies and the second number refers to the percentage within the variable “servicetype1.”

Different distributions of the independent variables require adapting the dependent
variable in order to meet the significance requirements for conducting regression analyses. While the variables “gravity of threat 2” and “issues 2” could be analyzed employing
“servicetype1”—distinguishing between the seaborne forces—the variable “violence”
requires the collapse of these categories. Moreover, “gravity of threat 3” calls for “USNUSMC Team” as dependent variable, because of the zero correlations between territorial
threats and the deployment of all forces.
Regression Analyses Crisis Characteristics 1
The variable “gravity of threat 2” was automatically removed from the regression
model by the stepwise entry mechanism. The results show that the categories “no navy”
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and “USN-USMC Team” are dominant in crises concerning one single military-security
issue.
Figure 18

Model Crisis Characteristics 1a: Servicetype2, Stepwise Multinomial Regression
Category

NO NAVY

USN-USMC TEAM

USN&OTHER
FORCES

ALL FORCES

1–2 issues

0.802

0.653

0.248

bl

1 Mil-Sec issue

5.577***

3.446*

0.536

bl

2 incl. Mil-Sec or 3+

rf

rf

bl

No violence

3.522*

rf

1.079

0.982

bl

Minor clashes

2.218

0.428

0.462

bl

Major clashes

3.534*

0.272

1.048

bl

War

rf

rf

rf

bl

1–2 issues

bl

rf

rf

rf

1 Mil-Sec issue

bl

0.760

0.311

0.144***

2 incl. Mil-Sec or 3+

bl

1.229

3.233

0.803

No violence

bl

rf

rf

rf

Minor clashes

bl

0.630

0.747

1.588

Major clashes

bl

0.251**

1.063

0.996

War

bl

3.265**

3.586*

3.522*

N = 224
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01

Sig. Model = 0.000
bl—baseline

Pseudo-R² = 0.233
rf—reference category

The Exp(B) value suggests that the highest category of issues correlates with responses
involving the Air Force; however, it fails to meet the significance requirements. No
clear deployment pattern for “All Forces” response is visible. “No Navy” is dominant
in the first three categories of violence when “war” serves as reference category and
“All Forces” as baseline. Although not significant, the negative or close-to-1 results
suggest that all forces are more likely in lower levels of violence than the other service
combinations. Once the baseline and reference category are reversed, all military forces
combinations are more likely in a setting marked by a war level of violence than by no
naval deployment. While the Exp(B) values are fairly similar, the combination with
the Air Force shows the strongest correlation. This suggests that high levels of violence
generally encourage all types of U.S. military interventions and that different military
intervention strategies are better explained by looking at the issues of the crises. Neither
the gravity of the threat nor the issue of the crisis seems to influence the deployment of
“All Forces,” suggesting that other considerations, such as the importance of the crisis to
the United States, determine the strength of the response.
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When the independent “issues 2” is analyzed alone, employing a simple multinomial
regression model, the correlation between the highest category and naval deployments including the Air Force shows a strong and significant value of 4.250. A model
testing the variable “violence” alone shows very similar results, but the Exp(B) values
for war change to more pronounced differences between the services, with “USN &
Other Forces” displaying the strongest correlation, followed by seaborne forces, and
“All Forces” having the lowest correlation. Violence and issues correlate significantly,
although not very high, at r = 0.227. A simple frequency analysis reveals that a war
level of violence is dominant in crises involving “2 incl. mil/3+ issues,” while crises
concerning “one mil-sec issue” concurred eighteen times when no violence was present, twenty-six times for minor violence, thirty-one times for major violence, and
fourteen times for war-level violence. Entries of “1–2 issues” rarely coincide in warlevel violence (twice) but rather take place in nonviolent settings (sixteen) and minor
clashes (thirteen).
In trying to explain the results, I took a closer look at the type of mission (N = 46)
and the strength of naval deployment (N = 73) where the information was available.
Because of the small N values, only frequencies can be presented. For the lowest issues
category, “1–2 issues,” six responses took place in the form of shows of force and two as
NEOs. For “mil-sec issues,” three were contingent positioning/reconnaissances, four
were NEOs, and two were shows of force, while for the highest issue categories, combat
(five) and show of force (eight) were dominant. In general, a show of force is the most
frequent type of mission, but given the absence of combat activity in lower-level crises,
this supports the assumption of a graver threat presented by crises involving multiple
issues. Looking at the strength of the naval deployment, the two variables increase
simultaneously. For the lowest issues category, deployments with no CVs are most frequent; conversely, for the highest issue category, deployments with two or more CVs are
most likely. Blechman and Kaplan had found a correlation between the use of aircraft
2
carriers and the importance of violence. Examining the “eyeball” correlations (that
is, those apparent on quick inspection) from the frequencies, aircraft carriers were not
overwhelmingly more frequent in war levels of violence. The same was observed for the
involvement of amphibious forces.
While the variable “gravity of threat 2” had been excluded from the previous model, the
frequency analysis shows that maritime forces are mostly deployed in crises where territory is threatened, while “All Forces” deployed only when a threat to influence is present. This encourages a distinction between the two categories. Surprisingly, territorial
crises never triggered the deployment of all U.S. military services. Following the separation of cases by the newly introduced distinction (no cases for territorial threats and
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all forces), no analysis was possible with the variable “servicetype 1” or “servicetype 2.”
Therefore, the variable “USN-USMC Team” was employed as dependent variable.
Figure 19

Model Crisis Characteristics 1b: USNUSMCTEAM, Stepwise Multinomial Regression
Category

NO NAVY

USN-USMC TEAM

USN&OTHER FORCES
(incl. all forces)

Low-level threat

3.795**

3.589*

bl

Territorial threat

14.915***

7.567**

bl

0.475

bl

Threat to influence
Grave threat

0.884

rf

bl

1–2 issues

1.462

1.105

bl

1 Mil-Sec issue

8.022***

5.333***

2 incl. Mil-Sec or 3+
No violence

rf

rf
3.445**

bl

rf

bl

1.094

bl

Minor clashes

2.340

0.452

bl

Major clashes

3.427***

0.265*

bl

War

rf

rf

bl

Low-level threat

bl

rf

Territorial threat

bl

0.536

0.254***

rf

Threat to influence

bl

0.569

4.294***

Grave threat

bl

1.057

3.445**

1–2 issues

bl

rf

rf

1 Mil-Sec issue

bl

0.880

0.182***

2 incl. Mil-Sec or 3+

bl

1.323

1.462

No violence

bl

rf

rf

Minor clashes

bl

0.609

1.472

Major clashes

bl

0.244**

1.005

War

bl

3.150**

3.445*

N = 224
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01

Sig. Model = 0.000
bl—baseline

Pseudo-R² = 0.347
rf—reference category

This time, the stepwise regression included all three independent variables. The findings clearly demonstrate the dominance of maritime forces only among the military
responses in crises posing a “threat to territory.” The likelihood of the deployment of
naval forces increases with a “territorial threat,” by 7.567, although “no naval involvement” is even more likely, with a factor of 14.915. Thus while the United States overall is
reluctant to become engaged in territorial threats with military forces, seaborne forces
are the tool of choice if a military response is decided on. There is a predictable outcome
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associated with the “threat to influence” category. It can be assumed that in such crises
the United States was the actor coded as perceiving a threat to its influence. In this model, the threat variable also suggests that out of the military forces, seaborne forces are
more likely to be deployed in low-threat crises, compared to stronger responses including the Air Force and Army.
The second half of the analysis with “no Navy” as baseline does not show significant
results for seaborne forces, because they are very similar to “no naval involvement,”
as the first part of the analysis reveals. The inclusion of the threat level in this model
suggests that this variable is likely to be influenced by seaborne responses and “stronger
involvements” not distinguishing between the Air Force and Army, in particular for
low-level threats. Overall, the hypotheses concerning the gravity of threat and the level
of violence can be partially confirmed—seaborne responses are more likely in crises
characterized by lower threats but more violence. The hypothesis regarding the issue of
the crisis has to be rejected for now, since “USN-USMC” responses do not seem to be
correlated to low-stakes issues.
Case Study 1a: Threat to Influence and All Forces. The U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 is representative of a large military forces deployment, in this
instance to control events in, and to maintain American influence over, the Western
Hemisphere. Armed and authorized to return fire, the troops were the first combat3
ready U.S. force to enter a Latin American country in almost forty years.
A civil war broke out in the Dominican Republic on 24 April 1965, when a junta, which
had deposed Juan Bosch in a military coup in 1963, was itself overthrown. The counterrevolution wanted to restore constitutional government and Bosch to power. The United
States was mostly concerned about the possibility of a second Cuba; an anti-American
regime would limit the influence of the United States and hinder its predominance
while potentially providing the Soviet Union (or USSR) with a new ally in Washing4
ton’s own backyard. But the foremost official justification was the threat to the lives of
American citizens.
Shortly after the outbreak of the crisis, the U.S. embassy requested the evacuation of
citizens of the United States and other nations. The USN was ready to move immediately and placed a task force—including the helicopter carrier USS Boxer (LPH 4) and 1,500
Marines—off the Dominican coast. On 27 April the evacuation operations began, with
unarmed helicopters airlifting Marines into the capital to protect American citizens.
Impediments to prompt evacuation led to an increase of U.S. troop strength ashore and
a strengthening of the naval task force. Supporting Air Force tactical units were moved
to the Caribbean area. After Marine forces and Army units established a safety zone
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and a safe corridor, refugees were also taken on board directly; by 2 May the Navy had
evacuated a total of three thousand civilians.
The mission’s objective was extended to include the prevention of communist influence
in the Dominican government. By 6 May the United States had twenty-two thousand
men ashore and nine thousand afloat. The signing of an “Act of Dominican Reconciliation” on 31 August 1965 ended the international crisis, with all sides agreeing on a
moderate provisional president. According to Siegel, U.S. naval forces did not begin to
5
6
withdraw until 28 June 1966; Cable sets the final withdrawal on 20 September 1966.
The need for this successful but expensive operation is disputed. A total of forty (the
Department of Defense [DoD] counts thirty-eight) ships of the USN were involved,
including Boxer, the tank landing ship Wood County (LST 1178), destroyer transport
Ruchamkin (APD 89), attack cargo ships Yancey (AKA 93) and Rankin (AKA 103), and
the dock landing ships Fort Snelling (LSD 30) and Raleigh (LPD 1). The evacuation operation mainly served to underline U.S. interest in the region by establishing a presence
7
and showing determination not to allow a communist takeover.
Case Study 1b: One Military-Security Issue and Seaborne Forces Only. The Turkish
straits crisis in 1946 presented a threat to national security for Turkey and demonstrated
U.S. naval commitment in the Mediterranean to support countries struggling against
communist influence—as after the Second World War it had promised to do. Soviet
activities mounted a growing threat to Eastern Europe in 1946. When a crisis broke out
between Turkey and the Soviet Union, this commitment was put to the test. But before
the outbreak, an important diplomatic event took place: in April 1946 the battleship
USS Missouri (BB 63) departed the United States for Turkey carrying the remains of
the deceased Turkish ambassador to the United States. Missouri was the ship on board
which Japan had surrendered at the end of the war; sending it was a clear demonstration
of American support for Turkey and a prelude to a permanent presence in the Mediterranean. Besides visiting Turkey, the battleship also underscored the U.S. commitment to
Greece. Missouri demonstrated the unique role of the Navy versus those of the Air Force
and Army. The vessel could be sent to the vicinity without a real commitment, but if necessary this political use of force could promptly be converted into a military use of force.
The Turkish straits crisis was triggered by two Soviet demands in August 1946; the
Soviet Union sought naval bases and joint control over the straits. Simultaneously, the
Soviets increased their naval activity in the region. As a direct response, the United
States expanded its own naval activity. After a visit to Lisbon, USS Franklin D. Roosevelt
(CV 42) entered the Mediterranean on 8 August. The presence of the world’s largest
aircraft carrier was intended to demonstrate the American commitment to Turkey in response to a Soviet buildup on the Turkish border and to signal concern about increased
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Soviet naval activity in the Black Sea. While the carrier did not visit Turkey, its presence sent a clear message of Washington’s intentions to resist Soviet expansion. The
deployment of an aircraft carrier offered the possibility of U.S. support on the mainland
through power projection ashore, should the Soviet Union invade Turkey. This crisis
shows the value of seaborne forces in a military-security issue crisis.
The advantage of flexibility allows observing the events, yet flexing muscles and exerting influence. The United States was able to demonstrate a commitment while staying
out of the way in case no direct action was necessary to solve the crisis. The deployment of stronger forces would likely have been interpreted as a direct involvement on
the part of the United States and would have heightened tensions and anxiety. At the
same time, it was a perfect occasion to begin the permanent stationing of U.S. ships in
the Mediterranean. Previously, U.S. naval forces in the Mediterranean had consisted
mostly of destroyers, cruisers, and auxiliary vessels. Soviet power and influence had expanded after the end of 1945 and posed a threat to the strategically important Mediterranean, a favorable environment for the exploitation of the diplomatic advantages of naval
forces. Although the Soviet Union downplayed the importance of the American naval
buildup, the permanent U.S. presence—announced in September 1946—was important
to conveying a message of immediate readiness should any country need support against
8
communist influence.
Case Study 1c: No Violence and Seaborne Forces. The Nam Tha crisis of 1962 illustrates the deployment of naval forces in crises not involving violence. In May 1962 an attack by the Laotian communist insurgent group known as the Pathet Lao on the Laotian
town of Nam Tha triggered a crisis for the United States and neighboring Thailand. The
Laotian government forces did not engage and instead retreated. Thailand, fearing a
Pathet Lao advance, strengthened its border with Laos. The United States sent the Seventh Fleet to the Gulf of Thailand on standby status and deployed Marine forces already
in Thailand for exercises to bolster that nation’s defenses against Laotian communists
should a request be received from Thailand. All U.S. forces in the Pacific and at home
were put on alert. The aircraft carrier Valley Forge (CV 45) assisted in the Marine landing in the Gulf of Bangkok, and the Hancock (CV 19) group took position off Da Nang,
South Vietnam. The deployment of the Seventh Fleet halted the Pathet Lao initiative
and, together with political pressure, brought the parties into negotiations. The crisis
ended with tacit understandings between Thailand and the United States, as well as
between Thailand and North Vietnam, manifested on 12 June 1962 when three Laotian
princes agreed to participate in a coalition government. The United States had deployed
naval forces to demonstrate its opposition to events in Laos in what Edward Marolda
9
considers a show of force. This example mirrors the pattern of show-of-force missions
in nonviolent settings.
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Regression Analysis Crisis Characteristics 2
The hypothesis assumes a stronger American involvement the greater the geostrategic
importance of the crisis, measured with the two variables “geostrategic salience” (global
versus subsystem) and “geographic location” (important versus not important). “Eyeball” correlations suggest that the greater the threat to the global system, the more likely
the United States is to become involved with all categories of military forces, while the
importance of the geographic location more generally determines whether the United
States becomes involved at all.
Figure 20

Model Crisis Characteristics 2: Servicetype1, Stepwise Multinomial Regression
CategorY
Loc not important
Loc important
Subsystem only

NO NAVY
5.362**
rf
11.319***

USN ONLY

USN-USMC

USN&OTHER
FORCES

ALL FORCES

2.025

0.861

2.497

bl

rf
6.203***

Global system

rf

Loc not important

bl

Loc important

bl

Subsystem only

bl

rf

rf

Global system

bl

1.825

2.064

N = 227
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01

rf

rf
5.485**

rf
2.648*

Sig. Model = 0.000
bl—baseline

rf
rf
6.382**

rf
4.194**
rf
rf
2.147
rf
2.699*

bl
bl
bl
rf
5.362**
rf
11.319***

Pseudo-R² = 0.247
rf—reference category

The regression results confirm the observations from the frequencies, above. If geostrategic salience is low (subsystem only), the United States is more likely to respond with
lower levels of force, with “no Navy” and “USN only” being the two dominant categories. This finding is consistent with a realist interpretation of U.S. intervention decisions
and motivations. Geographic location shows a significant result only for “no naval involvement,” although the Exp(B) values suggest that the deployment of the USN and Air
Force is more likely in crises in regions of relatively low importance to the United States
than a deployment of all forces. When the baseline and reference category are reversed,
“USN-USMC” responses show the highest likelihood of deployment, with 6.382, even
higher than “All Forces.” Geographic location represents U.S. interest in the region, but
geostrategic salience is a more accurate measure of the potential impact the crisis may
have on the global system. Thus the hypothesis can be confirmed.
A closer look reveals that seventy-eight of the crises posing threats to subsystems occurred in geographic locations of low interest to the United States and ninety-three in
geographic locations of high interest. Thus a threat to the subsystem is almost as likely
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to occur in a location of interest as in one of no interest. When the crisis poses a threat
to the dominant or global system, the distribution is very different, with fifty-seven
cases in high-importance regions and only eight in less important ones.
Case Study 1d: Threat to Global System and All Forces. The several incidents involving
Berlin during the Cold War are examples of crises posing threats to the global system
and of U.S. responses including all military services. The Berlin Blockade of 1948 was
one of the first major escalations between the United States and the Soviet Union. After
World War II, Berlin had been divided into American, British, French, and Soviet zones.
The announcement by the three Western governments that they planned to integrate
their zones in Germany triggered a crisis with the Soviets, in the form of a Soviet blockade that stopped all transport to and from Berlin through Soviet-occupied East Germany. The West responded with an unprecedented airlift to provision the city by air, called
Operation Vittles, in which the United States deployed all available transport aircraft.
The USN moved a carrier battle group (I was unable to determine which) to the North
Atlantic in reaction to the crisis. The contribution of the Navy to the airlift was both direct and indirect. From the beginning the Navy provided airlifts and fuel in support of
the Air Force. But only in late October 1948, when the U.S. Air Force needed support in
order to meet the demand, did the U.S. Navy become directly involved. Negotiations between the Soviet Union and the Western powers extended over several months until the
Soviets finally agreed to end the blockade under the condition that the United States,
United Kingdom, and France lift their trade restrictions against East Germany. The last
day of the blockade was 12 May 1949. The end of the crisis left Germany split into two
10
states—the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.
Crisis Characteristics Hypotheses Results Summary
Table 4-1 summarizes the findings for the four crisis-characteristics hypotheses.
Table 4-1
Hypothesis 1a: Low Threat

Mixed results

Hypothesis 1b: Low Stake

Not confirmed

Hypothesis 1c: Violence

Mixed results

Hypothesis 1d: Geostrategic Interest

Confirmed

Crisis Actor Models
The influence of crisis actor characteristics on seaborne crisis response is analyzed with
the help of four hypotheses: the number of involved actors, the involvement of the United
11
Nations, the stability of the actors, and the attitude toward the American involvement.
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The models capture variables at both the macro (system) and micro (actor) levels and
seaborne crisis response serves as both a dependent and an independent variable.
The two hypotheses under Crisis Actor Model 1 assume that on the one hand, a greater
number of actors leads to a stronger U.S. response, while on the other hand, low or no
UN involvement triggers deployments by seaborne forces only (see sidebar 2).
Figure 21

Crisis Actor Model 1
H2a: Number of Actors

x6 = number of actors
Y = U.S. seaborne
crisis response

H2b: UN Involvement

x7 = UN involvement

SIDEBAR 2
The variables in the hypotheses are expressed as follows.
(6) x6 = number of crisis actors (cractr).
This variable was measured with the number of crisis actors as provided by
the ICB data.
(7) x7 = global organization organ most active in crisis (globorg,
globorg2).
The “globorg” variable from the ICB was transformed into the new variable “globorg2” and is divided into three categories: no UN involvement,
low-level UN organ (general activity/Secretary-General/General Assembly)
involvement, and Security Council involvement.
(8) x8 = stability (stability).
The variable “stability” was created by combining the two ICB2 actor variables “government stability” and “societal unrest.” Possible categories
include “normal,” when both variables remained stable; “societal instability,” an increase in societal unrest with governmental stability normal; and,
conversely, “governmental instability,” a decrease in governmental stability
with no change in societal unrest. Finally, the most unstable category is
measured by an increase in instability for both variables: “governmental
and societal instability.”
(9) y4 = attitude to U.S. involvement (usfavr, usfavr2).
This variable measures the crisis actors’ attitudes to U.S. activity, from
the ICB2 data, with the possible values “unfavorable,” “neutral,” and
“favorable.”

In Crisis Actor Model 2, greater stability is assumed to favor the deployment of seaborne
forces only (see sidebar 2).
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Figure 22

Crisis Actor Model 2
Y = U.S. seaborne
crisis response

x8 = stability

H2c: Stability

Crisis Actor Model 3 analyzes the hypothesis that the deployment of seaborne crisis
response forces only will lead to more favorable perceptions of U.S. involvement (see
sidebar 2).
Figure 23

Crisis Actor Model 3
H2d: Perception of U.S.
Involvement

x = U.S. seaborne
crisis response

Y4 = attitude to U.S.
activity

The table in figure 24 presents the frequencies for the actor variables, with the exception
of the metric variable “number of actors.”
figure 24

Crisis Actors Frequencies
USN-USMC

USN & Other
Forces

ALL FORCES

10/43.5

6/40

2/9.5

4/12.9

8/34.8

1/6.7

7/33.3

7/22.6

61/63.8

5/21.7

8/53.3

12/57.1

20/64.5

Governmental
instability

18/7.4

4/7

3/8.8

9/13.8

5/5.1

Governmental and
societal instability

34/13.9

10/17.5

6/17.6

5/7.7

16/16.2

26/10.7

Actor Characteristics
UN involvement
(system level)

Stability
(actor level)

No Navy

USN only

No UN involvement

49/36

Low-level UN
involvement

26/29.5

Security Council

Societal instability

Attitude toward
U.S. activity (actor
level)

14/24.6

11/32.4

13/20

10/10.1

Both normal

166/68

29/50.9

14/41.2

38/58.5

68/68.7

Favorable

124/51.9

24/49

17/54.8

25/44.6

42/50.6

Neutral

17/7.1

6/12.2

1/3.2

6/10.7

2/2.4

Unfavorable

98/41

19/38.8

13/41.9

25/44.6

39/47

Note: The first number presents the frequencies and the second number refers to the percentage within the variable “servicetype1.”

The majority of “USN only” responses occurred in crisis settings with no or low-level
UN involvement, while for all other service combinations, deployments coinciding
with United Nations Security Council (UNSC) activity are most common. Overall, the
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United States seems to be more likely to respond if the crisis actors experience neither
societal nor governmental unrest. If the United States deploys in crises with societal unrest, seaborne forces are more likely to be deployed alone than in combination with the
Air Force or Army. The frequencies for the attitudes toward U.S. activity show no clear
pattern (all cases where the United States was coded as “crisis actor” or as “inactive”
were treated as missing data). Perceptions of American activity without any military
service involvement or with just naval forces are slightly more neutral or least likely to
be unfavorable.
“UN involvement” and the “number of crisis actors” are measured at the system level
and are combined in a stepwise multinomial regression model. The hypothesis regarding the influence of instability, measured at the actor level, is analyzed in a simple
regression model. Unfortunately, the dependent variable “attitude towards U.S. activity”
did not generate any significant results. The attitude of the actors will be further evaluated in the section looking at crisis outcomes with an introduction of a new variable. To
understand better the impact of the often-claimed limited decisiveness, it will be interesting to see how actors’ satisfaction with the outcome correlates with attitude toward
U.S. activity.
Regression Analysis Actor Characteristics 1
In figure 25, the event “All Forces” is chosen as baseline, and both “no Navy” and
“USN-USMC” are significantly negatively correlated with the number of actors. “USN
only” and “USN & Other Forces” suggest the same direction but fail to achieve significant
results. When “no Navy” functions as baseline, all military service combinations are more
likely the higher the number of crisis actors, with “USN & Other Forces” and “All Forces”
Figure 25

Model Actor Characteristics 1: Servicetype2, Stepwise Multinomial Regression
Category

NO NAVY

USN

USN-USMC

USN&OTHER
FORCES

ALL FORCES

Number of actors

0.486***

0.808

0.493*

0.964

bl

No UN inv

2.755*

8.702***

2.587

0.812

bl

Low-level UN inv

1.124

4.371**

0.330

1.650

bl

UNSC inv

rf

Number of actors

bl

No UN inv

bl

rf

rf

Low-level UN inv

bl

1.232

0.312

4.984*

2.452

UNSC inv

bl

0.317*

1.065

3.394

2.755*

N = 226
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01

rf
1.664**

Sig. Model = 0.000
bl—baseline

rf
1.015

rf
1.985***
rf

bl
2.059***
rf

Pseudo-R² = 0.215
rf—reference category
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showing the highest correlations. The category “USN-USMC” shows a value close to 1,
suggesting no influence, but because of the lack of significance this cannot be interpreted.
The most telling outcome of the model is the increase of the probable odds by a factor of
8.7 for “USN only” responses in crises with “no UN involvement” and 4.371 with “low
level UN involvement.” There is an even greater likelihood than no naval involvement at
all compared to “All Forces.” “All Forces” responses, and even more so the combination
with the Air Force, correlate highly with “Security Council” involvement. While the
Exp(B) for the Air Force combination does not generate a significant result in the combined model, a simple regression analysis with “UN involvement” as the only independent shows significant values for “USN & Other Forces” and UNSC involvement.
Overall, both hypotheses can be confirmed. The results suggest that the higher the
number of crisis actors, the stronger the American response. For the UN activity, naval
forces alone correlate with “no UN involvement” and “low UN involvement,” while “All
Forces” responses concurred mainly with Security Council involvement.
While low or no UN involvement might suggest that a crisis was of low importance, it
can also suggest that the United States was hesitant to send a strong force without some
form of legitimization. Running of cross-tabulation calculations indicated “low level
threats” occurred thirty times with “no UN involvement,” twenty-three times with “low
level UN involvement,” and thirty-five times with “UNSC involvement.” As expected,
“no UN involvement” was least likely in gravely threatening crises, but the UNSC responded to all three threat categories about equally. As for issues, “UNSC involvement”
is most likely in the highest category, while “no UN involvement” is most frequent in
crises concerning one security/military issue. But overall, no or low UN involvement is
not a synonym for low importance. The strength of the USN response does not seem to
be influenced by UN activity either. “Eyeball” correlation shows that a force strength
of more than one CV is also frequent with no or low UN involvement. The type of mission is a better predictor. Combat is most common when the UNSC is involved, while
reconnaissance/contingent positioning coincides with no UN activity. The frequency of
reconnaissance/contingent positioning lends further support to the idea of expressing
concern by observing events from a distance without becoming directly involved and
attracting only limited global attention.
Case Study 2b: Low UN Involvement and USN-Only Response. Trouble in Nicaragua
and Guatemala in early November 1960 led to the deployment of U.S. naval forces but
low UN involvement. Cuba was suspected of supporting an invasion of Nicaragua by
exiles and a revolt in Guatemala. In response to requests by both countries, the United
States deployed naval and air surveillance. The U.S. Navy was sent to patrol the nations’
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Caribbean coasts and to stand by in case of a possible invasion from mid-November
until 7 December 1960. Two aircraft carriers, USS Shangri-La (CV 38) and Wasp
(CV 18), as well as eight other surface ships, formed the naval patrol force. They kept
outside the three-mile limit and watched for suspicious vessels heading for the two
countries. The naval forces were withdrawn after confirmation from Nicaragua and
Guatemala that help was no longer needed and that the crisis had ended for both ac12
tors. This episode serves as a good example of the flexibility, readiness, and subtlety
of naval forces—short reaction time, ability to wait and see, and effortless withdrawal
when no longer needed.
Regression Analysis Actor Characteristics 2
The next model analyzes the impact of the actors’ stability on seaborne crisis response at
the actor level.
Figure 26

Model Actor Characteristics 2: Servicetype1, Stepwise Multinomial Regression
Category

USN&OTHER
FORCES

ALL FORCES

NO NAVY

USN

USN-USMC

Gov. instability

1.475

1.876

2.914

3.221**

bl

Gov. & soc.
instability

0.870

1.466

1.821

0.559

bl

Societal instability

1.065

3.283**

5.343***

2.326*

bl

Both normal

rf

N = 499
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01

rf
Sig. Model = 0.007
bl—baseline

rf

rf

bl

Pseudo-R² = 0.057
rf—reference category

The suggested frequency distribution is confirmed in the regression analysis. The odds
of “USN only,” “USN-USMC,” and “USN & Other Forces” are increased by a factor of
3.3, 5.3, and 2.3, respectively, in crises characterized by an increase in societal unrest
but no change in government conditions, with “All Forces” as baseline. The results for
“only government instability,” although positive for “no Navy” and the seaborne forces,
present significant results only for the combination with the Air Force. The results suggest that “All Forces” responses are most likely when both factors remain normal, while
seaborne forces (and especially the Marine Corps) deploy when an increase in societal
unrest is present, in combination with the Air Force in case of increased governmental
2
instability. The low R value suggests that the association is rather weak and that many
other factors influencing the dependent variable remain unaccounted for.
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Overall, the mixed results encourage further analysis, but for now the hypothesis that
the deployment of seaborne forces only is more likely when there is no decrease in stability cannot be confirmed.
Case Study 2c: Different Forms of Unrest within One Crisis. Because this variable
is measured at the actor level, different actors within one crisis experience different
changes. The Congo civil war crisis of 1998 can be cited as an example. Tensions in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) had been growing, and on 29 July 1998
President Laurent-Désiré Kabila announced the expulsion of all foreign troops and
of his chief military adviser, a Rwandan Tutsi, triggering a crisis for Rwanda. Shortly
thereafter fighting erupted, and the DRC accused Rwandan forces of aggression.
Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Chad backed Kabila, but his former ally Rwanda
received support from Uganda. The violent conflict triggered crises for the DRC,
Uganda, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Chad. After months of fighting, the governments involved in the war signed a peace agreement, joined shortly after by the two
principal rebel groups. Violence erupted again in February 2000, and attempts to hold
a summit were unsuccessful. When Kabila was assassinated in February 2002, his son
Joseph inherited the presidency. In February he met Rwandan president Paul Kagame
in Washington, D.C., marking the first step toward peace talks, while Rwandan and
Ugandan troops retreated, in a gesture of goodwill. On 30 July 2002, after prolonged
negotiations, Rwanda and the DRC signed a final peace agreement in South Africa.
According to the ICB there is evidence for U.S. covert involvement in training troops
on both sides.
The USN was also engaged in preparation for a planned noncombatant evacuation
operation. From 10 to 16 August 1998, USS Saipan (LHA 2) and the 22nd MEU(SOC)
stood ready in operation Autumn Shelter for a possible evacuation of the American embassy and U.S. citizens from Kinshasa, Congo. In the event, the NEO was not
required and was canceled on 16 August. While for five of the crisis actors—Angola,
Rwanda, Namibia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe—neither a change in political stability nor
societal unrest was noted, Chad experienced an increase in societal unrest, and Congo
suffered from both political instability and societal unrest. The USN was engaged in
operations in Congo, the crisis actor experiencing the most turmoil, not Chad.
Crisis Actor Hypotheses Results
Two out of the four hypotheses were confirmed by the regression analyses (see table
4-2). The measurement of political stability needs further evaluation and results before
rejecting the hypothesis.
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Table 4-2
Hypothesis 2a: Number of Actors

Confirmed

Hypothesis 2b: UN Involvement

Confirmed

Hypothesis 2c: Political Stability

Mixed results

Hypothesis 2d: Attitude to U.S. Activity

No results

Part I Conclusion: Crisis Characteristics
While knowledge of a “trigger” would point to the initial reason for the crisis breakout,
the gravity of the threat assesses the whole situation. To have a thorough picture for
assessing the stakes of the crisis, the variable “gravity of threat” was introduced. While
a violent trigger would suggest a need for immediate action, a crisis posing a grave
threat, above all else, calls for a strong response. Overall the analyses confirmed that
a crisis posing a “grave threat” is more likely to trigger force responses stronger than
the dispatch of seaborne forces. The Air Force dominates crises characterized by the
most extreme threats. The gravity of the threat captures the more realist component of
the level of the crisis, since a grave threat has the potential to destabilize and disrupt a
country and thereby spill over to other countries or affect whole regions. This in turn
might trigger responses by other actors. Where the gravity of the situation requires a
firm response and the dispatch of ground troops seems too risky, airpower seems to be
the best choice. Even in situations where the time factor might not be especially critical,
the dispatch of ground troops could lose too much time, whereas air forces are capable
of striking faster.
When a crisis poses a threat to influence, it is deemed important enough to send ground
troops for, because it can be assumed that in most cases the influence of the superpower
has been threatened. This finding evokes the realist school of thought in decisions about
the intensity of engagement. While a grave threat may not threaten U.S. interests, a
threat to influence most likely does so. Thus, grave threat crises need forceful intervention, but in the form of airpower, while threats to influence trigger the strongest display
of U.S. force. For the most part “low gravity threats” do not trigger military involvement when compared to no naval involvement, but when assessed against stronger force
levels, seaborne forces responded more frequently to low-gravity threat crises. Thus the
U.S. force level is graduated to the gravity of the threat.
Interesting to note is the dominance of seaborne responses to territorial threats within
military responses generally. Since territorial threats are difficult to resolve, the United
States might frequently decide to minimize any involvement. But if a military response
is desired, naval forces can offer advantages. From a coercion-theory perspective, a
limited level of force is most effective before a threat is carried out, for coercion is
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superfluous if a country has already been overrun. In the case of territorial risk, imme13
diate action is appropriate to deter further escalation. Again, the USN is a ready force
and has the ability to stand by and adapt to developments ashore, should the United
States choose to send military forces at all. If the deterrence or compellence option fails,
naval forces can readily switch to a more forceful posture. “Low-level threats” suggest
susceptibility to deterrence to prevent continued escalation because of the lower magnitude and depth of conflict. The connection between deterrence and “low-level,” or
“territorial,” threats deserves more exploration.
The second hypothesis assumed frequent seaborne activity in “low-issue” crises. The
results show USN-USMC forces mostly deployed in crises concerning “one militarysecurity issue,” the highest of the issue categories. However, in crises with more than
one issue, naval forces are not deployed alone. I had expected the U.S. Navy to be dispatched mostly in crises characterized by a political-diplomatic issue and not in highpolitics situations. Nevertheless, it can be argued that because only one single issue is
present, albeit one of the highest importance, the crisis is more structured and the issue
requiring resolution clearer. George finds that the clarity of the objective favors coercive
14
diplomacy.
Alternatively, the explanation of no visible correlation between seaborne forces only and
low-issue crises may lie with the vast arsenal of tools the United States can choose from
to react to diplomatic crises besides the military services. Examples include the diplomatic corps, foreign-aid network, and Defense Department civilians, and so on. While
in the nineteenth century the United States had to rely primarily on naval forces to
15
conduct diplomacy, today there are many other sources at the government’s disposal.
This view is supported by the correlation between “no naval involvement” and different
issue categories. For crises involving security-military issues, however, the Navy is still
preferred over the other military response tools.
The time factor is likely to play an important role as well. Military-security issues might
require immediate responses or long-lasting deployments, both of which seaborne
forces can offer. The results of this analysis again reveal unexpected findings for the
ground forces. Together with “no Navy” they correlate positively with “1 to 2 issue” crises exclusive of military-security aspects, suggesting their involvement in “low-politics
crises.” In high-stakes crises, the “USAF” combination is dominant and the deployment
of seaborne forces even more likely than “All Forces.” High-salience crises are said to
be longer lasting and more difficult to resolve; this might explain the reluctance to put
boots on the ground when no threat to American national interests is present.
The gravity of the threat and the stakes of the crisis do not include information about
the level of violence. “USN & Other Forces” is most frequent in the highest category of
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violence when “war-level violence” is experienced. When the independent variable is
analyzed individually, ground troops show the weakest correlation among all military
forces for the highest level of violence. In the combined model, the seaborne forces show
the weakest correlation, but overall the difference between the service combinations is
not substantial enough to confirm reluctance to put boots on the ground. Nevertheless,
results also indicate that violence also does not call for a more forceful response. It is
important to keep in mind that the deployment of ground troops is not a synonym for
combat actions. For example, military training and providing security are important
Army functions. All services can offer advantages: the USN can adopt a wait-and-see
posture, the Air Force can exert more coercion power with minimal risk, and ground
troops can offer decisiveness. As previously stated, violent crises bear a greater risk of
third parties becoming directly involved, especially in the form of ground confrontations. Often third parties remain aloof when a crisis has become too violent, as is often
the case in civil wars or ethnic conflicts. While a certain tendency to prefer airborne
forces as coercion tool when violence is very high is visible, the results are not as clearcut as anticipated. The positive correlation with seaborne forces and violence can be
interpreted as an attempt to exert at least some influence by deploying near a crisis location while staying out of the immediate danger zone. After observing the events ashore,
the wait-and-see approach can quickly be converted to the use of force.
Overall, the first part of the crises characteristics analysis revealed many results counter
to my previous assumptions. In particular, the high frequency of use of ground forces in
“low-stakes” crises and the use of seaborne forces for high-violence or territorial threats
point to interesting research questions. The issues at stake and the gravity of threat are
of foremost importance for the actors directly involved; thus when the United States
intervenes as a third party, it is likely that other considerations, such as U.S. national
interests, will exert a greater influence on the crisis management technique.
The results of the next hypothesis, controlling for geostrategic importance, show more
clear-cut and predictable results. The realist school of thought and national interests
suggest that a crisis of greater strategic significance to the United States triggers a
stronger military response and thus a more robust commitment and signaling of intentions. Crises merely affecting “subsystems” are most positively correlated with “no naval
involvement” responses, followed by “USN only,” “USN-USMC,” and “USN & Other
Forces,” while “All Forces” dominates in “global system” crises. While this could point
to the limited decisiveness of naval forces, crises affecting the global system are likely
to be greater in magnitude and require forceful and dominant interventions. Thus, this
point does not speak against the usefulness of seaborne forces but rather to the importance of using the right force for the task at hand. “All Forces” also responded frequently
to crises located in important regions, although “USN-USMC” shows a slightly stronger
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association to crises in these areas. This could point to the value of the USN-USMC
team as a “go anywhere, do anything” force. The USN deployment in regions of both
low and high importance can be supported by the continuous global presence of naval
forces. While the largest presence will be close to locations of interest to the United
States, forward presence allows faster reactions anywhere.
Overall, realist considerations seem to govern the decision-making process in choosing
response tools for crises characterized by geostrategic importance. This is supported by
Michael Gilligan and Stephen Stedman’s statement that “for a realist, the location of a
conflict plays a critical role in determining its importance because it plays a significant
role in determining the degree of threat the conflict poses to a state’s vital interests. This
relationship stands in sharp contrast to the humanitarian idealist model in which the
16
location of the conflict should be largely irrelevant.”
Part I Conclusion: Crisis Actors
The next part of the analysis focused on the crisis actors. The results confirmed earlier
research, concluding that more crisis actors trigger stronger military responses by the
United States and thus connote more complex crises. According to Meernik, crises
17
involving more actors are of greater importance to U.S. national interests. Conflict
resolution is more challenging when multiple actors are involved, because more than
one party needs to be convinced or coerced and it becomes difficult to find common
ground for agreement. Nevertheless, the differences between the service combinations
are not very large.
The most convincing actors’ results regard the influence of UN activity. The results
show that for the majority of “All Forces” responses the UN involvement had reached
the Security Council level. Naval forces alone are positively correlated with “no UN
involvement” or “low-level UN involvement.” I note that “USN only” responses are even
more likely than “no naval involvement” for these two categories. This result supports
the advantage of limited intrusiveness and subtlety, while flexing muscles. The dispatch
of naval forces is more politically acceptable and offers a potentially coercive diplomatic
tool. The ability to exert influence discreetly attracts less attention and thus less criticism not only from other nations or the UN but also from Congress and the American
public. Noninvolvement of the United Nations could also suggest a less important crisis.
While there is a low statistical correlation between “no UN involvement” and the “gravity of threat,” there is no linear relationship with UN activity. More convincing are the
considerations of a careful legitimization of more forceful actions, the support of diplomatic efforts, and the benefits of a wait-and-see approach. The findings also support
Ekatarina Stepanova’s findings that often waiting for UNSC activity will cause the right
18
moment for intervening to be lost.
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The political-stability analysis revealed interesting yet inconclusive results. Seaborne
forces, especially with Marine Corps elements, dominate in crises with an increase in
“societal unrest” but not in crises marked by “governmental instability.” The hypotheses argue that lack of unity renders negotiations and thus conflict resolution more
difficult. Presumably societal unrest need not influence a leadership’s ability to speak
with one voice, whereas an increase in governmental instability would. “All Forces”
responses have occurred most frequently either when an increase in both governmental
and societal unrest was present or when both factors remained stable. To understand
more fully the dynamics of the different service deployment combinations, it would be
useful to control for the type of mission. NEOs might be a frequent response to societal
unrests and explain the dispatch of maritime and airborne forces. Another possibility is
the naval wait-and-see approach with only limited involvement, in an attempt to calm
19
the situation down. In such cases, sending “USN-USMC” forces to the crisis location
to show interest visibly off a coast can be a useful strategy. As previously said, conflict
management works best between well identified entities. Thus the overall high frequency of all types of American response when the stability remains constant points to
a reluctance to become involved when conflict management is likely to be difficult and
challenging.
The analysis regarding the last actor hypotheses did not reveal any significant results.
The frequencies would suggest that “USN only” responses are most likely viewed as
“neutral” and least likely to be “unfavorable,” while the category “favorable” is very
comparable among the different response forms. This would support that limited intrusiveness is viewed favorably but that actors hope for a more forceful response on their
behalf, though opponents express a less negative attitude toward this limited form of
U.S. engagement.
The problem of all actor-level analysis is the uniform treatment of the naval variables.
The USN involvement is coded identically for every involved crisis actor, without controlling exactly for the target country where the United States intervenes or the party
with which the United States sides. Naval involvement is measured at the system level
(the crisis as one entity), without accounting for differences at the macro level—within
the crises and the actors. For example, a crisis can include five crisis actors. Out of the
five crisis actors the USN might be involved in only one country, in the form of a NEO,
but the current data treat all involved actors equally. Thus all five actors would be
coded positively for USN involvement and for a NEO mission. Controlling for the difference between ally and adversary of the United States and the resulting intervention/
nonintervention strategy for each actor could reveal important differences.
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We Move on the Seas That We Control, Part II
Assessing the Empirical Evidence—U.S. Involvement and
Crisis Outcomes

The correlation between U.S. involvement and seaborne crisis response is measured
1
with the help of six hypotheses, analyzing the degree and effect of U.S. activity.
Depending on the hypotheses, seaborne crisis response serves as the dependent or
independent variable. Because of high intercorrelation between the independent
variables, all hypotheses will be analyzed in individual simple regression models (see
sidebar 1).
U.S. Involvement Model 1 tests the hypothesis that the deployment of seaborne forces
only is more likely in lower forms of U.S. involvement. The hypothesis for U.S. Involvement Model 2 assumes that the effectiveness of American activity will be lower when
only seaborne forces are deployed. U.S. Involvement Model 3 hypothesizes that the
deployment of seaborne forces only is least likely in crises where U.S. direct military
activity is the most effective. U.S. Involvement Model 4 analyzes whether in cases the
United States deploys only seaborne forces, the contribution to the abatement is lower.
U.S. Involvement Model 5 assumes that in crises where the United States is a direct
actor, stronger force levels are deployed. Finally, U.S. Involvement Model 6 tests the
hypothesis assuming that the deployment of seaborne forces only positively influences
response readiness.
Figure 27

U.S. Involvement Model 1
H3a: Form of U.S.
Involvement

x9 = content of
U.S. activity

Y = U.S. seaborne
crisis response
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Figure 28

U.S. Involvement Model 2

H3b: U.S. Effectiveness

x = U.S. seaborne
crisis response

y5 = effectiveness of
U.S. activity

x = U.S. seaborne
crisis response

y6 = most effective
U.S. activity

Figure 29

U.S. Involvement Model 3
H3c: U.S. Direct
Military Effectiveness

Figure 30

U.S. Involvement Model 4

H3d: Termination

x = U.S. seaborne
crisis response

y7 = U.S. contribution
to abatement

x10 = U.S. crisis
actor

Y = U.S. seaborne
crisis response

Figure 31

U.S. Involvement Model 5

H3e: U.S. Crisis Actor

Figure 32

U.S. Involvement Model 6
x11 = naval reaction
Y = U.S. seaborne
crisis response

H3f: U.S. readiness
x12 = USN forces
abroad

SIDEBAR 1
The variables in the hypotheses are expressed mathematically as follows.
(1) x9 = content of U.S. activity (usinv, usinv2).
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This variable measures the highest level of U.S. activity in international crises, based on the variable “level of U.S. involvement.” The same criterion
was already applied to select the cases.
(2) y5 = effectiveness of U.S. involvement (usefct, usefct2).
This dependent variable is measured with the variable coding the effectiveness of the U.S. activity on crisis abatement, ranging from the categories
“escalation” to “no contribution to the abatement” and the “single most
important contributor.” Because of the limited number of cases, some categories had to be collapsed or excluded.
(3) y6 = most effective type of U.S. activity (usefac, usefac2).
The most effective type of U.S. activity (dependent variable) on the crisis
abatement has four values: “not effective,” “low-level most effective,”
“semi-/covert military most effective,” and “direct military most effective.”
(4) y7 = U.S. contribution to pace of abatement (uspace, uspace2).
The question of how naval forces influence the termination of a crisis is
measured with the help of the variable “U.S. contribution to pace of abatement” (dependent variable), thereby specifying whether the United States
“contributed,” “delayed,” or had “no influence” on the pace of abatement. Unfortunately, the category “no influence on the pace of abatement” showed an insufficient number of cases and had to be excluded.
(5) x10 = U.S. actor in crisis (usactor).
Whether the United States is a direct crisis actor or is involved as a third
party is measured with the binary variable “U.S. actor in crisis.”
(6) x11 = naval reaction time (elaps), and
x12 = naval forces abroad (USNabroad).
Next I introduced duration variables, measuring the first and last days of
the response as well as the total number of days: “start of naval involvement,” “end of naval involvement,” and “duration of naval involvement,”
adapted from the CNA reports. For cases with multiple naval involvements,
two time variables were created. Unfortunately, only one response date is
provided, although the services rarely all deployed at the same time. This
variable is unable to distinguish the speed of naval force deployment compared to that of the other military services. The readiness of naval forces is
measured by the elapsed time between the crisis trigger date (from the ICB
data set) and the start date of naval involvement (CNA), and by the total
number of active naval personnel deployed outside the United States in
the year of the crisis trigger date, as provided in U.S. Defense Dept., Active
Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by Country (Washington, D.C.: n.d.), available at www.defense.gov/.

The table in figure 33 presents the frequencies for the U.S. involvement variables, with
the exception of the metric variables “response time” and “number of USN personnel
abroad.”
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Figure 33

U.S. Involvement Frequencies
U.S. Involvement
Content of U.S.
activity

Effectiveness of U.S.
activity

U.S. actor in crisis

No Navy
Low level
Semi-military

Contribution to pace
of abatement

USN-USMC

USN &
Other
Forces

All Forces

110/80.91

8/34.8

8/50

6/28.6

8/25.8

24/37.7

12/52.2

8/50

13/61.9

6/19.4
17/54.8

Direct military

2/14.4

3/13

0/0

2/9.5

Intervention
escalated

5/3.7

4/17.4

1/6.3

1/8

7/22.6

No or marginal
contribution

87/64.6

11/47.8

6/37.5

6/28.6

2/6.5

Important/most
important

43/31.9

8/34.8

9/56.3

14/66.7

22/71

7/5.1

6/26.1

4/25

10/47.6

25/80.6

129/94.9

17/73.9

12/75

11/52.4

6/19.4

68/50.4

9/39.1

3/18.8

5/23.8

3/9.7
10/32.3

U.S. actor
U.S. not actor

Most effective U.S.
activity

USN only

Ineffective
Eff. low level

51/37.8

3/13

6/37.5

6/28.6

Eff. semi-military

14/10.4

8/34.8

7/43.8

8/38.1

4/12.9

Eff. direct military

2/1.5

3/13

0/0

2/9.5

14/45.2

Not effective

80/60.2

13/68.4

4/26.7

6/28.6

2/7.7

Effective

53/39.8

6/31.6

11/73.3

15/71.4

24/92.3

Delayed

2/1.5

4/17.4

1/6.3

0/0

5/16.1

Note: The first number presents the frequencies and the second number refers to the percentage within the variable “servicetype1.”

I will begin with the hypotheses treating naval involvement as the independent variable,
analyzed in three different models.
Regression Analyses U.S. Involvement 1: Seaborne Crisis Response Independent
Variable
The frequency chart shows a high number of “All Forces” responses and American
interventions contributing to an “escalation” or seen as “important/most important,”
while seaborne forces responses alone are most likely to coincide with “no or marginal
contribution” and “important/most important.” Because “USN & Other Forces,” “USNUSMC,” and intervention “escalated” only show a value of one each, the independent
variable “USN-USMC Team” was chosen.
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Figure 34

Model U.S. Involvement H3b: Effectiveness
Escalated

Not Contributed/
Marginal

Important/Most
Important

rf

rf

bl

USN-USMC

1.324

4.500

bl

NO NAVY

Category
USN&OTHER FORCES (incl.
all forces)

0.523

9.105

bl

USN&OTHER FORCES (incl.
all forces)

bl

rf

rf

USN-USMC

bl

0.294*

1.324

NO NAVY

bl

5.188**

2.529

USN&OTHER FORCES (incl.
all forces)

rf

bl

rf

USN-USMC

0.294*

bl

0.212***

NO NAVY

0.057***

bl

0.110***

USN&OTHER FORCES (incl.
all forces)

1.911

0.110***

bl

USN-USMC

2.529

0.494*

bl

NO NAVY

rf

USN&OTHER FORCES (incl.
all forces)

bl

0.057***

0.523

USN-USMC

bl

0.195**

0.395

NO NAVY

bl

USN&OTHER FORCES (incl.
all forces)
USN-USMC
NO NAVY
N = 226
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01

rf

rf

bl

rf

17.400***

bl

9.105***

5.118**

bl

2.023*

rf
Sig. Model = 0.000
bl—baseline

bl

rf

Pseudo-R² = 0.200
rf—reference category

Effectiveness of U.S. Activity
When “USN & Other incl. all forces” responses serve as the reference category, U.S.
interventions featuring “no Navy” and “USN-USMC” forces were most likely to “not/
marginally contribute,” although the results fail to meet the significance requirements.
If the reference category is changed to “no Navy,” “All Forces” responses are most likely
in crises where U.S. intervention escalates the situation compared to “no/marginal contribution.” The category “important/most important” operates in the same direction,
although the odds ratio is weaker. “USN-USMC” forces show the same tendency as “All
Forces” responses, albeit both the correlations with “escalation” and “important/most
important” are lower. But compared to “no naval involvement,” seaborne forces are also
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more likely when American activity is “important/most important” rather than “not/
marginal contribute.” Overall, whereas the odds of “escalation” are lower for seaborne
forces, the odds for “important” influence are also weaker. Thus the hypothesis can be
confirmed.
A closer look at the frequency distribution of the type of mission and force strength
shows that two cases of escalation coincide with a show of force and three with a NEO,
while for the category “important/most important” four deployments are combat and
ten are show-of-force missions. It is unlikely that NEO missions contribute to escalation;
thus for future analysis it would be interesting to introduce more independent variables.
The frequencies for the strength of the force show that for the category “important/
most important,” more than one CV was involved in twenty-six, one CV in thirteen
crises, and none in four. The “eyeball” correlations also reveal that “escalation” coincides with eight operations that included one or more CVs and only two with none.
When the United States did not contribute, no CV was involved in seven cases, one CV
in nine, and one or more in four. When the United States contributed to an escalation,
the involvement was more frequent in the form of a direct military activity. When the
U.S. contribution was important/most important, fifteen operations occurred at a low
level and an equal number at the level of direct military engagement, while twenty-three
were semi-military. These numbers further support the correlation with “All Forces”
responses and escalations.
Case Study 3b: United States Contributed to Escalation. As with all the models where
USN involvement coincides with an escalation of the crisis, we should not assume that
USN activities are directly or primarily responsible for the escalation.
In the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1993–94, U.S. activity overall was directly responsible for an escalation of tension, yet the USN involvement was said to have contributed
to the final resolution. The ICB coded the crisis as U.S. activity escalating the crisis, but
a more in-depth look would have to distinguish between the effects of the various activities. The death of the North Korean president earlier that month and North Korea’s
reluctance to participate in the nuclear inspections had caused a tense situation. Thus
USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63), operating with Japanese and South Korean forces in late July
1994, was in a state of high alert. The United States negotiated with North Korea over its
nuclear program while keeping open the option of military strikes. Two carriers—Kitty
Hawk and a second, the name of which could not be determined—were positioned off
the Korean Peninsula in a demonstration of force. It was later said that the carriers had
contributed to maintaining the stability during the negotiations. The crisis ended with
2
an agreement in October 1994.
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Most Effective U.S. Activity
The following simple multinomial regression analysis shows that “USN-USMC” involvement is “most effective in covert/semi military operations,” whereas “All Forces”
are “most successful in direct military activities.” A large number of naval involvements
also exercise “no influence.” It is important to note that the majority of “covert/semi3
military interventions” are semi-military and that only very few are covert operations.
Low-level activities are mostly political in nature but include a small number of economic and propaganda engagements.
Figure 35

Model U.S. Involvement H3c: Most Effective Activity
Category

Ineffective

ALL FORCES

Eff. low level

Eff. semi-military

Eff. Mil.

rf

rf

bl

rf

USN&OTHER FORCES

11.667**

4.200

14.000***

bl

USN-USMC

18.667***

4.200*

17.500***

bl

158.667***

35.700***

24.500***

bl

NO NAVY
ALL FORCES

bl

USN&OTHER FORCES

bl

0.360

1.200

0.086***

USN-USMC

bl

0.025*

0.938

0.054***

NO NAVY

bl

0.225**

0.154**

0.006***

ALL FORCES

0.006***

0.028***

0.041***

bl

USN&OTHER FORCES

0.074**

0.118**

0.571***

bl

USN-USMC

0.118**

0.118**

0.714

bl

NO NAVY

rf

ALL FORCES

bl

4.444***

6.476**

158.667***

USN&OTHER FORCES

bl

1.600

7.771***

13.600**

USN-USMC

bl

1.000

6.071***

8.500**

NO NAVY

bl

N = 226
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01

rf

rf

rf

rf
Sig. Model = 0.000
bl—baseline

rf

rf

rf

bl

rf

Pseudo-R² = 0.291
rf—reference category

With “All Forces” as reference category and “direct military most effective” as baseline,
the other three American involvement categories are positively correlated with the categories “ineffective,” “effective low level activity,” and “effective semi-military activity.”
“No Navy” shows the highest values, especially for the category “ineffective,” because of
the very few instances in which this type of response occurred when “direct military activity” was most effective. Seaborne forces alone increase the odds for “effective low level
activity” by a factor of 4.200, the same as “USN & Other Forces,” although the latter fails
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to reach the significance requirements. For effective covert/semi-military operations the
“USN-USMC Team” shows a higher value of 17.500. “All Forces” correlates highest with
“effective direct military activities.” The high values for “low-level effective” and “semimilitary effective” are influenced by the low number of cases where “All Forces” were
involved in crises in which U.S. activity was not effective.
When we examine the “eyeball” correlations with the type of mission, combat displays
the highest frequency for “direct military most effective,” show of force for the category
“semi-military most effective,” and show of force and NEO for “low level most effective.”
CV strength presents the highest percentage of no CVs when “ineffective” and one CV
when “semi-military effective.” As expected, one-plus (“1+”) CVs is most frequent when
“direct military” is coded as the most effective activity. This suggests that the presence
of an aircraft carrier greatly enhances the success of the U.S. activity.
In sum, the results suggest that the dominant influence of “seaborne forces only” lies in
successful operations short of direct military activity. Since the hypothesis assumes that
“All Forces” is most successful in direct military activities and naval forces in the lower
categories of activity, the hypothesis can be confirmed. However, out of all military
responses seaborne activities are also the ones most highly correlated to ineffectiveness.
Case Studies 3c: Semi-military and Low-Level Involvement. During the Cold War the
United States was semi-militarily engaged in many crises in Central America. A case
in point where the semi-military response was the most effective activity is the crisis
in Guatemala in 1953. The United States saw the growing influence of the communist
party in Guatemala as inimical to U.S. interests in Latin America.
When in late 1953 Guatemala learned of American support for an antigovernment
“liberation” movement, it requested military supplies from the Soviet Union. On the
day the Soviet arms shipment arrived, the United States began an air-sea patrol mission
in the Gulf of Honduras to protect Honduras from an invasion by its neighbor and to
control shipments to Guatemala. Talks between the parties and the United States were
not successful. On 3 June 1954, the United States airlifted arms to Honduras and antigovernment forces in Guatemala, and on 7 June, a “contingency evacuation” force was
deployed. This operation, code-named Hardrock Baker, was used to implement
a comprehensive sea blockade of Guatemala. It included submarines and amphibious
4
ships carrying a Marine battalion landing team. With this aggressive configuration of
naval forces the United States built up psychological pressure on Guatemala, underscoring the weakness of Guatemala’s position and opening up the option for intervention.
On 29 June 1954, with the resignation of Guatemala’s president and the accession of an
anticommunist government, the crisis ended. Thus the semi-military activity of the
5
USN greatly helped to bring about a termination of the crisis.
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The 1971 Bangladesh crisis can be described as a demonstration of low-level U.S.
activity and USN-only deployment. This crisis was triggered by an attack of the West
Pakistan army on Dacca University in Bangladesh on 25 March 1971. At that time, Bangladesh was still formally known as East Pakistan and East Bengal. East Pakistan now
declared its independence, bringing on armed conflict with West Pakistan. India supported East Pakistan, and on 3 December, after months of minor clashes, a formal war
between India and Pakistan broke out. Within two weeks, Indian forces overwhelmed
the Pakistani troops based in the seceding territory. The war ended on 17 December
1971 with Pakistan’s surrender, and Bangladesh officially became a sovereign state.
The United States was politically very active in this crisis. To undergird U.S. support,
the Seventh Fleet moved into the Bay of Bengal in support of Pakistan. On 10 December, as Indian troops liberated the new country of Bangladesh, a naval force consisting
of a battle group led by USS Enterprise (CV 65) and an amphibious ready group was
deployed to the Indian Ocean to stand by for a possible evacuation of Western nationals.
An evacuation operation proved unnecessary, because the Royal Air Force had already
evacuated most foreigners. Nonetheless, the naval forces stayed in the Indian Ocean in
a show of force, monitoring both Indian and Pakistani operations and maritime and
air traffic, as well as increasing numbers of Soviet aircraft and vessels, with the goal of
intimidating India and tilting the situation in favor of Pakistan.
The USSR had also moved some of its naval forces into the vicinity of the Bay of
Bengal, to demonstrate support for India. According to Siegel, U.S. naval forces played
an important role in influencing events on the ground. “The presence of U.S. naval
forces south of the Indian subcontinent, along with growing diplomatic isolation, thus
evidently helped to sway Indian decision makers away from the preferred option of
continuing the war with an offensive in the West. Enterprise’s deployment strengthened
6
U.S. diplomatic efforts.” According to Mrityunjoy Mazumdar, this entry of Enterprise
into the Bay of Bengal left a deep impression on Indian policy makers as well as the
7
Indian navy for much of the next two decades. Thus this crisis serves as a good example
of the power of naval forces in combination with diplomatic initiatives.
U.S. Activity and Pace of Abatement
In my examination of the impact of the different American responses on the pace of
abatement of crises, the frequencies show that out of the military responses, “USN
only” contributes the least, and stronger military commitments the most. In order to
run the regression analysis, the category “delayed” had to be recoded into missing data,
because of the 0 value for “USN & Other Forces” and the low numbers for other service
combinations.
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Figure 36

Model U.S. Involvement H3d: Abatement
Category

Not Effective

Contributed

rf

bl

ALL FORCES
USN&OTHER FORCES

4.800*

bl

USN-USMC

12.000***

bl

NO NAVY

18.113***

bl

ALL FORCES

bl

rf

USN&OTHER FORCES

bl

0.028*

USN-USMC

bl

0.083***

NO NAVY

bl

0.055***

ALL FORCES

0.055***

bl

USN&OTHER FORCES

0.265**

bl

USN-USMC

0.663

bl

NO NAVY

rf

bl

ALL FORCES

bl

USN&OTHER FORCES

bl

USN-USMC

bl

NO NAVY

bl

N = 214
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01

Sig. Model = 0.000
bl—baseline

18.113***
3.774***
1.509
rf
Pseudo-R² = 0.182
rf—reference category

The results confirm the surmise that the stronger the force, the more the United States
contributes to the pace of abatement. The greatest increase in the probable odds of “no
contribution” attaches to the category “no Navy.” When “All Forces” is the reference category, all other U.S. involvement variable categories are more likely “not to contribute”
to the pace of abatement. When the reference category is interchanged with “no Navy,”
“USN & Other Forces” increases the odds by a factor of 3.774, “All Forces” by 18.113,
and the “USN-USMC Team” by 1.509. The latter, however, fails to reach the significance
level. The frequency chart suggests that for the maritime responses, the category “USN
only” is largely responsible for the lack of contribution to the abatement. A second regression analysis distinguishing between the seaborne forces confirms this assumption.
“USN-USMC” forces contribute even more to the pace of abatement than the combination with the Air Force. While the statistical analysis finds that naval forces do not
contribute to the abatement, they do not delay termination either. This was verified by
running the regression analysis with all three categories for pace of abatement and the
independent variable “USN-USMC TEAM,” collapsing the categories “All Forces” and
“USN & Other Forces.” “All Forces” and “USN-USMC” forces responses contribute the
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most, followed by responses involving the Air Force, yet the hypothesis that naval forces
alone do not contribute to the pace of the abatement can be confirmed. The different
findings for naval forces alone and in combination with the USMC demonstrate the
importance of differentiating between them if possible.
Looking at the “eyeball” correlations, the deployment of no CVs is more frequent when
U.S. activity did not contribute, while “one-plus CVs” shows a high correlation with
contribution to abatement of the crisis. Shows of force are more frequent for the category
“contributed,” while most NEO operations concurred with no contribution. All combat
operations coincided with a contribution to the abatement. Similarly, when amphibious
forces were involved, the variable showed a high frequency for contribution. This further supports the importance of the strength of the force employed and the motivation.
When the United States is engaged only in a NEO activity, the influence on the pace of
the abatement is likely to be less strong.
Case Study 3d: Delay of Pace of Abatement. I select one of the U.S. crises with Libya
in the 1980s to exemplify a rare case where the American involvement did delay the
termination of the crisis. Only the USN was involved in the response. The Sixth Fleet
announced its intention to conduct maneuvers in the Mediterranean and thereby posed
a crisis for Libya, which alerted its armed forces (12 August 1981). On 18 August Libya
claimed that U.S. naval forces had entered Libyan territorial waters in the Gulf of Sirte,
where the two aircraft carriers—USS Forrestal (CV 59) and USS Nimitz (CV 68)—with
four cruisers, four destroyers, four frigates, and two destroyer escorts performed openocean missile exercises. The United States had deployed the naval forces to challenge
Libya’s claim to the Gulf and was holding the maneuvers to demonstrate that “America
has the muscle to back up its words.” Aircraft from both carriers had to intercept Libyan
aircraft multiple times. On 19 August USN pilots shot down two Libyan fighters that
had threatened Nimitz. The United States intended to demonstrate its resolve to protect
the freedom of the seas. Libya’s ruler, Muammar Qadhafi, threatened to attack American nuclear bases in the Mediterranean should the USN again enter Libyan territorial
waters. The crisis suddenly ended on 1 September 1981. The crisis centered on the
maneuvers of U.S. naval vessels, and not on the USN response to the Libyan counterinitiative. Thus the naval activity triggered the crisis but was probably not directly responsible for the delay of the abatement.

After this analysis of American responses as an independent variable the next section
presents the findings for the hypotheses with U.S. involvement as a dependent variable.
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Regression Analyses U.S. Involvement 2: Seaborne Crisis Response Dependent
Variable
This analysis measures the level of U.S. activity without accounting for the effectiveness
of the activity. As expected, no naval involvement was most frequent in “low-level U.S.
interventions.” Both “USN-USMC” and “USN & Other Forces” were mostly deployed in
“semi/covert-military,” whereas “All Forces” were typically dispatched as part of “direct
military interventions.” As mentioned earlier, only two direct military involvements by
the United States occurred without naval forces. Somewhat surprising is the relatively
high number of “All Forces” responses in “low-level involvements.” While “All Forces”
clearly deploy primarily in “direct military interventions,” their dispatch in “low level
involvements” was not anticipated.

Figure 37

U.S. Involvement H3a: Content of Activity
Category
Low-level

NO NAVY

USN-USMC

USN&OTHER FORCES

ALL FORCES

116.875***

11.333***

6.375**

bl

34.000***

18.889***

18.417***

bl

Covert/semi-military
Direct military

rf

rf

rf

bl

Low-level

bl

0.097**

0.055***

0.009***

Covert/semi-military

bl

0.556

0.542

0.029***

Direct military

bl

rf

rf

rf

Low-level

rf

rf

rf

bl
bl

Covert/semi-military

0.291**

1.668

2.889

Direct military

0.009***

0.088***

0.157**

Low-level

bl

Covert/semi-military

bl

Direct military

bl

N = 227
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01

rf

rf

5.720***
10.313**
Sig. Model = 0.000
bl—baseline

bl
rf

9.931***

3.437**

18.333***

116.875***

Pseudo-R² = 0.363
rf—reference category

Content of U.S. Activity
With “direct military intervention” as reference category, “low level activity” increases
the probable odds of “no Navy” by a factor of 116.875, followed by the “USN-USMC
Team” with 11.333 and “USN & Other Forces” by 6.375. For “semi/covert military
involvements” the factors change to 34.000, 18.889, and 18.417. Overall, all U.S. naval
involvement categories are more likely to correlate with direct military interventions
than no naval involvement.
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The frequencies from the “eyeball” correlations are confirmed by the more rigorous
statistical model, and the hypothesis can be confirmed. Seaborne involvement only is
more likely in lower forms of American involvement. Of all simple regression models,
2
this model generated the largest R , thus suggesting the strongest association between
the dependent and independent variables.
Case Study 3a: Low-Level Involvement and All Forces. On careful examination of the
combination of “All Forces” and “low level U.S. involvement,” one sees that military
forces often served as a standby resource, as in the Cyprus crisis of 1974–75, and do not
automatically become involved in combat. I could not find any specific information
about U.S. Army deployments other than the codings in the CNA reports. On 15 July
1974 a Greek-led military coup ousted the Cypriot government and installed a puppet
regime. This triggered a crisis for Cyprus and Turkey. The ousted Cypriot government
requested help from Britain and the UN Security Council. Turkey intervened on 20 July
and occupied parts of the island. In an immediate reaction to the coup, the United States
delayed the return of USS America (CV 66), then routinely deployed in the Mediterranean, to the United States until relieved by USS Independence (CV 62). At the same time
American and British diplomats began mediation attempts, which led to an unstable
cease-fire. Forrestal was deployed to the central Mediterranean. Other assignments for
Forrestal and the Sixth Fleet amphibious ready group were canceled so that they would
be ready if needed.
On 22 July aircraft from USS Inchon (LPH 12)—other sources name USS Coronado
(LPD 11)—evacuated more than four hundred American and foreign nationals to Beirut
8
from the British base at Dhekelia in southern Cyprus; Independence provided air cover.
In early August the ships’ departures were postponed in reaction to riots and demonstrations before the American embassy that resulted in the murder of the American
ambassador to Cyprus. With the easing of tension, all contingency operations ended
by 2 September. After negotiations, the toppled Cypriot president, Archbishop Michael
Makarios, returned on 7 December 1974. In January 1975 naval forces were deployed
again for possible evacuation duties. USS Saratoga (CV 60) and amphibious forces were
released on 21 January 1975. “In February 1975 a Turkish-Cypriot Federated State was
proclaimed and, on 24 February, a Constituent Assembly for Turkish Cyprus was convened, ending the crisis for Turkey. By their failure to challenge this act, the crisis ended
9
for Cyprus and Greece as well.”
U.S. Crisis Actor
The variable advanced in the next model controls for the U.S. involvement as a direct
crisis actor or third party. The chart of frequencies shows that seaborne forces most
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often deploy alone in crises where the United States is not directly involved. Seventyfour percent of all “USN only” responses occurred when the United States acted as a
third party, the remaining 26 percent when the United States was a direct crisis actor.
The numbers for “USN-USMC” forces are almost identical, with 75 and 25 percent, respectively. “USN & Other Forces” show almost a fifty-fifty distribution, and “All Forces”
are clearly more frequent in “U.S. direct actor” crises, with 81 percent of the total “All
Forces” responses.
Figure 38

U.S. Involvement H3e: Actor
Category

NO NAVINV

U.S. not crisis actor

76.786***

U.S. crisis actor

rf

U.S. not crisis actor

bl

U.S. crisis actor
U.S. not crisis actor
U.S. crisis actor
U.S. not crisis actor
U.S. crisis actor
N = 227
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01

USN-USMC
12.083***
rf

bl

rf

rf*
16.753***
rf
Sig. Model = 0.000
bl—baseline

0.060***
rf

bl

0.379*

bl

rf

2.636*
rf

4.583**
rf

0.157***

6.355***

USN&OTHER FORCES

bl
bl

ALL FORCES
bl
bl
0.013***
rf
0.083***
rf
0.218**
rf

Pseudo-R² = 0.352
rf—reference category

The regression analysis confirms the previous assumptions. If the United States is not
directly involved, the odds of all categories of U.S. involvement short of “all forces”
responses increase. All Exp(B) values are significant, and “no naval involvement” and
“USN-USMC forces” are the most likely responses to crises in which the United States
acts as a third party. The results support the hypothesis that stronger forces are dispatched if the United States is committed as a direct actor. Crises involving the United
States as a third party largely triggered responses involving no naval forces or only
2
seaborne responses. Similar to the previous model, the R is very high, and the binary
variables “third party” and “direct crisis” actor are very important for the explanation of
the different types of American responses.
U.S. Readiness
The “number of USN personnel abroad” and the “elapsed time” between the outbreak
of the crisis and the naval reaction are metric variables. Neither significantly correlates
with the different service-type combinations. As mentioned previously, the inability
to distinguish between the naval reaction date and the time elapsed before other forces
arrive in the theater supports the speculation that were this problem accounted for, the
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results might be different. The Iraq/Lebanon upheaval in 1958 is a good example. The
Navy was ready off the coast of Lebanon thirteen hours after the order was received,
compared with five days for the Air Force (to advance from its base in Turkey) and even
10
longer for the Army (from Germany). Yet no different response dates are provided to
control for this difference. Similarly, “USN personnel abroad” generated no statistically
significant results. However, a further examination of the possible influence of the number of USN personnel and the response time revealed some results.
Figure 39

Frequency of Number of CVs Deployed and USN-USMC Deployments per Year
Number of CVs
0

Frequency
13

USN-USMC Deployments
per Year

Frequency

0

107
94

1

26

1

2

21

2

26

3

7

3

10

4

2

6

3

Total

237

8

1

Total

73

Figure 39 shows how often different CV-strength levels were deployed and to how
many crises the “USN-USMC Team” responded per year. Once these other dependent
variables are chosen, alternative findings can be offered. The “number of USN personnel” is positively correlated to both the “number of CVs deployed” in a crisis and the
“number of USN-USMC responses per year.” This finding supports the assumption that
the frequency of crisis response is closely tied to the number of personnel the Navy has
at its disposal and the number of CVs deployed. Conversely, the causation may also run
the other way. Because of international crises, more naval personnel were sent overseas.
There is no statistically significant relationship between “elapsed time” and “USN forces
abroad,” but when direct military activities are excluded the number of USN personnel
already abroad shortens the naval reaction time. Thus in low-level and semi-military
U.S. response activity, the number of USN personnel and short reaction times are
positively correlated. This finding further supports the assumption that the uniform
treatment of elapsed time for all services negatively influences the measurement of fast
2
naval reaction times. Here the R values can be used to demonstrate the variance in
2
the dependent variable, explained by the independent variables. While all three R s are
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Figure 40

Multivariate Regression Outputs
Dependent Variable
a

Independent Variable

Model R2

Coefficient b

Coefficient t

Number of CVs

USN personnel abroad

0.057

0.239***

3.369***

Annual USN-USMC
crisis involvements

USN personnel abroad

0.051

0.225***

3.397***

USN abroadb

Elapsed time

0.049

–0.221*

–1.714*

a. Includes only cases up to 1990 because for the later involvements no information about the number of CVs was available.
b. Cases with direct U.S. military activity were excluded from this model.

rather low, a single independent variable is unlikely to explain much of the variance,
suggesting that additional factors influence the dependent variables.

Even though some results can be presented with the currently available data, the hypothesis cannot be answered correctly and thus has to be rejected in this analysis. However,
the U.S. involvement hypotheses were mostly confirmed (the exception was H3f).
Table 5-1
Hypothesis 3a: Form of Involvement

Confirmed

Hypothesis 3b: U.S. Effectiveness

Confirmed

Hypothesis 3c: Direct Military Activity

Confirmed

Hypothesis 3d: Termination

Confirmed

Hypothesis 3e: U.S. Crisis Actor

Confirmed

Hypothesis 3f: U.S. Readiness

Not confirmed

Crisis Outcome Models
The relation between the crisis outcome and seaborne response is measured with the
help of four hypotheses analyzing different aspects of the termination of international
11
crises. All hypotheses treat seaborne crisis response as the independent variable (see
sidebar 2): Crisis Outcome Model 1, Crisis Outcome Model 2, Crisis Outcome Model 3,
and Crisis Outcome Model 4.
Figure 41

Crisis Outcome Model 1

H4a: Definite Outcome

x = U.S. seaborne
crisis response

y8 = content of
outcome
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Figure 42

Crisis Outcome Model 2

H4b: Agreement

x = U.S. seaborne
crisis response

y9 = form of
outcome

x = U.S. seaborne
crisis response

y10 = tensions

Figure 43

Crisis Outcome Model 3
H4c: Reduction of
Tensions

Figure 44

Crisis Outcome Model 4

H4d: Actor Satisfaction

x = U.S. seaborne
crisis response

y11 = extent of
satisfaction

SIDEBAR 2
The variables of the hypotheses are expressed mathematically as follows.
(1) y8 = content of outcome (outcome, outcome2).
Whether an outcome was stable was determined with the help of the variable “content of outcome,” with the categories “victory” and “defeat”
treated as definite and “stalemate” and “compromise” as more ambiguous.
(2) y9 = form of outcome (forout, forout2).
This hypothesis is measured with the variable “form of outcome,” including such categories as “unilateral,” “imposed,” “tacit,” and “formal
agreement,” to control for the crisis outcome. Certain categories had to
be collapsed. For example, the different values for unilateral self, ally, and
adversary are recoded into one category, “unilateral.”
(3) y10 = tension (outesr, outesr2).
The change in tension is measured with the variable “reduction” or “escalation” of tension. The category “recent case” was recoded into missing
data.
(4) y11a = extent of satisfaction with the outcome (outevl, outevl2).
The satisfaction of the actors is identified with the variable “extent of satisfaction” (outevl). Not all categories showed a large enough number of
cases, so values had to be collapsed. All cases where at least one of the
crisis actors was not satisfied were coded as dissatisfied (outevl2).
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(5) y12 = satisfaction/attitude mix.
This variable was generated by the combination of the “extent of satisfaction with the outcome” and the “attitude towards U.S. activity.” Several
categories were collapsed to establish four new categories: “favorable and
satisfied” (favorable includes the category neutral), “favorable and dissatisfied,” “not favorable and satisfied,” “not favorable and dissatisfied.”

The following table presents the frequencies for the crisis outcome variables.
Figure 45

Crisis Outcome Frequencies
Crisis Outcomes
Content of outcome

Form of outcome

Victory/defeat

No Navy
125/48.1

USN ONLY
28/50

USN-USMC

USN &
OTHER
FORCES

ALL FORCES

28/77.8

41/62.1

80/74.8

Compromise

61/23.5

7/12.5

7/19.4

19/28.8

17/15.9

Stalemate

74/28.5

21/37.5

1/2.8

6/9.1

10/9.3

Formal agreement

52/25.2

13/28.9

12/42.9

12/20.7

31/32.6

Understanding

58/28.2

5/11.1

2/7.1

17/29.3

15/15.8

Unilateral

91/44.2

26/57.8

10/35.7

25/43.1

31/32.6

5/2.4

1/2.2

4/14.3

4/6.9

18/18.9

Tensions

Escalation

Imposed

97/40.8

29/50.9

13/38.2

36/53.7

60/55.6

Reduction

141/59.2

28/49.1

Satisfaction

Satisfied

Satisfaction/attitude

21/61.8

31/46.3

48/44.4

76/29.2

11/20

6/16.7

30/44.8

18/16.7

Not satisfied

184/70.8

44/80

Fav/satisfied

51/22.6

30/83.3

37/55.2

90/83.3

7/17.1

3/10

13/25.5

7/8.6

Fav/dissatisfied

77/34.1

17/41.5

14/46.7

12/23.5

35/43.2

Not fav/satisfied

46/20.4

10/24.4

3/10

11/21.6

5/6.2

Not fav/dissatisfied

56/23

7/17.1

10/33.3

15/29.4

34/42

Note: The first number presents the frequencies and the second number refers to the percentage within the variable “servicetype1.”

Regression Analyses Crisis Outcomes: Content of Outcome
About 44 percent of seaborne interventions ended in a “victory” for a crisis actor,
compared with 20 percent that ended in “defeat,” suggesting that a little more than half
terminated with a “definite outcome.”
Sixteen percent were characterized by “compromise” and 20 percent by “stalemate,” a
total of roughly 36 percent “ambiguous outcomes.” Forty-nine percent of “All Forces”
responses concurred with “victories” for crisis actors and 26 percent with “defeats.”
Only 25 percent resulted in “ambiguous outcomes.” Because the frequencies suggest that
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largely naval forces alone are deployed in crises resulting in “stalemate” (37.5 percent
versus 2.8 percent for USN-UMSC), the variable “servicetype1” serves as independent
variable. Although the expected values of the cross-tabulation meet the requirements,
one has to be cautious interpreting the values for “USN-USMC” forces, because they
were only deployed in one crisis resulting in a “stalemate.” However, because the main
interest lies in “USN only” responses, I chose “servicetype1” as the independent variable,
in order to highlight the strong influence on “stalemates.”
Figure 46

Model Crisis Outcome H4a: Content
Category
ALL FORCES

Victory

Compromise

Stalemate

Defeat

rf

rf

rf

bl

USN&OTHER FORCES

1.915

3.447**

1.867

bl

USN-USMC

1.137

1.281

0.311

bl

USN ONLY

1.346

1.441

7.350***

bl

NO NAVY

1.027

2.337**

4.819***

ALL FORCES

rf

bl

rf

bl
rf

USN&OTHER FORCES

0.551

bl

0.537

0.288**

USN-USMC

0.887

bl

0.243

0.781

USN ONLY

0.934

bl

5.100***

0.694

2.062*

0.428**

NO NAVY

0.439**

ALL FORCES

0.974

0.428*

0.208***

bl

USN&OTHER FORCES

1.864

1.488

0.387*

bl

USN-USMC

1.107

0.548

0.065**

bl

USN ONLY

1.311

0.617

1.525

bl

NO NAVY

rf

bl

rf

rf

ALL FORCES

2.275**

bl

0.485*

2.337**

bl

USN&OTHER FORCES

1.253

bl

0.260***

0.672

USN-USMC

2.019

bl

0.188**

1.824

USN ONLY

2.125

bl

2.473*

1.621

NO NAVY

rf

bl

rf

rf

N = 525
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01

Sig. Model = 0.000
bl—baseline

Pseudo-R² = 0.111
rf—reference category

When “All Forces” serves as the reference category and “defeat” as the baseline, “USN &
Other Forces” and “no Navy” positively correlate with “compromise,” while the probable
odds of “stalemate” are increased by “no Navy” and “USN only” responses. “USN only”
exercises the strongest influence on “stalemate” in the model. Choosing “compromise”
as baseline leads to a negative relationship between the “definite” categories of the
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dependent variable and all USN involvements, although not all values are significant.
“USN only” and “no Navy” remain positively correlated to “stalemate.” Once the reference category is changed to “no Navy,” the positive relationship between “All Forces”
responses and “victory” and “defeat” becomes apparent, with “defeat” showing a slightly
higher correlation. When the baseline is changed to “compromise,” both “victory” and
“defeat” (stronger) are more likely for “All Forces” responses, while “compromise” is
more likely than “stalemate.” The high values for “USN-USMC” response and “definite
outcomes” can be ignored, because of the influence of the low number of “stalemate”
outcomes for this category. “USN only” responses seem to be more correlated to “defeat”
and “victory” than to “compromise,” but not significantly. The strong relationship with
“stalemate” is maintained. The values for the Air Force associate positively with “victory” and “compromise.”
Overall, naval forces show the highest correlation with the ambiguous outcome “stalemates,” while “USN & Other Forces” shows significant values for “victorious” outcomes
and “compromises” and “All Forces” generally dominates the “definite outcome” categories. Thus the hypothesis can be confirmed, because a “stalemate” can be interpreted as
an even more ambiguous outcome than a “compromise.”
Case Study 4a: Stalemate Outcome and USN Only Involvement. The most recent
Taiwan Strait crisis, from 1995, serves as an example of a stalemate outcome for all
involved actors. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States were at
loggerheads following the visa approval for President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan for a visit
to Cornell University. This gesture, together with the sales of fighter aircraft to Taiwan,
increased the PRC’s fear of growing American support for Taiwanese independence.
In an attempt to coerce the United States to commit formally to a “one-China policy,”
the PRC conducted missile tests and naval exercises in the Taiwan Strait beginning in
July 1995. These tests and exercises elicited no U.S. response until, according to Robert
Ross, 19 December, when the aircraft carrier Nimitz cruised through the Taiwan Strait
12
marking the first time U.S. ships had patrolled that area since 1976. When the Chinese
activity continued, the United States decided to deploy two aircraft carriers to the area.
In March 1996 Independence arrived, followed shortly thereafter by Nimitz. With the
successful conclusion of the Taiwanese election, the crisis ended.
It is unclear how much the carriers contributed to the abatement of the crisis. Similarly,
the effectiveness of the deterrence is disputed since it is very difficult to say with certainty which action was responsible for deterring the adversary. While Gouré questions
the contribution of the two CVs, Ross sees their deployments as successful coercive
diplomacy to guarantee stability during the elections by deterring Chinese involvement
13
and confirming American commitment.
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Agreement
Seaborne forces responses are divided among 36 percent “formal agreement,” 47 percent
“unilateral,” 8 percent “imposed,” and 9 percent “understanding” outcomes. “All Forces”
responses frequencies are divided among 33 percent “formal agreement,” 33 percent
“unilateral,” 19 percent “imposed,” and 16 percent “understanding.” Major differences
are found in “unilateral” and “imposed” outcomes. Similar to the variable “content of
the outcome,” naval forces only and “imposed” outcomes concurred only once, but the
expected frequencies of the cross-tabulation analysis allows “servicetype1” to serve as
the independent variable.
Figure 47

Model Crisis Outcome H4b: Agreement
Category
ALL FORCES

Formal
Agreement
rf

Understanding

Unilateral

rf

rf

Imposed
bl

USN&OTHER FORCES

1.742

5.100**

3.629**

USN-USMC

1.742

0.600

1.452

bl

USN ONLY

7.548*

6.000

15.097**

bl

NO NAVY

6.039***

10.568***

bl

13.920***

ALL FORCES

bl

USN&OTHER FORCES

bl

2.928**

2.083*

0.574

USN-USMC

bl

0.344

0.833

0.574

USN ONLY

bl

0.795

2.000

0.132*

bl

0.166***

NO NAVY

rf

rf

bl

rf

2.305**

1.750*

ALL FORCES

0.166***

0.072***

0.095***

bl

USN&OTHER FORCES

0.288*

0.366

0.343

bl

USN-USMC

0.288*

0.043***

0.137***

bl

USN ONLY

1.250

0.431

1.429

rf

ALL FORCES

bl

0.434**

0.571*

6.039***

USN&OTHER FORCES

bl

1.270

1.190

3.467*

USN-USMC

bl

0.149**

0.476

3.467*

USN ONLY

bl

0.345*

1.143

0.800

NO NAVY

bl

N = 432
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01

Sig. Model = 0.000
bl—baseline

rf

rf

rf

bl

NO NAVY

rf

bl

rf

Pseudo-R² = 0.113
rf—reference category

In a first step, “imposed” serves as the baseline and “All Forces” as reference category.
“USN only” and “no Navy” show significant odds ratios of 7.548 and 6.039 for the
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category “formal agreement.” Compared to “imposed,” naval forces alone show the
highest correlation with “unilateral acts,” followed by “formal agreements,” while no
naval involvement shows the highest Exp(B) for “understanding.” The combination with
the Air Force shows positive associations with the categories “understanding” and “unilateral acts.” When the baseline is changed to “formal agreement,” all categories show a
negative correlation with “imposed,” but only the values for “no Navy” and “USN only”
are significant. Overall, naval forces alone are frequently featured in crises with “formal
agreements” and “unilateral acts,” as previously suggested in the cross-tabulation. Once
the reference category is changed to “no Navy,” “All Forces” correlates more highly
with crises characterized by “imposed” outcomes, compared to “formal agreements.”
Although not significant, “USN only” suggests a negative correlation with “imposed”
outcomes.
“Naval forces alone” correlates highly with “formal agreements” and “unilateral acts.”
The same is visible for “all forces” and “imposed” outcomes. Overall, these findings
point to a positive relationship between naval forces only and “formal agreements.”
Tensions
The next advanced variable is “tension,” measuring the increase or decrease of tension
following the termination of the crisis.
The “eyeball” correlations suggest that “All Forces” and “USN & Other Forces” responses more likely coincide with an “escalation” of tensions, whereas “USN-USMC” forces
seem more positively related to a “reduction.” Naval forces alone are distributed almost
fifty-fifty. The regression analysis employed the variable “servicetype1” as independent
variable. Unfortunately, the significance of the model does not meet the requirements;
thus the model cannot be interpreted, and for now the simple frequencies are the only
results available.
Case Studies 4c: Tension and Seaborne Involvement. The Jordan regime crisis in
1957 serves as a good example for the possible impact of naval forces on the reduction
of tensions. On 4 April 1957, Jordanian army officers and Palestinians sympathetic to
President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt attempted to overthrow King Hussein of Jordan
but failed. The king feared Egyptian and Syrian involvement in the coup attempt and
reacted by dismissing the entire leftist cabinet, triggering demonstrations and riots. The
United States expressed support for the king by providing economic aid and deploying
units of the Sixth Fleet, including the aircraft carriers Forrestal and USS Lake Champlain
(CV 39), as well as the heavy cruisers USS Salem (CA 139) and USS Des Moines (CA 134),
to the eastern Mediterranean. USN ships with 1,800 Marines on board anchored off
Beirut on 20 April ready for a possible intervention in Jordan, while thirty ships of the
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Sixth Fleet—described as the “most formidable naval striking force ever assembled in
the Eastern Mediterranean”—carried out air-defense maneuvers in the open sea. The
task of all these forces was to ensure that the Jordanians maintained their independence
and withstood the threat of communism. “Once again,” explained Vice Admiral Charles
Brown, “we find ourselves dropping everything and rushing to the scene of the fire.” It
can be said that “the swift and firm reaction averted a near catastrophe in the Middle
14
East.” Marines stood by in Amman in case their support was needed for the evacuation of Americans. Amphibious forces off the Lebanese coast were put on a state of alert.
Only the easing of tensions due to diplomatic efforts backed up by naval forces led to
normalization. The departure of the USN force on 3 May signaled the end of the crisis.
In contrast, the U.S. intervention in Grenada serves as a good example of the possibility
of naval forces increasing tension, because their deployment heightened fear of a potential stronger U.S. backup. Maurice Bishop, the former prime minister of Grenada, had
been placed under house arrest, been freed on 19 October 1983, and shortly thereafter,
together with close supporters, murdered. Ostensibly fearing a threat to its influence in
the region and to the safety of American citizens in Grenada, the United States showed
concern. In response to a request for help by the Organization of East Caribbean States,
the United States sent to the region a naval task force, including the aircraft carrier Independence and assault ship Guam (LPH 9). The Independence CVBG had been en route
to the Mediterranean for a regularly scheduled deployment. However, according to
Christopher Wright this deployment had been hardly routine, being more likely under15
taken in anticipation of the developments in Grenada. Because of its prior proximity to
the Caribbean, the naval task force was immediately on the scene. This triggered a crisis
for Grenada. On 25 October, in Operation Urgent Fury, U.S. naval, Marine, and
Army forces invaded Grenada. Marines were airlifted to the island. When it was clear
that American students were not in danger, the objectives of the operation shifted to the
restoration of democratic government to Grenada and the elimination of alleged Cuban
intervention in Grenada. By 28 October the U.S. troops had accomplished their mission,
16
and by 4 November Independence finally departed for the Mediterranean.
Actor Satisfaction
The frequencies suggest that all U.S. responses are more likely in crises with negative
actors’ satisfaction. “USN & Other Forces” shows the lowest “eyeball” correlation with
“dissatisfaction,” while “USN-UMSC” and “All Forces” are highest, with equal percentages of 83.3.
When the category “satisfied” is chosen as baseline, “No Navy,” “USN only,” and “USN
& Other Forces” are more likely to correlate with satisfactory outcomes than “All
Forces.” However, the value for “USN only” is not significant. “USN & Other Forces”
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Figure 48

Model Crisis Outcome H4d: Satisfaction
Category

Satisfied

Not Satisfied

ALL FORCES

bl

USN&OTHER FORCES

bl

0.247***

USN-USMC

bl

1.000

USN ONLY

bl

0.800

NO NAVY

bl

0.484**

ALL FORCES

bl

2.065**

USN&OTHER FORCES

bl

0.509**

USN-USMC

bl

2.065

USN ONLY

bl

1.652

NO NAVY

bl

ALL FORCES

bl

USN&OTHER FORCES

bl

USN-USMC

bl

4.054***

USN ONLY

bl

3.243***

NO NAVY

bl

1.963**

N = 526
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01

Sig. Model = 0.000, Sig. Step Servicetype1 = 0.000
bl—baseline

rf

rf
4.054***
rf

Pseudo-R² = 0.055
rf—reference category

remains positively associated with “satisfaction” even after “no Navy” is chosen as reference category, whereas “All Forces” contributes significantly to “dissatisfaction.” When
“USN & Other Forces” serves as reference category, all other categories increase the
probable odds of “dissatisfaction” with the outcome, with “USN-USMC” forces and “All
Forces” showing equally the highest value.
The combination with the Air Force is most positively correlated to “actor satisfaction,”
while “All Forces” responses are most negatively correlated. Although the findings suggest that “USN only” responses correlate slightly positively with satisfaction compared
to “all forces” responses, the results are mixed.
While actors might be dissatisfied with the outcome of a crisis, they might still be satisfied with U.S. involvement, and this point may be of great importance. Unfortunately,
the original variable “attitude to U.S. involvement” failed to generate significant results.
Thus for the next variable I combined “attitude to U.S. involvement” with the variable
“actor satisfaction” (dependent variable y12).
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Mix: Satisfaction and Attitude to U.S. Involvement
The simple frequency analyses suggest that out of all military service combinations,
“USN & Other Forces” were most often associated with crises characterized by “actor
satisfaction” and “favorable” perception of U.S. involvement, followed by “USN only.”
With almost the same frequency, “All Forces” and seaborne forces responses rise to the
top in the next category, “favorable/dissatisfied.” Naval forces alone and in combination
with the Air Force were most likely to be deployed in crises with “dissatisfied” actors
but favorable attitudes to American activity, while at the same time “USN only” was
least likely to be deployed in crises with “dissatisfied” actors and “unfavorable” attitudes to U.S. activity. “All Forces” responses dominate in the category “not favorable/
dissatisfied.”
Figure 49

Model Crisis Outcome H4e: Attitude/Satisfaction Mix
Category
ALL FORCES

FaV&Sat

Fav&Mix/Diss

Not Fav&Sat

Not Fav&Mix/Diss

rf

rf

rf

bl

USN&OTHER FORCES

6.422***

0.835

4.987**

bl

USN-USMC

1.545

1.309

1.236

bl

USN ONLY

1.829

2.088*

2.833

bl

NO NAVY

3.365**

1.622*

3.612**

bl

ALL FORCES

bl

USN&OTHER FORCES

bl

0.130***

0.800

0.156***

USN-USMC

bl

0.800

0.800

0.647

USN ONLY

bl

1.500

1.500

0.529

bl

0.297**

NO NAVY

rf

rf

rf

0.482

1.074

ALL FORCES

0.297**

0.617*

0.277**

bl

USN&OTHER FORCES

1.909

0.515

1.380

bl

USN-USMC

0.459

0.803

0.342

bl

USN ONLY

0.561

1.287

0.784

bl

NO NAVY

rf

rf

rf

ALL FORCES

bl

2.075

0.913

3.365**

USN&OTHER FORCES

bl

0.270***

0.723

0.524

USN-USMC

bl

1.747

0.745

2.177

USN ONLY

bl

2.293

1.397

1.781

NO NAVY

bl

rf

rf

rf

N = 473
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01

Sig. Model = 0.001
bl—baseline

bl

Pseudo-R² = 0.075
rf—reference category
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Compared to “All Forces” responses, the categories “USN & Other Forces” and “No
Navy” are positively correlated with “favorable/satisfied” (particularly the former), with
“not favorable/dissatisfied” as baseline. However, both categories are also positively
related to “not favorable/satisfied.” While the odds ratio for “USN & Other Forces” is
stronger for “favorable/satisfied,” the opposite is true for no naval involvement. “USN
only” significantly correlates only with “favorable/dissatisfied.” All four response categories suggest a negative correlation with “not favorable/dissatisfied,” but not all meet
the significance requirements. Once the reference category is changed to “no Navy,” “All
Forces” responses are mostly associated with “unfavorable/dissatisfied.” Seaborne forces
fail to achieve any significant results, although “USN only” suggests a positive correlation with “favorable/dissatisfied,” while the combination with the Air Force remains
correlated with “favorable/satisfied.”
The relatively high B values for “All Forces” and “dissatisfied” actors that are both
“favorable” and “unfavorable” to U.S. activity may be influenced by the decisiveness of “All Forces” responses. This increases the likelihood of a definite outcome,
leaving at least one crisis actor dissatisfied. Another explanation is that crisis actors
may be grateful for the strong U.S. commitment and yet dissatisfied with the overall
outcome. The results do not confirm positive attitudes to solely American maritimeforce responses. Somewhat more expected was the finding that when actors seem to
be favorable to U.S. seaborne-only activity, they are less satisfied with the outcomes,
2
supporting the assumption of lower decisiveness. The low R suggests that many other
factors influence the attitude and satisfaction. Overall, the regression analysis revealed
mixed results.
Case Study 4d: Various Actors with Different Attitudes. The Western Somalia Liberation Front invaded Ogaden on 22 July 1977. This attack triggered a crisis for Ethiopia. In
October, the Somalis came close to victory, having secured most of the Ogaden territory,
but the USSR reacted by providing weapons and military advisers, and by transporting
Cuban troops from Angola to Ethiopia. This allowed Ethiopia to launch counterattacks,
defeating the Somali army, despite U.S. military aid to the latter. The Somali retreat
from the Ogaden territory was announced on 9 March 1978 and finished five days later,
ending the crisis. The USN became involved only in February 1978, when following
the collapse of the Somali army in Ogaden the Kitty Hawk battle group was ordered
to a holding point north of Singapore in case it should be needed for American citizen
evacuation and to conduct surveillance operations. The ship was released on 23 March
1978. In this crisis, both actors were dissatisfied with the crisis outcome; Somalia was
favorable to U.S. involvement, but Ethiopia was not. The United States provided military
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aid to Somalia but no troops. This suggests that the military aid to Somalia rather than
the naval involvement might have been seen as unfavorable.

While the first two hypotheses could be confirmed, no results were generated by the
regression analysis controlling for tension, and mixed results were found for the variable
“satisfaction.”
Table 5-2
Hypothesis 4a: Definite Outcome

Confirmed

Hypothesis 4b: Agreement

Confirmed

Hypothesis 4c: Reduction of Tensions

No results

Hypothesis 4d: Actor Satisfaction

Mixed results

Part II Conclusion: U.S. Involvement
The section of the models featuring the various U.S. variables lends some support to
claims of critics of the lack of decisiveness of naval forces. However, while seaborne
forces alone are less important for the crisis abatement, they also correlate less with
escalation of crises compared to “All Forces” responses. Consequently, the influence
that “All Forces” reactions exert on the crisis comes at a high price and might worsen the
situation rather than help bring it to an end. Thus the dispatch of “All Forces” carries
the risk of strong, unpredictable reactions, whereas seaborne forces overall exert a more
moderate influence.
The findings also support critics by showing that responses by naval forces alone
often correlate with crises where the U.S. activity had no influence on the situation.
The greater intrusiveness associated with ground forces poses a grave threat and thus
escalates the situation but brings the strength needed to enforce compliance. This supports Robert Pape’s finding that threats of force and demonstrative uses of force are less
17
effective than the use of significant amounts of force in coercion. Analysis of termination tempo shows that while seaborne forces alone do not seem to contribute to the pace
of abatement, these results improve when a distinction between “USN only” and the
“USN-USMC Team” is made. The latter exercises a positive influence on the speed of
crisis termination—indeed, stronger than a combined “seaborne-airborne” response,
albeit still weaker than “All Forces.” But does a fast abatement always imply a better or
more advantageous crisis outcome? It is possible that “All Forces” contribute to the pace
of abatement at the cost of long-term stability. This suggests that a positive value for this
variable is not intrinsically desirable and that the relationships are more complex.
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Another analysis focused on the most effective American activity in the crisis. Seaborne forces are frequently deployed when the most effective U.S. activity takes the
form of semi-military operations. Overall, seaborne forces are more likely correlated
with all successful U.S. activity levels below the directly military. This supports the
suggested advantages of subtlety and flexibility. Yet the finding that seaborne forces
are also more likely to be involved when the American response is “ineffective,” rather
than when “low-level activity” is successful, was not anticipated. This result would
argue against the successful backing-up of diplomatic or other political efforts in
low-level responses by seaborne forces. When only the “form of U.S. involvement”
is analyzed—that is, without controlling for the “most effective form of involvement”—seaborne forces are mostly deployed in semi-military and low-level operations,
although in the former only marginally more often than “USN & Other Forces.” “All
Forces” responses correlate highly with direct military operations. As expected, seaborne forces are more likely to deploy in crises where the United States acts as a third
party and is not involved as a direct crisis actor. The last finding can again be interpreted in the context of realist considerations in decision making. When the United
States is directly involved, the crisis is more likely to concern national interests and is
thus of greater importance to the nation.
The unsatisfactory measurement of response times posed a major problem for statistical analyses. The data set did not allow a distinction between the reaction times of the
different services, for it provided only single dates for the beginning of responses. It
would be valuable to examine the effects (if any) of different response times, because
readiness, speed, and independence are great naval advantages. There are significant
differences between the military services in regard to immediate reaction capabilities.
Often, such as in Lebanon in 1958 and in Afghanistan in 2001, both forward-deployed
and surged maritime forces are the first to be ready for deployment and arrive at the
theater. Similarly, the coding of the naval personnel variables is also suboptimal. The
numbers control only generally for all active USN personnel outside the United States,
without taking into account the number of personnel deployed within reaction radius of
the crisis or from which AOR they were dispatched. Controlling for these different factors might produce insight. The present results suggest that operations below a “direct
military level” involving the “USN-USMC Team” have faster reaction times. This finding confirms my expectation, since ground troops require the longest preparation time
before they arrive in the theater. As for the number of USN personnel abroad, positive
relationships were found with the total number of USN-USMC responses per year and
the number of deployed aircraft carriers.
Overall, the qualified decisiveness of naval forces was confirmed. Whereas the dispatch
of “All Forces” is important for the crisis abatement, it also correlates highly with the
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category “escalation.” This cannot be ignored, for it bears on the ineffectiveness of
seaborne forces alone. Additionally it would be helpful to see a cost-benefit analysis of
maritime operations. The USN offers subtleness and rapid response capabilities but
often does not exert decisive influence. Nevertheless, seaborne forces are of great importance in semi-military operations when ground troops are less useful and thus offer a
promising alternative tool for crisis engagement below direct military activity.
Part II Conclusion: Crisis Outcomes
In terms of crisis outcomes, seaborne forces correlate positively with ambiguous yet formal outcomes. Termination in “stalemate” is most frequent in crises where the United
States sent naval forces only, while “victory” and, to a greater extent, “defeat” are associated with “All Forces” responses. “All Forces” also correlate highest with “imposed”
outcomes, while naval forces are dispatched alone in crises terminating with “formal
agreements” or “unilateral acts.” One possible explanation is that naval forces are often
unable to prevent unilateral acts but in successful interventions can shape and promote
formal agreements. The Navy’s function of backing up diplomacy with limited intrusiveness, signaling U.S. interest and shaping developments, would support its advantage
in supporting formal agreements. “All Forces” are strong enough to impose outcomes
or to help the U.S. ally win the crisis. Thus the definite crisis outcomes (victory/defeat)
are imposed by the scale of force applied (all forces). This in turn can affect the other
outcome criteria, “satisfaction” and “tension.”
The results for the effects on tension are more ambiguous. Because the overall model
fit is poor, the results merely suggest that when “USN only” responses are treated as a
separate category, “USN-USMC” correlates with a reduction of tension, even more than
“no naval involvement,” whereas the other service combinations are positively correlated
with an increase in tension. Nevertheless, the direction of the “eyeball” correlations is
interesting and deserves further inquiry. The assumption that excessive use of force
can result in escalation is supported by these results, as well as by the earlier analysis
measuring the American effectiveness. “USN-USMC” forces are a powerful combination but not as threatening as “All Forces” and thus can influence escalation positively,
whereas the USN alone might not provide a sufficient incentive to change behavior.
Conversely, naval forces may serve as a prelude to stronger U.S. action, thereby feeding
fear of escalation. In the event of “All Forces” responses, the actor-level results do not
support my hypothesis that at least for the U.S. allies, tensions might ease. Where only
one of several actors is supportive of U.S. intervention, the level of tension may not be
diminished appreciably.
Outcomes leaving all actors satisfied are most frequent where seaborne forces were
dispatched in combination with the Air Force, followed by responses with no naval
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forces. Conversely, “all forces” and “USN-USMC” responses were least likely in crises
where all crisis actors considered the outcomes satisfactory. The correlation between
“seaborne-airborne” responses and “actor’s satisfaction” remains strong, regardless
of the perception of the U.S. involvement. One possible explanation could be that the
force combination was helpful in promoting a satisfactory outcome for all, but only the
U.S. ally was satisfied with the American involvement. The direction of this variable
may also be more dependent on the type of the crisis. Contrary to my expectation,
naval forces alone were not viewed as significantly more favorable by the crisis actors.
The mere frequencies suggest that USN forces alone were most often deployed in crises
characterized by a favorable attitude to U.S. involvement yet dissatisfaction with the
outcome. However, more robust statistical analyses show that the significance is very
weak. One possible explanation is the weakness of misperception. Naval signaling
could be interpreted as a prelude to a stronger American response, a development either
hoped for or feared. Additionally, in some cases the U.S. ally may have been hoping for
a more powerful response than was provided by naval forces. “All Forces” responses
generated the highest correlation with unfavorable attitudes toward U.S. involvement.
On one hand, this is surprising, since the parties favored by U.S. intervention should
be more satisfied with a stronger commitment. On the other hand, the finding that not
all parties were satisfied with the outcome was to have been expected, since the variable
does not distinguish between allies of the United States and non-allies. This can further
be influenced by the number of actors. With a large number of crisis actors, the scope
for individual dissatisfaction is greater. Current data do not allow me to explore this
distinction.
Importantly, the strength of the response should not be measured only by the type of
service deployed. Blechman and Kaplan already distinguished between the type and
18
the level of force. A possible measurement for the level of force within naval responses
is the dispatch of aircraft carriers. A survey study conducted by Zakheim et al. found
that there seems to be a general consensus among senior opinion leaders that only
19
a U.S. carrier presence will be effective during a major crisis. In smaller incidents,
the opinions differed. While some still preferred carriers, others were more cautious
and favored displays of smaller naval-strength combinations. This question about the
optimal type of force is crucial for a variety of reasons. Generally it is important to
distinguish between the different force levels involved in naval interventions, independent of the service combinations. Blechman and Kaplan analyzed successful outcomes
from the vantage point of the United States but found negative correlations with higher
force levels.
Treating definite outcomes as more successful, this analysis reveals different findings. The system-level-data evidence shows that responses without aircraft carrier
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involvement are more likely to lead to ambiguous outcomes, whereas the stronger the
CV force, the more likely a definite outcome becomes. Likewise, the absence of CVs (or
the use of only one) is positively correlated with a formal agreement, whereas more than
one CV strongly increases the chances of an imposed agreement. Assuming that the
United States imposes its will on the crisis actors, the Blechman/Kaplan finding can be
confirmed. Responses without any aircraft carriers concurred most frequently with the
variable value “all actors satisfied,” whereas there was no “eyeball” correlation for the
variable “tensions.” The presence of aircraft carriers also indicates the magnitude of the
crisis, but one should also distinguish between the different force levels within naval
and other military interventions. Blechman and Kaplan also found a positive influence
20
of the commitment of land troops. The current data partially confirm this, with the
strong correlation of all-forces responses and contribution to the pace of abatement,
followed by USN-USMC deployments. While this does not directly control for success,
the termination of a crisis can in itself be considered a success, independent of the type
of outcome.
The dependent variables are influenced by many additional intervening factors—for example, whether tension is more likely to escalate in crises characterized by high levels of
violence or high-politics issues, or whether the satisfaction is influenced by the type of
crisis. However, accounting for all these considerations would result in an overly complex model, and the resulting outputs would be very difficult to interpret. For instance,
in crises where the actors were satisfied with U.S. involvement but dissatisfied with the
outcome, it is important not only to distinguish between the different service combinations but also to control for the issue of the crisis or the form of the outcome. This would
include the influence of the type of mission and the question of what constitutes a positive outcome. A combat operation is likely to be perceived more negatively by the crisis
actors than a NEO mission. In this context, it would be helpful to evaluate the views of
beneficiaries of the missions. The data suggest that in NEO and contingent positioning
missions, the U.S. crisis involvement is more likely to be perceived as favorable or neutral, whereas its involvement in combat operations is rated unfavorably. Shows of force
generate nearly equal results.
Further research would also have to control for the number of crisis actors, since this
will influence the correlation between attitude and mission. Currently, the same mission type is coded for all involved actors. Noteworthy is the high frequency of more than
one naval mission within a single crisis. This can be interpreted as a confirmation of the
naval ability to be flexible. For instance, in a single crisis seaborne forces can immediately react with a show of force, followed by combat operations if necessary, and in the
aftermath operate in a contingent positioning mission to observe the implementation
of an agreement, cease-fire, or peace plan. While these are general crisis outcomes, it
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would also be important to distinguish between what the United States sought to deter
and whether it succeeded. These goals can be very different from overall crisis characteristics. A comprehensive analysis of positive/negative outcomes should include the
question of the perspective. Who perceives the outcome as satisfactory? Is a positive
outcome representative of a peaceful settlement of the crisis terminating in a formal
agreement, or does it refer to the perception of a crisis actor or of the United States? A
positive outcome for the United States might just as well be an imposed agreement as a
formal one, independent of such other considerations as the duration of the resolution
or the disposition of the majority of the crisis actors.
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Conclusion
In this study I have sought to weave together different ideas on the usefulness of naval
forces for U.S. crisis management. I created a new data set, measuring the activities of
seaborne forces in American responses to international crises, by adding new variables
1
to an already existing, well established crisis data project. By means of combining
different methodological and theoretical approaches, I have tried to shed light on the
overarching question: “What is the role of U.S. naval forces in crisis response?” There is
no short and direct answer. Drawing on various theories and assumptions I found that
maritime forces are a promising response tool for certain types of crises, yet there is no
unambiguous response to the question posed above. I broke the research down into
four categories and have used statistical analyses and historical examples to underline
my findings.
The more specific research questions posed in the introductory chapter were concerned,
first, with the types of crises and locations to which U.S. naval forces mostly respond
alone. Seaborne forces deploy in crises characterized by territorial threats and threats
of low gravity generally and when clearly defined military-security issues are at stake.
Their involvement is not correlated with crises characterized by low-salience issues. Seaborne deployments in crises with high levels of violence seem just as frequent as higherforce levels. There is no particular location that triggers seaborne deployments, but if
the crisis location is of great geostrategic interest, naval forces will deploy not alone but
rather together with ground troops. The research questions regarding the crisis actors
were concerned with the influence of different actors’ characteristics and how they
perceived the seaborne crisis response. The presence of fewer crisis actors and little or
no UN involvement is more likely to favor “seaborne only responses,” while the stability
of the actors does not seem to promote particular types of military response. No results
were found to answer the question in regard to the perception of the naval involvement.
The third set of questions looked at the type of U.S. activity, the deployment with other
military services, and the effectiveness of seaborne responses. All American response
activity levels below direct military favor “seaborne only deployments.”
In general, the USN often deploys with the Marine Corps or the Air Force. If the U.S.
Army is involved, usually most other services participate as well. All results differed
depending on whether the baseline was set to “All Forces” or to “no Navy” responses.
When “All Forces” activities were chosen as baseline, “USN-USMC” responses and no
naval involvement often compared similarly. When “no Navy” was defined as baseline,
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the results changed to indicate the military character and highlight the adaptability
of naval forces. In all cases expect for one, “USN & Other Forces” stands for seaborne
force(s) and “USAF” and was therefore treated as combination with the Air Force.
Navy–Marine Corps–Air Force joint forces proved to represent a highly valuable crisisresponse tool. The question regarding the effectiveness of “seaborne only responses” is
difficult to answer. While seaborne forces were overall less effective if deployed alone,
they also show the lowest correlation with an escalation of tension of all military service
combinations. Thus while seaborne-only responses exert a lower influence, this should
not be translated as ineffectiveness. The last of the categories, the crisis outcome, was
concerned with the influence of U.S. naval forces on outcomes. Naval forces correlated
positively with crises ending with ambiguous outcomes, but also formal agreements,
suggesting subtle influence that can support diplomatic efforts but not decisively terminate crises. To provide a more detailed overview, figure 50 presents all the hypotheses
and results after the regression analyses.
Figure 50

Hypotheses Results Overview
Hypothesis 1a: Low Threat

Mixed results

Hypothesis 1b: Low Stake

Not confirmed

Hypothesis 1c: Violence

Mixed results

Hypothesis 1d: Geostrategic Interest

Confirmed

Hypothesis 2a: Number of Actors

Confirmed

Hypothesis 2b: UN Involvement

Confirmed

Hypothesis 2c: Political Stability

Mixed results

Hypothesis 2d: Attitude to U.S. Activity

No results

Hypothesis 3a: Form of Involvement

Confirmed

Hypothesis 3b: U.S. Effectiveness

Confirmed

Hypothesis 3c: Direct Military Activity

Confirmed

Hypothesis 3d: Termination

Confirmed

Hypothesis 3e: U.S. Crisis Actor

Confirmed

Hypothesis 3f: U.S. Readiness

Not confirmed

Hypothesis 4a: Definite Outcome

Confirmed

Hypothesis 4b: Agreement

Confirmed

Hypothesis 4c: Reduction of Tensions

No results

Hypothesis 4d: Actor Satisfaction

Mixed results
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Both advantages and disadvantages of naval deployments were confirmed. Many findings point to the benefits of naval forces as flexible, subtle, and ready forces. Seaborne
forces, and to some extent the Air Force, have the capability to arrive in the theater
quickly and respond rapidly but also to stand by, in a wait-and-see posture. They are the
military response tool of choice in low-level and semi-military U.S. activities. Ground
forces require much longer transition times and are therefore better suited for longerlasting crises and they signal a stronger American commitment. The findings that
greater geostrategic interests, more crisis actors, and direct involvement trigger stronger
responses can be explained with a realist approach. More idealist goals, such as a right
intention, in the form of promoting a formal agreement, appear to be more likely to be
supported by maritime forces. The results supporting realist considerations are stronger,
and it remains to be seen if the idealist tendency can be confirmed in future studies.
Lack of decisiveness should not be overstated; it is not crucial that naval forces be as
decisive as ground forces. It is more important to implement unique naval capabilities.
The qualities of naval forces lie in other tasks and advantages that set them apart from
others and allow different response activities. Fast reaction, limited intrusiveness, and
the ability to wait and see are great advantages but are not necessarily suitable for all crises types and settings. For example, if the United States wants to speed up the abatement
decisively, “All Forces” responses are necessary, but when a stronger emphasis is placed
on minimizing the chances of escalation caused by U.S. activity, the “USN-USMC team”
presents the better response tool. Similarly, if the United States wants to impose an
outcome, ground troops are necessary, whereas support for reaching a formal agreement is better undertaken by USN forces alone. Conflict resolution is a central challenge
of defense management, and many different tools are at the government’s disposal to
pursue its goals. If the United States wants to intervene successfully in crises, it is crucial
to study how the characteristics of crises and actors influence naval involvement and
how, in turn, naval involvement impacts outcomes. American decision makers should
carefully consider the differences of the service combinations in making their crisis
response choices. It is thus necessary to analyze the force combinations in more depth,
further distinguishing between military interventions to improve conflict resolution
strategies.
This exploratory study presents a variety of promising and interesting results and identifies areas of interest for future research. Why are naval forces not more successful in
low-level U.S. activities, through supporting political crisis-resolution efforts? Why are
naval forces predominant in crises focusing on single military-security issues and territorial threats? Why is there no correlation with low-gravity-of-threat crises? How can
the influence of naval forces on outcomes be interpreted? Why is naval involvement not
viewed more favorably by crisis actors? Examination of the psychological effects of naval
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forces on an adversary and how they are perceived would provide more useful information on the questions of subtlety, intrusiveness, and effectiveness. All of this prompts
the question of how sailors view themselves, as well as their role and function in conflict
settings. Naval roles change over time and have to adapt to current threats and challenges. For example, the vulnerability of U.S. ships, especially of aircraft carriers to the
enhanced technological resources of potential adversaries, may lead to changes in the
American approach to crisis resolution. Yet this research suggests the importance of the
dispatch of at least one aircraft carrier for decisive intervention. Many results, such as of
hypotheses controlling for outcomes, point to the benefits of sending an aircraft carrier
to underline intentions and enhance coercion power. More research is required to analyze when, how, and what type of ship to deploy to achieve the desired outcome.
In the remainder of this conclusion I will discuss the shortcomings of this analysis,
followed by suggestions for additional data for future research. I will then take a closer
look at the diplomatic role of naval forces and try to derive lessons from my analyses of
the role of seaborne forces in crisis response as they pertain to current debates of
sea power.
Shortcomings
Many of the shortcomings were already mentioned in the discussion of the results, but
the following paragraphs identify and discuss additional problems.
Small Number of Cases and Generalization
One of the biggest shortcomings is the small number of cases. For further research it
would be of great interest to expand the latest CNA data set in order to enlarge the number of cases and to extend them beyond international crises. The CNA studies identified
more naval responses to international incidents than captured in this project. Following the definition of the ICB data project meant that many incidents were excluded.
But already the definition applied here renders comparisons difficult. The question of
when responses cross from peacetime to wartime is difficult to answer. By application
of Siegel’s 1995 definition of a threshold of one thousand casualties, incidents as diverse
as the Gulf War in 1990, the Six-Day War in 1967, an international crisis in Yemen in
2
1979, and minor skirmishes in Latin America in 1959 and 1960 are compared. By the
addition of more cases, the different types of crises could be better grouped and distinguished. While the current work captures responses only within the time frame of the
crisis, the inclusion of cases of nonroutine naval involvement before a crisis breaks out
would allow one to draw more inferences about deterrence capabilities and potentially
influential reactions taking place in anticipation of the crisis.
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The importance of understanding events before the occurrence of a crisis is illustrated
by the case of “Liberia–Sierra Leone.” The ICB codes a crisis lasting from 23 March to
31 October 1991. However, Navy, Marine, and Army elements were engaged in a NEO
in Liberia from April 1990 until January 1991, before the crisis outbreak. Additionally, the NEO took place in Liberia, while the ICB crisis mainly focuses on the crisis in
Sierra Leone, as a result of the long-lasting civil war in Liberia. It is further important to
distinguish between different deployments within crises. Often, naval forces respond in
more than one mission to a crisis, and at other times “USN forces only” either are present before other services join the operations or remain after they depart. For example,
before and after the Suez nationalization war in 1956–57, the United States sent naval
patrol forces with Marines on board to the area. During the peak of the crisis, the U.S.
response was augmented by the Air Force. Since it was always the largest force level that
was coded, this dispatch of maritime forces only before the peak was not captured in
the data for statistical analysis. The distinctions between independent naval operations
would allow us to judge better their respective influence on the crisis and their functions within the U.S. military services.
The treatment of crises occurring within a larger conflict or even war presents an additional problem. I tried to focus on naval responses to the specific crisis and not on the
conflict at large, but alternative approaches might be as valid. In a future study, the cases
where U.S. military, but not naval, forces were dispatched should be included, to control
for possible differences. The Gorenburg et al. CNA report identifies 167 cases with and
3
142 without naval involvement, exclusive of HA/DR operations. It would be rewarding to analyze the type of incidents involving military services exclusive of the naval
component.
Furthermore, all available CNA data could be enhanced by adding variables including
controlling for the crisis characteristics, American involvement, actors, and outcomes.
The inclusion of U.S. intentions and success could also produce useful findings. However, the CNA data only focus on military responses to situations, thereby excluding
all U.S. involvements short of deploying military services. It would be worthwhile to
expand the research to include U.S. response to international incidents short of military
activities. A larger sample would also allow finer distinctions between the maritime
forces. The type of mission and the type and level of force, whether power was projected
ashore, how closely the vessels approached the adversary, and the principal naval and
Marine activities—all these could collectively shed more light on the influence and
responses of naval forces. There is a fundamental difference between whether Marines
were just present and whether they landed, and if so, whether in conjunction with a
NEO or in combat.
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The currently low number of “USN only” cases allows for a limited number of hypotheses differentiating between USN and USN-USMC forces. As shown, this differentiation can produce insight on the variables “geographic location,” “UN involvement,”
“U.S. contribution to pace of abatement,” “ambiguous outcome,” and “tension.” A larger
number of cases would enable the inclusion of a factor controlling for the level of force
within the USN activity. Analyses providing results on the influence of the type and
strength of different ships for successful outcomes could also prove helpful in the current debate about the necessary number and types of ships. Simple frequency distributions have suggested that the force level does play an important role. Overall, it would be
very helpful if there were a more standardized process to capture “naval data” within the
Department of the Navy. The lack of consistent and uniform documentation renders the
data collection very challenging and comparisons difficult.
All these shortcomings present me with the very problem I criticized in other data
sets—generalization, particularly the generalization of “military interventions.” While
this project contributes to the understanding of the different functions and capabilities
of the armed services, thus differentiating between different forms of military interventions, it entailed compromises and generalizations.
Simple Regression Models
Because a wide variety of different variables was included, the analysis is composed of
many different individual models and is not structured to test different theoretical approaches against each other in one comprehensive model. While its approach provides
a broad overview of how naval forces are deployed in international crises, it limits depth
of analysis. The reliance on largely individual models, given their inability to control for
interactive effects, supports simple correlations with a measurement of association of
strength to describe the relationship between the dependent and independent variables.
The stepwise regression models lowered both the Exp(B) values and the number of
significant results. This is not surprising, since the independent variables intercorrelate
with unpredictable effects on the dependent variable.
Moreover, it also suggests that certain variables are not as influential as assumed from
the simple regression outputs. Future models have to determine which factors remain
important when they are no longer treated separately. As always, the independent variable is just one factor impacting the dependent variable; there are many other influences on both the dependent and independent variables. This is especially true for
2
simple models including one independent variable and thus outputting only a low R
value. This suggests a low strength of association, because many other relevant factors
impacting the dependent variable are not accounted for. With more data at hand, future
research should strive to generate more complex models, controlling for interaction
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effects. Nevertheless, the presentation of frequencies and simple regression analyses
were sufficient for the purpose of this projects, since a stated goal was to generate a new
data set, thereby preparing the groundwork for future projects, and to determine which
factors deserve inquiry in greater depth.
The Maritime Century: The Way Ahead
I will end by focusing on the diplomatic functions of the USN and the usefulness of the
sea-air team. I believe these results can offer valuable insight when placed in the larger
context of the role of seaborne forces in the twenty-first century, which many analysts
have termed the “maritime century,” because of the influence sea power exercises on
4
international events. As Admiral Roughead said, “Our Navy is very different than the
larger U.S. navies of the past. And while our Navy is very different, and much smaller,
5
we are also facing a new emerging order that I believe requires more naval power.”
First I will briefly discuss the promising combination of seaborne forces and the U.S.
Air Force.
AirSea Battle
Since its publication by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in May
2010, the AirSea Battle concept has garnered significant attention. I do not mean to
attempt to evaluate the concept but rather to apply my findings to the usefulness of the
sea-air team. The AirSea Battle concept “rests fundamentally on the tight integration of
Air Force and Navy operations in the WPTO [Western Pacific Theater of Operations]—
6
each Service plays a key enabling role for the other in accomplishing critical missions.”
Many of the results of this study strongly underline the effectiveness of the combination
of sea and airborne forces. Signaling and coercion power can be enhanced, while much
of the present flexibility and readiness can be maintained. The influence exerted is similar to a deployment of ground troops and the deterrent effect is significant, but the level
of commitment is lower and less intrusive. For example, in crises involving multiple
issues and when governmental instability is high, the combination with the Air Force
has been the response tool of choice, suggesting its usefulness in complex situations.
Yet unlike the deployment of ground troops, sea-air forces are more likely deployed in
U.S. activities below direct military involvements, supporting the arguments of lower
intrusiveness and greater flexibility.
Additionally, the sea-air team is also viewed as more favorable by the actors and shows a
high “eyeball” correlation with crises where U.S. activity is important for the abatement;
only one case coincided with activity responsible for an escalation of the situation. Of
course, these findings do not directly influence the desired antiaccess and area-denial
capabilities, but as Jose Carreno and his coauthors say, “The salient question is, to what
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extent did and does cooperation either make U.S. forces more efficient or create real
synergy? . . . [I]t is important to understand that the Navy, by itself, was able then and is
capable now to conduct an air-sea battle. [The concept] must integrate some unique set
of capabilities from both services to create real synergistic effects that neither service
7
can accomplish individually.” The many positive results of a combination with the Air
Force found in this study are particularly promising and can help to begin identifying
8
situations where a combination of forces is most useful. A more careful analysis of these
dynamics can improve effectiveness, enhance synergies, and inform the implementation
of AirSea Battle.
Naval Diplomacy
Three results in particular—the frequency of the use of naval forces short of direct military activities, the correlation with low or no UN involvement, and the impact on crisis
outcomes—underlined the diplomatic potential of naval forces. The Global Strategic
Assessment of 2009 came to the following conclusion: “The character of war is changing.
Low-level uses of force and greater civil-military integration, whether to interdict traf9
fickers or conduct humanitarian operations, are becoming more necessary.” To support
diplomatic initiatives—especially in low-level activities—with military strength is an
important task for naval forces. The results of this study distinguish the Navy from the
other services, especially short of direct military involvement; still, the statistics are not
as supportive as I had expected. Seaborne forces alone dominate lower-level U.S. deployments, but the overall number of responses was rather small, and the effectiveness of
the activity not what would be hoped for. Although the previous paragraph points to
the effectiveness of a sea-air combination, naval forces acting alone do possess critical
advantages that make them particularly suited for diplomatic tasks.
The study also provides very encouraging results supporting the importance of naval
forces with respect to their diplomatic potential and their subtleness. The strong and
positive relation between no or low-level UN involvement and “USN only” responses
highlights the diplomatic rather than the offensive military role of naval forces. Furthermore, the positive correlation between formal agreements and naval forces suggests a
subtle positive influence on the solution-finding process and the form of outcome. Over
the years there has been a clear decline in operations carried out by maritime forces
alone, as the United States seems to place emphasis on deploying forces jointly. This
10
development has been observed in many other studies since the end of the 1980s. The
data confirm that after 1985, joint operations dominate American crisis response, the
change coinciding with the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.
While joint operations have proved themselves, this very success undermines the
Navy’s ability to exploit its diplomatic potential to the fullest. Since 1990 only four of

meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP39:_InDesign:08 NP_39 Conclusion.indd January 17, 2013 9:06 AM

influence without boots on the ground   189

the international crises featured a maritime response only. In 1994, during the second
North Korean nuclear crisis, naval vessels were displayed in a show of force, and again
during the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995–96 the United States deployed two aircraft carriers in a show of force. The presence of naval forces, it is said, played an important role in
both cases. In the former they contributed to maintaining the stability during the nego11
tiations. During the latter, the naval deployments were a successful coercive diplomacy
12
effort to guarantee stability during the Taiwanese elections by deterring the Chinese.
The two other crises involving the USN-USMC team came in the form of two NEOs: in
1998 in the Ethiopia-Eritrea crisis (although the mission was ultimately canceled) and
Lebanon in 2006.
Naval diplomacy also has a crucial preventive role before crisis breaks out, an important
aspect not captured in this analysis. Because every crisis is treated in the data as one
unit, I have not accounted for the different responses within one crisis, such as changing
missions or different levels of coercive diplomacy, or for the timing of the deployment
of other military services. For example, the data do not distinguish between “sticks”
employed after “carrots” have failed to solve the crisis and the two used simultaneously.
During the Bosnia crisis, for instance, the United States remained reluctant to approve
air strikes, but naval forces arrived in the theater in the very early stages. Because the
response is coded at the highest service-combination level, the Bosnia case does not
account for USN involvement only. Especially in the beginning, the naval involvement
was largely meant to establish a blockade, which it successfully did. Analysis in greater
depth of the timing could provide more insight into these dynamics and report such
effective outcomes as this.
But most importantly, naval diplomacy is a central task for the USN on a daily basis and
is not restricted to crisis response. Port visits and joint exercises also serve diplomatic
functions, and the United States has employed its naval forces to coerce and deter on
many occasions during routine deployments. The recent U.S. attempt to highlight the
role of soft power inevitably portends an increased emphasis on diplomacy. As the
QDR states,
As a global power, the United States has a broad range of tools for advancing its national interests
described above. Whenever possible, we seek to pursue those interests through cooperation, diplomacy, economic development and engagement, and the power of America’s ideas and values. When
absolutely necessary, the United States and its allies have shown the willingness and ability to resort
to force in defense of our interests and the common good.13

With the steadily increasing criticality of the Indo-Pacific commons, the use of naval diplomacy will become even more important. This strategy is not confined to the United
States; many nations have turned to their naval forces to demonstrate interest and
intention. The results in this study suggest that naval forces as a diplomatic tool in crises
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are underutilized and that the Navy would have much to offer. This observation is also
supported by a 2009 Naval Institute Proceedings article calling for the reintroduction of
14
naval diplomacy, described as one of the most valuable national resources. The 2007
maritime strategy emphasizes soft power and low-level USN activities. In contrast, as
15
Pritchett points out, no special chapter is devoted to naval diplomacy in the NOP 2010.
He urges that humanitarian assistance and disaster relief be integrated as part of, and
within, the broader frame of naval diplomacy. HA and DR were excluded in the present
analysis, but they offer promising ways of exercising soft power and thus diplomatic
influence. Polls revealed that disaster relief delivered in response to the Indian Ocean
tsunami in 2004–2005 or the earthquake in Pakistan in 2005 resulted in a more positive
16
attitude toward the United States. Humanitarian assistance missions can improve the
image of the United States, especially through the annual deployments of Operations
Continuing Promise and Pacific Partnership. Yet it is crucial to understand
better the impact and the actual benefits of HA and DR, as well as the forms of naval
diplomacy captured in this study, to U.S. interests.
This study presents some preliminary findings, but it will be necessary to find better
measures of the influence that naval diplomacy exerts, especially in a time of “low-level
17
uses of force and greater civil-military integration.” Cable concludes that “gunboat diplomacy is a screwdriver intended to turn a particular screw. It is not a hammer that will
18
bang home any old nail.” This statement explains the importance of understanding
possibilities and limitations of the impact and success of naval diplomacy. Naval forces
alone will not decisively impose outcomes in large-scale international crises, as the
results have confirmed. If doing so is the U.S. goal, other means should be chosen. The
tasks assigned the USN should be more specific and limited, such as to deter a certain
move by one of the actors or to support political efforts. Thus, before any conclusions
are drawn in regard to the limited decisiveness of naval forces in this context, one has to
take such considerations into account. Depending on the crisis and American objectives, naval forces alone may or may not be sufficient. Luttwak finds that the influence
of naval diplomacy is largely determined by the reaction of others, rather than by the
19
intentions of the employing actor.
This could prove interesting in the context of the increasing tensions with China in the
western Pacific. J. J. Widen summarizes Luttwak’s thought process as follows: “A latent
and unintended application of naval diplomacy—routine fleet movements—could be
more effective and considered more threatening than an active and planned threat us20
ing naval forces, which could sometimes be completely ignored.” This aspect of naval
diplomacy—in light of the continuous U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific commons—is
of the highest interest, and understanding this dynamic can provide useful guidance.
Luttwak offers more lessons that remain relevant today, especially in regard to the
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discussion of the number of ships and their types, and above all the need for aircraft
carriers. For naval diplomacy, he argued, it is often more important to be visible than
to be viable for combat. He had in mind the Soviet Union, which built ships not only
for combat but also to impress other actors. While one particular ship might not offer
decisive combat power, it can still serve as a symbol for the might of the country, with
backup readily available. “The dominating framework of armed suasion is thus the
domestic, international and local political context, which in combination will determine
21
the absolute feasibility, and degree of success, of its exercise.”
Such ideas should inform forward presence, exercises, port visits, and other such considerations, as these lessons can be applied to today’s geopolitical situation, especially in
the Indo-Pacific. Again, it depends on the type of influence the United States wishes to
exert. For influencing outcomes decisively, this study suggests the importance of more
powerful forces, including aircraft carriers. This might not be necessary for lower-level,
diplomatic missions.
Overall, it is important to collect more data to confirm the usefulness of naval forces
in low-level activities. The practicalities of measurement are very challenging, but this
study provides a first step that can be built on in the future to evaluate how to employ
naval diplomacy effectively and when this tool is appropriate. In 2009 Michael Quigley
wrote, “A wide range of naval options—from sending a small escort ship sailing within
sight from a foreign port to parking an entire carrier group off the coast—can provide a
multitude of diplomatic options. Gunboat diplomacy can prevent or even resolve inter22
national crisis situations.” In the current debates regarding the future of the U.S. Navy,
such considerations should be given more weight, especially in this maritime century.
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A.1. Crisis Listing
#

ICB Crisis #

Start Year

Name

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

110
111
112
113
114
115
116
120
121
123
125
126
127
128
131
132
133

1946
1946
1946
1947
1947
1947
1947
1947
1948
1948
1948
1948
1948
1948
1949
1950
1950

Communism in Poland
Turkish Straits
Greek Civil War
Communism in Hungary
Truman Doctrine
Marshall Plan
Indonesia Independence II
Palestine Partition/Israel Independence
Communism in Czechoslovakia
Berlin Blockade
China Civil War
Costa Rica-Nicaragua I
Indonesia Independence Iii
Sinai Incursion
Soviet Bloc-Yugoslavia
Korean War I
Korean War II

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
164
165
166
168

1951
1951
1951
1952
1953
1953
1953
1953
1953
1953
1953
1954
1954
1955
1955
1956
1956
1956
1956
1956
1957
1957
1957
1957
1957
1957
1958
1958
1958
1958

Hula Drainage
Punjab War Scare I
Suez Canal
Catalina Affair
Burma Infiltration
Invasion of Laos I
Korean War III
East German Uprising
Trieste II
Qibya
Guatemala
Dien Bien Phu
Taiwan Strait I
Costa Rica-Nicaragua II
Baghdad Pact
Gaza Raid-Czechoslovakia Arms
Suez Nationalization-War
Qalailya
Poland Liberalization
Hungarian Uprising
Mocoron Incident
Jordan Regime
France-Tunisia
Syria-Turkey Confrontation
IFNI
West Irian I
Abortive Coup Indonesia
Iraq-Lebanon Upheaval
Taiwan Strait II
Berlin Deadline

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

170
171
172
175
176
178

1959
1959
1959
1960
1960
1960

Central America-Cuba I
China-India Border I
Shatt-Al-Arab I
Failed Assassination-Venezuela
Congo I-Katanga
Central America-Cuba II

1

Crisis Actors
USSR
Turkey, US
Greece
Hungary, USSR
Greece, Turkey, US
Czechoslovakia, Russia
Netherlands, Indonesia
Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria
Czechoslovakia, USSR
France, UK, US, USSR
China, US
Costa Rica
Indonesia, Netherlands
Egypt, Israel, UK
Yugoslavia
China, South Korea, Taiwan, US
North Korea, People's Republic of China, South
Korea, US, USSR
Greece, Italy
India, Pakistan
Egypt, UK
Sweden
Burma
France, Laos
China, North Korea, South Korea; US
Russia
Italy, Yugoslavia
Jordan
Guatemala, Honduras
France, UK, US
China, Taiwan, US
Costa Rica, Nicaragua
Egypt
Egypt, Israel
Egypt, France, Israel, UK, US, USSR
Israel, Jordan
Poland, USSR
Hungary, USSR
Honduras, Nicaragua
Jordan
Tunisia
Syria, Turkey, US
Spain
Netherlands
Indonesia
Jordan, Lebanon, UK, US
People's Republic of China, Taiwan, US
France, German Democratic Republic, German
Federal Republic, UK, US, USSR
Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama
China, India
Iran, Iraq
Dominican Republic, Venezuela
Belgium, Congo
Guatemala, Nicaragua

Seaborne Crisis Response

Appendix A. Crises Summaries

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

180
181
182
185
186
187
190
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
200
202
203
206
208
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227

1961
1961
1961
1961
1961
1961
1961
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
1963
1963
1963
1963
1963
1964
1964
1964
1964
1964
1965
1965
1965
1965
1965
1966
1966
1967
1967
1967
1968
1968
1968
1968

Pathet Lao Offensive
Bay of Pigs
Pushtunistan III
Berlin Wall
Vietcong Attack
West Iraian II
Goa II
Taiwan Strait III
Nam Tha
China-India Border II
Yemen War I
Cuban Missiles
Malysia Federation
Dominican Republic-Haiti II
Cuba-Venezuela
Cyprus I
Jordan Waters
Panama Flag
Ogaden I
Gulf of Tonkin
Congo II
Yemen War III
Pleiku
Rann of Kutch
Dominican Intervention
Kashmir III-Nuclear Confrontation
Rhodesia's Udi
Yemen War IV
El Samu
Che Guevara-Bolivia
Six Day War
Cyprus III
Pueblo
TET Offensive
Karameh
Prague Spring Offensive

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

228
229
230
231
232
233
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
246
249
254
255
256
257
258
259
260

1968
1968
1969
1969
1969
1969
1969
1969
1970
1970
1970
1970
1971
1971
1972
1972
1973
1973
1973
1974
1974
1975
1975

Essequibo I
Beirut Airport
Vietnam Spring Offensive
Ussuri River
War of Attrition
EC-121 Spy Plane
Football War
Cairo Agreement-PLO
Invasion of Cambodia
Black September
Cienfuegos Submarine Base
Conakry Raid
Invasion of Laos II
Bangladesh
Vietnam Port Mining
Christmas Bombing
Cod War I
October-Yom Kippur War
Oman- South Yemen
Cyprus III
Final North Vietnam Offensive
Mayaguez
War in Angola

113.
114.
115.
116.

261
263
265
267

1975
1975
1976
1976

Moroccan March
Cod War
Lebanon Civil War
Operation Thrasher

2

Thailand, US
Cuba, US
Afghanistan, Pakistan
DDR, France, UK, US, USSR, West Germany
South Vietnam, US
Indonesia, Netherlands
Portugal
China
Thailand, US
China, India
Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen
Cuba, Soviet Union, US
Indonesia, Malaysia
Dominican Republic, Haiti
Venezuela
Cyprus, Greece, Turkey
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria
Panama, US
Ethiopia, Somalia
North Vietnam, US
Belgium, Congo, US, USSR
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen
South Vietnam, North Vietnam, US
India, Pakistan
US
India, Pakistan
Zambia
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen
Israel, Jordan
Bolivia
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, US, USSR
Cyprus, Greece, Turkey
South Korea, North Korea, US
South Vietnam, US
Israel, Jordan
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic
Republic, Hungary, Poland, USSR
Guyana
Lebanon
South Vietnam, US
China, USSR
Egypt, Israel, USSR
US
El Salvador, Honduras
Lebanon
Cambodia, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, US
Israel, Jordan, Syria, US
US
Guinea
Laos, North Vietnam
Bangladesh, India, Pakistan
North Vietnam, South Vietnam, US
North Vietnam, South Vietnam, US
Iceland, UK
Egypt, Israel, Soviet Union, Syria, US
Oman
Cyprus, Greece, Turkey
Cambodia, US
Cambodia, US
Angola, Cuba, South Africa, Soviet Union, US,
Zaire, Zambia
Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Spain
Iceland, UK
Syria
Mozambique, Zimbabwe
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117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

272
273
274
275
277
278
279
281
282
283
286
287
289
291
292
293
294
295
296
298
301
303
306
307
309
310
311
315

1976
1976
1976
1976
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1977
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1978
1979
1979
1979
1979
1979
1979
1980
1980

Aegean Sea I
Nagomia Raid
Poplar Tree
Syria Mobilization
Shaba I
Mapai Seizure
Belize II
Egypt-Libya Clashes
Ogaden II
Rhodesia Raid
Chimoio-Tembue Raids
Beagle Channel I
Litani Operation
Cassinga Incident
Shaba II
Air Rhodesia Incident
Nicaragua Civil War II
Beagle Channel II
Fall of Amin
Sino-Vietnam War
North-South Yemen II
Afghanistan Invasion
Soviet Threat Pakistan
Rhodesia Settlement
US Hostages in Iran
Colombia-Nicaragua
Raid on Gafsa
Solidarity

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

317
319
321
322
324
327
329
330
331
332
335
336
337
338
339
340
342
343
344
347
348
350
351
352
354
355
356
357
358
360
361
362
363
365
369
370

1980
1980
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1981
1982
1982
1982
1982
1982
1983
1983
1983
1983
1983
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1985
1985
1985
1985
1985
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986

Onset Iran- Iraq War
Jordan- Syria Confrontation
Chad-Libya V
Ecuador-Peru Border III
Iraq Nuclear Reactor
Al-Biby Missiles I
Coup Attempt in the Gambia
Gulf of Syrte I
Operation Protea
Galtat Zemmouri I
Khorramsahr
Falkland/Malvinas
War in Lebanon
Ogaden III
Lesotho Raid
Libya Threat to Sudan
Chad- Libya VI
Invasion of Grenada
Able Archer
Operation Askari
Basra- Kharg Island
Omdurman Bombing
Vietnam Incursion into Thailand
Sino-Vietnam Clashes
Nicaragua MIG-21S
Botswana Raid
Expulsion of Tunisians
Al-Biqa Missiles II
Egypt Air Hijacking
South Africa Raid on Lesotho
Capture of Al-Faw
Chad- Libya VII
Gulf of Syrte II
South Africa Cross Border Raid
Contras II
Chad-Libya VIII

3

Greece, Turkey
Mozambique
North Korea, US
Israel
Angola, Congo
Mozambique
Iceland, UK
Egypt, Libya
Ethiopia, Somalia
Zambia
Mozambique
Argentina, Chile
Lebanon
Angola, South Africa
Angola, Belgium, France, US, Zaire
Zimbabwe, Zambia
Costa Rica, Nicaragua
Argentina, Chile
Libya, Tanzania, Uganda
China, North Vietnam
North Yemen, South Yemen
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Soviet Union, US
Pakistan
Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Iran, US
Colombia, Nicaragua
Libya, Tunisia
Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic,
Poland, USSR
Iran, Iraq
Jordan
France, Libya
Ecuador, Peru
Iraq, Israel
Israel, Syria
Senegal
Libya
Angola
Morocco
Iraq
Argentina, UK
Israel, Lebanon, Syria
Ethiopia, Somalia
Lesotho
Egypt, Libya, Sudan
Chad, France, Libya
Grenada, US
Russia
Angola
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia
Egypt, Libya, Sudan
Thailand
China, North Vietnam
Nicaragua, US
Botswana
Tunisia
Israel, Syria
Egypt, Libya
Lesotho
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia
Chad, France, Libya
Libya, USA
Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Honduras, Nicaragua
Chad, Libya
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181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

373
376
379
380
383
385
386
388
391
392
393

1987
1987
1987
1987
1988
1988
1988
1989
1989
1990
1990

Todghere incident
Aegean Sea III
Mecca Pilgrimage
South Africa Intervention in Angola
Contras III
Iraq Recapture of Al-Faw
Libyan Jets
Cambodia Peace Conference
Invasion of Panama
Kashmir III-Nuclear Confrontation
Gulf War

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

394
395
397
398
399
400
401
403
406
408
409
411
412
413
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426

1990
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1992
1992
1993
1993
1994
1994
1995
1995
1995
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1997
1998
1998
1998
1998

Rwanda-Uganda
Liberia-Sierra Leone
Yugoslavia I: Croatia-Slovenia
Bubiyan
Foreign Intervention in Zaire
Ecuador-Peru Border IV
Nagorny-Karabakh
Yugoslavia II: Bosnia
Iraq No-Fly Zone
North Korean Nuclear
Operation Accountability
Haiti Military Regime
Iraq Droop Deployment- Kuwait
Ecuador-Peru V
Taiwan Strait IV
Red Sea Islands
Aegean Sea IV
Operation Grapes of Wrath
Desert Strike
North Korean Submarine
Zaire Civil War
UNSCOM I
Cyprus-Turkey Missile Crisis
Ethiopia-Eritrea
Indian-Pakistan Nuclear Tests
DRC Civil War

218.
219.
220.
221.

427
428
429
430

1998
1998
1998
1999

US Embassy Bombings
Syria-Turkey
UNSCOM II Operation Desert Fox
Kosovo

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

431
432
433
434
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
448
449
450
451
452

1999
1999
2001
2001
2001
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2003
2003
2004
2004
2005
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006

Kashmir IV Kargil
East Timor II
Caspian Sea
Afghanistan- USA
Indian Parliament Attack
Kaluchak
Parsley Island
Pankisi Gorge
Iraq Regime Change
North Korea Nuclear II
Iran Nuclear I
Haifa Suicide Bombing
DRC - Rwanda
South Ossetia - Abkhazia
Ethiopia – Eritrea II
Iran Nuclear II
Chad-Sudan II
North Korean Nuclear III
Israel Lebanon War II
Ethiopia Invasion Somalia
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Somalia
Greece, Turkey
Iran, Saudi Arabia
Angola, South Africa
Honduras, Nicaragua
Iran, Iraq
Libya, US
Cambodia, North Vietnam
Panama, US
India, Pakistan
Bahrain,Egypt,France,Iraq,Israel,Kuwait,Oman,Qat
ar,Saudi Arabia,Syria,UAE,UK,US
Rwanda
Sierra Leone
Croatia, Slovenia, Yugoslavia
Kuwait
Belgium, Congo, France
Ecuador, Peru
Armenia, Azerbaijan
Bosnia, Croatia, Yugoslavia
Iraq
North Korea, South Korea, US
Israel, Lebanon
Haiti, US
Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, US
Ecuador, Peru
China, Taiwan
Eritrea, Yemen
Greece, Turkey
Israel, Lebanon
Iraq, US
North Korea
Rwanda, Zaire
Iraq, US
Cyprus, Turkey
Eritrea, Ethiopia
India, Pakistan
Angola, Chad, Congo, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda,
Zimbabwe
Afghanistan, Sudan, US
Syria
Iraq, UK, US
Albania,Belgium,Canada,France,Germany,Italy,Net
herlands,Portugal,Spain,UK,US,Yugoslavia
(Serbia)
India, Pakistan
Australia, Indonesia
Azerbaijan
Afghanistan, Pakistan, UK, US
India, Pakistan
India, Pakistan
Spain, Morocco
Russia, Georgia
Iraq, UK, USA
USA, North Korea
France, Germany, UK, Iran
Israel, Syria
Congo, Rwanda
Georgia, Russia
Ethiopia, Eritrea
France, USA, UK, Iran
Chad, Sudan
USA, North Korea
Israel, Lebanon
Ethiopia
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A.2. International Crises with USN Involvement
The following appendix A.2 summarizes the crises in which the U.S. Navy was involved. It is
not meant to be a comprehensive account of the international crises as such is already provided
by the ICB. All cases are structured in the same order. For each crisis, a short summary of the
ICB crisis description, including additional information about the USN involvement is provided.
Information was collected from USN ship histories and available materials at the operational
archives, such as command histories and reports by the CNO. Any additional sources are
referenced. The reference Proceedings refers to the United States Naval Institutes Proceedings
May issue (since 1970) published in the year following the crisis. Because of the enormous
differences in the amount of information available for the cases, the crises descriptions vary
greatly in length and detail. Each case includes the ICB crisis number and the codings from all
applicable datasets: ICB, CNA I (Siegel), CNA II (Mahoney) and CNA III (Cobble, Gaffney,
and Goreburg) for the variables name, start and end date and form of U.S. involvement. 96 cases
are described, including Afghanistan, Iraq and the three cases where naval involvement could not
be confirmed sufficiently to qualify for the statistical analyses.
1. # 111 Turkish Straits; 8/7/1946 – 10/26/1946, 81
The Turkish straits crisis in 1946 presented a threat to national security for Turkey and
demonstrated U.S. naval commitment in the Mediterranean to support countries struggling
against communist influence—as after the Second World War it had promised to do. Soviet
activities mounted a growing threat to Eastern Europe in 1946. When a crisis broke out between
Turkey and the Soviet Union, this commitment was put to the test. But before the outbreak, an
important diplomatic event took place: in April 1946 the battleship USS Missouri (BB 63)
departed the United States for Turkey carrying the remains of the deceased Turkish ambassador
to the United States. Missouri was the ship on board which Japan had surrendered at the end of
the war (Blechmand and Kaplan 1978, 1); sending it was a clear demonstration of American
support for Turkey and a prelude to a permanent presence in the Mediterranean. Besides visiting
Turkey, the battleship also underscored the U.S. commitment to Greece. Missouri demonstrated
the unique role of the Navy versus those of the Air Force and Army. The vessel could be sent to
the vicinity without a real commitment, but if necessary this political use of force could promptly
be converted into a military use of force.
5
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The Turkish straits crisis was triggered by two Soviet demands in August 1946; the Soviet Union
sought naval bases and joint control over the straits. Simultaneously, the Soviets increased their
naval activity in the region. As a direct response, the United States expanded its own naval
activity. After a visit to Lisbon, USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CV 42) entered the Mediterranean
on 8 August. The presence of the world’s largest aircraft carrier was intended to demonstrate the
American commitment to Turkey in response to a Soviet buildup on the Turkish border and to
signal concern about in-creased Soviet naval activity in the Black Sea. While the carrier did not
visit Turkey, its presence sent a clear message of Washington’s intentions to resist Soviet
expansion. The deployment of an aircraft carrier offered the possibility of U.S. support on the
mainland through power projection ashore, should the Soviet Union invade Turkey. The
advantage of flexibility allows observing the events, yet flexing muscles and exerting influence.
The United States was able to demonstrate a commitment yet stay out of the way if no direct
action was necessary. The deployment of stronger forces would likely have been interpreted as a
direct involvement on the part of the United States and would have heightened tensions and
anxiety. At the same time, it was a perfect occasion to begin the permanent stationing of U.S.
ships in the Mediterranean. Previously, U.S. naval forces in the Mediterranean had consisted
mostly of destroyers, cruisers, and auxiliary vessels. Soviet power and influence had expanded
after the end of 1945 and posed a threat to the strategically important Mediterranean, a favorable
environment for the exploitation of the diplomatic advantages of naval forces. Although the
Soviet Union downplayed the importance of the American naval buildup, the permanent U.S.
presence—announced in September 1946—was important to conveying a message of immediate
readiness should any country need support against communist influence. Another purpose of the
deployment was to show support for the government in Greece in its battle against the
Communists (see case #112).
(The CNA I study combines Turkey and Greece as one crisis: Siegel describes increased naval
activity in the Mediterranean)
Additional Sources: Alvarez 1974; Baer 1994, 282 – 283, Cane 1975; Sheehy 1983
Dataset
ICB
CNA I

Turkish Straits
Turkey/Greece

Dates
8/7/1946 – 10/26/1946, 81
8/16/1946, 148
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U.S. Response
3
USN & USMC

Ships involved
1 CV & Amp
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2. # 112 Greek Civil War; 11/13/1946 – 2/28/1947, 108
Greek guerillas and the Greek government were embroiled in an ongoing conflict. On 13
November 1946 the guerillas, supported by the Communist regime in Yugoslavia, launched a
serious attack on Greece culminating in a crisis. The Greek army responded with military
operations on 18 November. In addition, Greece appealed to the UN Security Council, and in
January 1947 the UNSC authorized a fact-finding mission. The mission confirmed infiltrations
across Greece's borders. On the day the U.S. government encouraged Greece to draft a request of
aid from the United States, the crisis is said to have ended. The request led President Truman to
seek Congressional approval for economic and military assistance (see Case #114). Although the
immediate crisis ended, the conflict continued over the next two years.
During this crisis U.S. naval forces were still in the Mediterranean because of their deployment
in the Turkish Strait crisis. The USS Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s (CV 42) visit prior to the
outbreak of this crisis was part of the demonstration of U.S. support for the Greek government.
The Mediterranean deployment lasted until early 1947.
Additional Sources: Cane 1975, Sheehy 1983
Dataset
ICB
CNA I

Greek Civil War
Turkey/Greece

Dates
11/13/1946–2/28/1947, 108
8/16/1946, 148

U.S. Response
2
USN & USMC

Ships involved
1 CV & Amp

3. # 114 Truman Doctrine; 2/21/1947 – 5/22/1947, 91
On 21 February 1946 the government of the United Kingdom declared that it was no longer
capable of supporting Greece and Turkey. This announcement triggered a crisis for Greece,
Turkey and the United States. Turkey and Greece both turned to the U.S. for help. The United
States was now faced with a difficult decision: a refusal to provide aid to the two countries
would signal lack of interest in Eastern Europe and encourage Soviet hegemony. Truman
decided to become engaged. The U.S. would grant Greece and Turkey economic and military aid
in their struggle against the Communists, ending the crisis for all three actors. With the support
of Congress the Truman doctrine had been born.

7
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In the spring of 1947 a US naval squadron, consisting of the aircraft carrier USS Leyte (CV 32)
and the cruisers USS Providence (CL 82) and USS Dayton (CL 105) and six destroyers visited
Piraeus, Suda Bay (Crete), and Istanbul during a cruise to a number of Mediterranean ports.
During this period of time the Congress was still debating the request for aid. The squadron
entered Greek waters in April and visited Istanbul in early May. U.S. ships would stay in the
region for months to come.
(CNA I: Two of CNA I’s responses cover this crisis period: the Greek Civil War and Security of
Turkey. Both were part of the Leyte tour in Spring 1947)
Additional Sources: Cane 1975, Keesing’s, Sheehy 1983
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA I

Truman Doctrine
Greece Civil War
Security of Turkey

Dates
2/21/1947-5/22/1947, 91
4/16/1947, 412
5/2/1947, 386

U.S. Response
2
USN & USMC
USN

Ships involved
1 CV & Amp
1 CV & Amp

4. # 120 Palestine Partition / Israel Independence; 11/29/1947 – 7/20/1949, 589
Ever since the partition of Palestine in November 1947 into two states, tensions had been high in
the region. The UN General Assembly Resolution of 29 November 1947, calling for the partition
of Palestine into two independent states, one Arab, the other predominantly Jewish, triggered a
crisis for Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. For those five Arab nations this loss of Arab
territory posed a serious threat. When Israel proclaimed the State of Israel in May 1948 the
precarious situation escalated and they reacted with an invasion on 15 May 1948. The United
Nations were heavily involved, trying to broker an agreement between the warring parties.
Already in early January 1948, the Sixth Fleet began patrol operations in the Eastern
Mediterranean in response to the deteriorating situation in Palestine. On 18 June a Marine Force
was detached from the USS Kearsarge (CV 33). One day later on 19 June the United States sent
the three destroyers, USS Putnam (DD 757), USS Henley (DD 762) and USS Owen (DD 776) to
patrol the Palestinian coast to secure the implementation of the truce conditions, previously
agreed on. No ground troops were dispatched to enforce the ceasefire. The destroyers were
deployed to back-up the UN mediator in attempting to maintain peace between Arab and Israeli
forces. When the truce temporarily broke down, the USS Putnam evacuated the UN team from
8
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the port in Haifa on 23 July. She was thus the first U.S. Navy ship to fly the UN flag. The crisis
had different outcomes and ended at different times for each crisis actor, for some with defeat,
and for some with agreements, although not long-lasting. The ICB end date marked the signing
of the last peace agreement between Israel and Syria.
Additional Sources: Hahn 2005
Dataset
ICB
CNA I

Palestine
Partition/Israel
Independence
Arab-Israel War

Dates
11/29/1947–7/20/1949, 589

U.S. Response
2

Ships involved

1/5/1948, 466

USN & USMC

1 CV & Amp

5. # 123 Berlin Blockade; 6/24/1948 – 5/12/1949, 323
The Berlin Blockade of 1948 was one of the first major escalations between the United States
and the Soviet Union. After World War II, Berlin had been divided into American, British,
French, and Soviet zones. The announcement by the three Western governments that they
planned to integrate their zones in Germany triggered a crisis with the Soviets, in the form of a
Soviet blockade that stopped all transport to and from Berlin through Soviet-occupied East
Germany. The West responded with an unprecedented airlift to provision the city by air, called
Operation VITTLES, in which the United States deployed all available transport aircraft.
The USN moved a carrier battle group (I was unable to determine which) to the North Atlantic in
reaction to the crisis. The contribution of the Navy to the airlift was both direct and indirect.
From the beginning the Navy provided airlifts and fuel in support of the Air Force. But only in
late October 1948, when the U.S. Air Force needed support in order to meet the demand, did the
U.S. Navy become directly involved. Negotiations between the Soviet Union and the Western
powers extended over several months until the Soviets finally agreed to end the blockade under
the condition that the United States, United Kingdom, and France lift their trade restrictions
against East Germany. The last day of the blockade was 12 May 1949. The end of the crisis left
Germany split into two states—the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic
Republic.
Additional Sources: United States Navy 1998
9
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Dataset
ICB
CNA I

Berlin Blockade
Security of Berlin
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Dates
6/24/1948–5/12/1949, 323
4/26/1948, 401

U.S. Response
Ships involved
4
USN,
USMC, 1 CV & Amp
USAF,
USARMY

6. # 125 China Civil War; 9/23/1948 – 12/8/1949, 4421
On 23 September 1948 the Chinese Communists inflicted a major defeat on the Nationalists, an
event which triggered a crisis within the United States who feared for their loss of influence over
China. By fall 1948 the northeast of China had fallen into Communist hands and in the following
month the Communist forces took control over the Chinese mainland. The Nationalists fled to
Taiwan. When in late October 1948 the United States decided not to provide the Nationalists
with military aid, the crisis ended for them. On 1 October 1949, the Chinese Communists
announced the creation of the People’s Republic of China (PCR), followed by the proclamation
by the Nationalists of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan on 8 December 1949. This action
implied an unofficial acceptance of the PCR and ended the crisis. The subsequent Taiwan crises
are a direct consequence of these events (#146, #166, and #192).
U.S. Marines were the first U.S. forces to arrive in the theater. As early as 1945 several thousand
Marines were dispatched to Vietnam. During the entire Civil War, Marines supported the
Nationalists with different force levels (Buhite 1978) and since 1946, USN forces maneuvered in
the waters around China. In early November 1948, the U.S. cruisers Helena (CA 75) and St. Paul
(CA 73) reached the port of Shanghai. USS Helena arrived from Californian waters where she
had held training sessions. Throughout the summer and fall of 1948, she operated in the Yellow,
East China, and South China Seas, before returning to Long Beach in December 1948. On 25
April 1949 the U.S. Pacific Fleet announced that the American cruiser St. Paul and Manchester
would proceed to Chinese waters from Pearl Harbor. According to CNA I, the cruiser USS
Belfast (PF 35) was ordered from Shanghai to Hong Kong and the cruiser USS Jamaica2 to the
Far East from Bermuda. Multiple carriers operated in and around Chinese waters at different
times. It was not possible to obtain exact information about the number and names of the
1

This crisis coding is a little problematic since it was not possible to definitely determine the U.S. military activity
during the ICB crisis period. However the U.S. involvement during the entire Civil War suggests a positive coding.
2
ship history says Jamaica was sold 1946
10
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involved carriers. For example the aircraft carrier USS Antietam (CV 36) arrived in Chinese
waters on 2 September 1945 and remained in the Far East for more than three years. The Yellow
Sea constituted her primary theater of operations while her air group provided support for the
Allied occupation of North China, Manchuria, and Korea. Surveillance operations were part of
the mission’s tasks. During the assignment the CV did leave the theater for short visits to Japan,
the Philippines, Okinawa, and the Marianas. Early in 1949, USS Antietam concluded her mission
in the Orient and headed back to the United States for deactivation.
Additional Sources: Buhite 1978; Keesing’s
Dataset
ICB

China Civil War

CNA I

China Civil War

Dates
9/23/1948
12/8/1949, 442
April 46, 1038

U.S. Response
– 2

Ships involved

USN, USMC, USAF, ? CV & Amp
USARMY

7. # 131 Soviet Bloc – Yugoslavia; 8/19/1949 – 11/99/1951, 89
Tensions in the Balkans rose with the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform3 in the
summer of 1948. The crisis was triggered by a Soviet ultimatum. Yugoslavia feared USSR
intervention and reacted with a military build-up. In March 1951, Tito filed a complaint with the
UN that Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union were mobilizing troops along
Yugoslavia's border. The UN in turn acknowledged Yugoslavia’s pursuit of a peaceful resolution
of the dispute. The United States supported Yugoslavia with economic aid and in mid-March, a
reinforced Marine Corps battalion arrived in the area. Later in March the relief force for the
Sixth Fleet arrived about 6 weeks ahead of schedule due to the tense situation in Yugoslavia. The
aircraft carrier USS Coral Sea (CV 43) arrived in the Mediterranean on 20 March 1951. At the
end of May, the Fleet was augmented with another aircraft carrier4. The crisis faded in
November 1951.

3

The abbreviation stands for Information Bureau of the Communists and Worker Parties. It was the first official
forum of the international communist movement. The intended purpose of Cominform was to coordinate actions
between Communist parties under Soviet direction.
4
After the end of the crisis - according to the ICB - the Yugoslavian Prime Minister Tito was welcomed aboard the
Coral Sea for a one-day cruise. This visit in September 1952 demonstrated the U.S. support of Yugoslavia.
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Dataset
ICB
CNA I

Soviet Bloc–Yugoslavia
Security of Yugoslavia
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Dates
8/19/1949–11/99/1951, 89
3/15/1951, 869

U.S. Response
2
USN, USMC

Ships involved
2 CV & Amp

8. #132 Korean War I; 6/25/1950 – 9/30/1950
On 25 June 1950 North Korean forces crossed the 38th Parallel, serving as the border between
North and South Korea since the end of World War II, triggering a crisis for both South Korea
and the United States. Two days later the President of the United States announced military
support for the South and ordered the Seventh Fleet to install a blockade in the Taiwan Strait in
reaction to the tense situation. This action triggered a crisis for the two Chinas. While the crisis
between the PRC and the U.S. faded in July 1950, USN forces were sent to the Taiwan Straits
on multiple occasions during the Korean War to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the
Nationalists and prevent a PRC invasion of Taiwan. According to Siegel aircraft from the USS
Valley Forge (CV 45) flew over Taipei early in the war und in April 1951 a task force (TF 77)
was sent to the Taiwan Straits. While this episode does not mark the first Taiwan Straits crisis it
is a prelude to the events of later coming years. Only the naval reaction to the Formosa Straits is
included in the analysis. All other reactions to the Korean War are excluded.
Dataset
ICB
CNA I

Dates
Korean War
6/25/1950 – 9/30/1950
Korean
War, 6/27/1950, 951
Formosa Straits

U.S. Response
4
USN

Ships involved
1 CV & NO
Amp

9. # 144 Guatemala; 12/12/1953 – 6/29/1954, 200
When in late 1953 Guatemala learned of American support for an antigovernment “liberation”
movement, it requested military supplies from the Soviet Union. On the day the Soviet arms
shipment arrived, the United States began an air-sea patrol mission in the Gulf of Honduras to
protect Honduras from an invasion by its neighbor and to control shipments to Guatemala. Talks
between the parties and the United States were not successful. On 3 June 1954, the United States
airlifted arms to Honduras and antigovernment forces in Guatemala, and on 7 June, a
“contingency evacuation” force was deployed. This operation, code-named HARDROCK
BAKER, was used to implement a comprehensive sea blockade of Guatemala. It included
12
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submarines and amphibious ships carrying a Marine battalion landing team. With this aggressive
configuration of naval forces the United States built up psychological pressure on Guatemala,
underscoring the weakness of Guatemala’s position and opening up the option for intervention.
On 29 June 1954, with the resignation of Guatemala’s president and the accession of an
anticommunist government, the crisis ended.
Additional Sources: Astor 2006: 50; Hippler 1984, Solantamity
Dataset
ICB
CNA I

Guatemala
Honduras-Guatemala

Dates
12/12/1953–6/29/1954, 200
5/20/54, 14

U.S. Response
3
USN, USMC

Ships involved
1 CV & Amp

10. # 145 Dien Bien Phu; 3/13/1954 – 7/21/1954, 131
In spring 1954, tensions between the French military and the Viet Minh peaked when they
launched their first major assault on the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu (13 March 1954). On
19 March, USN forces in the region, including the carriers USS Wasp (CV 18) and USS Essex
(CV 9) were put on alert. Responding to pleas from the French, who were fighting in the
mountains of Tonkin, the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower deployed an aircraft
carrier task force and supporting units to the South China Sea. On 22 March the carrier task
group steamed towards the coast of Indochina. At various times the USS Wasp, the USS Essex,
the USS Boxer (CV 21) (replaced USS Wasp), and the USS Philippine Sea (CV 47) steamed off
the Indochinese Peninsula prepared to launch their aircraft against Communist forces besieging
the French base. Awaiting a possible order from Washington to enter the conflict, the USN
dispatched carrier reconnaissance planes to fly over the area around Dien Bien Phu. The aircraft
gathered intelligence on Viet Minh troop movements and logistic buildup. The Seventh Fleet
recommended Operation VULTURE to rescue the French forces, but President Eisenhower
decided against unilateral action and the idea was rejected. When Dien Bien Phu fell on 7 May
and a formal cease-fire began, the crisis ended for the U.S. Two months later, the signing of a
final declaration ended the crisis for all actors.
Additional Sources: Marolda 1994, Solantamity
Dataset

Dates

U.S. Response
13

Ships involved
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CNA I

Dien Bien Phu
Dien Bien Phu
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3/13/1954–7/21/1954, 131
3/13/1954, 90

2
USN

2 CV & NO Amp

11. # 146 Taiwan Strait I; 8/66/1954 – 4/23/1955, 266
In the summer of 1954, tensions increased over the Tachen islands in the Formosa Straits. The
crisis centered on the Quemoy, Matsu, and Tachen island groups, held by Chiang Kai-shek’s
Nationalists. The Chinese Communists planned to overwhelm the Chinese Nationalists,
beginning with a bombardment of Quemoy Island, followed by an invasion of Taiwan. On 12
September the U.S. decided to send the Seventh Fleet to the area with the orders to protect
Taiwan against any attacks from the Chinese mainland. Since the United States did consider the
Tachen Islands vital for the defense of Taiwan, American officials acceded to an evacuation after
a sudden buildup of Communist Chinese on the island group. Over one week in early February,
the USN evacuated 15,000 civilians and 11,000 military5 personnel form the Tachen Islands
without opposition.
Multiple USN ships supported the evacuation operation. From November 1954 to June 1955 the
USS Essex (CV 9) engaged in training exercises for part of the time with the 7th Fleet and
assisted in the Tachen Islands evacuation. The USS Wasp (CV 18) provided air cover for the
evacuation mission. While operating with the Seventh Fleet, the carrier USS Kearsarge (CV 33)
was in an alert position to assist in the evacuation of Nationalist Chinese from the Tachen
Islands. In January of 1955 the USS Yorktown (CV 10) was called upon to help the operation. In
December 1954, the USS Midway (CV 41) departed Norfolk on a world cruise, which culminated
in her transfer to the Pacific Fleet and joining of the Seventh Fleet off Taiwan in February 1955.
Not long after her arrival the carrier participated in the evacuation operation. She remained in the
area patrolling the Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea until June. When Mao realized that the
United States was placing great military emphasis on the area, he halted the shelling and
suspended the campaign against Taiwan until all U.S. ships and aircraft had departed. In this
instance the U.S. military deterrence was successful, the attack was delayed. Although the U.S.
was determined to support Taiwan, Mao had drawn the conclusion that the United States would
not interfere in an operation against the Tachen Islands because the Mutual Defense Treaty
5

Numbers vary from report to report
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between the U.S. and the Republic of China only covered Taiwan and the Pescadores. This
misinterpretation clearly demonstrates the importance of the opponent’s perception in deterrence
operations (Siegel 1995, 9). According to the ICB, the crisis for Taiwan ended with the
fortification of Quemoy and Matsu, supported by the United States. President Eisenhower
deemed the survival of the two islands very important and feared their loss to be a first step to
the loss of Taiwan, and a demoralization for the Nationalists. The crisis between China and the
United States wound down when during the Bandung Conference on 23 April the Chinese
Communists announced their willingness to begin negotiations. By then end of the month an
unofficial cease-fire for the Formosa Straits was in place.
Additional Source: Baer 1994, Keesing’s, Marolda 2000, Rushkoff 1981, Siegel 1995

Dataset
ICB

Taiwan Strait I

Dates
8/66/1954 – 4/23/1955, 266

U.S. Response
3

CNA I

Tachen Island

2/8/1955, 6

CNA II

Tachen Island

2/1955

USN,
USAF

Ships involved

USMC, 6 CV’s & Amp
6 CV’s & Amp

12. # 152 Suez Nationalization War; 7/26/1956 – 3/12/1957, 230
The international Suez crisis was triggered by the invasion of Egypt by Israel, Britain, and
France. Nasser, the president of Egypt, announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal, as a
symbol of rising Egyptian influence in the Middle East. Britain and France viewed the
nationalization of the Suez as a challenge to their authority and as a threat to shipping through
the canal. Their invasion, following a provocation by Israel was supposedly intended to separate
these two warring parties. Eisenhower strongly rejected the unilateral actions of his European
allies. In February 1956 CNA I describes the formation of USN destroyer patrols in the Red Sea
in reaction to the growing tension in the region. The events around the Suez Nationalization War
are divided into three different phases and cases: Pre-Suez, Suez War, and Post-Suez. In reaction
to the nationalization of the Suez Canal, the two aircraft carriers USS Coral Sea (CV 43) and USS
Randolph (CV 15) and an amphibious force group were moved to the Eastern Mediterranean.
When tensions seemed to cool off in mid-September the force was dispersed. The United States
15
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was monitoring the situation via U-2 reconnaissance flights out of Turkey in what Kalley (2001)
calls a preemptive move. Following the Israeli attack in October which triggered the war, major
portions of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, including three aircraft carriers were moved to the Eastern
Mediterranean again. In October 1956 the Sixth Fleet landed Marines at Alexandria and other
points in the Middle East to protect the evacuation of 2,000 Americans and other foreign
nationals. After receiving reports that the USSR was funneling ships through the Black Sea to the
Mediterranean, the CNO ordered a three-carrier task force to sail from the U.S. to the Western
Pacific and a two-carrier task force to sail to the vicinity of the Azores. Surveillance in the
eastern Mediterranean was intensified. On 13 December the alert status was lifted. The USS
Coral Sea evacuated American citizens from the troubled area, and stood by off Egypt until
November before returning to Norfolk in February 1957. In response to the October 1956 attack,
the USS Randolph was operating near the Suez Canal. Aircraft aboard Randolph provided air
cover and surface and air reconnaissance for the evacuation of U.S. nationals from Alexandria.
The carriers USS Forrestal (CV 59), USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVA-42) (Lake Champlain
(CVA-39) later replaced USS Franklin D. Roosevelt), and USS Antietam (CV 36) and additional
ships were involved. The carriers conducted air operations while maintaining readiness to enter
the Mediterranean should their services be needed. The United States’ naval involvement
signaled U.S. interest in the region and the resolve to defend victims of aggression. On 5
November, both Britain and France agreed to a cease-fire and declared their intention to
withdrawal from the Canal Zone. 12 March 1957 marked the final end of the episode with the
completion of the Israeli withdrawal.
Additional Sources: Cable 1981, Kalley 2001, 34 – 35
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA I
CNA I

Suez
Nationalization
War
Red Sea Patrols
Pre Suez
Suez War

CNA I
CNA II

Post-Suez
Red Sea

Dates
7/26/1956 – 3/12/1957, 230

U.S. Response
2

Ships involved

2/6/1956, 138
8/1956, 69
10/4/1956, 8

USN
USN, USMC
USN,
USMC,
USAF
USN, USMC

0 CV & no Amp
2 CV & Amp
3 CV & Amp

11/6/1956, 38
2 – 8/ 1955
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13. # 157 Jordan Regime; 4/4/1957 – 5/3/1957
On 4 April 1957, Jordanian army officers and Palestinians sympathetic to Nasser attempted to
overthrow King Hussein of Jordan but failed. The King feared Egyptian and Syrian involvement
in the coup attempt and reacted by laying off the entire leftist cabinet triggering demonstrations
and riots. The United States expressed support for the king by providing economic aid and
deploying units of the Sixth Fleet, including the aircraft carriers USS Forrestal (CV 59), USS
Lake Champlain (CV 39), and heavy cruisers USS Salem (CA 139) and USS Des Moines (CA
134) to the Eastern Mediterranean. USN ships with 1,800 Marines on board anchored off Beirut
on 20 April to stand ready for a possible intervention in Jordan, while 30 ships of the Sixth Fleet
described as the "most formidable naval striking force ever assembled in the Eastern
Mediterranean", carried out air defense maneuvers in the open sea. Their task was to ensure that
the Jordanians maintain their independence and withstand the threat of Communism. “Once
again” explained VADM Brown, “we find ourselves dropping everything and rushing to the
scene of the fire”. It can be said that “the swift and firm reaction averted a near catastrophe in the
Middle East” (cited in Evans 2007). Marines stood by in Amman in case their support was
needed for the evacuation of Americans. Amphibious forces off the Lebanese coast were put on a
state of alert. Only the easing of tensions due to diplomatic efforts backed up by naval forces led
to a normalization of the force status. The departure of the USN on 3 May signaled the end of the
crisis.
Additional Sources: Cable 1981, Hahn 2005, Keesing’s, USS Forestall Ship History (Evans
2007)
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA II

Jordan Regime
Jordan Unrest
Jordan

Dates
4/4/1957 – 5/3/1957
4/25/1957, 9
4-5/1957

U.S. Response
3
USN, USMC

Ships involved
2 CVS & Amp
2 CVS & Amp

14. # 159 Syria-Turkey Confrontation; 8/18/1957 – 19/29/1957, 73
The election of a pro-Soviet Chief of Staff of the Syrian armed forces triggered a crisis for
Turkey and the United States. Turkey held meetings with its nearby neighbors Iraq, Jordan,
Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia and deployed troops along its Syrian borders. The United States,
worrying that the Soviet Union could significantly expand their influence, emphasized the
17
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Eisenhower Doctrine again, confirming that the U.S. will render assistance to any country in the
Middle East if subject to communist threat. The Soviets and Syria accused Turkey several times
of planning an attack on Syria. Major portions of the Sixth Fleet were moved to the Eastern
Mediterranean, and aircraft were redeployed from Western Europe to Adana, Turkey - another
sign of U.S. support. One aircraft carrier involved was the USS Randolph (CV 15)6 which was
deployed off the Syrian coast and patrolling the Eastern Mediterranean. The crisis came to an
end when the Soviet Premier Khrushchev made an appearance at the Turkish Embassy in the
Soviet Union. The ICB describes the U.S. involvement as mainly political-diplomatic, supported
by speeches reaffirming commitments to Turkey. However the presence of four aircraft carriers
suggests a larger U.S. involvement.

Dataset
ICB
CNA I

Dates
Syria – Turkey 8/18/1957 – 10/29/1957, 73
Confrontation
Syria
8/21/1957, 118

CNA

Syria

8-12/1957

U.S. Response
3
USN,
USAF

Ships involved

USMC, 4 CV’s & Amp
4 CV’s & Amp

15. # 164 Abortive Coup Indonesia; 2/21/1958 – 5/20/1958
Indonesia’s denunciation of foreign influence and the popularity of the Indonesian Communist
Party had been of concern to the West for some time. The rebel headquarters was located in the
southern coastal city of Padang. Rebel strongholds stretched all the way to Medan, near the
Northern end of the island and not far from Malaysia. The crisis was triggered by the accusation
that the Indonesian rebels were instruments of the West and the military reaction by President
Sukarno to defeat the rebels. The U.S. and Britain covertly supported this rebellion in its early
phase, ideally wanting to see Sukarno overthrown. The deployment of the Seventh Fleet off the
shore of Indonesia had a marked impact, and the Indonesian government sought to minimize any
further U.S. involvement. Moreover, the U.S. remained reluctant to become officially involved
and publicly declared this matter a strictly internal Indonesian affair. Many sources point to U.S.
support of the rebels before the crisis broke out, but when their defeat seemed imminent, the U.S.
6

I was not able to identify the names of the other aircraft carriers
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government tried to improve relations with the Indonesian government. Over the next several
weeks the two states slowly resumed talks and the crisis terminated. In early March the United
States had deployed USMC forces, one aircraft carrier, two destroyers and one heavy cruiser in
the proximity of Indonesia. A contingency evacuation force operated north of Sumatra for most
of this period. According to Brichoux and Gerner (2002) then CNO Admiral Burke sent the
Chief of Naval Intelligence Admiral Frost to Jakarta where he worked closely with the U.S.
ambassador and the Indonesian naval chiefs. The official declaration on 20 May stating no U.S.
involvement in this internal affair triggered the abatement of the crisis.
Additional Sources: Brichoux & Gerner 2002; 6; Curtis 2004; Fletcher Prouty 1976
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA II

Abortive
Indonesia
Indonesia
Indonesia

Dates
Coup 2/21/1958 – 5/20/1958

U.S. Response
3

Ships involved

12/10/57, 174
12/1957-6/1958

USN, USMC

2 CV & Amp
2 CV & Amp

16. # 165: Iraq-Lebanon Upheaval; 5/8/1958 – 10/88/1958
In May 1958 Lebanon experienced a crisis when riots among political and religious factions
threatened the government. The President of Lebanon requested U.S. help to control the
situation. In July 1958 the Iraqi army staged a coup against the Hashemite government in
Baghdad. While first hesitant, the revolt in Baghdad led President Eisenhower to approve
Operation BLUE BAT. The U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and Army were all involved.
Marines landed on Lebanese shores to restore order in Beirut, to stabilize the country and to
protect the American citizens in the country. The deployed U.S. naval forces totaled 70 vessels,
including the three aircraft carriers USS Saratoga (CV 60), Wasp (CV 18) and Essex (CV 9) (as
well as heavy cruiser USS Des Moines (CA 134), guided missile heavy cruise Boston (CV 69),
and 28 destroyers. The entire Sixth Fleet supported the operation especially through the landing
of the Marines. Their tasks included patrol missions, reconnaissance missions and transportation
of Marines who needed to be evacuated by carrier aviation. This incident clearly demonstrated
the Sixth Fleet’s dominance over the Mediterranean. Soviet naval forces in the proximity were
neither capable of challenging U.S. influence in this crisis nor their control over the
Mediterranean. While the Navy played an important immediate role, U.S. Air Force units and
19
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U.S. Army units were both unable to react promptly. The Navy was ready off the coast of
Lebanon thirteen hours after the order was received, whereas it took the Air Force five days to
advance from its base in Turkey.
Additional Sources: Baer 1994, 363; Berkeley University; Hahn 2005, 43; Keesing’s
Dataset
ICB

Dates
5/8/1958 – 10/88/1958

U.S. Response
4

CNA I
CNA I

Name
Iraq-Lebanon
Upheaval
Lebanon
Lebanon

Ships involved

5/15/1958, 48
July 1958, 93

CNA I
CNA II
CNA II
CNA II

Jordan-Iraq
Lebanon
Lebanon
Jordan-Iraq

7/17/1958, 138
5/1958
6-10/1958
7-12/1958

USN, USMC
3 CVS & Amp
USN,
USMC, 3 CVS & Amp
USAF, USARMY
USN
0 CV & NO Amp
3 CVS & Amp
3 CVS & Amp
0 CV & NO Amp

17. # 166: Taiwan Strait II; 7/17/1958 – 10/23/1958, 99
In the second Taiwan crisis the Chinese Communists attacked the islands Quemoy and Matsu by
air. The United States deployed an impressive naval flotilla in response. The Chinese
Communists tried to cut the islands off from outside supplies and support. A reinforced Seventh
Fleet with a total of six aircraft carriers, a Marine Amphibious Ready Group and additional three
USMC fighter squadrons that had moved from Japan to Taiwan, made up the naval force heading
toward Chinese waters. China reacted by claiming extension of its territorial water line,
effectively blocking off any access to Quemoy and Matsu. The New York Times called the USN
and USAF deployment "the most powerful air-naval fighting force in history” (cited in the USS
Essex ship history). Aircraft carriers involved included the USS Essex (CV 9), the USS Lexington
(CV 16), the USS Hancock (CV 19), the USS Yorktown (CV 10) and the USS Bennington (CV
20). The USS Yorktown and the USS Bennington earned the expeditionary medal for participation
in an American show of strength in the Taiwan Strait. The carriers escorted Chinese Nationalist
ships resupplying the islands. The U.S. involvement also included diplomatic efforts to resolve
the crisis. This clear demonstration of U.S. commitment together with no signs of involvement
by the Soviet Union led to the abatement of the crisis and no further escalations.
Additional Sources: Halperin 1966; Marolda 2000
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Dataset
ICB
CNA I

Taiwan Strait II
Quemoy

Dates
7/17/1958 – 10/23/1958, 99
Aug 58, 1967

CNA II

Quemoy

6-12/1958

U.S. Response
Ships involved
3
USN,
USMC, 6 CVS & Amp
USAF
6 CVS & Amp

18. # 168: Berlin Deadline; 11/27/1958 – 9/15/1959, 293
On 27 November 1958 the Soviet Premier Khrushchev demanded in an ultimatum the
withdrawal of the United States, Great Britain and France from Berlin and a transformation into
a free, demilitarized city within six month. The Western Powers rejected the ultimatum and
declared their determination to stay in West Berlin. As a reaction to the ultimatum the U.S.
began to reinforce its combat and support units in Europe and U.S. transport planes prepared for
an airlift. U.S. aircraft carriers7 with nuclear weapons aboard were redeployed to the
Mediterranean and Marines alerted for a possible deployment to Berlin. For the months May
through September naval forces worldwide were on general alert. A carrier force deployed to the
Mediterranean was put on high alert and demonstrated readiness. In 1959 the Soviet Union
agreed to annul the ultimatum and to meet with the Western powers. Although the talks did not
result in an agreement they did open the door for further dialogue. Only in early August did the
powers sign an interim agreement after President Eisenhower paid Khrushchev a visit in
Moscow on 3 August 1959. When the Soviet returned the visit, a formal agreement was signed
on 15 September, terminating the crisis for all the participants. The parties had agreed on a ban
of nuclear weapons and missiles from Berlin and the reduction of local Western military forces.
Additional Sources: Solantamity
Dataset
ICB
CNA I

Berlin Deadline
Berlin Crisis

Dates
11/27/1958 – 9/15/1959, 293
May 1959, 145

CNA II

Berlin Crisis

5 – 9/ 1959

7

I could not determine which aircraft carriers were dispatched.
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2
USN,
USMC, 2 CVs & Amp
USAF, USARMY
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19. # 170: Central America – Cuba I; 4/25/1959 – 12/88/1959, 251
Panama, Nicaragua, Costa Rico, and Haiti experienced crises because of invasions by Cuban
supported rebels. The crisis for the first actor, Panama, was triggered by the landing of a boat
carrying foreign invaders. A complaint to the OAS led to the supply of arms and the
authorization of naval and aerial patrols off the Panama coast. The Cuban-backed invaders
surrendered. With the termination of the patrols the Panama crisis ended.
On 1 June a small number of Nicaraguan exiles based in Costa Rica marched into Nicaragua.
Again the OAS conferred and decided on a fact-finding mission. Although Nicaragua did not
feel threatened by Costa Rica, which declared its neutrality, it accused Castro of being involved
in supporting the exiles. A brief military action by Nicaraguan forces ended the rebellion and the
crisis ended.
After the Nicaraguan crisis, the Dominican Republic experienced a crisis, triggered by a small
invasion backed by Cuba. The invasion was repelled and the crisis terminated towards the end of
the year after months of high tensions.
Haiti was the last country to be invaded during these years of high internal instability. Again the
invaders suspected of Cuban origin, surrendered.
The United States sent a small naval surveillance patrol force to Caribbean waters, off the coast
of Panama, in the early phase of the crisis, to deter further landings.
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA I
CNA II

Dates
Central America – 4/25/1959 – 12/88/1959, 251
Cuba I
Panama
4/30/59, 5
Panama
Aug 59, 93
Panama
3-5/1959

U.S. Response
3

Ships involved

USN
USN

0 CVs & NO Amp
0 CVs & NO Amp

20. # 176: Congo I – Katanga; 7/5/1960 – 2/15/1962
Congo won its independence from Belgium on 30 June 1960. When on 5 July 1960 Congolese
soldiers mutinied and assaulted Belgium and European nationals in Congo, Belgium sent
military forces reinforcements. Congo reacted with appeals to the United States and the UN. U.S.
help was not forthcoming, although the UN decided to dispatch military forces and called for the
22
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withdrawal of Belgian troops. In mid-July 1960 the aircraft carrier USS Wasp (CV 18) with
Marines aboard was deployed to the Congo in reaction to the civil strife and to support the
evacuation of Western nationals. For the rest of the year USN ships (the carrier Wasp returned to
the United States) supported U.N. forces in Congo and provided sealift assistance. In early
February 1961 two amphibious ships and two destroyers supported the lift of U.N. forces into the
Congo. But this did not end the internal division raging in the country and the crisis continued.
Only with the ratification of a cease-fire agreement and the termination of the secession attempts
of the Katanga province on 15 February 1962 did the crisis terminate.
Additional Sources: Cable 1981
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA I
CNA II
CNA II

Congo I - Katanga
Congo

Dates
7/5/1960 – 2/15/1962
7/1/60, 124

Gulf of Guinea- 2/2/61
Congo
Congo
7-11/1960
Gulf
of 2-3/1961
Guinea/Congo

U.S. Response
Ships involved
2
USN,
USMC, 1 CV's & Amp
USAF, USARMY
USN, USMC
0 CV's & NO amp
1 CV & Amp
0 CV & Amp

21. # 178: Central America – Cuba II; 11/9/1960 – 12/7/1960, 29
Trouble in Nicaragua and Guatemala in early November 1960 led to the deployment of U.S.
naval forces. Cuba was suspected of supporting an invasion of Nicaragua by exiles and a revolt
in Guatemala. In response to requests by both countries, the United States deployed naval and air
surveillance. The U.S. Navy was sent to patrol the nations’ Caribbean coasts and to stand by in
case of a possible invasion from mid-November until 7 December 1960. Two aircraft carriers,
USS Shangri-La (CV 38) and Wasp (CV 18), as well as eight other surface ships, formed the
naval patrol force. They kept outside the three-mile limit and watched for suspicious vessels
heading for the two countries. The naval forces were withdrawn after confirmation from
Nicaragua and Guatemala that help was no longer needed and that the crisis had ended for both
actors.
Additional Sources: Cable 1981
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Dates
Central America – 11/9/1960 – 12/7/1960, 29
Cuba II
Guatemala
11/14/1960, 272
Guatemala11-12/1960
Nicaragua

U.S. Response
3

Ships involved

USN

2 CVs & NO Amp
2 CVs & NO Amp

22. # 180: Pathet Laos Offensive; 3/9/1961 – 5/16/1961, 69
Fighting between Pathet Laos and Laotian government troops lead to a retreat of the latter,
threatening the accession of communist and neutralist troops. This triggered a crisis for the U.S.
on 9 March 1961. In reaction to the deteriorating situation in Laos, ships from the Seventh Fleet,
including the aircraft carriers USS Lexington (CV 16), USS Coral Sea (CV 34), USS Bennington
(CV 20) and amphibious forces were ordered to deploy to the South China in January 1961. The
naval forces were assigned to act as a deterrent force to prevent further attacks by Communist
guerillas and to demonstrate U.S. support for the Laotian government. USN aircraft also
conducted reconnaissance missions over Laos. In spring 1961 the situation deteriorated further
and almost the entire Seventh Fleet was moved into the area. The three carriers, Coral Sea (CV
43), Midway (CV 41) and Kearsarge (CV 33), one helicopter carrier, three groups of amphibious
ships, two submarines, and three Marine battalion landing teams formed the U.S. force. In
addition forces were put on alert in Okinawa and in the Philippines. Despite Kennedy’s decision
not to launch a military offensive, the Chinese Communists ended the intervention and declared
their willingness to negotiate. A cease fire was agreed upon on 8 May 1961
(CNA I listed the deployment in January as well, but since the ICB crisis only starts in March,
only the second CNA I crisis coding is listed although the previous one is described above as
prelude to the spring crisis).
Additional Source: George 1991, Marolda 1994
Dataset
ICB
CNA I

Pathet
Offensive
Laos

CNA II

Laos

Dates
Laos 3/9/1961 – 5/16/1961, 69
3/21/61, 34

U.S. Response
3

Ships involved

USN,
USMC, 3 CV's & Amp
USAF, USARMY
3 CV's & Amp

3-6/1961
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23. # 181: Bay of Pigs, 4/15/1961 – 4/24/1961, 24
Naval, Marines and Air Force personnel supported the invasion of Cuba by exiles. On 15 April
1961 the invaders, flying U.S. aircraft, bombed locations in Cuba. On the same day, Cuba
accused the United States of complicity during a UN General Assembly meeting. Two days later
Cuba announced a state of national alert, ordering Cubans to fight the exiles. On the 18, the day
of the invasion, escort ships and naval frogmen provided by the USN attempted to land on the
beaches to facilitate the invasion. According to Astor however, reefs hindered the landing of the
ships. A carrier task force and at least one Marine battalion team stood by during the invasion
attempt. The forces aimed to hide any sign of U.S. involvement and the destroyers were ordered
not to move closer than 20 miles to Cuban territory and not to open fire unless fired upon first.
Local militias detected the invaders immediately. USN units remained in the vicinity as the U.S.
attempted to ensure that the captured exiles were not abused by the Cuban government and tried
to negotiate terms for their release. Air cover was received from the USS Essex (CV 9) to
intimidate Cuban government forces without directly engaging in acts of war and not to seek air
combat nor attack ground targets. A note from the USSR to the U.S. on 18 April warned of a
possible chain reaction to all parts of the globe arising from the invasion and reasserted Soviet
support for Cuba in repelling the attack. The U.S. responded through President Kennedy's
answer to the Soviets: Kennedy emphasized that the U.S. "intends no military intervention" in
Cuba, but would act to protect the hemisphere in case of military intervention by an outside
force. Late on 19 April, the destroyers USS Eaton (code-named Santiago) and USS Murray
(code-named Tampico) moved into Cochinos Bay to evacuate the remaining retreating invaders.
From 19 April until about 22 April, sorties and reconnaissance flights were flown to obtain
visual intelligence over combat areas. It is reported that the USS Shangri-La (CV 38) was part of
the task force stationed off the Cayman Islands.
The crisis ended for Cuba already on 19 April when it defeated the invaders who were unable to
escape to the mountains. It ended for the U.S. on the 24 when - reversing earlier disclaimers of
U.S. involvement - the White House issued a statement by Kennedy assuming direct
responsibility for the events leading to the Bay of Pigs fiasco.
Additional Sources: Astor 2006, 67 – 68; National Security Archives 2001
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Dataset
ICB
CNA I

Bay of Pigs
Bay of Pigs

Dates
4/15/1961 – 4/24/1961, 24
Apr 1961, 62

CNA II

Bay of Pigs

4-6/1961

U.S. Response
Ships involved
3
USN,
USMC, 2 CV's & Amp
USAF
2 CV's & Amp

24. # 185: Berlin Wall; 8/66/1961 – 10/28/1961, 89
Before the outbreak of the crisis the Soviet Union had threatened to sign a separate peace treaty
with East Germany if by the end of 1961 no German peace treaty was agreed upon. Following a
period of increased flows of refugees from East Germany into West Germany, the Soviet Union
encouraged East Germany to build a wall along the border of the two sectors of Berlin. This
triggered a crisis for France, the U.K., the U.S. and Western Europe. In response, the U.S. sent
reinforcements to the Berlin brigade. A rapid build-up of forward deployed forces started. Prior
to this, in response to the mounting Soviet pressure, USN forces were augmented with more than
30 ships and naval reserve personnel. The Sixth Fleet8 was put on alert and its strength was
increased by one aircraft carrier. An aircraft carrier group was moved to the Northeast Atlantic.
According to Blechman and Kaplan (1978), U.S. force demonstration deterred the Soviet Union
from carrying out various threats previously announced, such as the signing of a unilateral peace
treaty. For France, the U.K. and West Germany the crisis ended with the withdrawal of the
Soviet deadline. The crisis for the two superpowers ended only later with a tacit agreement on 28
October.
Additional Sources: Blechman and Kaplan 1978, 71; Friedman 1983, 24
Dataset
ICB
CNA I

Berlin Wall
Berlin Crisis

Dates
8/66/1961 – 10/28/1961, 89
July 1961, 102

CNA II

Berlin Crisis

8/1961 - 5/1962

8

U.S. Response
Ships involved
4
USN,
USMC, 3 CV's & Amp
USAF, USARMY
3 CV’s

I was not able to confirm the names of the involved aircraft carriers, The USS Independence, Shangri-La and
Saratoga were all deployed to the Mediterranean at around this time.
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25. # 193: Nam Tha; 5/6/1962 – 6/12/1962, 38
In May 1962 an attack by the Laotian communist insurgent group known as the Pathet Lao on
the Laotian town of Nam Tha triggered a crisis for the United States and neighboring Thailand.
The Laotian government forces did not engage and instead retreated. Thailand, fearing a Pathet
Lao advance, strengthened its border with Laos. The United States sent the Seventh Fleet to the
Gulf of Thailand on standby status and deployed Marine forces already in Thailand for exercises
to bolster that nation’s defenses against Laotian communists should a request be received from
Thailand. All U.S. forces in the Pacific and at home were put on alert. The aircraft carrier Valley
Forge (CV 45) assisted in the Marine landing in the Gulf of Bangkok, and the Hancock (CV 19)
group took position off Da Nang, South Vietnam. The deployment of the Seventh Fleet halted
the Pathet Lao initiative and, together with political pressure, brought the parties into
negotiations. The crisis ended with tacit understandings between Thailand and the United States,
as well as between Thailand and North Vietnam, manifested on 12 June 1962 when three Laotian
princes agreed to participate in a coalition government. The United States had deployed naval
forces to demonstrate its opposition to events in Laos in what Edward Marolda (1994) considers
a show of force
Additional Sources: George 1991; Marolda 1994
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA II

Nam Tha
Thailand
Thailand

Dates
5/6/1962 – 6/12/1962, 38
5/10/1962, 90.
5-8/ 1962

U.S. Response
3
USN, USMC

Ships involved
2 CV's & Amp
2 CV's & Amp

26. # 194: China-India Border; 9/8/1962 – 1/23/1963, 138
The Sino-Indian border dispute had been ongoing but escalated in 1962. This crisis was triggered
by a Chinese troop movement that threatened India’s territorial integrity. India reacted by
planning the eviction of the Chinese troops. By 4 October India was ready to carry out the
operation, triggering a crisis for China. On 20 October China launched massive attacks in the
disputed border area. Later that day Indian Prime Minister Nehru made an urgent and open
appeal to the United States for armed intervention against the Chinese. He asked for bomber and
fighter squadrons to begin air strikes if PRC troops further advance into Indian territory. India
rejected the Chinese suggestion for mutual withdrawal and decided to react with military force.
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The U.S. offered military aid to India. A U.S. aircraft carrier 9 was dispatched from its base in the
Pacific to the Bay of Bengal, but returned before reaching Indian waters when the crisis suddenly
ended (21 November) with China’s declaration of a unilateral cease-fire and its planned
withdrawal. In January 1963 following mediation efforts and the completed Chinese withdrawal,
the crisis ended for India.
Dataset
ICB
CNA I

China-India
Border
Sino-Indian War

CNA II

Sino-Indian War

Dates
9/8/1962 – 1/23/1963, 138

U.S. Response
3

Ships involved

11/19/62, 2

USN

1 CV's & NO
Amp
1 CV

10-12/1962

27. # 195: Yemen War I, 9/26/1962 – 4/15/1963, 202
On 26 September a revolution brought to an end the Yemen monarchy triggering a crisis for
Jordan and Saudi Arabia which feared a spillover of anti-monarchy movements. In turn both
countries supplied the Yemeni Royalists with arms, which triggered a crisis for Egypt and the
YAR (Yemen Arab Republic). Egypt sent in troops and at the end of October a civil war erupted
between Royalist and Republican forces. The United States recognized the Republican
government on 19 December 1962, three month after the coup. The various participants
interpreted U.S. recognition as they saw fit, some accusing the United States of seeking to
protect its interests in Saudi Arabia, others viewing it as a response to potential communist
influence. The United States did send a warship to Jeddah but was firm in not granting military
aid to Yemen. Its intent was to reassure Saudi Arabia and demonstrate U.S. interest in the
stability of Saudi Arabia so as to deter Egyptian and Soviet involvement. “To that end, a US Air
Force squadron was dispatched to the Kingdom, the Saudi Air Force was augmented, and a small
over-the-horizon naval presence was maintained” (Prados 2005). The United States with help
from the United Nations achieved the signing of an agreement between Saudi Arabia and Egypt
on 10 April 1963. A few days later Jordan officially recognized the Yemen Arab Republic and
ended its involvement. The two Yemen agreed on a ceasefire ending this crisis in the first phase
of the Yemen War.

9

I was not able to identify the name of the aircraft carrier.
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Additional Sources: Youssef 2004; Prados 2005
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA II

Dates
Yemen War I
9/26/1962 – 4/15/1963, 202
No data
Yemen Civil War 1-7/1963
/ Saudi Arabia

U.S. Response
3

Ships involved

0 CV & NO Amp

28. # 196: Cuban Missiles; 10/16/1962 – 11/20/1962, 36
During the Cuban Missile crisis the two superpowers came as close as they ever would to a
nuclear war. In October 1962, U-2 reconnaissance planes operated by the CIA revealed the
construction of bases in Cuba, capable of launching Soviet nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.
Simultaneously with the gathering of additional information, naval forces in collaboration with
other U.S. forces were ordered to the Atlantic and Caribbean to prepare for eventual
contingencies. U.S. armed forces all around the world were put on an alerted status. The aircraft
carrier groups Enterprise (CV 65) and Independence (CV 62) were dispatched together with six
Polaris submarines based in Holy Loch, Scotland. Naval aerial reconnaissance units assisted in
the effort to collect information about the situation in Cuba. Footage from naval aircraft
confirmed the construction of a nuclear-armed redoubt. On 22 October, President Kennedy
shared U.S. intelligence with the world and announced the deployment of quarantine force,
including Task Force 135 and Task Force 136, to interdict Cuba-bound shipping. These naval
forces consisted of antisubmarine carriers, cruisers, and close to 30 destroyers and guided missile
frigates. In addition Navy shore-based patrol planes observed Soviet submarine movement and
merchant ships heading toward Cuba. To demonstrate the resolute resolve to blockade all ships
steaming towards Cuba the two destroyers USS John R. Pierce (DD-753) and USS Joseph P.
Kennedy (DD-850) stopped and searched the Marucla on 26 October. The Lebanese-flagged
vessel with Soviet goods aboard was heading for Cuba. Without military equipment aboard the
ship was allowed to continue. Many other Soviet ships turned around before reaching the
blockade line. The United States armed forces were visibly superior but were not aggressively
arrayed. This allowed the Soviet Premier Khrushchev to agree to withdraw Soviet offensive
weapons from Cuba without losing his face. In return the U.S. would not invade Cuba and would
remove its missiles from Turkey, a step already agreed on before the crisis. By the end of
November, U.S. naval forces confirmed the dismantling of Soviet missiles in Cuba and their
29

Seaborne Crisis Response

Appendix A. Crises Summaries

return to the Soviet Union. “The U.S. Navy played a pivotal role in this crisis, demonstrating the
critical importance of naval forces to the national defense. The Navy's operations were in
keeping with its strategic doctrine, which is as valid today as it was in late 1962. The Navy, in
cooperation with the other U.S. armed forces and with America's allies, employed military power
in such a way that the president did not have to resort to war to protect vital Western interests.
Khrushchev realized that his missile and bomber forces were no match for the Navy's powerful
Polaris ballistic missile-firing submarines and the Air Force's land-based nuclear delivery
systems once these American arms became fully operational” (Utz 1993). In the end the Soviet
Union was compelled to withdraw the missiles. The Cuban Missile crisis is often cited as a good
example for a successful resolution through coercive diplomacy where instead of relying on
military force President Kennedy chose coercive diplomacy to convince Khrushev to remove the
missiles. He also employed a carrots and sticks approach, setting an ultimatum while offering
incentives in the form of the removal of U.S. missiles from Turkey in return for Soviet
compliance. The extraordinary war risk further persuaded both governments to resolve the crisis
peacefully.
Approximately 180 USN ships and a 60-ship amphibious force were involved in this crisis. A
total of eight U.S. aircraft carriers were deployed as part of the force: the Enterprise (CV 65),
Independence (CV-62), Essex (CV 9), Lake Champlain (CV 39), Lexington (CV 16), Randolph
(CV 15), Saratoga (CV 60) and Wasp (CV 18) 10
Additional Sources: Blechman and Kaplan 1978, 71; Utz 1993; George 1991; Marolda 2000
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA II

Cuban Missiles
Cuban
Crisis
Cuban
Crisis

Dates
10/16/1962 – 11/20/1962, 36

Missiles 10/14/62, 38

U.S. Response
4

Ships involved

USN,
USMC, 8 CV's & Amp
USAF, USARMY
8 CV's & Amp

Missile 10-11/1962

29. # 197: Malaysia Federation; 2/11/1962 – 8/9/1965, 910
President Sukarno made a statement expressing Indonesia’s opposition to the formation of
Malaysia on 11 February 1962. This speech triggered a crisis for Malaysia. The UK was
10

For a detailed listing of all USN ships involved see http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq90-3.htm#anchor156376
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involved immediately and arranged talks between Brunei, Malaysia, Sabah (British Borneo),
Sarawak, and Singapore to agree on the formation of the Federation of Malaysia. The resulting
agreement triggered a crisis for Indonesia. The Federation of Malaysia was created on 16
September 1962. The United States demonstrated an interest in the crisis and from 29 November
through 17 December 1962 the seaplane carrier USS Salisbury Sound (AV 13) stopped for a port
visit in Singapore. Further talks and even the involvement of the UN did not change Indonesia’s
position. When Indonesia called back its ambassador to Kuala Lumpur, the U.S. reacted by
halting economic aid to Indonesia. Attorney General Robert Kennedy tried to mediate but the
agreed cease-fire was never implemented. The crisis gradually faded. “Singapore seceded from
Malaysia on 9 August 1965, an event that Indonesia viewed as the beginning of the breakup of
the Federation, a "face-saver." Malaya, too, perceived a victory because Indonesia's
confrontation policy ended without destroying the Federation” (ICB, Malaysia Federation Crisis
Summary).
Additional Sources: Solantamity
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA II

Malaysia
Federation
IndonesiaMalaysia
Indonesia
Malaysia

Dates
2/11/1962 – 8/9/1965, 910

U.S. Response
2

Ships involved

October 1963, 78

USN

1 CV & NO Amp

– 9-12/1963

1 CV & NO Amp

30. # 198: Dominican Republic – Haiti II; 4/26/1963 – 6/3/1963
A crisis for the Dominican Republic was triggered on 26 April 1963 when Haitian policemen
“forcibly entered the Dominican Republic embassy and arrested opponents of Haiti's regime”
(ICB, Dominican Republic – Haiti II Crisis Summary). On 27 April, U.S. fearing for the lives of
American citizens in Haiti sent a naval task force, including the carrier USS Boxer (CV 21) and
2,000 Marines. On 8 May Navy ships evacuated 2,279 civilians. The United Kingdom and
France deployed ships as well. When the OAS fact-finding mission came to the conclusion that
no further actions against Haiti should be undertaken and relations between Haiti and the
Dominican Republic had normalized, the naval forces were withdrawn on 3 June. Cable
describes the naval forces’ involvement as a positive gunboat diplomacy action.
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Additional Sources: Cable 1981; Solantamity
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA II

Dominican
Republic – Haiti II
Haitian Unrest
Haiti

Dates
4/26/1963 – 6/3/1963

U.S. Response
3

Ships involved

4/29/1963 34
4-6/1963

USN, USMC

1 CV & Amp
1 CV & Amp

31. # 200 Cuba – Venezuela; 11/1/1963 – 12/1/1963, 31
A crisis for Venezuela was triggered on 1 November 1963 with the discovery of an arms cache
on a deserted beach and the uncovering of plans to hinder the elections in December and overrun
Caracas. Later that month it was confirmed that the arms were provided by Cuba. When on 1
December the Venezuelan elections were held without hindrance the crisis ended.
According to Captain Roth, U.S. naval aircraft were searching for a ship suspected of carrying
insurgents in November 1963. After the ship was located the Venezuelan Navy was notified.
Additional Sources: Roth 2001 and email exchange 2009.
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA II

Cuba – Venezuela
NO DATA
VenezuelaColombia

Dates
11/1/1963 – 12/1/1963, 31
11/1963

U.S. Response
2

Ships involved

O CV & NO Amp

32. # 202: Cyprus I; 11/30/1963 – 8/10/1964, 256
A proposal by the President of the Cypriot Republic for a new constitution, which would change
Cyprus into a unitary state with guarantees for the Turkish minority, triggered a crisis for
Turkey. Turkey’s opposition to the changes and the threat of intervention then broadened the
crisis to include Cyprus and Greece. A series of cease-fire talks were held, which helped to
defuse the situation but tensions remained (December 1993). A UN Peacekeeping Force was
formed on 27 March further easing the tension. Yet in 1964 the crisis escalated between May and
August, with the U.K., the U.S., the NATO and the United Nations trying to broker an
agreement. The United States showed presence by sending elements of Sixth Fleet to the vicinity
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of Cyprus to conduct patrols. An aircraft carrier11 was stationed off Cyprus for most of March,
early June, and from 8 August – 2 September 1964. A direct threat by the United States to halt
all military aid to Turkey and to stand aside if the Soviets became involved, led Turkey to
abandon its intervention plans. In August the Security Council adopted a cease-fire resolution,
which Cyprus and Turkey accepted the next day, ending the crisis on 10 August 1964. “The UN
was the most active mediator during the crisis, but it is likely that the U.S. -- through Johnson’s
pleas to all actors and warning to Turkey that it would no longer automatically be under U.S.
protection if it should invade Cyprus -- was the most effective mediator” (ICB).
The National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies (1997, 51) states that:
“Since 1964, U.S. intervention in the Greek-Turkish disputes has proved to be the only way to
avoid open conflict between these two historic rivals. The Greeks and the Turks are likely to
remain at odds. Washington will likely remain the closest thing there is to a totally honest
broker”.
Additional Sources: National Defense University 1997, 51
Dataset
ICB
CNA I

Cyprus I
Cyprus

Dates
11/30/1963 – 8/10/1964, 256
1/22/1964, 269

CNA II

Cyprus

1-10/1964

U.S. Response
Ships involved
2
USN,
USMC, 1 CV & Amp
USAF
1 CV & Amp

33. # 206: Panama Flag; 1/9/1964 – 1/12/1964, 4
This short crisis between Panama and the United States was triggered by U.S. students raising
the American flag at a high school in the Canal Zone. In reaction, Panamanian students marched
into the Canal Zone with their flag. Serious riots followed and the U.S. responded with force.
Panama accused the U.S. of aggression and suspended diplomatic relations on 9 January until 3
April. Following the riots an Amphibious Ready Squadron was stationed off Panama’s East
coast. A week after diplomatic relations were restored the U.S. naval amphibious force stationed
in the region was withdrawn.
Additional Sources: Global Security: Panama Canal Riots, Roth email exchange 2009
11

I was not able to determine the name of the involved aircraft carrier.
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Dataset
ICB
CNA I

Panama Flag
Panama

Dates
1/9/1964 – 1/12/1964, 4
January 64, 101

CNA II

Panama

1-4/1964

U.S. Response
Ships involved
2
USN,
USMC, 0 CV & Amp
USAF, USARMY
0 CV & Amp

34. # 210: Gulf of Tonkin; 7/30/1964 – 8/77/1964, 9
The crisis began with an attack on North Vietnamese islands in the Gulf of Tonkin by South
Vietnam. In retaliation the U.S. destroyer Maddox (DD-731), operating in international waters,
was hit by North Vietnamese Navy on 2 August. Immediately after attack the USS Ticonderoga
(CV 14) rushed to assist Maddox. Two days later Turner Joy (DD 951) requested support
alleging a new torpedo attack. President Johnson decided to react to the unprovoked attacks (the
real circumstance around the Gulf of Tonkin affair are highly debated and many disagree that the
attacks on the U.S. destroyers were unprovoked. According to the North Vietnamese their
sovereignty extends five miles, according to the U.S. only three). On 5 August the United States
retaliated with strikes against the North Vietnamese mainland. The aircraft carriers Ticonderoga
and Constellation (CV 64) were part of the force. In reaction to the events, U.S. Congress passed
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing all necessary means to protect U.S. armed forces on 7
August, ending this crisis but ushering the Vietnam War escalation.
Additional Sources: Astor 2006, 112
Dataset
ICB

Gulf of Tonkin

Dates
7/30/1964 – 8/77/1964, 9

U.S. Response
4

Ships involved

CNA I

Gulf of Tonkin

8/2/64, 9

USN

CNA II

Gulf of Tonkin

8/1964

2 CV's & NO
Amp
2 CV's & NO
Amp

35. # 212: Yemen War III; 12/3/1964 – 8/25/1965, 266
During the lengthy Yemen War, a Royalist assault on Republican territory, with Saudi support,
triggered this crisis for Yemen and Egypt. United States surface combatants from the Middle
East Force (MIDEASTFOR) carried out surveillance and presence missions during the critical
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period of July and August 1965. After negotiations, an agreement between the two parties lead to
the abatement of the crisis but the war continued.
Additional Sources: Solantamity
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA II

Yemen War III
Yemen
Yemen

Dates
12/3/1964 – 8/25/1965, 266
July 1965, 32
7/1965 - 11/1967

U.S. Response
2
USN

Ships involved
0 CV & NO Amp
0 CV & NO Amp

36. # 215: Dominican Intervention; 4/24/1965 – 8/31/1965, 130
The U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 is representative of a large military
forces deployment, in this instance to control events in, and to maintain American influence
over, the Western Hemisphere. Armed and authorized to return fire, the troops were the first
combat-ready U.S. force to enter a Latin American country in almost forty years.
A civil war broke out in the Dominican Republic on 24 April 1965, when a junta, which had
deposed Juan Bosch in a military coup in 1963, was itself overthrown. The counterrevolution
wanted to restore constitutional government and Bosch to power. The United States was mostly
concerned about the possibility of a second Cuba; an anti-American regime would limit the
influence of the United States and hinder its predominance while potentially providing the Soviet
Union (or USSR) with a new ally in Washington’s own backyard. But the foremost official
justification was the threat to the lives of American citizens.
Shortly after the outbreak of the crisis, the U.S. embassy requested the evacuation of citizens of
the United States and other nations. The USN was ready to move immediately and placed a task
force—including the helicopter carrier USS Boxer (LPH 4) and 1,500 Marines—off the
Dominican coast. On 27 April the evacuation operations began, with unarmed helicopters
airlifting Marines into the capital to protect American citizens.
Impediments to prompt evacuation led to an increase of U.S. troop strength ashore and a
strengthening of the naval task force. Supporting Air Force tactical units were moved to the
Caribbean area. After Marine forces and Army units established a safety zone and a safe
corridor, refugees were also taken on board directly; by 2 May the Navy had evacuated a total of
35
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three thousand civilians. The mission’s objective was extended to include the prevention of
communist influence in the Dominican government. By 6 May the United States had twenty-two
thousand men ashore and nine thousand afloat. The signing of an “Act of Dominican
Reconciliation” on 31 August 1965 ended the international crisis, with all sides agreeing on a
moderate provisional president. According to Siegel, U.S. naval forces did not begin to withdraw
until 28 June 1966; Cable sets the final withdrawal on 20 September 1966.
The need for this successful but expensive operation is disputed. A total of forty (the Department
of Defense [DoD] counts thirty-eight) ships of the USN were involved, including Boxer, the tank
landing ship Wood County (LST 1178), destroyer transport Ruchamkin (APD 89), attack cargo
ships Yancey (AKA 93) and Rankin (AKA 103), and the dock landing ships Fort Snelling (LSD
30) and Raleigh (LPD 1). The evacuation operation mainly served to underline U.S. interest in
the region by establishing a presence and showing determination not to allow a communist
takeover.
Additional Sources: All Hands 1965, 2 -5, Blechman and Kaplan 1978; Cable 1981; Department
of Defense 1965; Loewenthal 1972.
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA II

Dominican
Intervention
Dominican
Republic
Dominican
Republic

Dates
4/24/1965 – 8/31/1965, 130

U.S. Response
4

4/25/1965, 515

USN;
USMC, 2 CV'S & Amp
USAF, USARMY
2 CV'S & Amp

4/1965 - 9/1966

Ships involved

37. # 216: Kashmir II; 8/5/1965 – 1/10/1966, 159
The infiltration of Pakistani fighters into Kashmir caused a crisis for India. In reaction, Indian
military forces crossed the Kashmir cease-fire line, prompting the Pakistani armed forces to
respond. On 5 September India invaded West Pakistan. The crisis led the United Nations to
appeal for a cease-fire. Since the lives of American citizens were endangered, the U.S. decided to
deploy a contingency evacuation force, to halt military aid to both parties (8 September 1965)
and not to extend further economic assistance. On 11 September two ships from MIDEASTFOR
left Bahrain for Karachi. Four days later U.S citizens were evacuated from West Pakistan with
the support of USAF planes. China sided with Pakistan and accused India of provocation.
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Chinese involvement and the fear of their intervention led the Western Powers to push for an
immediate solution to the crisis. The UN resolution of 17 September did not yet end the crisis
since both parties still deployed their armed forces in Kashmir; only further talks concluding
with the Tashkent Declaration on 10 January 1966 brought the crisis to an end.
Additional Sources: Solantamity
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA II

Kashmir II
Indo-Pakistani
War
Indio-Pak War

Dates
8/5/1965 – 1/10/1966, 159
9/11/1965, 25

U.S. Response
2
USN, USAF

10-11/1965

Ships involved
0 CV & NO Amp
0 CV & NO Amp

38. # 219: Yemen War IV; 10/14/1966 – 9/26/1967, 348
A further crisis in Yemen began with air attacks on Royalist territory and Saudi villages. The
expectation of Royalist retaliation then triggered a crisis for Egypt and Yemen. The latter
engaged in renewed attacks. After months of fighting reconciliation was reached in April 1966.
The situation changed with the beginning of the Six Day War. At the end of August the Prime
Minister of Sudan successfully proposed a new peace plan. With the final Egyptian withdrawal
from Yemen the crisis ended on 26 September 1967. Since 1965 U.S. naval forces had been on
station in the area to observe the developments.
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA II

Yemen War IV
NO DATA
Yemen

Dates
10/14/1966 – 9/26/1967, 348

U.S. Response
2

Ships involved

7/1965 - 11/1967

USN

O CV & NO Amp

39. # 222: Six Day War; 5/17/1967 – 6/11/1967, 26
An Egyptian overflight of Israel’s nuclear research center and increased Egyptian presence in the
Sinai precipitated a crisis between the two countries. Israel felt compelled to protect its rights of
freedom of navigation when Egyptian President Nasser closed off the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli
shipping. Preemptive strikes by Israel against Egypt forced Egypt and Jordan to react with
military force. On 5 June the crisis escalated with an Israeli attack on the Egyptian Air Force and
the occupation of the Gaza Strip and Sinai. On 9 June the Israeli invasion of the Golan Heights
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drew Syria and the Soviet Union into the crisis. Egypt and Syria fought with Soviet weapons,
employed by Soviet advisors, but were defeated by a numerically inferior Israeli Army. Syria’s
acceptance of the cease-fire ended the crisis on 10 June 1967 and Israel emerged with new
borders and additional territory. The United States was heavily involved. After initial hesitancy
the United States deployed their Sixth Fleet with about 50 warships, including the two aircraft
carriers USS America (CV 66) and USS Saratoga (CV 60) and a Marines battalion landing team
on 6 June. One of the first actions was to reduce the 100- mile territorial water claim of Syria to a
50-mile, and to send a carrier towards Syria to reinforce diplomatic efforts to reach a cease-fire
agreement. The U.S. naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean showed its opposition to any
Soviet intervention, and played a major role in determining the Six Day War. During the crisis
the Arab combatants accused the United States of providing air cover to Israeli ground forces
from its aircraft carriers, an allegation that was contradicted by the aircraft carrier’s flight plans.
The Sixth Fleet also warned to Israel to stand down and avoid escalation.
Additional Sources: Hahn 2005, 52 – 53; Kalley 2001
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA II

Six Day War
Six
Day War
Middle East War

Dates
5/17/1967 – 6/11/1967, 26
6/6/1967, 6
5-6/1967, 2

U.S. Response
Ships involved
2
USN,
USMC, 2 CV's & Amp
USAF, USARMY
2 CV's & Amp

40. # 223: Cyprus II; 11/15/1967 – 12/4/1967, 20
The second Cyprus crisis was triggered by assaults on two Turkish-Cypriot villages, which led to
the Turkish decision to dispatch military force in reaction. Turkey also requested the removal of
the chief of the Greek forces in Cyprus. In combination these events triggered a crisis for Cyprus
and Greece. The United Nations became involved and Cyprus Vance, the former U.S. Deputy
Secretary of Defense acted as mediator in a shuttle diplomacy effort. On 1 December an
agreement was reached between Turkey and Greece and three days later with Cyprus which
ended the crisis. Cyrus Vance’s intensive shuttle diplomacy helped to resolve this crisis.
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Although the United States deployed a contingency force from its Sixth Fleet 12 to stand by for a
possible evacuation of U.S. citizens, the evacuations took place with commercial aircraft.
Additional Sources: Slengesol 2000, 99
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA II

Cyprus II
Cyprus
Cyprus

Dates
11/15/1967 – 12/4/1967, 20
11/15/1967, 24
11-12/1967

U.S. Response
2
USN, USMC

Ships involved
1 CV's & Amp
1 CV's & Amp

41. # 224: Pueblo; 1/21/1968 – 12/23/1968, 338
North Korean forces seized the USS Pueblo on 22 January 1968. The USS Pueblo had been
operating in international waters off the coast of Korea, gathering intelligence information. This
incident happened one day after North Korea had tried to assassinate the South Korean President.
Since the War of 1812 no U.S. warship had surrendered to foreign forces. The surviving crew
members were held hostage for eleven months, accused of spying in Korean territorial waters.
The U.S. reacted by deploying Air Force and Navy forces. Naval vessels, including the aircraft
carrier USS Enterprise (CV 65), escorting destroyers and support ships, were dispatched to the
Sea of Japan off the North Korean coast. On 6 February the Enterprise began to withdraw as a
sign of goodwill from the United States. To secure their release the United States had to
apologize and admit (falsely) that the USS Pueblo had entered Korean territorial waters at the
time of the attack. The imposed agreement was reached on 23 December 1968 and subsequently
the crew was released while the ship was never recovered. Different carriers were part of the
U.S. response at different times and included the USS Ranger (CV 61), Yorktown (CV 10), Coral
Sea (CV 43), and Kearsarge (CV 33). Because the safety of the held crew members was
paramount the U.S. decided against a blockade, the seizure of North Korean shipping, or the
dispatch of bombers against North Korean territory.
Additional Sources: Cable 1981
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
12

Pueblo
Pueblo

Dates
1/21/1968 – 12/23/1968, 338
1/24/1968, 59

I was not able to determine the name of the involved aircraft carrier
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1-3/1968

3 CV's & NO
Amp

42. # 233: EC-121 Spy Plane; 4/15/1969 – 4/26/1969, 12
North Korean aircraft shot down a USN reconnaissance plane over the Sea of Japan, accusing it
of having entered Korean airspace. A Sea Air Rescue (SAR) mission began immediately after
the shoot down. The United States rejected the claim and dispatched a formidable naval force to
the Sea of Japan, including four aircraft carriers. The crisis ended on 26 April when the U.S.
naval task force was reduced to a one carrier battle group and the other naval forces were moved
from the Sea of Japan into the Yellow Sea.
The naval force included the carriers USS Enterprise (CV 65), Hornet (CV 12), Ranger (CV 61)
and Ticonderoga (CV 14) and the battleship New Jersey (BB 62).
Additional Sources: Cable 1981
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA II

EC-121 Spy Plane
EC-121
Shootdown
EC-121

Dates
4/15/1969 – 4/26/1969, 12
4/15/1969, 26
4/1969

U.S. Response
Ships involved
4
USN,
USAF, 4 CV's & NO
USARMY
Amp
4 CV's & NO
Amp

43. # 236: Cairo Agreement – PLO; 10/22/1969 – 11/3/1969, 13
The PLO announcement of heavy fighting between the PLO and Lebanese government forces on
22 October 1969 drew Lebanon into the crisis. Egypt, Jordan and Syria supported the resulting
negotiations. On 3 October the crisis ended with the “Cairo” agreement, which allowed the PLO
to “operate as a "state within a state" in Lebanon”. During 26 – 30 October the United States
deployed a contingency force, consisting of two aircraft carrier forces, USS Saratoga (CV 60) &
USS Independence (CV 62), and the Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group (MARG) to the
region.
Dataset
ICB
CNA I

Dates
Cairo Agreement 10/22/1969 – 11/3/1969, 13
– PLO
Lebanon-Libya
10/26/69, 5
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USN, USMC

2 CV's & Amp
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Ops
NO DATA

44. # 238: Black September; 9/15/1970 – 9/29/1970, 15
On 11 June the aircraft carrier USS Forrestal (CV 59) was ordered to the Eastern Mediterranean
to stand by should air cover for evacuation from Jordan become necessary. When tensions
deescalated the carrier was ordered back to Italy (21 June), but once again (3 September) the
Sixth Fleet was brought into play due to increasing tensions. Three days later the two aircraft
carriers Saratoga (CV 60) and Independence (CV 62) as well as the MARG were positioned in
the Eastern Mediterranean. The crisis actually peaked on 15 September with the shuffling of the
Jordan cabinet, which demonstrated its resolve to fight the PLO influence. The king was no
longer willing to tolerate PLO raids from Jordanian territory. This caused a crisis for Syria and
the United States. Whereas the U.S. feared the loss of its ally the king of Jordan, Syria remained
committed to support the PLO and to maintain its influence in the region and invaded Jordan on
19 September. In reaction to the Syrian invasion, the U.S. deployed an additional aircraft carrier,
the USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67) (departing from the East Coast of the U.S.) and elements of
the 8th Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB). Jordan resisted the invasion militarily while Israel
declared its determination to prevent a PLO victory in Jordan. When Syrian forces withdrew
from Jordan, PLO forces moved to Southern Lebanon. After mediation efforts, Jordan and Syria
agreed on a cease-fire on 27 September which was put into effect two days later. Only one
aircraft carrier then remained in the Eastern Mediterranean. The USS John F. Kennedy returned
to Souda Bay on 8 October. In addition to naval forces, the U.S. had alerted troops in Germany
while Soviet naval forces were closely monitoring U.S. naval activities during the crisis. Former
Sixth Fleet commander Admiral Isaac Kidd observed that the eastern Mediterranean looked like
“an international boat show” (cited in Baer 1994, 401).
Additional Sources: Baer 1994, 401, Cable 1981
Dataset
ICB
CNA I

Black September
Jordan

Dates
9/15/1970 – 9/29/1970, 15
9/2/1970, 60

CNA II
CNA

Jordan
Jordan Civil War

9-10/1970
9/2/1970 - 11/1/1970, 61
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3
USN,
USMC, 3 CV's & Amp
USAF, USARMY
3 CV's & Amp
Turkey, Show of
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IIII

Force,
USN,
USMC,
USAF,
USARMY

45. # 239: Cienfuegos Submarine Base; 9/16/1970 – 10/23/1970, 38
U.S. intelligence flights disclosed the construction of a Soviet submarine base on the Southern
coast of Cuba, triggering a crisis for the U.S. The Soviet Union rejected the accusation, claiming
that no agreements had been violated and no prohibited weapons had been stored at Cienfuegos.
Intelligence showed the halt of the construction and Soviet naval forces left the base. This ended
the crisis for the United States, yet disagreements persisted until spring 1971. According to CNA
II, U.S. naval forces operated in the area in reaction to the crisis.
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA II

Cienfuegos
Submarine Base
NO DATA
Cienfuegos

Dates
9/16/1970 – 10/23/1970, 38

U.S. Response
2

Ships involved

9/1970 - 6/1971

USN

0 CV & NO Amp

46. # 242: Bangladesh; 3/25/1971 – 12/17/1971, 268
This crisis was triggered by an attack of the West Pakistan army on Dacca University in
Bangladesh on 25 March 1971. At that time, Bangladesh was still formally known as East
Pakistan and East Bengal. East Pakistan now declared its independence, bringing on armed
conflict with West Pakistan. India supported East Pakistan, and on 3 December, after months of
minor clashes, a formal war between India and Pakistan broke out. Within two weeks, Indian
forces overwhelmed the Pakistani troops based in the seceding territory. The war ended on 17
December 1971 with Pakistan’s surrender, and Bangladesh officially became a sovereign state.
The United States was politically very active in this crisis. To undergird U.S. support, the
Seventh Fleet moved into the Bay of Bengal in support of Pakistan. On 10 December, as Indian
troops liberated the new country of Bangladesh, a naval force consisting of a battle group led by
USS Enterprise (CV 65) and an amphibious ready group was deployed to the Indian Ocean to
stand by for a possible evacuation of Western nationals. An evacuation operation proved
unnecessary, because the Royal Air Force had already evacuated most foreigners. Nonetheless,
the naval forces stayed in the Indian Ocean in a show of force, monitoring both Indian and
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Pakistani operations and maritime and air traffic, as well as increasing numbers of Soviet aircraft
and vessels, with the goal of intimidating India and tilting the situation in favor of Pakistan.
The USSR had also moved some of its naval forces into the vicinity of the Bay of Bengal, to
demonstrate support for India. According to Siegel (1995, 7 - 8), U.S. naval forces played an
important role in influencing events on the ground. “The presence of U.S. naval forces south of
the Indian subcontinent, along with growing diplomatic isolation, thus evidently helped to sway
Indian decision makers away from the preferred option of continuing the war with an offensive
in the West. Enterprise’s deployment strengthened U.S. diplomatic efforts.” According to
Mrityunjoy Mazumdar (2006), this entry of Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal left a deep
impression on Indian policy makers as well as the Indian navy for much of the next two decades
Additional Sources: Cable 1981, Siegel 1995
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA II
CNA
IIII

Bangladesh
Indo-Pakistani
War
Indio-Pak War
Indo-Pac-War

Dates
3/25/1971 – 12/17/1971, 268

U.S. Response
3

Ships involved

12/10/1971, 30

USN

1 CV & Amp

12/1971 - 1/1972
12/10/1971 - 1/8/1972, 30

Bangladesh, NEO
(plans only), USN,
USMC

1 CV & Amp

47. # 255: October-Yom Kippur War; 10/5/1973 – 5/31/1974, 239
Egyptian forces moved towards the Suez Canal on 5 October 1973, triggering a crisis with Israel.
One day later, Egyptian and Syrian forces carried out a surprise attack against Israel, marking the
onset of war. In the following months , talks and negotiations were held, mediation efforts
attempted, agreements proposed, and cease-fire agreements broken until a final agreement was
reached on 29 May 1974. The signing 2 days later ended the crisis. The United States and the
Soviet Union played important roles in reaching the agreement and both deployed naval forces to
the Eastern Mediterranean. In reaction to the outbreak of the war, U.S. forces around the world
were put on alert and the Sixth Fleet was reinforced. The Sixth Fleet’s mission was the
protection of U.S. transport planes delivering weapons and ammunition to Israel. The two
aircraft carriers USS Independence (CV 62) and USS Roosevelt (CV 42) and an amphibious force
were on a high level of alert in reaction to the crisis. During October the two carriers and
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amphibious forces stood ready for a possible evacuation contingency operation. The aircraft
carrier John F. Kennedy (CV 67), together with amphibious forces, joined the U.S Sixth Fleet in
the Eastern Mediterranean on 25 October. With the reduction of tensions on 17 November, the
Sixth Fleet’s alert status was scaled down to a normal DEFCON (Defense Readiness Condition).
In April 1974 the USS Forrestal (CV 59) operated in the Central Mediterranean and was
available to support U.S. efforts. Besides the involved carriers, CNA II lists two Marine
Battalion Landing Teams and the vessels Guadalcanal (LPH 7) and Iwo Jima (LPH 2).
U.S. naval forces played an important role in the 1973 Middle East crisis. The United States
Navy with the Sixth Fleet and the Soviet Navy, with the Fifth Eskadra both had a peacetime
naval presence in the Mediterranean. In an immediate reaction to the outbreak of the war on 6
October 1973, the aircraft carrier USS Independence was sent to the Eastern Mediterranean to
demonstrate U.S. concern. The aircraft carriers USS Franklin D. Roosevelt and USS John F.
Kennedy remained in European ports, until 10 October when they deployed alongside the U.S.
air supply route to Israel, out of concern that Libya or Algeria might try to interdict the supply
route. The Soviet Fifth Eskadra responded in turn to the Sixth Fleet’s show of force and to
demonstrate support for its ally Egypt. In a tit for tat the United States put its forces on yet a
higher state of alert. The USS Independence returned to Greece only when the cease-fire
agreement seemed certain to hold and after the end of the U.S. – Soviet naval confrontation
(Allen 1980, 27 – 29).
Additional Sources: Allen 1980; Cable 1981; Keesing’s; Marolda 2000
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA I
CNA II
CNA
IIII

Dates
Yom 10/5/1973 – 5/31/1974, 239

October
Kippur War
Middle East War

10/6/1973, 48

Middle East Force
Middle East War
Middle East War

10/24/1973, 22
10 – 11/1973
10/6/1973 – 11/22/1973, 48
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USN,
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USN
0 CV & NO Amp
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USAF

Seaborne Crisis Response

Appendix A. Crises Summaries

48. # 256: Oman – South Yemen; 11/18/1973 – 3/11/1976, 846
The crisis was triggered when Oman announced an aerial assault carried out by South Yemen on
a military post and South Yemeni involvement in fighting between rebels and government forces
in Oman. Oman successfully defeated the rebels, chasing them over the border into South Yemen
by the end of 1975. On 11 March 1976 Oman and South Yemen signed a cease-fire agreement,
reached with the help of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, finally ending the crisis. U.S. naval forces
were operating off Yemen in a show of force during the early crisis period.
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA II
CNA
III

Dates
Oman – South 11/18/1973 – 3/11/1976, 846
Yemen
NO DATA
NO DATA
Middle East Force 10/24/1973 - 11/13/1974,
386.

U.S. Response
3

Ships involved

Yemen, Show of
Force, USN

49. # 257: Cyprus III; 7/15/1974 – 2/25/1975, 225
On 15 July 1974 a Greek-led military coup ousted the Cypriot government and installed a puppet
regime. This triggered a crisis for Cyprus and Turkey. Cyprus requested help from Britain and
the UN Security Council. Turkey intervened on 20 July and occupied parts of the island. In an
immediate reaction to the coup, the United States delayed the return of USS America (CV 66),
then routinely deployed in the Mediterranean, to the United States until relieved by USS
Independence (CV 62). At the same time American and British diplomats began mediation
attempts, which led to an unstable cease-fire. Forrestal was deployed to the central
Mediterranean. Other assignments for Forrestal and the Sixth Fleet amphibious ready group were
canceled so that they would be ready if needed.
On 22 July aircraft from USS Inchon (LPH 12)—other sources name USS Coronado (LPD 11)—
evacuated more than four hundred American and foreign nationals to Beirut from the British
base at Dhekelia in southern Cyprus; Independence provided air cover. In early August the ships’
departures were postponed in reaction to riots and demonstrations before the American embassy
that resulted in the murder of the American ambassador to Cyprus. With the easing of tension, all
contingency operations ended by 2 September. After negotiations, the toppled Cypriot president,
Archbishop Michael Makarios, returned on 7 December 1974. In January 1975 naval forces were
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deployed again for possible evacuation duties. USS Saratoga (CV 60) and amphibious forces
were released on 21 January 1975. “In February 1975 a Turkish-Cypriot Federated State was
proclaimed and, on 24 February, a Constituent Assembly for Turkish Cyprus was convened,
ending the crisis for Turkey. By their failure to challenge this act, the crisis ended for Cyprus and
Greece as well.” (ICB).
Additional Sources: Grossnick 1997, Proceedings, Slengesol 2000
Dataset
ICB
CNA I

Cyprus III
Cyprus

Dates
7/15/1974 – 2/25/1975, 225
7/15/74, 39

CNA I
CNA II
CNA II
CNA
III

Cyprus Unrest
Cyprus
Cyprus
Cyprus Coup

1/18/75, 4
7-8/1974
1/1975
7/22/1974 - 7/25/1974, 4

CNA
III

Cyprus Unrest

1/18/1975 - 1/21/1975, 3

U.S. Response
Ships involved
2
USN,
USMC, 2 CV's & Amp
USAF, USARMY
USN, USMC
1 CV & Amp
2 CV's & Amp
1 CV & Amp
USN,
USMC,
USAF, USARMY,
Cyprus, NEO
USN,
USMC,
Cyprus,
NEO
(plans only)

50. # 258: Final North Vietnam Offensive; 12/14/1974 – 4/30/1975, 138
On 14 December North Vietnam launched an offensive and on 1 January 1975 the Khmer Rouge
followed their example in Cambodia. Cambodian and South Vietnamese forces both fought back
and the latter requested U.S. aid. The rebels took control over the Cambodian capital on 17 April,
ending for Cambodia the last Vietnam War crisis. Meanwhile North Vietnam advanced its
offensive. With the fall of Saigon and the capitulation of South Vietnam (30 April 1975), the
crisis ended. At the outset the U.S. provided aid for South Vietnam and Cambodia which
Congress continuously reduced. Toward the end of the crisis, U.S. activity was limited to
evacuating U.S. citizens. The carriers USS Enterprise (CV 65), USS Coral Sea (CV 43), USS
Hancock (CV 19), USS Midway (CV 41), and the assault ship Okinawa (LPH 3) received orders
to proceed to the Vietnamese water and stand ready for possible contingency operations in
March. The USS Hancock served as a helicopter platform for the evacuation of U.S. citizens and
other foreign nationals from Cambodia to Okinawa as part of Operation EAGLE PULL. On 29
April 1975 the Enterprise together with Coral Sea executed Operation FREQUENT WIND, an
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evacuation contingency operation to rescue foreign nationals from Vietnam, by covering
evacuation helicopters. The USS Midway and Okinawa also assisted in the evacuation operations.
Additional Sources: Grossnick 1997, Proceedings

Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA
III
CNA
III

Final
Vietnam
Offensive
NO DATA
Eagle
Cambodia

Dates
North 12/14/1974 – 4/30/1975, 138

Pull 2/1/1975 - 4/12/1975, 71

Frequent Wind

4/4/1975 - 4/30/ 1975, 27

U.S. Response
2

Ships involved

Cambodia, NEO
USN,
USMC,
USAF, USARMY
Vietnam, NEO
USN,
USMC,
USAF

51. # 259: Mayaguez; 5/12/1975 – 5/15/1975, 3
On 12 May 1975 Khmer Rouge forces seized the merchant vessel USS Mayaguez off the
Cambodian coast, claiming the vessel had entered Cambodian territorial waters. The situation
recalled the Pueblo affair and President Ford ordered an immediate military rescue mission. The
U.S. had seaborne forces on location and in Thailand, who responded on the very same day. U.S.
Marines recovered the empty USS Mayaguez while other Marines, flown by Air Force
helicopters, attempted to rescue the captured seamen, protected by naval air and surface forces.
USN, USMC and USAF forces were directly involved in the rescue attempt. Upon landing at
Tang Island the Marines did not find the Mayaguez crew who had been moved to a fishing boat.
On 14 May Cambodia announced the release of the captives and crew and vessel were retrieved
by U.S. forces. The naval response involved two aircraft carriers the USS Coral Sea (CV 43) and
the USS Hancock (CV 19). The latter was only alerted. According to CNA II the USMC
dispatched Elements of Third Marine Division while the USNI Proceedings mentions companies
from the 4th ad 9th Marines on USAF aircraft. With the termination of U.S. military activity the
crisis ended for Cambodia on 15 May.
Additional Sources: Astor 2006, 175 – 180; Gaffney 2002, 5, Grossnick 1997, Proceedings
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Mayaguez
Mayaguez

Dates
5/12/1975 – 5/15/1975, 3
5/13/1975, 3

Mayaguez
Mayaguez Rescue

5/1975
5/12/1975 – 5/15/1975, 4

U.S. Response
Ships involved
4
USN,
USMC, 2 CV’S & Amp
USAF
1 CV & Amp
Cambodia,
Combat,
USN,
USMC, USAF

52. # 261 Moroccan March; 10/16/1975 – 4/14/1976, 181
The King of Morocco declared his intention to “march” into Western Sahara on the same day the
World Court had decided that neither Mauritania nor Morocco had any sovereignty rights over
the Western Sahara. By this action Morocco triggered a crisis for Spain which brought the matter
before the Security Council. Spain and Algeria were resolved to oppose the Moroccan March
militarily. The King of Morocco reversed the incursion (6 November) after 5 days when Spain
agreed to exclude Algeria from the negotiation. Mauritania, Morocco, and Spain signed an
agreement on 14 November, dividing the Western Sahara between Mauritania and Morocco
whereas Spain was granted a “share in the valuable Bu Craa phosphate mines” (ICB). Although
the crisis ended for Spain, Algeria came into conflict with the Polisario Rebels. In December the
rebels fought with Algerian, Moroccan and Mauritanian forces. A further agreement between
Morocco and Mauritania ended the crisis (14 March 1976), during which the United States
provided military aid to Morocco, whereas the Soviet Union supported the Polisario Rebels. The
USN vessels made three highly publicized visits to Morocco ports in January 1976 to
demonstrate U.S. support in response to the USSR involvement.
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA
III

Moroccan March
Polisario Rebels

Dates
10/16/1975 – 4/14/1976, 181
1/5/1976, 18

U.S. Response
3
USN

Polisario Rebels

1/5/1976 - 1/22/1976, 18

Morocco, Show of
Force, USN

Ships involved
0 CV's & NO
Amp

53. # 265: Lebanon Civil War; 1/18/1976 – 11/15/1976, 298
Lebanese Christian forces attacked three towns, mostly inhabited by Moslems. Syria sent troops
to support the Moslems and tried unsuccessfully to mediate the crisis, then to impose a
resolution. By late September, Lebanese opposition against Syrian influence had ended but
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unrest persisted until the Arab League authorized the stationing of Syrian soldiers in Beirut.
“Shortly thereafter, Syria reverted to its traditional pro-Palestinian stance after tension and
clashes between Syrian and Christian forces, supporting the PLO against the Israeli-backed
Christian militias” (ICB). The United States expressed its concern over Syrian behavior. Already
in August 1975 USN forces had been in the vicinity in case an evacuation operation became
necessary. By the end of March 1976, vessels from the Sixth Fleet, within 20 hours distance to
Lebanon were re-alerted for a possible evacuation. On 3 May 1976, the USS America (CV 66)
was deployed to the Eastern Mediterranean in support of Operation FLUID DRIVE, a
contingency operation for a possible evacuation mission of U.S. citizens and other foreign
nationals. A state of readiness persisted for next three months. For its part, the Soviet
Mediterranean fleet monitored events closely, as it had during the Yom-Kippur crisis. The
evacuation began on 20 June 1976 after the assassination of the U.S. ambassador to Lebanon.
USMC with the help of USN forces evacuated 263 Americans and other foreign nationals from
Beirut to the USS Spiegel Grove (LSD-32) which brought them to Greece. After the successful
operation the carrier departed for Italy on 2 August. On 28 July 308 more U.S. and foreign
nationals were evacuated from Beirut via the USS Coronado (LPD-11) to Greece. The crisis
involved one aircraft carrier the USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67), later replaced with the USS
Independence (CV 62).
Additional Sources: Proceedings
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA
IIII

Lebanon
War
Lebanon
Lebanon
War

Dates
Civil 1/18/1976 – 11/15/1976, 298

U.S. Response
2

August 1975, 367
Civil 8/1/1975 - 7/28/1976, 363

USN, USMC
1 CV'S & Amp
Lebanon,
NEO
(plans only)
USN, USMC
Lebanon, NEO
USN,
USMC,
USAF
Lebanon, NEO
USN,
USMC,
USAF

CNA
IIII

Lebanon

6/20/1976- 6/21/1976, 2

CNA
IIII

Lebanon

7/27/1976 - 7/27/1976, 1
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54. # 274: Poplar Tree; 8/17/1976 – 9/16/1976, 31
Two U.S. Army soldiers were killed in Korea while trying to cut down a poplar tree in the
demilitarized zone of Korea, triggering a crisis for the United States. The U.S. responded by
deploying a squadron of 20 F-111s and a navy task force to South Korea. In addition all U.S.
forces were put on DEFCON 3. The naval task force included the aircraft carrier Midway (CV
41) (this deployment force was comparable to that of the 1973 October-Yom Kippur crisis-war
and only slightly lower than that of the Cuban Missile crisis). The U.S. was determined to show
its resolve and to underscore its influence worldwide. This U.S. reaction triggered a crisis for
North Korea, which put its armed forces on alert. Operation PAUL BUNYAN consisted of
cutting down the tree in a sign of U.S. determination, an action that was protected from the air.
No violence was used. The ICB call this “the most dramatic show of U.S. force in Korea since
the Korean War” (ICB). The cutting of the tree, and North Korea’s statement recognizing the 17
August killings as a regretful incident, deescalated the tensions. The USS Midway carrier battle
group remained in the area of the Korea Strait until 8 September. The United States and North
Korea signed a new joint security area (JSA) agreement in early September which ended the
crisis (16 September).
Additional Sources: Proceedings
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA
IIII

Dates
Poplar Tree
8/17/1976 – 9/16/1976, 31
Korean
Tree 8/19/76, 21
Incident
Paul Bunyan
8/18/1976 - 8/21/1976, 4

U.S. Response
Ships involved
3
USN,
USAF, 1 CV & NO Amp
USARMY
South Korea, Show
of Force USN,
USAF, USARMY

55. # 282 Ogaden II; 7/22/1977 – 3/14/1978, 236
The Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) invaded Ogaden on 22 July 1977. This attack
triggered a crisis for Ethiopia. In October, Somalia came close to victory, having secured most of
the Ogaden territory, but the USSR reacted by providing weapons, military advisers, and Cuban
troops from Angola, to Ethiopia. This allowed Ethiopia to launch counterattacks, defeating the
Somali Army, despite U.S. military aid to the latter. The Somali retreat from the Ogaden territory
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was announced on 9 March 1978 and finished five days later, ending the crisis. The USN became
involved only in February 1978. Following the collapse of the Somali Army in Ogaden, the USS
Kitty Hawk (CV 63) battle group was ordered to a holding point north of Singapore in February,
in case the CVBG should be needed for U.S. citizen evacuation and to conduct surveillance
operations to monitor the situation. The ship was released on 23 March 1978.
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA
III

Ogaden II
Ogaden War
Ogaden War

Dates
7/22/1977 – 3/14/1978, 236
February 1978, 51
2/1/1978 - 3/23/1978, 51

U.S. Response
Ships involved
3
USN, USAF
1 CV & NO Amp
Somalia,
Cont.
Posit.
USN

56. # 294: Nicaragua Civil War; 9/10/1978 – 7/17/1979, 311
Guerillas invaded Nicaragua from Costa Rica on 10 September 1978. Nicaragua, fearing the
threatened overthrow of its government launched a counterattack. Because Costa Rica did not
have an official army, it signed a mutual aid agreement with Venezuela and received weapons
from Panama. Nicaragua overwhelmed the guerillas on 25 September and on the same day
agreed to the U.S. mediation offer. By mid-January it had become evident that the mediation
efforts were not progressing and in early February the U.S. ended military support for Nicaragua.
The OAS and the UN Assembly both condemned Nicaragua for repressing its citizens and
endangering its neighbors. The crisis continued with occasional clashes until 27 May 1979 when
a further guerilla infiltration from Costa Rica was defeated by Nicaragua. The Somoza
government had become isolated and on 4 June the OAS agreed on a resolution requesting a
democratic regime for Nicaragua. In mid-July the OAS approved the installation of a left-wing
revolutionary junta and when President Somoza fled on 17 July the crisis ended.
USN surface ships from the Atlantic Fleet were engaged in surveillance operations off the West
coast of Nicaragua. The Washington Star had reported in July that the amphibious ship USS
Saipan (LHA 2) was in position off the coast off Nicaragua in case U.S. citizens needed
evacuation following the fall of the Somoza government
Additional Sources: Proceedings
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ICB
CNA I
CNA
III

Nicaragua
War
Nicaragua
Nicaragua
Strife

CNA
III

Nicaragua
War
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Dates
Civil 9/10/1978 – 7/17/1979, 311

U.S. Response
3

9/16/1978, 16
Civil 9/16/1978 - 9/30/1978, 15

USN, USAF
O CV & NO Amp
Nicaragua, Cont.
Posit.
USN
Nicaragua,
NEO
USN,
USMC,
USAF,

Civil 06/12/1979 – 08/31/1979, 81

Ships involved

57. # 298: Sino-Vietnam War; 12/25/1978 – 3/15/1979, 81
China was drawn into a crisis when Vietnam crossed the Cambodian border on 25 December
1978 and reacted with a counter-invasion of Vietnam on 17 February 1979. After more clashes,
justified as punishment for Vietnamese aggression, China withdrew on 15 March. This ended the
crisis. The U.S. sent six USN ships into the South China Sea, including the USS Constellation
(CV 64) battle group, to observe the development of the crisis in a contingent positioning
operation.
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA
III

Dates
Sino-Vietnam War 12/25/1978 – 3/15/1979, 81
China-Vietnam
2/25/1979, 6
China Invasion of 2/25/1979 - 3/3/1979, 7
Vietnam

U.S. Response
2
USN
China, Cont. Posit
USN

Ships involved
1 CV & NO Amp

58. # 301: North-South Yemen II; 2/24/1979 – 3/30/1979, 35
The lingering border conflict between the two Yemens worsened. This crisis was triggered when
North Yemen accused South Yemen of attacking Northern territory and forwarded a complaint
to the U.S. Ambassador, the League of Arab States (LAS), and the UN on 24 February 1979.
North Yemen retaliated with a counterattack. Saudi Arabia tried to maintain their good relations
with the North and to improve them with South Yemen, but alerted its troops as a precautionary
measure. The U.S. supplied the YAR with Saudi-financed weapons; while the Soviet Union
provided arms to the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDYR). The LAS supported the
mediation effort and brought about a cease-fire agreement, consequently broken by both parties.
After a second cease-fire agreement the Yemeni troops began to withdraw on 18 March. On 30
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March the two countries agreed to unite as one country. With this action the crisis ended. As a
result of the Yemen crisis, the U.S. planned to send military equipment to Saudi Arabia to
reimburse what the latter had given to North Yemen. In early March 1979 the United States sent
the USS Constellation (CV 64) and two escorts from Subic Bay to the Arabian Sea for
observation. CNA I assumes the naval force was also deployed to reassure Saudi Arabia and
underscore its intent to remain in the region, despite the revolution in Iran. The crisis abated after
some weeks.
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA
III

North-South
Yemen
Yemen
NO DATA

Dates
2/24/1979 – 3/30/1979, 35

U.S. Response
3

Ships involved

3/6/79, 93

USN, USAF

1 CV & NO Amp

59. # 303: Afghanistan Invasion; 3/77/1979 – 2/28/1980, 351
The Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States were involved in this crisis. After
the fall of the monarchy in Afghanistan, a revolutionary council of three leaders - politically left
oriented with ties to the Soviet Union - took power. The leader of the People's Democratic Party
of Afghanistan (PDPA) became the new President. In March 1979 Afghan Muslims rebelled
against the regime in the so called Herat Uprising. The Soviet Union, determined to defend the
communist forces in Afghanistan, faced a crisis. The Afghan regime replaced the leader of the
PDPA with Amin, in a move that affronted the Soviet Union and deepened the crisis for
Afghanistan which feared Soviet interference. In December 1979 Soviet forces invaded
Afghanistan. The new PDPA leader was killed in late December and the crisis as it affected
Afghanistan and the Soviet Union abased. Yet events extended the crisis to the United States and
Pakistan, the former stopped exports to the Soviet Union, boycotted the Olympic Games in
Moscow and supplied the anti-soviet rebels with weapons. These actions blunted the crisis for
the United States. For Pakistan the crisis ended with U.S. reassurance of support and military aid.
The events in the Middle East brought strategic changes for the U.S. Navy. Towards the end of
1979, in light of the Iran hostage crisis and the Afghanistan invasion by Soviet troops, US naval
concentrations were deployed to the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea including the USS
Midway (CV 41) (late October) and one month later the USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) (late
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November), bringing the U.S. naval force in the Indian Ocean to two aircraft carrier battle
groups. Because of the Soviet Afghanistan invasion, the United States decided to maintain this
level of presence.
Additional Sources: Astor 2006, 187 – 189
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA

Afghanistan
Invasion
Afghan/Iran
Hostages
Afghan/Iran
Hostages

Dates
3/77/1979 – 2/28/1980, 351

U.S. Response
3

10/9/79, 472

USN,
USMC, 2 CV's & Amp
USAF, USARMY
Iran, Afghanistan,
Show of Force
USN,
USMC,
USAF, USARMY

10/9/1979 - 1/23/1981, 472

Ships involved

60. # 309: U.S. Hostages in Iran; 11/4/1979 – 1/20/1981, 443
On 4 November 1979 radical Iranian students seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran, taking
everybody hostage. The leader of the Revolution, which had overthrown the pro-Western Shah
regime, Ayatollah Khomeini gave his tacit approval. The students demanded unsuccessfully the
surrender of the Shah, who at that time was in the United States for medical treatment. Three
hostages were released from captivity on 19 November, and ten more on 20 November. After
months of negotiation and fruitless mediation, the United States committed to a secret rescue
mission Operation EAGLE CLAW/EVENING LIGHT in an attempt to free the hostages (24
April 1980). The eight helicopters in the rescue mission departed from the deck of the USS
Nimitz (CV 68). Unfortunately the operation was not successful and had to be aborted. All
hostages remained in captivity. Only after the inauguration of the new President Ronald Reagan
did Iran agree to release the remaining fifty-three hostages on 20 January 1981, after being held
captive for 444 days.
As mentioned previously (Afghanistan Invasion crisis) the USN augmented its presence in the
region by permanently deploying two aircraft carrier battle groups to the Indian Ocean and
Arabian Sea. The USS Midway (CV 41) was moved to the region in late October, followed by the
USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63), who extended its cruise in late November 1979. This was the first time
since World War II that the U.S. Navy had two carrier task forces in the Indian Ocean in
response to crises. On 21 December 1979, the Defense Department announced a three-ship
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nuclear-powered carrier battle group from the Sixth Fleet would deploy to the Indian Ocean to
relieve the Seventh Fleet carrier battle group led by Kitty Hawk. The USS Nimitz arrived in the
Arabian Sea on 22 January 1980. At the end of 1979 the USS Forestall (CV 59) had relieved
Nimitz in Italy so the nuclear-powered carrier could move to the Middle East in response to the
hostage crisis. Forestall remained the only aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean. The Midway
was relieved by the Coral Sea (CV 43) on 5 February 1980 which remained in the Indian Ocean
until 30 April when she was succeeded by the USS Constellation (CV 64). In the beginning of
May the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CV 69), coming from Norfolk, VA, relieved the USS
Nimitz.
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA

CNA

Dates
US Hostages in 11/4/1979 – 1/20/1981, 443
Iran
Afghan/Iran
10/9/1979, 472
Hostages
Afghan/Iran
10/9/1979 - 1/23/1981, 472
Hostages
Desert One

4/24/1980 - 4/26/1980

U.S. Response
4

Ships involved

USN,
USMC, 2 CV's & Amp
USAF, USARMY
Iran, Afghanistan,
Show of Force
USN,
USMC,
USAF, USARMY
Iran, Combat
USN,
USMC,
USAF

61. # 315: Solidarity; 8/14/1980 – 12/13/1981, 486
A crisis developed between Poland and the Soviet Union when a large number of Polish ship
builders went on strike on 14 August 1980 in Gdansk. The workers demanded labor reforms and
greater civil rights. The strike led to the creation of Solidarity, the free national trade union.
While the Polish government denounced the strike and the demands posed by the workers an
agreement was reached at the end of August. Subsequently East Germany and Czechoslovakia
were thrown into crisis by the apparent political concessions made to the striking workers by the
so-called “Gdanks Accords”. The Communist countries demanded a harder line by Polish
government in handling the matter. In December 1981 Poland arrested almost the entire
leadership of Solidarity, outlawed the Solidarity trade union and enacted martial law, thereby
terminating the crisis for the four communist crisis actors. The United States provided AWACS
aircraft to the NATO to monitor the border situation and expressed its overall concern. “In
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December 1980, 963rd Airborne Air Control Squadron crews on temporary duty at Keflavik
Naval Air Station, Iceland, redeployed to Ramstein Air Base, West Germany, in response to
heightening tensions in Poland. Linking up with NATO groundbased radar sites, the operation,
called Exercise Creek Sentry, monitored East European air activity during the crisis”
(globalsecurity).
Additional Sources: Global Security: Creek Sentry
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA
III

Poland
Creek Sentry

Dates
8/14/1980 – 12/13/1981, 486
12/9/1980, 24
10/1/80 - 5/1/81, 144

U.S. Response
2
USN, USAF
Poland,
Reconnaissance
USN, USAF

Ships involved
0 CV & NO Amp

62. # 317 Onset Iran-Iraq War; 9/17/1980 – 11/30/1980, 75
When Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, U.S. support was mostly directed towards Saudi Arabia and its
safety, provided in the form of air defense. Safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz against the
possibility of Iranian mining was another concern. Saddam Hussein’s announcement of Iraqi
sovereignty over the Shatt-al-Arab triggered the first intrawar crisis for Iran on 17 September
1980. A few days later Iraq occupied a large part of the border area, virtually closing off Iranian
access to its main oil refinery in Abadan. Additionally Iraqi forces launched air attacks on
Iranian air and army bases, which precipitated counter strikes. Simultaneously Iraqi forces
invaded Iranian territory in the region of its main oil facilities. The next weeks were marked by
constant attacks and counterattacks. The crisis for Iran ended when Iran’s president declared the
successful expulsion of Iraqi troops. Iraq unofficially accepted the stalemate on 30 November.
Officially the U.S. adopted a position of ostensible neutrality but in the light of the threat to the
oil facilities and to oil supplies to the Western world, the U.S., U.K., France and Australia
deployed warships to the Strait of Hormuz. On 11 October MIDEASTFOR was reinforced and
by mid-October about 60 warships of the four countries were in the region to avert a disruption
of the oil supplies. In late September, 4 USAF AWACS aircraft had been deployed to Saudi
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Arabia. By February 1981 the United States had decided to augment its naval forces in the Indian
Ocean and to maintain a two aircraft carrier battle group13 strength.
Additional Sources: Gaffney 2002, 5
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA
III

Dates
Onset Iran – Iraq 9/17/1980 – 11/30/1980, 75
War
Iran – Iraq War
9/30/1980, 125
Iran – Iraq War
9/30/1980, 125

U.S. Response
3

Ships involved

USN, USAF
2 CV’s & Amp
Iraq, Show of Force
USN

63. # 327: Al-Biqa Missiles I; 4/28/1981 – 7/24/1981, 88
The crisis began when Israeli forces shot down two helicopters on their route to supply Syrian
troops on 28 April 1981. The Syrian retaliation on Christian militias in Lebanon prompted Israel
to destroy the Syrian missile bases. “Both Israel and Syria accused each other of violating the
1976 Red Line agreement: by the use of Syrian air power against any party to the civil war and
the introduction of missiles into Lebanon; and by Israel's intervention in the civil war with air
power far north of the Israel/Lebanon border” (ICB, Al-Biqa Missiles I, Crisis Summary). The
United States was actively involved and sent Philip Habib as main mediator to settle the dispute
on 5 May. Two days earlier the U.S. deployed the USS Forrestal (CV 59) battle group and the
Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group to the Eastern Mediterranean. The USS Independence
(CV 62) carrier group, transiting from the Indian Ocean through the Suez Canal, was kept in the
Eastern Mediterranean (until 26 May) to support U.S. crisis resolution efforts. To demonstrate its
disapproval of the continuing bombing, the U.S. halted the delivery of F-16 planes to Israel.
They were released after the cease-fire. The mediation and U.S. pressure greatly contributed to
the establishment of the cease-fire. With the cease-fire in effect the crisis over the Al-Biqa valley
ended for Israel and Syria (24 July). The USS Forrestal was released after 53 day whereas the
amphibious forces were on alert until 14 September when it became apparent that evacuation
operations would not be necessary.
Dataset
ICB
13

Al-Biby Missiles I

Dates
4/28/1981 – 7/24/1981, 88

U.S. Response
2

I was not able to determine the names of the involved aircraft carriers
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5/3/1981, 135
5/3/1981 – 9/14/1981, 135

USN, USMC
2 CV’s & Amp
Syria, Contingent
Positioning
USN, USMC

64. # 330: Gulf of Syrte I; 8/12/1981 – 9/1/1981, 21
The Sixth Fleet announced its intention to conduct maneuvers in the Mediterranean, and posed a
crisis for Libya which alerted its armed forces (12 August 1981). On 18 August Libya claimed
U.S. naval forces had entered Libyan territory by the Gulf of Syrte, where the two aircraft
carriers USS Forestall (CV 59) and USS Nimitz (CV 68), four cruiser, four destroyers, four
frigates, and two destroyer escorts performed open ocean missile exercises. The U.S. had
deployed the naval forces to challenge Libya’s claim to the Gulf of Syrte and the maneuvers
were held to demonstrate that ”America has the muscle to back up its words”. U.S. aircraft from
both carriers had to intercept Libyan aircraft multiple times. On 19 August, USN pilots shot
down two Libyan fighters who had threatened the USS Nimitz. Libya’s ruler Qaddahfi threatened
to attack American nuclear bases in the Mediterranean were the USN again to enter Libyan
territorial waters. The crisis suddenly ended on 1 September 1981.
Dataset
ICB

Gulf of Syrte I

Dates
8/12/1981 – 9/1/1981, 21

U.S. Response
4

Ships involved

CNA I

Libya

8/1/1981, 20

USN

CNA
III

Libya

8/1/1981 - 8/20/1981, 20

Libya, Cont. Posit
USN

2 CV's & NO
Amp

65. # 337: War in Lebanon; 6/5/1982 – 5/17/1983, 347
Israel attacked the PLO in South Lebanon and invaded Lebanese territory on 5 June 1982. This
rapid progression of the invasion deepened the crisis for Syria. Although Israel and Syrian had
agreed on a cease-fire with the help of U.S. mediation, fighting erupted again on 11 June. The
MARG was ordered to deploy to the Eastern Mediterranean in June and the aircraft USS John F.
Kennedy (CV 67) was sent to the region to stand by for possible evacuation operations of U.S.
and other foreign nationals from Beirut. The ship remained on station until relieved on 17 June
by the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CV 69). The U.S. Embassy advised all U.S. citizens to leave
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Lebanon and closed the embassy on 24 June. U.S. citizens were evacuated and transported to
ships of the Sixth Fleet which brought them to Cyprus. In July the U.S. halted military aid
deliveries to Israel to demonstrate their disapproval of Israel’s activities. In August the situation
worsened and the MARG had to stand ready in case of the deployment as part of the
peacekeeping force and to support the evacuation of PLO forces from Beirut. With the help of
U.S. mediation, the crisis between Syrian and Israel was resolved by September. On 22
September the MARG was ordered to Lebanon together with 2 aircraft carriers to support U.S.
Marines ashore. The USS America (CV 66) arrived off the coast of Lebanon on 2 January and
was relieved by the USS Nimitz (CV 68) on 20 January 1983. In February the alert level was
lowered again. The United States was actively involved and ready to deploy military forces to
Lebanon if necessary. Direct talks between the governments of Israel and Lebanon under U.S.
auspices led to a peace agreement in May 1983.
The presence of U.S. (and other nations’) naval forces helped to limit the conflict in Beirut by
preventing a threatened Israeli attack on Beirut itself. The presence of naval forces also
supported the diplomatic efforts by the United States besides providing helicopter transportation
for the U.S. mediators during their shuttle diplomacy.
Additional Sources: Proceedings
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA I
CNA I
CNA
III
CNA
III
CNA
III

Dates
6/5/1982 – 5/17/1983, 347
6/8/1982, 45
8/10/1982, 30

War in Lebanon
Israel Invasion
Peacekeeping
Force
Palestine
9/22/1982, 143
Massacre
Israel Invasion of 6/8/1982 - 7/22/1982, 45
Lebanon
Evac. of PLO-Leb. 8/10/1982 - 9/9/1982, 31
Palestine
Massacre

9/22/1982 - 2/28/1984, 515
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2
USN, USMC
USN, USMC

Ships involved

USN, USMC

2 CV’s & Amp

Lebanon, NEO
USN, USMC
Lebanon, NEO
USN,
USMC,
USAF
Lebanon, Show of
Force
USN, USMC

1 CV & Amp
2 CV’s & Amp
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66. # 340: Libya Threat to Sudan; 2/11/1983 – 2/22/1983, 12
Signs of an increase of military forces in Libya threatened crises in Sudan and Egypt. Sudan
feared a Libyan attempt to remove the Numeiri regime and filed a complaint with the UN while
alerting its armed forces. Egypt and Sudan had been part of a mutual defense agreement since
1976 and had signed a Charter of Integration in October 1982. Egypt placed forces along its
Syrian borders in case they needed to be deployed to Sudan. The United States became involved
militarily on 17 February. The aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CV 68) was deployed to the Red Sea
to monitor the crisis off the coasts of Sudan and Egypt and delivered four multipurpose AWACS
reconnaissance planes to Egypt. This U.S. reaction prompted a military expansion in Libya. The
meeting of the Presidents of Sudan and Egypt on 22 February reduced tensions and ended the
crisis for all actors. The U.S. asserted its interest through a show of force mission but without
needing to assemble ground troops.
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA
III

Dates
Libya Threat to 2/11/1983 – 2/22/1983, 12
Sudan
Libya-Sudan
2/14/1983, 11
Early Call/Libya
2/14/1983 - 2/28/1973, 15

U.S. Response
3
USN
Egypt, Show
Force
USN, USAF

Ships involved

of

1 CV & NO Amp

67. # 342: Chad – Libya VI; 6/24/1983 - 12/11/1984, 536
Continued fighting between separatists and Libyan invaders in Chad and Sudan resulted in
another crisis in June 1983. On 24 June Libyan-backed forces occupied a city in Northern Chad.
France warned that it would not stand idle in the face of Libyan aggression. Together with Zaire,
it supplied weapons for Chad. Chad renewed its accusations of Libyan intrusion and the OAS
demanded a cease-fire, a Libyan retreat from Chad, and negotiations. Parallel to diplomatic
efforts, Chad launched a counteroffensive on 9 July that brought on Libyan air strikes. In turn,
French troops were deployed to Chad in Operation MANTA. Peace talks and reconciliation
efforts by the OAU were unrewarding. At the end of April, Qaddhafi proposed a withdrawal
plan, which France accepted. Five months later the proposal was put into effect and by 12
November the crisis had ended. The United States had reacted by increasing military aid to Chad
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and by placing the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D Eisenhower (CV 69) in a state of alert in the
Gulf of Syrte.
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA
IIII

Chad – Libya IV
Libya-Chad
Libya/Chad

Dates
6/24/1983 - 12/11/1984, 536
8/1/1983, 16
7/25/1983 - 12/31/1983, 160

U.S. Response
Ships involved
3
USN
1 CV & NO Amp
Chad, Peace Op Military Supply
USN, USAF

68. # 343: Invasion of Grenada; 10/19/1983 – 10/28/1983, 10
Maurice Bishop, the former prime minister of Grenada, had been placed under house arrest, been
freed on 19 October 1983, and shortly thereafter, together with close supporters, murdered.
Ostensibly fearing a threat to its influence in the region and to the safety of American citizens in
Grenada, the United States showed concern. In response to a request for help by the Organization
of East Caribbean States, the United States sent to the region a naval task force, including the
aircraft carrier Independence and assault ship Guam (LPH 9). The Independence CVBG had
been en route to the Mediterranean for a regularly scheduled deployment. However, according to
Christopher Wright this deployment had been hardly routine, being more likely undertaken in
anticipation of the developments in Grenada. Because of its prior proximity to the Caribbean, the
naval task force was immediately on the scene. This triggered a crisis for Grenada. On 25
October, in Operation Urgent Fury, U.S. naval, Marine, and Army forces invaded Grenada.
Marines were airlifted to the island. When it was clear that American students were not in
danger, the objectives of the operation shifted to the restoration of democratic government to
Grenada and the elimination of alleged Cuban intervention in Grenada. By 28 October the U.S.
troops had accomplished their mission, and by 4 November Independence finally departed for
the Mediterranean.
As Gaffney observed: “The U.S. had been watching the island anxiously as the Soviets built an
airfield, using Cuban labor, ostensibly to bring in tourists, but which the U.S. thought was to be a
Soviet airbase threatening the approaches to the Panama Canal. The U.S. seized upon an
incident—a Marxist coup, using the excuse of protecting and evacuating American medical
students—to invade 6 days after the coup. Grenada was a convenient distance from CONUS. The

61

Seaborne Crisis Response

Appendix A. Crises Summaries

U.S. had plenty of warning; the surprise was how ill-planned the invasion turned out to be”
(Gaffney 2002, 7).
Additional Sources: Gaffney 2002, 7, Marolda 2000, Morales 1994, 80 - 81
Dataset
ICB
CNA I

Invasion
Grenada
Grenada

CNA

Urgent Fury

Dates
of 10/19/1983 – 10/28/1983, 10
10/20/1983,23
10/20/1983 - 12/14/1983, 55

U.S. Response
4

Ships involved

USN,
USMC, 1 CV & NO Amp
USAF, USARMY
Grenada, Combat
USN,
USMC,
USAF, USARMY

69. # 344: Able Archer; 11/2/1983 – 11/11/1983, 914
On 2 November 1983 the Soviet Union shot down Korean Air Lines Flight 007 which had flown
through Soviet airspace, killing all 269 crew members and passengers. The Soviets could not
identify the plane and chose to destroy the aircraft. Immediately after the downing, USN vessels
from the Seventh Fleet, USAF aircraft and ships of the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency were
deployed to the area looking for debris and demonstrating U.S. presence. The Able Archer crisis
occurred only on 2 November with the start of NATO military exercises but it is often linked
with the downing of KAL 007. “Able Archer” refers to the test of “nuclear release mechanisms
in case of a nuclear first strike against the Soviet bloc” (ICB, Able Archer, Crisis Summary). The
Soviet Union however perceived the exercise as a prelude of an actual attack and put its nuclear
fighters on alert. The United States and other NATO members claimed to be surprised by the
Soviet misinterpretation and reaction. The exercise ended on 11 November without any military
confrontations and the associated tensions subsided. The mentioned naval deployment was
triggered by the downing of the KAL 007 and naval forces remained in the region in a show of
force after the search and rescue operation ended on 5 September.
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA

Dates
Able Archer
11/2/1983 – 11/11/1983, 9
KAL 007
9/1/1983, 66
KAL 007 Shot 9/1/1983 - 11/6/1983, 67

14

U.S. Response
Ships involved
4
USN, USAF
0 CV & NO Amp
Soviet
Union,

Because Able Archer and the KAL 007 Shot Down are not the same crisis this case is excluded from the statistical
analysis.
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Down

Show of Force
USN, USAF

70. # 348: Basra-Kharg Island; 2/21/1984 – 7/11/1984, 141
During the Iran-Iraq War, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were pulled into the conflict in a series of
minor incidents between 21 February 1984 and 11 July 1984. In February 1984, Iran captured
the oil drilling facility on Majnoon Island in Southern Iraq, and then attempted to intercept the
Basra-Baghdad road. Iraqi forces counterattacked on Iranian oil facilities on Kharg Island. Over
the next week Iraq recaptured the positions held by Iranian forces ending the crisis for Iraq on 18
March. When a Kuwaiti oil tanker was hit near Bahrain, Kuwait was drawn into the crisis (13
May) with its claim that Iran was responsible. In turn, Iran threatened the safe passage of all
shipping in the Gulf if Iranian access to Kharg Island was not guaranteed. This declaration set in
motion the tanker war. When a Saudi ship was attacked within Saudi territorial waters by Iranian
aircraft, Saudi Arabia was then implicated in the confrontation. Kuwait sought U.S. Stinger
antiaircraft missiles and U.S. naval escorts for the protection of Kuwaiti tankers. The Saudi
response was more forceful. On 5 June, with the help of U.S. advanced early-warning (AWACS)
reconnaissance planes, Saudi forces shot down an Iranian F-4 fighter. For Iran, the crisis ended
with the signing of an agreement with Iraq precluding the shelling of civilian areas. Saudi Arabia
for its part formed an air defense zone, and Kuwaiti signed an arms deal with the Soviet Union.
The crisis led to a renewed U.S. commitment of a continuous aircraft carrier presence in the
North Arabian Sea. In late May, MIDEASTFOR ships began to escort U.S. merchant ships
because of the escalating violence in the region and the USS Enterprise (CV 68) was dispatched
as a show of U.S. resolve.
Throughout the Iran-Iraq War, U.S. military forces remained forward deployed in the Persian
Gulf. The intensity of the commitment varied. In general naval forces protected shipping and
cleared mines. But especially this intra-war crisis enlarged USN involvement. Future naval
operations such as the Earnest Will escort operations of 1987-1988, played an important role in
preventing the spread of the war into other states of the region, but were not in direct reaction to
an intra-war crisis and are therefore excluded.
Additional Sources: Proceedings
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Dates
2/21/1984 – 7/11/1984, 141

U.S. Response
3

April 1984, 245
USN, USAF
04/01/1984 – 11/30/1984, USN, Show
244
Force, Iraq

Ships involved

of

1 CV & NO Amp

71. # 354: Nicaragua MIG-21S; 11/6/1984 – 11/12/1984, 7
On the day Ronald Reagan was elected President of the United States, intelligence identified a
Soviet vessel en route to Nicaragua with MIG-21s destined for the Sandinistas and some
members of the new government feared a repetition of the Cuban Missile Crisis. U.S. military
exercises in Honduras were immediately intensified and the U.S. Navy increased its presence
operations in the Central America region as a show of force and to deter Nicaraguan aggression.
With the Soviet Union confirmation that no jet fighter aircraft were aboard the vessel, and the
official United States acknowledgment that it had no plans to intervene in Nicaragua, the crisis
ended. (Even earlier, U.S. naval presence had been intensified during the election period in El
Salvador and to demonstrate U.S. commitment to Central America. The operation starting in
March 1984 included the CVBG America (CV 66).)
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA
III

Dates
MIG- 11/6/1984 – 11/12/1984, 7

Nicaragua
21S
Central America
3/13/1984, 264
Central America 5/13/84 – 11/26/84, 259
CV Presence

U.S. Response
3

Ships involved

USN, USMC
1 CV & Amp
Nicaragua, Show of
Force
USN

72. # 358: Egypt Air Hijacking; 11/23/1985 – 12/3/1985, 11
On 23 November 1985 an Egypt Air flight bound for Athens was hijacked. The terrorists were
members of the “Egypt Revolution”, a group opposed to President Mubarak and supposedly part
of the anti-Arafat “Al-Fatah Revolutionary Command”. Libyan involvement was suspected.
Egypt’s forces were deployed along the Libyan border in a state of high alert. The hijacked
plane, running out of fuel, landed in Malta. Refused refueling led the terrorists to segregate the
passengers by nationality. They then shot into a group of Western European, North American,
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Australian, and Israeli passport holders killing one hostage. Egypt sent elite troops to Malta on
24 November in a force that included three U.S. officers to storm the airplane. During the assault
on the terrorists 60 people died. Egypt did not retaliate against Libya and the crisis subsided (3
December”. In a contingency operation USN vessels, including the USS Coral Sea (CV 43), were
deployed to the waters off Malta during the stand-off.
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA
III

Egypt
Hijacking
Egypt
Hijacking
Egypt
Hijacking

Dates
Air 11/23/1985 – 12/3/1985, 11

U.S. Response
3

Ships involved

Air 11/23/1985, 3

USN

1 CV & NO Amp

Air 11/23/1985 - 11/25/1985, 3

Malta, Response to
Terrorism
USN

73. # 363: Gulf of Syrte II; 3/24/1986 – 4/21/1986, 21
At the end of December 1985 two major terrorist attacks took place in the airports of Rome and
Vienna. Libya was accused of funding the attacks, and all U.S. citizens were advised to leave
Libya in January 1986. All exchange between the two governments was cancelled. The United
States decided to dispatch a second carrier battle group to the Mediterranean. Operations near
Libya began at the end of January and again in February without any incidents. On 24 March
1986 the aircraft carriers USS America (CV 66), USS Coral Sea (CV 43), and USS Saratoga (CV
60) advanced into the Gulf of Syrte, ostensibly to engage in freedom of navigation exercises.
Libya claimed the Gulf as Libyan territory in 1973 and U.S. naval aircraft came under fire
although without suffering any damage. The U.S. retaliated by sinking two Libyan patrol boats.
The last two days of the exercise "Attain Document III" ended on 27 March without further
incidents. When an explosion occurred on board a TWA flight from Rome to Athens on 2 April,
tensions returned. The U.S. assumed Libyan involvement, Libya denied the charges. On 5 April
1986 a bomb exploded in the La Belle Discotheque in West Berlin. Two U.S. soldiers and one
Turkish woman died and many others were injured. Libya never publicly admitted its role but
intelligence suggested Libyan involvement. Fearing U.S. retaliation, Libya threatened to kill
Americans indiscriminately and to take all foreigners in Libya hostage. The U.S. was
unsuccessful in dissuading Libya from the path of terrorism. Given the evidence of the West
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Berlin bomb involvement, the United States decided to launch military strikes against terroristrelated sites in Libya. On 14 April 1986 Operation EL DORADO CANYON was executed. The
USAF with the help of aircraft from the USS America and USS Coral Sea carried out air strikes
against Libya. This action terminated the crisis for the United States. A declaration of the UN
Security Council condemning the U.S. strikes on 21 April was vetoed by the U.S. and the U.K.
Operation EL DORADO CANYON had two goals; first, to compel Libyan support of terrorism
and second, to deter Gaddafi from resuming any form of support in the future.
Additional Sources: Gaffney 2002, 5, Till 2009, 265 – 266
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA I
CNA
III
CNA
III

Gulf of Syrte II
OVL-FON Ops
La Belle Disco,
Libya
OVL-FON Ops
El Dorado Canyon

Dates
3/24/1986 – 4/21/1986, 21
January 1986, 85
4/10/1986, 6

U.S. Response
4
USN
USN, USAF

1/26/86 - 4/28/86, 93

Libya, Response to
terrorism
USN
Libya, Combat
USN,
USMC,
USAF

4/9/1986 - 4/19/1986, 11

Ships involved
3 CV & NO Amp
2 CV's & NO
Amp

74. # 383: Contras III; 3/6/1988 – 3/28/1988, 2315
On 6 March 1988 Nicaragua attacked Contra camps on Honduran territory. Nicaragua denied the
Honduran allegation and sought a UN and OAS investigation, although no observers were
dispatched. Honduras asked the United States for support which was granted by dispatching
troops and arms. Nicaraguan troops near the border were attacked by Honduran fighter planes,
threatening further fighting should Nicaragua not withdraw. With the withdrawal of Nicaraguan
forces on 17 March, the crisis began to fade and was terminated once all U.S. troops left the
region on 28 March.
In the operation JITTERY PROP the U.S. conducted electronic surveillance operations off
Central America throughout the 1980 to interdict possible arms smuggling by the Nicaragua
Sandinistas to rebels in El Salvador. According to Roth an involvement of JITTERY PROP in
the crisis is possible but not confirmed. The USS Sphinx spent most of its time during 1985-1987
Because it USN involvement in this crisis cannot be confirmed with sufficient certainty this case is excluded from
the statistical analyses.

15
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in the Gulf of Fonseca off the coast of Nicaragua and El Salvador intercepting military and
guerrilla communications. The vessel monitored suspected shipping, intercepted communications
and encrypted messages, and probed the shore surveillance and air-to-air defense capabilities of
the other nations.
Additional Sources: Gaffney (Email exchange), Roth (Email exchange)
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA

Name
Contras III
NO DATA
Jittery Prop

Dates
3/6/1988 – 3/28/1988, 23

U.S. Response
3

1/8/88 - 12/14/88, 342

El Salvador, Cont.
Posit
USN

Ships involved

75. # 391: Invasion of Panama; 12/15/1989 – 1/3/1990, 26
Tensions between Panama and the United States had been increasing for some time over the
revised Panama Canal treaties and General Noriega. The installation of Noriega as the new head
of government in Panama on 15 December 1989 brought matters to a head. Random harassments
of U.S. personnel culminated in the killing of a Marine officer and the abuse of the wife of a
navy officer and a declaration of a state of war by Panama.
Displays of U.S. military strength, U.S. economic sanctions, mediation attempts by other
countries and an attempted coup failed to oust Noriega from power. Thus on 17 December the
United States invaded Panama in Operation JUST CAUSE to protect the lives of U.S. citizens, to
uphold democracy, to capture Noriega, and to safeguard the Panama Canal treaties. The U.S.
overthrew the Noriega Regime, who stood down on 3 January and a new regime was installed.
All military services were deployed to support the operation. U.S. naval involvement included a
ship held in a MODLOC (Miscellaneous Operational Details, Local Operations) off the coast of
Panama. The U.S. deployment of Special Forces (4’000 amongst them many Navy SEALs) was
the largest since the Vietnam War. Morales (1994) describes “the Panamanian intervention (…)
as an important transition from 'Monroe militarism' and Reagan's 'containment militarism' to
Bush's 'New World Order militarism'. Panama invokes the new model of post-Cold War military
policing actions”.
Additional Sources: Astor 2006, 222 – 223, Morales 1994
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Dates
of 12/15/1989 – 1/3/1990, 26

CNA I

Invasion
Panama
Panama Elections

5/11/1989, 52

CNA I

Panama

12/20/89 34

CNA
III

Nimrod Dancer

3/18/1988 – 12/20/1989, 643

U.S. Response
4

Ships involved

USN,
USMC, 1 CV & Amp
USAF, USARMY
USN,
USMC, 0 CV& NO Amp
USAF,USARMY
Panama, Show of
Force
USN,
USMC,
USAF, USARMY

76. # 393: Gulf War; 8/2/1990 – 4/12/1991, 254
The Gulf War crisis erupted on 2 August 1990 with Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the United
States as the principal participants (Bahrain, Egypt, France, Israel, Oman, Qatar, Syria, United
Arab Emirates (UAE), the U.K., and the USSR were also involved). On 28 May Saddam Hussein
accused Kuwait and the UAE of launching an economic war against Iraq and Kuwait of stealing
Iraqi oil from the disputed oil field of Rumaila. Kuwait put its armed forces on alert and denied
the Iraqi allegation. On 23 July Iraqi forces were deployed to the Saudi Arabian border.
Mediation efforts between Iraq and Kuwait were unsuccessful and Iraq then mobilized forces
along the Kuwaiti border before invading the nation on 2 August. Four days later troops were
dispatched to the Saudi Arabian border. The U.S. responded to the threat to Kuwait and its oil
sources with a build-up of U.S. forces in the region, demanding that Iraq complies with the UN
resolution and withdraws from Kuwait. Iraq’s response was to formally announce the annexing
of Kuwait. Over the next weeks several UN resolutions were passed. In late October the U.S.
began unilateral air and naval strikes and more troops were sent to the Gulf region over the next
weeks. On 29 November the UN Security Council resolution 678 authorized “the use (of) all
necessary mean” to coerce Iraq to comply with earlier resolutions, by no later than 15 January
1991. When the deadline had passed, a coalition of states participated in operation DESERT
STORM, launched on 24 February to free Kuwait with military force. On 8 April the Iraqi forces
were thrown out of Kuwait. A formal cease-fire was in effect as of 12 April.
Even before the outbreak of the crisis U.S. naval forces were active in the region. In response to
Iraqi’s growing pressure on Kuwait, Middle East Force ships engaged in an exercise with the
United Arab Emirates, involving five MEF ships and three USAF aircraft (24 July 1990). The
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forces remained in theater on higher alert during the period prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
But despite the combined U.S.-U.A.E. exercise, Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. During
this crisis and war the U.S. Navy played an important role in deciding the outcome. The USN
also received assistance from the British, Royal Saudi, and Kuwaiti Navy. When the crisis began
the USN was already on station with six ships of its Joint Task Force Middle East, which had
operated in the Persian Gulf since 1949. In the initial deployment phase the role of the USN was
critical. In a matter of days the USS Independence (CV 62) CVBG sailed from the Indian Ocean
to the Gulf area shortly followed by the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CV 69) CVBG departing
from the Mediterranean and the Saratoga (CV 60) CVBG from CONUS in Florida. The
Independence and Eisenhower were the first U.S. forces in the theater when operation DESERT
SHIELD began. The ships were joined in the Gulf one week later by Marines who had been at a
prepositioning station in the Indian Ocean, ready to support the airlifted elements of Marine
Expeditionary force. According to Baer (1994, 448) this impressive display of readiness was
made possible by the forward deployment of Navy and Marine Corps units. In addition an
Atlantic battle group led by the battleship Wisconsin (BB 64) was ordered to the region. Saudi
Arabian approval to insert U.S. forces was granted in about a week (Gaffney 2002, 5). Siegel
(1995, 17 – 18) hypothesizes that the display of U.S. military power, underlined by the presence
of two aircraft carrier battle groups, might have played a role in King Fahd's acceptance of U.S.
forces into Saudi Arabia. This force signaled U.S. willingness to defend Saudi Arabia even with
forces from CONUS still on their way. Navy forces (both U.S. and allied) also played a crucial
role in interdiction operations, enforcing Iraqi compliance with UN economic sanctions. Naval
vessels were actively patrolling and boarded vessels, suspected of breaking the sanctions. The
naval patrols largely guaranteed the compliance with the sanctions at sea. Dismukes (1994, 40)
points out the advantages of forward presences and notes “in some cases, where geography and
politics combine against the U.S., forces forward are necessary to make the deployment of forces
from CONUS possible. In the Gulf War, if Saddam had seized the ports or had attacked when
U.S. forces were still small, the result would have been difficult and costly for the U.S. As it
happened, the U.S. had forward forces at sea that provided an answer to those threats. The
employability and thus the credibility of CONUS-based forces can depend on forces already
overseas”.
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The first U.S. Air Force and Army units arrived at the crisis location a few days after receiving
the order to move to Saudi Arabia on 8 August. This was the first time since the Vietnam War
that the U.S. had deployed such a high number of troops, with 210’000 military personnel in
theater at the end of October 1990 and more than 400’000 in early January. On 7 August,
President Bush ordered U.S. military aircraft and troops to Saudi Arabia after King Fahd
approved the deployment of a multinational force to defend his country against a possible Iraqi
invasion. On 15 September the USS John F. Kennedy joined the Saratoga. The two carriers
operated together for the next two days before the former assumed the watch in the Red Sea
while the USS Saratoga moved to the Mediterranean. Aircraft took off nearly every day from the
carriers and conducted training sorties over Saudi Arabia. On 27 October, John F. Kennedy held
a turnover with Saratoga and headed back to the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal. In early
November the decision was made to reinforce and double the current number of CVBGs. To
meet the new force level, the USS America (CV 66), Ranger (CV 61), and Roosevelt (CV 71)
were sent to the region to support USS John F. Kennedy, Midway (CV 41) and Saratoga. During
the days before the beginning of the war the USS Forrestal (CV 59) received orders twice to
deploy but both were cancelled. The total strength at the launch of DESERT STRIKE included
six battle groups, two battleships, and a 31-ship amphibious task force totaling in over 100 ships
and submarines, 75’000 Sailors and 85’000 Marines afloat and ashore.
Although the Gulf War is often seen as a victory for the Air Force and Army they needed bases,
while the Navy did not. The Navy, controlling the seas, delivered most of the equipment (Baer
2003, 450). Till remarks that the “widespread notions that large surface ships, especially carriers,
would be too vulnerable in narrow waters when confronted by swarms of missile-armed fast
attack craft were comprehensively disproved in this conflict” (Till 2009, 172).
Additional Sources: Baer 1994; Dismukes 1994; Gaffney 2002; Siegel 1995; Till 2009
Dataset
ICB
CNA I
CNA I
CNA
IIII

Dates
Gulf War
8/2/1990 – 4/12/1991, 254
Iraqi Pressure on 7/24/1990, 9
Kuwait
Operation Desert 8/2/1990, 166
Shield
Desert Shield
8/7/1990 – 1/15/1991, 162
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Iraq MIO

8/7/1990 – 12/31/1999, 3424

Desert Storm

1/17/1991 – 4/5/1991, 79

Iraq, MIO
USN
Iraq, Combat
USN,
USMC,
USAF, USARMY

77. # 403: Yugoslavia II: Bosnia; 3/3/1992 – 11/21/199516
After the passing of a referendum for an autonomous Bosnia the crisis was triggered by the
Bosnian independence declaration on 3 March 1992. First, the Bosnian Serb, Croat and Muslim
leaders agreed to separate Bosnia-Herzegovina into three ethnic regions during talks in Lisbon.
But when they returned the Muslim President of Bosnia spoke out against a division, accusing
Serbia and Croatia of trying to annex Bosnian territory. As of 6 April 1992 Bosnia was
recognized by the European Union. The United States and other states followed soon thereafter.
In a reaction to the EU recognition Bosnian Serbs, supported by Serbia, proclaimed a Serbian
Republic of Bosnia. Intense fighting broke out between the different ethnic groups. The situation
was especially bad in Sarajevo, the capital. The UN sent peacekeeper through the United Nations
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to alleviate the suffering of the civilians and create “safe areas.
The NATO supported UNPROFOR with limited military involvement mainly through symbolic
airstrikes against the Bosnian Serbs. The U.S. intervened as part of the NATO implementation.
The U.S. spoke out for tighter sanctions against Serbia and the adoption of a UN Security
Council resolution to enforce the no-fly zones. The crisis was marked by different policies
towards Bosnia. While the European Union remained hesitant and favored a diplomatic solution
the United States was more outspoken in condemning Serbian aggression. The U.S. did not send
troops to support UNPROFOR but actively participated in the NATO air strikes. The longer the
crisis persisted the more involved the United States became. After the shelling of the Markela
Marketplace on 5 November the NATO finally engaged in offensive air power operations. On 21
November 1995 all parties signed the so called Dayton Accord agreement, ending the Bosnian
crisis. ICB lists the following four decisions the parties agreed on: (1) a division of territory
between the Bosnian-Croat Federation (51 percent) and the autonomous Serb entity, the republic
of Srpska (49 percent); (2) a constitution comprising a central government for Bosnia as a whole
with a three-person group presidency, a two-house legislature, a court, and a central bank; and
16

The crises resulting from the break-up of Yugoslavia are very complex and involve many different actors and
strategies. The following is only a very brief description, mostly focused on the U.S. naval involvement
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separate presidencies, legislatures, and armies for each of the two entities within Bosnia; (3) the
mutual withdrawal of forces by both entities behind agreed cease-fire lines; and (4) the dispatch
of a peacekeeping NATO force of 60,000 under U.S. command to monitor the cease-fire and
control the airspace over Bosnia.
The United States Navy supported operations MARITIME GUARD, SHARP GUARD,
DECISIVE ENHANCEMENT, DENY FLIGHT, DECISIVE EDGE, DECISIVE GUARD and
DELIBERATE FORGE17.
The first three operations were launched to establish a blockade in the Adriatic Sea. NATO
maritime forces began operating in the Adriatic on 22 November 1992 to enforce the UN
embargoes in former Yugoslavia. Together with Western European Union (WEU) forces, NATO
maritime forces patrolled the waters and contacted a total of 12,367 merchant vessels, inspected
1,032 and found 9 in violation of the UN embargoes. The operation ended with the
commencement of operation SHARP EDGE on 15 June 1993. SHARP GUARD was established
to enforce the economic sanctions and the arms embargo against Serbia-Montenegro. U.S. naval
forces including surface combatants, intelligence-gathering attack submarines, and active and
reserve maritime patrol aircraft operated with NATO and WEU forces. The U.S. participation in
SHARP GUARD had to be restricted after U.S. Congress passed a legislation demanding a
limitation in November 1994. The operation lasted more than three years and helped to provide
the necessary conditions for a peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina. During the operation no
ships were reported in violation of the embargoes. In December 1995 SHARP GUARD was
replaced by Operation DECISIVE ENHANCEMENT, lasting until December 1996.
No-fly zones over Bosnia-Herzegovina were established after the adoption of Security Council
Resolution 816. To ensure the enforcement operation DENY FLIGHT began on 12 April 1993.
DENY FLIGHT proposed to neutralize Serbian aircraft that were supporting their ground forces
in Bosnia. It initially involved some 50 fighter and reconnaissance aircraft (later increased to
over 100) from various Alliance nations, flying from airbases in Italy and from aircraft carriers in
the Adriatic. By the end of December 1994, over 47,000 sorties had been flown by fighter and
supporting aircraft. On 28 February 1994, four warplanes violating the no-fly zone over Bosnia17

Provide Promise, joint operation with the U.S. Air Force, involving both naval carrier aircraft and land-based air,
protected humanitarian relief efforts in the besieged cities of the former Yugoslavia, lasted from July 1992 to March
1996. This operation is not include in the summary because it constitutes a humanitarian operation and involved air
transport and air drops of relief supplies to the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
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Herzegovina were shot down by NATO aircraft. This was the first military engagement ever
undertaken by the Alliance.
On 24 November 1994, the North Atlantic Council decided that NATO air power could be used,
under the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 958 and after agreement
with Croatian authorities, against aircraft flying in Croatian air space, which have engaged in
attacks on or which threaten UN safe areas.
NATO's DENY FLIGHT operation, enforcing the no-fly zone over Bosnia, terminated on
December 20, 1995, when the implementation force (IFOR) assumed responsibility for the
airspace over Bosnia. DENY FLIGHT transitioned to DECISIVE EDGE in support of the IFOR
Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. Carrier and shore-based squadrons continued flight operations
in support of joint and combined enforcement of a U.N.-mandated no-fly zone in the airspace
over the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Operation DECISIVE EDGE then transitioned to
DELIBERATE GUARD in support of the stabilization force (SFOR) Operation JOINT GUARD.
Throughout 1997, Italy-based Marine F/A-18D and EA-6B aircraft provided suppression of
enemy air defense and close air support and electronic warfare to Navy maritime patrol aircraft.
Additionally it brought real-time, still and full-motion video imagery to the ground commanders.
DELIBERATE GUARD transited to Operation DELIBERATE FORGE. Forces from the United
States European Command participated in, and directly supported, Operation DELIBERATE
FORGER, the NATO air operation in support of SFOR operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. (20
June 1998 marked the transition from the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) to a slightly
smaller force).
The U.S. CVBG’s played an important role in the overall operations. Their flexibility and
capability to respond rapidly contributed to the success. NATO airpower was strengthen by naval
aircraft and also served as a deterrent force. For example the continuous presence of carrier
based aircraft in the Adriatic and NATO land-based aircraft in Europe permitted attacks far
inland.
Several carrier battle groups supported the operations. Among them were the USS John F.
Kennedy (CV 67), USS America (CV 66), USS Roosevelt (CV 42) and USS Eisenhower (CV 69).
Shortly after Christmas 1992 the USS John F. Kennedy was ordered to the Adriatic Sea to
support a possible U.S. intervention (the carrier remained in Marseille). A year later (25
February 1993) the carrier was called upon to monitor airdrops over Bosnia-Herzegovina in
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conjunction with Operation PROVIDE PROMISE until 25 March when she was relieved by the
USS Roosevelt. Between 15 March 1994 and 31 December 1994 the USS Eisenhower
participated in the different operations DENY FLIGHT, SHARP GUARD and PROVIDE
PROMISE in reaction to the tense situations in former Yugoslavia. During DENY FLIGHT from
12 April 1993 to 20 December 1995, the NATO led Implementation Force (IFOR) assumed
responsibilities for the military aspects of the peace agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina. Despite
enemy resistance including heavy and accurate ground fire, combined with logistics and bad
weather problems during more than 100,000 sorties over DENY FLIGHT’s 983 days, the
campaign prevented Serbia from effectively using its air power. Prior to the ship’s arrival the
Bosnian-Serbs fired anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles against reconnaissance
aircraft, prompting NATO commanders to assign escorts to such flights. The USS America
participated in operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORGE.
Burg (2003, 57) concludes that “the use of coercive diplomacy [as of late 1994] in Bosnia by the
United States, in cooperation with its NATO partners and local actors, succeeded in bringing the
fighting in that country to an end and in persuading all sides to enter into a negotiated settlement
of the war”.
Additional Sources: Burg 2003; Global Security (various); Grimmett 2010
Dataset
ICB
CNA
III
CNA
III

Dates
II: 3/3/1992 – 11/21/1995

Yugoslavia
Bosnia
Maritime A4455 11/1/1992 - 12/18/1996, 1509
Guard/Sharp
Guard/Decisive
Enhancement
Deny
4/12/1993 - 7/18/1998, 1924
Flight/Decisive
Edge/Deliberate
Guard/Deliberate
Forge

U.S. Response
FRY,
Force

Show

Ships involved
of

Yugoslavia

78. # 406: Iraq No-Fly Zone; 8/18/1992 – 9/8/1992, 22
In March 1991 a no-fly zone over northern Iraq was established. On 18 August 1992 France,
U.K. and the U.S. established a southern no-fly zone below the 32nd Parallel to safeguard the
Shia population from Saddam’s forces. The U.K. sent six Tornado jets to support the Southern
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Watch mission. These two activities triggered a crisis for Iraq. Although the no-fly zone went
into effect in late August, attacks against the Shia rebels in the South increased. But Iraq seemed
reluctant to cross the no-fly zone and on 8 September officially declared its non-interference with
the no-fly zone, ending the crisis.
The Southern Watch mission lasted until the end of 1999 and different naval vessels were
deployed in support of the operations. The USS Independence (CV 62) was deployed to the
Arabian Gulf as of mid-1992 and was part of the beginning of the Southern Watch mission.
Dataset
ICB
CNA

Iraq No-Fly Zone
Southern Watch

Dates
8/18/1992 – 9/8/1992, 22
8/19/1992 - 12/31/1999, 2691

U.S. Response
Ships involved
4
Iraq, No Fly Zone
USN,
USMC,
USAF, USARMY

79. # 408: North Korean Nuclear; 3/99/1993 – 10/21/1994, 600
The death of the North Korean president earlier that month and North Korea’s reluctance to
participate in the nuclear inspections had caused a tense situation. Thus USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63),
operating with Japanese and South Korean forces in late July 1994, was in a state of high alert.
The United States negotiated with North Korea over its nuclear program while keeping open the
option of military strikes. Two carriers—Kitty Hawk and a second, the name of which could not
be determined—were positioned off the Korean Peninsula in a demonstration of force. It was
later said that the carriers had contributed to maintaining the stability during the negotiations.
The crisis ended with an agreement in October 1994.
Additional Sources: Gaffney 2002
Dataset
ICB
CNA
IIII

Dates
Korean 3/99/1993 – 10/21/1994, 600

North
Nuclear
Korea tensions

6/1/94 - 7/31/94, 61

U.S. Response
2
North Korea, Show
of Force
USN
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80. # 411: Haiti Military Regime; 7/77/1994 – 10/15/1994, 77
In 1991, the President of Haiti, Father Jean Bertrand Aristide, was overthrown by a military junta
barely one year after being elected. The resulting crisis produced a large flow of refugees fleeing
from the deteriorating situation in Haiti to the United States. The refugees were perceived as a
threat to domestic stability. The U.S. appeared unable to restore democratic order on the
tumultuous island. On 31 July the UN Security council passed a resolution authorizing the
member states to “to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military
leadership”. As a result the Clinton administration intervened on 15 September 1994 despite
public and Congressional reluctance, traceable to the previous Somalia disaster. The U.S.
represented by former President Carter, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General
Powell, and Senator Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee began unofficial
mediation. They persuaded the junta to sign an agreement to resolve the crisis without violence
and to leave Haiti. The former president would then be brought back to head the government.
Successful mediation owned much to the U.S. threat of military force if necessary. As part of the
agreement, the U.S. dispatched 20,000 troops to guarantee a safe transition and Aristide returned
on 15 October 1994.
The U.S. military services followed up with the operations SUPPORT DEMOCRACY and
UPHOLD/RESTORE DEMOCRACY in which the carriers USS Eisenhower (CV 69) and
America (CV 66) and the amphibious ship Wasp (LHD 1) participated in a multinational force
from 14 September 1994 – 24 September 1994. This intervention led to a historic Army-Navy
collaboration in which the two services prepared for Army air assaults launched from USN
aircraft carriers. The force not only included forces from the Army’s airborne corps but also a
Joint Special Operations Task Force (including SEALs, Army Rangers, and the 16th USAF
Special Operations Wing among others). The Marines aboard were prepared for combat search
and rescue missions. Because the U.S. forces were able to land peacefully, combat was
unnecessary. On 31 March 1995 U.S. forces’ peacekeeping operations were taken over by
international forces.
Additional Sources: Girard 2004
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CNA

Support
Democracy

9/1/1993 - 10/18/1994, 413

CNA
III

Uphold/Restore
Democracy

9/8/94 - 4/17/95, 222

Haiti, Show of
Force
USN, USMC
Haiti, Show of
Force
USN,
USMC,
USAF, USARMY

81. # 412: Iraq Troop Deployment Kuwait; 10/7/1994 – 11/10/1994, 35
This crisis had its origin in the Iraqi troop deployment and involved Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and
the United States on 7 October 1994. The U.S. responded within a day and deployed the aircraft
carrier Eisenhower (CV 69), accompanied by an Aegis cruiser carrying Tomahawk missiles to
demonstrate resolve. Air Force and Navy units already in the area as part of the operation
SOUTHERN WATCH, formed forces in operation VIGILANT WARRIOR. The U.S.
commitment to Saudi Arabia was reaffirmed. Although Iraqi troops began to retreat on 11
October, the U.S. increased its military strength in the region so as to respond quickly to future
threats. The crisis ended on 10 November, when Saddam Hussein signed the declaration of
"Iraq's recognition of the sovereignty of the state of Kuwait, its territorial integrity and political
independence".
Additional vessels supporting VIGILANT WARRIOR included the USS George Washington
(CVN 73) battle group, the USS Tripoli (LPH 10), Amphibious Ready Group, 15th Marine
Expeditionary Unit (SOC), and Military Sealift Command ships.
Additional Sources: Gaffney 2002, 5
Dataset
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CNA
III
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77
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82. # 415: Taiwan Strait IV; 5/22/1995 – 3/25/1996, 307
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States were at loggerheads following the
visa approval for President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan for a visit to Cornell University. This
gesture, together with the sales of fighter aircraft to Taiwan, increased the PRC’s fear of growing
American support for Taiwanese independence. In an attempt to coerce the United States to
commit formally to a “one-China policy,” the PRC conducted missile tests and naval exercises in
the Taiwan Strait beginning in July 1995. These tests and exercises elicited no U.S. response
until, according to Robert Ross, 19 December18, when the aircraft carrier Nimitz cruised through
the Taiwan Strait marking the first time U.S. ships had patrolled that area since 1976. When the
Chinese activity continued, the United States decided to deploy two aircraft carriers to the area.
In March 1996 Independence arrived, followed shortly thereafter by Nimitz. With the successful
conclusion of the Taiwanese election, the crisis ended.
It is unclear how much the carriers contributed to the abatement of the crisis. Similarly, the
effectiveness of the deterrence is disputed since it is very difficult to say with certainty which
action was responsible for deterring the adversary. While Gouré (2001) questions the
contribution of the two CVs, Ross (2000; 2002) sees their deployments as successful coercive
diplomacy to guarantee stability during the elections by deterring Chinese involvement and
confirming American commitment.
Additional Sources: Gaffney 2002, 8, Gouré 2001, Ross 2000 and 2002, Scarlett 2009
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Taiwan Strait IV
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Taiwan Flexible 3/1/1996 - 4/17/1996, 48
Deterrence

U.S. Response
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83. # 419: Desert Strike; 8/31/1996 – 9/14/1996, 15
On 31 August 1996 Iraqi forces entered in the Kurdish civil war on behalf of the Kurdish
Democratic Party (KDP). Because the Iraqi troops crossed the 36h Parallel, violating the safe
zone agreement, their mobilization brought them into conflict with the United States. Air sorties
18

Scarlett (2009) only mentions the deployments the following March.
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over Iraq were increased, followed by operation DESERT STRIKE, bombing Iraqi targets on 3
and 4 September. President Clinton announced he would not tolerate any violation of the
agreement and would react with force. Additionally the safe zone in the South was increased
from the 32nd to the 33rd Parallel. The U.S. attempt to convince the UN to adopt a resolution
condemning the Iraqi violation was unsuccessful. Iraq tried to oppose the increase of the
exclusion zones but after U.S. forces destroyed the air defense system, Iraq agreed to the new
zones and declared not to interfere with U.S. patrols anymore. This declaration terminated the
crisis for Iraq and the United States.
The CVBG Carl Vinson (CV 70) was part of DESERT STRIKE, together with the USS Laboon
(DDG 58) and Shiloh (CG 67). USN forces fired 14 of the total of 26 cruise missiles. The
remaining 13 were fired by Air Force B-52s, escorted by F-14s from Carl Vinson. On the second
day, strikes were fired from the destroyers Russell (DDG 59), Hewitt (DD 966), Laboon and the
nuclear-powered attack submarine Jefferson City (SSN 759). The USS Enterprise (CV 65) who
had been operating in the Mediterranean was ordered to the Persian Gulf and arrived in the
theater two days after receiving the order to augment the displayed force.
Additional Sources: Global Security: Desert Strike
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84. # 421: Zaire Civil War; 10/8/1996 – 5/16/1997, 221
In response to the threat by the government of Zaire (on 8 October 1996) to treat the
Banyamulenge as rebels if they did not leave the country within 6 days, they launched attacks
against the Zairian army and refugee camps. Around 1,000,000 Hutu refugees from neighboring
Rwanda and Burundi fled from their camps in Zaire in reaction to the unrest. These
developments triggered a crisis for Zaire and Rwanda. Zaire accused Rwanda and Burundi of
training and arming the rebels. Both rejected the accusations. When Zairian forces shelled a
Rwandan town on 29 October, Rwanda dispatched troops to Eastern Zaire. The Banyamulenge
together with the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Zaire-Congo (ADFL)
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carried out successful attacks in Eastern Zaire, creating a buffer zone between Rwanda and the
rest of Zaire. Because the Zairian president was abroad and the Zairian army was incapable of
halting the adversary, the political stability of the country was endangered through a threatened
army coup. Parliament reacted by demanding the departure of all Tutsis from Zaire on 1
November. The following day the ADFL with the help of the Rwandan army, brought East Zaire
under their control. This resulted in mass demonstrations demanding war against Rwanda and
Burundi and lead to attacks on Tutsi properties. More than 1,000,000 Rwandan and over 100,000
Burundian Hutu had fled from the violence in Eastern Zaire. Alarmed by these high numbers the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) called for immediate international intervention
to prevent a grave humanitarian crisis. The ADFL announced a cease fire during which refugees
might return to Rwanda, and approved the UN request for supplying humanitarian aid. U.S.,
Canada, U.K., South Africa and other African states approved the dispatch of UN-sponsored
forces to eastern Zaire. Additionally the U.S. agreed to send 1,000 American troops. The
multinational military force was ready on 14 November but the return of refugees seemed to
make such intervention unnecessary. After the termination of the cease fire fighting resumed and
on 20 January 1997 and Zaire declared war against the rebels. In February the UN Security
Council adopted a peace plan and in March, following further escalations, a multinational force
was deployed to Congo to stand by for possible evacuations of foreign nationals. When president
Mobutu of Zaire returned on 21 March he urged the parties to agree on a cease fire and to
assume talks. During the peace-talks, led by the President of South Africa, Mobutu agreed to step
down after new elections whereas Kabila, the head of the ADFL demanded an immediate
handover of power to his forces. Mobutu’s resignation on 16 May ended the crisis and Kabila
assumed power as the head of the new Democratic Republic of Congo.
The confused developments in Zaire led the U.S. to prepare19 for the possible evacuation of U.S.
citizens. In November 1996, the USS Nassau (LHA 4) left port with the Mediterranean
Amphibious Ready Group (MARG 97-1) to participate in operation SILVER WAKE off
Albania. During this assignment Nassau was redeployed in support of Operation GUARDIAN
RETRIEVAL in Zaire. Together with elements of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special
Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)) on board, the USN vessel steamed to the coast of Zaire.
President Clinton reported to Congress that, on March 25, 1997, a standby evacuation force of
19

Joint Task Force Headquarters for the US Army Southern European Task Force (SETAF)
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U.S. military personnel had been deployed to Congo and Gabon to provide security for American
private citizens, government employees, and selected third country nationals in Zaire, and to be
available for evacuation if necessary. Nassau’s deployment lasted about one month before the
USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) relieved the vessel20.
Additional Sources: Global Security: Guardian Retrieval, Grimmett 2010
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85. # 422: UNSCOM I; 11/13/1997 – 2/23/1998, 102
UNSCOM was established to oversee the elimination of Iraq’s biological and chemical weapons
programs while the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) focused on the nuclear
program. The Iraqi eviction of all U.S. UNSCOM personnel on 13 November 1997 brought an
immediate U.S. response - the next day U.S. forces in the area were mobilized and (CENTCOM)
responded with a land, sea, and air strike force of more than 35,000 U.S. and coalition forces.
These activities triggered a crisis for Iraq. Tensions reached a high point when Iraq interfered in
the inspection of a UNSCOM team accusing the American leader of espionage and expelling him
from the country. The UN Security Council was deeply divided on an appropriate response.
During the first two months of 1998 the U.S. advocated military strikes against Iraq while other
members (with the exception of the UK) favored a diplomatic solution of the crisis. On 20
February the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan arrived in Baghdad and defused the immediate
crisis. With U.S. approval, an agreement was signed, reaffirming the authorities of UNSCOM.
However President Clinton made it clear that U.S. forces would remain on alert until Iraq
conformed to the new agreement.

20

Globalsecurity points to a difficulty in operations in Africa: “The vast continent of Africa provides some real
challenges to a military planner as well as fuel suppliers. Re-supply for remote facilities can take several days to
transport jet fuel one way, in extremely difficult terrain. Limited bridger support (truck-transport) and small storage
tanks are commonplace. During Operation Guardian Retrieval, the Air Force planned missions through Libreville,
Gabon, expecting a certain amount of fuel based on contractor stated capabilities. Their capability was no where
near this quantity, and the airport even ran out of fuel at one point”.
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As part of the mobilization effort the USS George Washington (CV 73) was sent to the Persian
Gulf to join the Nimitz (CV 68) battle group. To maintain the two carrier battle group presence,
the USS Independence (CV 62) relieved Nimitz on station a few months later. USN vessels and
allied/coalition ships made up a force of 50 ships and submarines and 200 naval aircraft to flex
muscles and support the diplomatic initiatives. The deployment of the USS George Washington
was followed by the dispatch of military aircraft on 20 November. Naval and Air forces were
both prepared to launch airstrikes. Force, however did not become necessary and in early June
the USS Independence returned to Japan. This was the largest multinational mobilization since
the Gulf War and this demonstration of force deterred Iraqi aggression and coerced compliance
with UNSCOM.
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86. # 424: Ethiopia – Eritrea; 5/6/1998 – 12/12/2000, 950
6 May saw violent confrontations between Ethiopian and Eritrean forces. Each government
accused the other with invasion. Mediation attempts by regional and international leaders were
unsuccessful and by late May each had mobilized additional forces leading to a full-scale war
between the two nations. A peace plan, drafted by the U.S. and Rwanda and supported by the
OAU, was conditionally approved by Ethiopia but rejected by Eritrea. Ethiopia demanded
Eritrean withdrawal from Ethiopian territory which Eritrea claimed for itself. Fighting resumed
until both parties reluctantly agreed on an OAU peace plan, which eased tensions for eight
months before fighting broke out again (23 February 2000). Again, each blamed the other for
initiating the violence. The violence ended on 12 December when both countries signed a peace
agreement drafted with the help of the OAU.
The U.S. was engaged unsuccessfully as a mediator, and provided evacuation operations.
Seaborne forces supported Operation SAFE DEPARTURE and evacuated 105 Americans and 67
third country nationals. Elements from the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations
Capable) evacuated the foreign citizens on 6 June 1998 as a precautionary measure. Marine
aircraft transported the evacuees to Amman in Jordan. The 11th MEU(SOC) was on a six-month
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deployment aboard the ships of the USS Tarawa (LHA 1) Amphibious Ready Group, which
includes USS Tarawa, USS Denver (LPD 9), and USS Mount Vernon (LSD 39).
Additional Sources: Global Security: Safe Departure
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87. # 426: DRC Civil War; 7/29/1998 – 7/30/2002
Tensions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) had been growing, and on 29 July
1998 President Laurent-Désiré Kabila announced the expulsion of all foreign troops and of his
chief military adviser, a Rwandan Tutsi, triggering a crisis for Rwanda. Shortly thereafter
fighting erupted, and the DRC accused Rwandan forces of aggression. Angola, Namibia,
Zimbabwe, and Chad backed Kabila, but his former ally Rwanda received support from Uganda.
The violent conflict triggered crises for the DRC, Uganda, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and
Chad. After months of fighting, the governments involved in the war signed a peace agreement,
joined shortly after by the two principal rebel groups. Violence erupted again in February 2000,
and attempts to hold a summit were unsuccessful. When Kabila was assassinated in February
2002, his son Joseph inherited the presidency. In February he met Rwandan president Paul
Kagame in Washington, D.C., marking the first step toward peace talks, while Rwandan and
Ugandan troops retreated, in a gesture of goodwill. On 30 July 2002, after prolonged
negotiations, Rwanda and the DRC signed a final peace agreement in South Africa.
According to the ICB there is evidence for U.S. covert involvement in training troops on both
sides. The USN was also engaged in preparation for a planned noncombatant evacuation
operation. From 10 to 16 August 1998, USS Saipan (LHA 2) and the 22nd MEU(SOC) stood
ready in Operation AUTUMN SHELTER for a possible evacuation of the American embassy
and U.S citizens from Kinshasa, Congo. In the event, the NEO was not required and was
canceled on 16 August.

83

Seaborne Crisis Response

Appendix A. Crises Summaries

Additional Sources: Pritchett (Galrahn) 2009, Global Security: 22nd MEU Assumes Operational
Control Its Major Subordinate Elements
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88. # 427: US Embassy Bombings; 8/7/1998 – 8/20/1998, 13
On 7 August 1998 the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salam, Tanzania were the
targets of terrorist attacks. The almost simultaneous bombings killed 224 people and wounded
more than 5,000 others. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. identified Al Qaeda as the primary suspect.
The U.S. accused the Taliban of allowing Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda to operate freely in
Afghanistan. While the U.S. received international support in condemning the embassy-attacks,
the Taliban refused to comply with the U.S. request to hand over bin Laden. On 20 August the
U.S. forces executed retaliatory air strikes over terrorist training grounds in Afghanistan and a
factory in Sudan. Allegedly a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan’s capital Khartoum, capable of
producing chemical weapons, was collaborating with Al Qaeda. With the launch of the air strikes
the crisis ended for all actors. The U.S. retaliation took place without warning and included
assorted naval vessels in the Red and Arabian Sea21. The surface combatants and SSN that fired
the Tomahawks were already in the Indian Ocean prior to the attacks.
Additionally, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) sent one Marine Corps Fleet AntiTerrorism Security Team (FAST) each to Kenya and to Tanzania. The teams were charged with
augmenting the security personnel. Naval Forces Central Command was asked to set up a Joint
Task Force in Nairobi. Furthermore, the USN dispatched a 30-person SEABEE unit to Kenya
from Guam to assist in Operation RESOLUTE RESPONSE and to locate survivors in the
buildings, treat the injured and organize repatriation of the American who had died. Marines
were responsible for external security at the temporary U.S. Embassy location. A Platoon of
Marines from the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) deployed to
Nairobi, Kenya just weeks before they were scheduled for a routine six month deployment to the
21

According to a Washington Post (Gellman and Priest 1998) article, CVN Abraham Lincoln was involved.
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Western Pacific, Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf Region. The Marines of 3rd Platoon, Golf
Company, Battalion Landing Team 2/1, 13th MEU(SOC) replaced the Fleet Anti-Terrorist
Security Team of Norfolk VA who had been in Kenya since 9 August.
Additional Sources: Gaffney 2002, 5
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89. # 429: UNSCOM II Operation Desert Fox; 10/31/1998 – 12/20/1998, 50
On 31 October 1998 Iraq refused further collaboration with UNSCOM and demanded that the
UN reviewed its sanctions and replace Richard Butler as UNSCOM chair as a condition for
resumed inspections. The UN Security Council adopted a resolution demanding the immediate
return of UNSCOM to Iraq on 5 November but disagreed about the means for resolving the
crisis. Only the U.K. and the U.S. voted for the use of military force versus diplomacy. U.K. and
U.S. forces in the Gulf region were increased unilaterally with the prospect of new military
strikes. On 14 October Saddam Hussein indicated through diplomatic channels Iraqi’s
acceptance of UNSCOM inspectors, even as U.S. aircraft was en route to Iraq, yet no further
steps were taken to cooperate with UNSCOM. U.S. and U.K. forces began operation DESERT
FOX and airstrikes lasted until 20 December. Although unauthorized by the UN, the U.S.
claimed prior UN authority threatening severe consequences in case of Iraqi non-compliance
with UNSCOM. With the termination of DESERT FOX the crisis ended for all actors. No
resolution had been found in regard to a resumption of UNSCOM activities.
The main battlegroup supporting the operation was the USS Enterprise (CV 65) which crossed
the Atlantic in four days and transited the Strait of Gibraltar on 14 November 1998. It entered the
Strait of Hormuz on 23 November after taking over from the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CV
69). During DESERT FOX the USN-USMC team launched more than 70 strike and strike85
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support aircraft and in 70 hours of operations the USS Enterprise launched 297 combat sorties.
The carrier USS Carl Vinson (CV 70) was diverted from her original schedule to Hong Kong and
Singapore but arrived in the theater only during the last night of operation DESERT FOX.
Nevertheless, the arrival of the carrier undermined U.S. resolve and relieved USS Enterprise.
The following USN vessels were involved in operation DESERT FOX: CVBG: USS Enterprise
(CV 65) and USS Carl Vinson (CV 70), USS Philippine Sea (CG 58), USS Gettysburg (CG 64),
USS Stout (DDG 55), USS Nicholson (DD 982), USS Hayler (DD 997), USS Klakring (FFG 42),
USS Miami (SSN 775), USS Hampton (SSN 76), USS Detroit (AOE 4)]; Amphibious Ready
Group: USS Belleau Wood (LHD 2), USS Dubuque (LPD 8), USS Germantown (LSP 42); Mine
Countermeasure Squadron: USS Ardent (MCM 12), USS Dextrous (MCM 13).
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90. # 430: Kosovo; 2/20/1999 – 6/10/1999, 109
Kosovo, with a population compromised of 90% Albanians, became part of Serbia in 1913.
Following the breakup of Yugoslavia, Kosovo sought independence. During the fighting
between Serbian forces and the Kosovar Albanian Liberation Army (KLA or UCK) in early
1998, NATO tried to mediate an agreement. In 23 February 1999, a tentative agreement for
Kosovo’ autonomy was drafted but the FRY was unwilling to endorse a lasting peace agreement.
NATO forces bombarded Serbian military targets in operation ALLIED FORCE in a mission
(March 24, 1999) designed to compel Slobodan Milosevic to cease ethnic cleansing in Kosovo
and to pull Serbian forces out of the disputed province. NATO hoped to coerce Serbia to
negotiate. Although initially expected to last only a few days, the operation continued for 78
days (June 10, 1999) until Milosevic agreed to NATO's terms. Although available, ground troops
were not deployed. One day after Serbia and NATO signed an agreement, the withdrawal of
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FRY forces from Kosovo began. The UN dispatched a peacekeeping force, to observe the
implementation of the agreements.
Operation NOBLE ANVIL was the U.S. component of operation ALLIED FORCE. The USS
Enterprise (CV 65) was deployed to the Adriatic Sea on 19 February and supported the buildup
to the operation during 22 – 26 February 1999. The aircraft carriers Enterprise and Theodore
Roosevelt (CV 71) supported by land-based squadrons and detachments, proved key to the
resolution of the fighting in Kosovo. The Kearsarge (LHD 3) Amphibious Ready Group (ARG)
operated together with the USS Roosevelt.
Murphy (1999) concluded: “The Navy contribution to ... the air campaign in Kosovo, although
low profile, was nonetheless very significant. The Tomahawk shooters, in and of themselves,
destroyed nearly 50 percent [of the] fixed target list in key categories such as the Serb army and
police headquarters. ... We were able to keep nine Tomahawk shooters in-theater. Those nine
sustained the air campaign in the first couple of weeks when the laser-guided bomb droppers
could not find targets because of bad weather. And if it hadn't been for those nine, we would
have stalled."The [carrier] Theodore Roosevelt arrived 14 days after the start [of hostilities].
Nonetheless, with only 8 percent of the total dedicated aircraft [deployed by NATO], [it was]
credited with 30 percent of the validated kills against fielded forces in Kosovo".
Burg (2003, 70) describes Kosovo as a failure of coercive diplomacy.”The singular emphasis on
airpower in Kosovo, and the belief among some senior U.S. policymakers that all it would take
would be a few days of bombing, appears to have been based on a faulty interpretation of the
events surrounding the endgame in Bosnia. This conviction, as well as concerns about the
domestic political costs of committing ground troops, led U.S. policymakers to take even the
possibility of deploying ground forces “off the table” and thus to weaken the coercive threat they
were attempting to construct”.
Additional Sources: Baker and Evans 2001, 18, Burg 2003, 70; Murphy 1999, Rand 2001
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91. # 432: East Timor II; 9/4/1999 – 10/19/1999, 45
On 4 November elections in East Timor resulted in a majority vote for independence from
Indonesia who had controlled East Timor since 1975. This vote resulted in an outbreak of
violence in East Timor where Indonesian army forces supported pro-Indonesian militias. A crisis
was experienced by Australia and Indonesia. Australia, worried by the outbreak of violence and
instability in relative close proximity, was committed to a peaceful settlement in contrast to
Indonesia. The United Nations authorized a peace-keeping force (INTERFET) led by Australia
to restore peace and security, protect refugees and provide humanitarian aid. Indonesia accepted
the UN troops but remained highly critical of the Australian involvement. When on 19 October
Indonesia’s parliament approved East Timor’s vote for independence the crisis ended.
Subsequently UN troops took over the peacekeeping mission.
On 8 October the United States announced the deployment of U.S. forces, including the USS
Belleau Wood (LHA 3) and personnel from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, to support
INTERFET. The U.S. forces provided helicopter airlifts and search and rescue missions until the
peacekeeping operation was transferred from Australia to the UN. After the crisis had ended, the
U.S. announced the deployment of U.S. military personnel to support of the United Nations
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to guarantee law and order and protect
humanitarian assistance activities.
One of the lessons of the East Timor operations was the way in which naval units could conduct
many different activities concurrently and for extended periods. “In a typical day in theatre, a
single frigate might, while acting in the presence and deterrence roles in a high state of combat
readiness and contributing to the development and maintenance of the wide area surveillance
picture, send parties ashore to assist with repair and rehabilitation work, act as a fuelling
platform for maritime and land helicopters, provide onboard rest and relaxations for land
component personnel, provide communication facilities and support logistics over the shore”
(Scott Richard quoted in Ryan 2000b, 80-81). McLaughlin (2002, 112) describes the strike
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capability of naval forces as a “protective umbrella” shielding the ground forces so they could
focus their attention on their peacekeeping mission without hindrance.
Additional Sources: Grimmett 2010; McLaughlin 2002; Ryan 2000b
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92. # 434: Afghanistan – USA; 9/11/2001 – 12/7/2001
The crisis was triggered by the Al Qaida attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on
11 September 2001. The United States accused Afghanistan of hosting the terrorists. Pakistan
was implicated because of its ties to the Taliban and offered help by trying to persuade the
Taliban to hand over Osama Bin Laden. President George W. Bush declared to carry the fight to
the attackers and its network of allies, especially the Taliban. Initially the world community
supported the United States in its acts of self-defense. On 7 October military operations against
Afghanistan began with cruise missile attacks and bombing raids. Both air and ground forces
were involved. By 23 November Kabul, the capital was under U.S. control. After mediation
efforts Hamid Karzai became the head of the interim government and was installed on 5
December. 2 days later Kandahar, the last Taliban stronghold, fell to U.S. forces. Although this
brought an end to the immediate crisis, the conflict is unsettled and after 11 years Afghanistan
remains critically unstable.
Naval forces played a crucial role. Within hours after the attack on the United States, naval
vessels were on their way to the Arabian Gulf. One carrier was already stationed in the Indian
Ocean and was soon joined by another CVBG group. Gaffney (2002, 1 – 2) calculated that it
took about one month “to prepare [the U.S.] retaliatory plans, assemble the forces, and secure
some initial bases as well as using existing bases in the Gulf area and Diego Garcia”. Only 5
days after the attacks the USS Enterprise (CV 65) and the USS Carl Vinson (CV 70) were in the
Southwest and South Asia region. The USS Vinson had already departed towards the Persian
Gulf in July 2001 to participate in operation SOUTHERN WATCH. After the attacks the carrier
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changed route and steamed to the North Arabian Sea. When the call for action was announced on
7 October the USS Vinson launched the first strikes of ENDURING FREEDOM. The carrier
remained in the Arabian Sea for 72 days, conducting more than 4,200 combat sorties, until midDecember. The USS Theodore Roosevelt (CV 42) moved her scheduled deployment date forward
to 19 September. After traversing the Suez Canal on 13 October 2001 the Roosevelt carrier battle
group arrived in the Arabian Sea on 15 October 2001. After a record breaking 159 consecutive
days at sea, the carrier was relieved on 27 March 2002. The USS Kitty Hawk (CV 73) left port at
the Yokosuka naval base for the Arabian Sea on 1 October 2001 until 23 December 2001 and
flew more than 600 missions over Afghanistan, including more than 100 combat sorties. The
USS John Stennis (CV 74) was sent to support ENDURING FREEDOM from 12 November
2001 to 28 May 2002.
An average of 200 sorties was flown per day with the same efficiency compared to 3,000 sorties
a day during DESERT STORM. Whereas 10 aircraft were needed during DESERT STORM for
one target, one aircraft could hit two targets during ENDURING FREEDOM. In the most intense
period from 7 October to 23 December 2001, U.S. strike missions totaled in 6,500. USN carrierbased planes conducted 75% (4,900) of the strike-missions, and the Air Force 25%. Additionally
the USN delivered 12,900 weapons (>70% of the total).
Additional Sources: CNN 2001; Gaffney 2002; Global Security (various); Keesing’s
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93. #440: Iraq Regime; 09/12/2002 – 05/01/2003
After 9/11, the Bush administration identified Iraq as the greatest threat to U.S. security,
accusing Saddam Hussein of controlling weapons of mass destruction. On 12 August 2002
President Bush declared before the UN General Assembly that the United States insisted on the
destruction of Iraq’s weapons and termination of its weapons program. Saddam Hussein agreed
to the unconditional return of the weapons inspectors. Over the next months the United States
tried to gain world support for an invasion of Iraq. Meanwhile weapons inspectors arrived in Iraq
on 18 November. As part of the inspections agreement, Iraq had to provide a complete
90

Seaborne Crisis Response

Appendix A. Crises Summaries

declaration of their weapons capabilities. Iraq delivered the report but it contained, according to
UN chief weapons inspector Hans Blix, very little new information since 1998. On 19 December
the U.S. reacted and announced a breach of UN 1441, claiming that the lack of new information
was a sufficient reason to invade. The United States tried to form a coalition of states supporting
a military intervention. Although peaceful resolutions were still discussed, the United States
viewed the inspections as a failure and strongly endorsed a military resolution. U.S. diplomatic
efforts to garner support for an intervention failed, as too many nations spoke out against military
action. Only the U.K. and Spain strongly supported the U.S. initiative. Yet the UN weapons
inspectors continued their work in Iraq and remarked an improvement of Iraqi collaboration. On
4 March Powell stated U.S. determination to intervene in Iraq unilaterally and in mid March it
had became apparent that a new UN Security Council Resolution would not pass. Following an
emergency summit, the U.S., U.K., and Spain issued an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and his
sons: if they would not leave Iraq within 48 hours U.S military forces would invade. Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM was launched on 20 March with the aim of overrunning Baghdad (“shock
and awe”), removing Saddam Hussein from power, and finding the weapons of mass destruction.
On 9 April the coalition forces seized Baghdad. The campaign took longer and the forces met
more resistance than anticipated but on 1 May President Bush declared victory on board the USS
Abraham Lincoln (CV 72), although Saddam Hussein had not been captured. In the following
months the violence in Iraq escalated leading to an insurgency that persisted for several years.
Only at the end of 2011 did the last U.S. troops leave a still unstable Iraq.
According to Keesing’s and Fox, seven carrier battle groups were deployed in support of the Iraq
invasion, five in the Gulf and two in the Mediterranean. In addition there were 3 amphibious
assault ships, 10 destroyers/frigates, 2 command ships and 1 submarine in the Red Sea/Golf of
Aden region. In Iraq USN personnel are also active on land. The following words by CNO
Admiral Roughead describe USN activity in the Middle East. “But I think many are surprised
that as we deploy our Navy around the world, we have about 24,000 Sailors in the Middle East.
And they are not all on ships. In fact, we have more Sailors on the ground in Iraq and
Afghanistan-13,600 to be exact who are there and I call them sand Sailors because we have been
in that fight with the Army and Marine Corps and the other services for some time. So we have
over 13,000 Sailors on the ground, some are deployed in regular units, but many are there as
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individual augmentees on the ground and they bring some skills, talent and competence that the
other services don’t have or don’t have in the numbers that they need”.
Additional Sources: Global Security (various); Fox 2009, Keesing’s, Roughead 2009b
Dataset
ICB
CNA
III
CNA
III

Iraq
Change
OEF-Iraq
OIF

Dates
Regime 9/4/1999 – 10/19/1999, 45
11/1/2002/3/19/2003
03/20/2003

U.S. Response
3

Ships involved

Show of Force
USN,
USMC,
USAF, USARMY
Combat
Operations
USN,
USMC,
USAF, USARMY

94. #441: North Korean Nuclear III; 10/04/2002 – 01/06/2004
In 2002 the U.S. concluded that North Korea was running a secret enrichment program and was
in possession of the necessary technology to manufacture nuclear weapons. On 4 October a U.S.
delegation, led by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James
Kelly, visited North Korea and confronted them with the U.S. findings. While first denying the
claims, North Korea later explained its action as a necessity because the U.S. branded them as
part of the axis of evil, although the secret program had been discovered before 2001. North
Korea withdrew for the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), after the IAEA did not comply
with the North Korean demands of removing seals and cameras from their nuclear facilities.
Initially the U.S. refused to directly negotiate with North Korea before the nuclear program was
destroyed. It reversed its position when it was clear that this furthered North Korea’s
intransigence. In late August 2003 first talks were held between the U.S., China, Japan, South
Korea, Russia and North Korea. The first round resulted in a vague agreement to find a solution
and to continue the talks. On 6 January 2004 North Korea agreed not to test or produce nuclear
weapons.
In early February 2003 the United States alerted bombers in the Pacific to reinforce U.S.
deterrence against any possible North Korean military action. By the end of May 2003 most of
the B-1Bs and B-52s that had been sent to Andersen Air Force Base in Guam had returned to the
United States.
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Additional Sources: Global Security (various), Wolfowitz 2003
ICB
CNA
III

Dates
North Korean
10/04/2002 – 01/06/2004
Nuclear III;
North
Korean 02/06/2003 – 05/17/2003,
Crisis
102

U.S. Response
2

Ships involved

North Korea, Show
of Force, USN,
USMC,
USAF,
USARMY

95. # 451: Israel – Lebanon War II; 07/12/2006 – 09/08/2006
The crisis was triggered on 12 July 2006 when Hezbollah troops invaded Lebanese territory and
attacked an Israeli army patrol. Three Israeli soldiers were killed and two taken hostage and
rockets were launched on Israel. Israel imposed a naval and air blockade and attacked targets in
Southern Lebanon (Operation JUST REWARD). Hezbollah justified the attack on the soldiers as
means of drawing attention to the Arabs, Palestinians and Lebanese held in Israeli prisons.
Further Israeli attacks in Lebanon, led to a high number of civilian casualties and the evacuation
of thousands of Lebanese citizens. The international community encouraged both parties to reach
a cease-fire. The mediation efforts of Condoleezza Rice, the U.S. Secretary of State, were
unsuccessful. The U.S., UN, EU, and the World Bank met to discuss ways of ending the crisis
and the League of Arab Nations appealed to the UN to protect Lebanon. The fighting however
continued and the violence escalated. Only when the parties agreed to the UN Security Council
Resolution 1701 did a cease fire become possible. On 14 August the hostilities officially
terminated when the cease fire came into effect but de facto some minor clashes continued until
late August. Lebanon did not join the military conflict but focused on mediation and negotiation.
On 8 September the Israeli sea and air blockades were lifted, marking end of the crisis. The U.S.
supplied Israel with precision-guided bombs and evacuated U.S. citizens from Lebanon.
U.S. evacuation operations began on 16 July 2006. Naval and Marine Corps forces evacuated
U.S. citizens to Cyprus. A smaller number of people were evacuated by Marine helicopters. On
17 July the U.S. announced the chartering of the cruise ship Orient Queen to evacuate U.S.
citizens. The ship left Beirut on 19 July with 900 people aboard. The cruise ship, heading to
Cyprus, was being escorted by the USS Gonzalez (DDG 66). Additionally U.S. sailors and
marines from the Iwo Jima (LHD 7) Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) and the 24th Marine
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Expeditionary Unit (MEU) with the ships Iwo Jima, USS Nashville (LPD 13), USS Whidbey
Island (LSD 41), USS Trenton (LPD 14) and High Speed Vessel Swift (HSV 2) supported the
operation. With the deployment of the USS Barry (DDG 52), USS Mount Whitney (LCC 20),
USS Big Horn (T-AO 198), and USS Wasp (LHD 1) more vessels arrived in the theater. On 26
July final NEO operations were carried out by U.S. military forces. A total of almost 14,000 U.S.
citizens had been evacuated by sea. The NOC (2006) comes to the following conclusion after the
Lebanon evacuation operation: “Our command and control capability, both afloat and ashore, as
well as our ability to operate in and from the world’s oceans, will continue to make our forces
well suited for global crisis response in the future”.
Additional Sources: Global Security: Lebanon Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO)
2006; NOC 2006
Dataset
ICB

Dates
Israel – Lebanon 07/12/2006 – 09/08/2006
War II
Lebanon
NEO 07/16/2006 – 07/26/2006, 10
Operation 2006

U.S. Response
3

Ships involved

Lebanon,
NEO, 0 CV & AMP
USN, USMC

96. # 452: Ethiopia Invasion Somalia; 10/09/2006 – 01/02/200722
The crisis broke out when Somali soldiers, supported by Ethiopian forces, temporarily took over
a strategic town in the South of Somalia. The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), in control of
Mogadishu and most of South Somalia issued a fatah declaring war on Ethiopia. Meanwhile
fighting between the UIC and the transitional federal government (TFG) of Somalia continued.
When the UIC announced the capture of an Ethiopian officer, Ethiopia confessed the deployment
of military advisers to Somalia. Despite mediation attempts by Sudan, fighting between Islamic
forces and Ethiopian forces erupted in northern Somalia in early November. On 6 December the
UN Security Council passed a U.S. backed resolution authorizing regional peacekeeping forces.
The arms embargo in effect against Somalia was weakened as a result. The African Union also
sought a resolution to the crisis, but hostilities continued and tensions escalated. In midDecember Yemen tried to mediate between the parties to no avail. Ethiopia refused to withdraw
from Somalia. The United States supported Ethiopia’s right of self defense. On 2 January
22

Because I was not able to determine with sufficient certainty whether USN involvement occurred during the ICB
crisis period this case was excluded from the statistical analyses.
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Ethiopia achieved victory through the defeat of the UIC, and it announced the withdrawal of the
troops. The United States had supported Ethiopia with military aid and equipment. Reuters
reported that according to diplomats United States had provided Ethiopia with surveillance and
intelligence information. According to Axe (2008), “U.S. Army advisers from the Guam
National Guard trained Ethiopian troops. Ethiopian aircraft flew with U.S.-funded parts. And
American warplanes targeted suspected terrorists at the same time that the Ethiopian army and its
allies in the Baidoa-based transitional government forces routed Islamic Courts fighters that
Ethiopian Prime Minster Meles Zenawi said had been on the cusp of "Talibanizing" Somalia”.
The Associate Press (2007) printed the following information: “U.S. Defense Department
officials said last month that a Navy strike group being sent to the Persian Gulf region as a show
of force to Iran, at odds with the United States over its nuclear program and over Iraq, also would
be available to help off Somalia. A U.S. Navy officer in the Gulf said Friday that the only U.S.
aircraft carrier in the region, USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, out of Norfolk, Virginia, was not being
deployed to the Somali coast. The officer said he could not discuss the possibility of other
carriers moving into the zone. However, the officer, noting media reports about another aircraft
carrier, the USS John Stennis, said it as of yesterday had not been ordered to move to the region.
The officer asked not to be named because of the sensitivity of the issue”. In the New York
Times Gettleman (2007) wrote “Islamists were widely believed to have been sheltering several
wanted terrorists, and American officials said they were hoping to use the swift collapse of the
Islamist forces as an opportunity to capture men they have been chasing for years. Ships from the
Fifth Fleet of the United States Navy, based in Bahrain, have increased patrols off Somalia’s
coast to prevent any suspects from escaping. “Yes, we have a presence out there,” said Lt.
Denise Garcia, a spokeswoman for the Fifth Fleet”23.
Additional Sources: Associated Press 2007, Axe 2008, Gettleman 2007, Reuters 2007
Dataset
ICB

Dates
Ethiopia Invasion 10/09/2006 – 01/02/2007
Somalia
?
?

23

U.S. Response
3

Ships involved

?

?

The engagement of the USN in Somalia can also be attributed to the growing piracy concerns. While in late 2007
the number of incidents had not reached their peak yet, pirates were active in the region. However, the counterpiracy Combined Task Force 151 was only established in January 2009 (United States Navy 2009d).
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Appendix B: Data
B.1. Variable Codebook24
B.1.1. Dependent Variables
Y1 – Y3 refers to all the different service type combination variables: servicetype1, servicetype2
and USNUSMCTEAM. All three variations are explained in detail in Chapter 3.
ATTITUDE TO U.S. INVOLVEMENT (y4)
Based on the ICB2 variable usfavr, this variable was transformed into usfavr2.
usfavr

usfavr2 (y4)

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(8)

U.S. activity viewed favorably
U.S. activity viewed neutrally
U.S. activity viewed unfavorably
U.S. inactivity viewed favorable
U.S. inactivity viewed neutrally
U.S. inactivity viewed unfavorably
U.S. crisis actor

(1)
(2)
(3)
(9)
(9)
(9)
(9)

U.S. activity viewed favorably
U.S. activity viewed neutrally
U.S. activity viewed unfavorably
MD
MD
MD
MD

(9)

MD

(9)

MD

EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. ACTIVITY (y5)
This variable was adapted from the ICB1 variable usefct. The value “U.S. not active” was
eliminated by the case selection.
usefct
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

usefct2 (y5)
No U.S. activity
U.S. activity escalated the crisis
U.S. activity did not contribute to
crisis abatement
U.S. activity contributed marginally
to crisis abatement
U.S. activity had an important

(9)
(1)
(2)
(2)
(3)

24

No U.S. activity
U.S. activity escalated the crisis
No contribution /
Marginal contribution
No contribution /
Marginal contribution
Important/Most important impact

For a more detailed description of the categories please refer to the ICB1 and ICB2 codebooks online at
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/data/
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(6)

impact on the crisis abatement
U.S. activity was the single most important (3)
contributor to crisis abatement

Important/Most important impact

(9)

MD

MD

(9)

MOST EFFECTIVE TYPE OF U.S. ACTIVITY (y6)
The most effective type of U.S. activity is adapted from the same ICB1 variable without any
modifications. The value “U.S. not involved” has already been eliminated by the case selection.
usefac

usefac2 (y6)

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

U.S. not involved
U.S. ineffective
Effective low-level U.S. activity
Effective U.S. military activity

(9)
(1)
(2)
(3)

MD
U.S. ineffective
Effective low-level U.S. activity
Effective U.S. military activity

(9)

MD

(9)

MD

U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO PACE OF ABATEMENT (y7)
This variable was modified from the ICB1 uspace variable. The values “U.S. not active” and
“U.S. activity delayed termination” were excluded. The former has already been eliminated by
the case selection and the latter did not show enough frequencies.
uspace
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(9)

uspace2 (y7)
No U.S. activity
U.S. activity delayed termination
U.S. activity had no effect on the timing
of termination
U.S. activity contributed to more rapid
termination

(9)
(9)
(1)

MD

(9)

(2)

MD
MD
U.S. activity had no effect on the
timing of termination
U.S. activity contributed to more
rapid termination
MD

DEFINITE OUTCOME (y8)
The outcome variable was adapted from the ICB2 variable content of outcome.
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outcome

outcome2 (y8)

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Victory
Compromise
Stalemate
Defeat
Other

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(9)

Victory
Compromise
Stalemate
Defeat
MD

(9)

MD

(9)

MD

AGREEMENT (y9)
This variable is adapted from the ICB2 variable form of outcome.
outfor

outfor2 (y9)

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)

Formal agreement
Semi-formal agreement
Tacit understanding
Unilateral – self
Unilateral – ally
Unilateral – adversary
Compliance
Imposed – imposer
Imposed – impose
Spillover
Other – glob. org. intervention
Other – ally
Other – internal or non-state actor
Other – misc.
Faded

(1)
(2)
(2)
(3)
(3)
(3)
(2)
(4)
(4)
(9)
(9)
(9)
(9)
(9)
(9)

Formal agreement
Understanding
Understanding
Unilateral
Unilateral
Unilateral
Understanding
Imposed
Imposed
MD
MD
MD
MD
MD
MD

(99)

MD

(9)

MD

TENSION (y10)
This variable was transformed from the ICB2 level into a binary scale.
outesr
(1)

outesr2 (y10)
Tension escalation

(1)
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(2)
(3)

Tension reduction
Recent case

(2)
(3)

Tension reduction
MD

(9)

MD

(9)

MD

SATISFACTION (y11)
This variable was transformed from the ICB2 level into a binary scaled variable.
outevl
(1)

outevl2 (y11)

(4)

All parties satisfied with content
of outcome
Crisis actor satisfied, adversaries
dissatisfied
Adversaries satisfied, crisis actor
dissatisfied
All parties dissatisfied

(9)

MD

(2)
(3)

(1)

All parties satisfied

(2)

At least one party not satisfied

(2)

At least one party not satisfied

(2)

At least one party not satisfied

(9)

MD

SATISFACTION-ATTITUDE MIX (y12)
In a next step the variable actor satisfaction (y11) was combined with attitude towards U.S.
activity (y4)
Satisfaction-attitude mix (y12)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Not favorable and not all satisfied
Not favorable and all satisfied
Favorable/neutral and not all satisfied
Favorable/neutral and all satisfied

(9)

MD
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B.1.2. Independent Variables
GRAVITY OF VALUE THREAT (x1)
The variable gravity of threat was adapted from the ICB1 dataset and transformed into gravcr2
and gravcr3 by collapsing categories.
gravcr
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Economic threat
Limited military damage
Territorial threat
Threat to influence
Threat of grave damage
Threat to existence

(9) MD

gravcr2 (x1a)

gravcr3(x1b)

(1) Low level threat
(1) Low level threat
(2) Territory or influence
(2) Territory or influence
(3) Grave threat
(3) Grave threat

(1) Low level threat
(1) Low level threat
(2) Territory
(3) Influence
(4) Grave threat
(4) Grave threat

(9) MD

(9) MD

ISSUES (x2)
Possible issues for the crisis actors are in the area of military-security, political-diplomatic,
economic-developmental or cultural-status (ICB2). The variable issue2 was adapted from the
ICB1 variable issues, collapsing several categories.
issue
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

issue2 (x2)
One issues other than military-security
Two issues other than military-security
Military-security issue alone
Two issues, including military-security
Three or more issues

(9) MD

(1)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(3)

1 -2 issues non military-security
1 –2 issues non military security
Military-security issue alone
2 -4 issues
2 -4 issues

(9)

MD

VIOLENCE (x3)
The variable violence was adapted from the ICB1 dataset without any modifications.
violence (x3)
(1)

No violence
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Minor clashes
Serious clashes
Full scale war

(9)

MD
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GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION (x4)
The variable geographic location was adapted from the ICB1 dataset and transformed into a
binary variable geogloc2 employing the categorization for strategic locations by Blechman and
Kaplan 1978.
geogloc

geogloc2 (x4)

(9)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(15)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(30)
(31)
(32)
(33)
(34)
(35)
(41)
(42)
(43)
(51)

Central Asia
East Asia
South-east Asia
South Asia
Middle East
West Africa
North Africa
East Africa
Southern Africa
Central Africa
Euro-Asia
East Europe
Central Europe
West Europe
North Europe
Southern Europe
North America
Central America
South America
Australasia

(0)
(1)
(1)
(0)
(1)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(9)
(1)
(0)
(0)

Not strategic location
Strategic location
Strategic location
Not strategic location
Strategic location
Not strategic location
Not strategic location
Not strategic location
Not strategic location
Not strategic location
Not strategic location
Strategic location
Strategic location
Strategic location
Strategic location
Strategic location
Missing data
Strategic location
Not strategic location
Not strategic location

(99)

MD

(9)

MD

GEOSTRATEGIC SALIENCE (x5)
The variable geostrategic salience was adapted from the ICB1 dataset and transformed into a
binary variable geostr2.
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geostr2 (x5)

geostr
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

One subsystem
More than one subsystem
Dominant system and one subsystem
Dominant system and more than one subsystem
Global system

(1)
(1)
(2)
(2)
(2)

Subsystem
Subsystem
Dominant/Global system
Dominant/Global system
Dominant/Global system

(9)

MD

(9)

MD

NUMBER OF ACTORS (x6)
The variables crisis actors was adapted from the ICB1 dataset without any changes.
cractr (x6)
Metric: Total number of crisis actors.

UN INVOLVEMENT (x7)
This variable was transformed from the ICB1 variable global organization organ most active in
crisis (globorg).
globorg

globorg2 (x7)

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

GO not in existence (1918 – 10 Jan. 1920)
No global organization activity
General/other global organization activity
(General) Assembly
(Security) Council

(9)
(1)
(2)
(2)
(3)

MD
No UN activity
Low level UN activity
Low level UN activity
Security Council

(9)

MD

(9)

MD

STABILITY (x8)
This variable was generated by combining the ICB2 variables government stability (gvinst) and
societal unrest (socunr).
Gvinst
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(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Significant increase during relevant period preceding the crisis
Normal level during relevant period preceding the crisis
Significant decrease during relevant period preceding the crisis
Newly independent state, government in exile

(9)

MD

socunr
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Significant increase during relevant period preceding the crisis
Normal level during relevant period preceding the crisis
Significant decrease during relevant period preceding the crisis
Newly independent state, government in exile

(9)

MD

For each variable values 3 and 4 were recoded into missing data. The new binary variables were
combined as follows:
stability (x8)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Significant increase in governmental instability but normal level of societal unrest
Significant increase in both governmental instability and societal unrest
Normal level of government stability but significant increase in societal unrest
Both normal level

(9)

MD

CONTENT OF U.S. ACTIVITY (x9)
The variable content of U.S. activity was adapted from the ICB1 dataset. Except for the value
U.S. not active all other categories were maintained. The category U.S. not active has already
been eliminated by the case selection.
usinv2 (x9)

usinv
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

U.S. not active
Low-level U.S. activity
U.S. covert or semi-military activity
U.S. direct military activity

(9)
(2)
(3)
(4)

MD
Low-level U.S. activity
U.S. covert or semi-military activity
U.S. direct military activity

(9)

MD

(9)

MD
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U.S. ACTOR IN CRISIS (x10)
The variable U.S. actor in crisis was adapted from the ICB1 dataset without any changes.
usactor (x10)
(1)
(2)

U.S. not an actor in crisis
U.S. actor in crisis

(9)

MD

NAVAL REACTION TIME (x11)
elaps (x11)
Metric: Elapsed time between crisis trigger date and naval response start measured in numbers.

USN FORCES ABROAD (x12)
USNabroad (x12)
Metric: Number of USN personnel abroad per year. Data retrieved from Department of Defense,
Deployment of Military Personnel by Country. Data is available as of 1950, for the years prior
the variable was coded as missing data.
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